This literature review traces paradigms within three different fields of study, each of which informs the theoretical foundations of the contentious politics of educational strategy selection: (a) education as a terrain of conflict; (b) movement theories and contentious politics; and (c) international relations theories of internationalization and transnationalization. This literature review is not a comprehensive overview of all three different fields of study. However, it does aim to capture those contributions that relate to the problem addressed in this dissertation. To this end, I critique some literature more than others, and emphasize concepts that inform my own theoretical framework.
Conflict Theories of Education These prominent strands of conflict theory—reproduction and resistance sub-theories—are useful on multiple levels for contextualizing a discussion on the contentious politics of education. At the foundational level, conflict theories provide us with insights about the site of contention (i.e., schools) and the actors involved (i.e., individuals, groups, and both state and nonstate institutions that desire access to schools and the rights associated with education). At a more intermediate level, conflict theories give us an idea of what is at stake in terms of the claims in contention, such as the risks associated with gains and losses in needs, development, solidarity, and agenda fulfillment. Finally, at a more advanced level, conflict theories illuminate domestic, international, and supranational relationships that have an impact on the foundational and intermediate level issues addressed above.
Reproduction Theories Classic conflict theory explains power relations exclusively in terms of the relation of people to the mode of production. Subsequently, two predominant “classes” emerge in capitalist societies: those who own the means of production, and those who produce goods and services but do not have ownership of the means (i.e., the “haves” and the “have-nots”; Kolakowski & Falla, 2005). Those controlling the means of production set out to subordinate workers through both coercive and noncoercive means. Thus, classical reproduction theorists contend that within any given society, an elite few control all aspects of the superstructure, insofar as it serves their own interests and maintains the status quo of existing economic relationships (Kolakowski & Falla, 2005). This includes educational institutions. However, by the 1930s, many Marxists saw problems with the classical model and could not explain why working class people in industrialized countries did not rise in revolt (Gramsci, 1971). These scholars began to develop more sophisticated theories of reproduction to reconcile failures in the classical model of Marxism. Two different categories capture the various developments made in reproduction theory in this era: (a) hegemonic-state reproduction and (b) cultural reproduction—both of which have elements of economic reproduction.
Hegemony and ideological state apparatus. Antonio Gramsci argued that in addition to using coercive means of repression, the state controls the ideological milieu of a society by maintaining cultural or ideological hegemony over the population (Gramsci, 1971). About Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Burke (2005) writes:
By hegemony, Gramsci meant the permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations. Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an “organising principle” that is diffused by the process of socialisation into every area of daily life. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalised by the population it becomes part of what is generally called “common sense” so that the philosophy, culture and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things. (para. 9)
According to Gramsci (1971), the state uses various strategies and institutions to maintain control, and the education system is one key example. In schools, the teaching of values, ideas, and identities, Gramsci argues, were used to serve the interests of those in power to the detriment of the lower classes. Moreover, from his perspective schooling was both a coercive and noncoercive arm of the state in maintaining ideological hegemony, since the treatment of children in schools could include violent or threatening measures of control as well as the more subtle variety.
Gramsci (1971) also asserts that breaking away from state hegemonic control is a challenge because the socialized masses are not aware of the need to change the status quo. Based on the premise that states control educational institutions, Gramsci asserts that if schools are left unchecked, they will continue to reproduce the ideology that serves to legitimate the dominant class and ensure the ideological hegemony of the elite.
On an international scale, theories of dependency maintain that core states hold developing states in a perpetual condition of underdevelopment, while serving the economic interests of the developed countries (Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 1974). Educational theorists have drawn on dependency theories and Gramsci’s (1971) ideas about hegemony to analyze power in institutions of higher education, referring to the intellectual and academic dependency of the nations of the developing world on core countries of the West (Alatas, 2003; Altbach, 1977).
Drawing from Gramsci’s early work, Althusser (1971) argues that powerful regimes adopt noncoercive means of repression to maintain control over their populations in addition to the more costly coercive means, because it is impractical to constantly maintain a state of open repression. To this end, the state employs formal and informal institutions that range from religious organizations to the media to, most importantly, educational systems (Althusser, 1971). These ideological state apparatuses, as Althusser calls them, indoctrinate the masses into accepting circumstances that they might otherwise have been inclined to resist (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004). Through this process, the ruling-elite maintains control over the working-class, ultimately reproducing the unequal relationships of power with the tacit acceptance of the majority of the population.
Cultural reproduction: Symbolic violence, cultural capital, and social capital. By the 1980s, many conflict theories were expanding theories of reproduction to include the struggle for power equity of noneconomic groups such as ethnic minorities and women (Peet, 1999; Pincus, 2002). These later cultural reproduction theorists do not undervalue the importance of class but contend that all struggles are multifaceted. Cultural reproduction theorists argue that schools favor the dominant culture, leaving minority cultures at a disadvantage (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004).
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), pioneers of cultural reproduction theory, have argued that certain elements are always at play, which sustain the dominant culture through institutions such as communications, the media, and schools. They call this symbolic violence because it does not manifest itself in physical form, but nonetheless has a detrimental impact on the subordinate class. This process can be extremely alienating to society’s subordinate groups. For example, school exams that are ostensibly unbiased inherently favor the culture and ideology of the dominant group, marginalizing others because of the linguistic, cultural, and social privileges that draw on the dominant cultural standard (Dika & Singh, 2002; Sissoko & Shiau, 2005).
Similarly, some scholars discuss how schools, and the curriculum in particular, legitimize the history, culture, and identity of the dominant group, leaving little room for any alternative stories (Apple, 1993). When minority groups do not see themselves represented in this tapestry of culture, they are disinclined to engage with the material, while the privileged students excel and thereby reproduce unequal relations of power and domination (Li, Savage, & Pickles, 2003). According to cultural reproduction theorists, the place of contestation, or the field of competition, always favors the dominant class, while the subordinate group has no choice but to adopt and acquire the know-how of the dominant culture in order to engage in the struggle for power (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Lareau & Weininger, 2003).
Resistance Theories Building upon reproduction theories, the resistance theories that have been emerging since the 1980s place a new emphasis on the role of human agency in struggles of inequality and repression. Resistance theorists of the conflict paradigm reject the idea of the inability of students to fend off the hegemonic messages of the school (Peet, 1999). While these theorists do not deny that educational institutions favor the dominant culture, they insist that students have the ability to recognize falsehood or discrimination. Some scholars argue that students who feel alienated by the culture of the classroom will choose to tune out (Shor, 1992), while others point to the way students will reject textbook content that does not resonate with their own lived experiences (Apple, 1993).
Freire (1970) and other critical pedagogy scholars suggest that by empowering students to frame problems with their own understanding of the world, they will learn using their own ideas rather than those of the elite. In other words, agency is in the hands of the individual and not the dominant power. While there is no naïve dismissal of the role of the dominant group in maintaining power and hegemonic control over schools, resistance theorists simply contend that every educational institution is a contested arena.
Summary The strength of conflict theories rests in their critical perspective on schooling. Particularly important to this area of inquiry is the issue of why and how the state uses the educational system to repress certain groups while privileging others. In this dissertation, I implicitly draw on components of both reproduction and resistance theory as the backdrop for the educational landscape in Iran. The Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes used schools to serve national interests both economically and ideologically. Resistance theories lend insight into why individuals and groups perceive access to educational opportunities to be beneficial and continue to seek schooling despite repressive conditions. As Carnoy and Levin (1985) suggest, “education is an arena of conflict over the production of knowledge, ideology and employment, a place where social movements try to meet their needs and business attempts to reproduce its hegemony” (p. 50).
Social Movement and Contentious Politics Literature The study of social movements is a precarious endeavor for many reasons. There are salient issues that arise when explaining how individuals make claims, mobilize, and take collective action toward a perceived transgression or unmet need. Some factors bearing on the formation and maintenance of social movements include agreement on common grievances, available resources to respondents, opportunities and structures affecting mobilization efforts, how actors frame challenges and solutions when mobilizing and taking action, and what mechanisms and processes set the latter factors into motion (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007).
Resource Mobilization Theory and Political Process Theories A group of scholars in the 1970s, drawing on rational choice theories with elements of neo-Marxism, began to question why some individuals experiencing grievance mobilize and participate in social movements, while others facing similar levels of grievances do not. For many discontented scholars in the 1970s, interests and grievances[1] were insufficient to explain why and how people mobilized (Jenkins, 1983; McAdam, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly 1971). Instead, some scholars began to explain mobilization and social movements in terms of the resources and pre-existing structures available to individuals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). These perspectives came to be known as the theory of resource mobilization and political processes or opportunity structures. Some early developers of this approach to social movements include, among others, Oberschall (1973), McCarthy & Zald (1977), Gameson (1975), Tilly (1973, 1978), Tarrow (1983), McAdam (1982) and Jenkins (1981, 1983; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977). Thus two sub-theories paralleled one another, drawing from the Millian and neo-Marxist perspectives, respectively: (a) the economic or organizational perspective; and (b) the political processes perspective (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996).
Resource mobilization theory. In 1977, McCarthy and Zald formulated a resource mobilization theory to explain the emergence of social movements. They identify three key concepts: (a) the social movement organization; (b) the social movement industry; and (c) the social movement sector. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), social movements are “preference structures directed toward social change” (p. 1218). Furthermore, they suggest that pre-existing preference structures are more likely to organize and collectively act. In this study, I treat religious groups as pre-existing preference structures. They define a social movement organization (SMO) as a formal organization that identifies and seeks to achieve its objectives through a social movement. McCarthy and Zald suggest that more than one social movement organization can participate in a particular social movement. Social movement organizations working in a common social movement, addressing similar issues, constitute what McCarthy and Zald call a social movement industry (SMI). Finally, a social movement sector (SMS), as defined by McCarthy and Zald, includes all social movement industries in society. This larger, more liberal categorization accounts for social movement organizations which function in more than one social movement industry.
McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasize that resource mobilization is determined by “the interaction between resource availability, the pre-existing organization of preference structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demands” (p. 1236). In other words, social movements arise when there are resources available to actors and organizations, or more broadly in the SMS—so long as the imposition of repression by authority regimes does not impede mobilization.
Much of the criticism against organizational RM is based on McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) reduction of collective action to economic terms and rational choice. Their assessment leaves little room for values, ideology, and commitment (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996). By focusing on economic changes, McCarthy and Zald overlooked the importance of cultural and value shifts within society (Jenkins, 1983).
In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, in reaction to the criticisms leveled against resource mobilization, both McCarthy and Zald began to shift focus to the political process approach that had been developing throughout the 1970s, and which will be the subject of the next section (Tilly, 1973, 1978). In 2004, Edwards and McCarthy expanded resource mobilization to include five types of resources:
1. Material--money and physical capital—part of McCarthy and Zald’s original thesis
2. Moral--solidarity and support for the movement’s goals
3. Social-organizational--organizational strategies, social networks, and bloc recruitment
4. Human--volunteers, staff, and leaders
5. Cultural--prior activist experience, understanding of the issues, and collective action know-how
This enhanced version of resource mobilization still maintains the importance of material resources in mobilization and collective action, but draws significantly on political opportunity structures and includes ideological factors, such as constructivist use of frames as modes of altering perceived resources and opportunities (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).
Political processes and opportunity approach. Charles Tilly’s (1978) work on opportunity models addresses the preconditions for mobilization and collective action. Others have also significantly shared in the theory’s formulation over the years, such as Tarrow (1994), McAdam, (1982; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996), Jenkins and Perrow (1977), and Morris (2000). Most political process theorists emphasize the significance of opportunity structures that facilitate or impede the feasibility of social movements (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984; Tilly, 1978). Classic political process theorists argue that political opportunities must be available to people before they can mobilize.[2] Therefore, it is argued that the step from mobilization to collective action does not result solely from deprivation or resource availability (Tilly, 1978).
Tilly’s (1978) work deals with the foundation of the political process approach.[3] He identifies five components of collective action: (a) interest; (b) organization; (c) mobilization; (d) opportunity; and (e) collective action. However, he focuses mainly on organization, mobilization, and opportunity in understanding collective action. Tilly defines organization as the capacity of a group to act on its interests. Mobilization is defined as the process of securing necessary resources for a group to take action. Finally, opportunity has to do with the relationship between a group and the world in which it exists (i.e., limits to opportunity are directly related to the repression, facilitation and power of various groups). For Tilly, the intersection of at least two of the following three areas results in a movement: beliefs, populations, and/or actions.
Tilly (1978) contends that collective action can be understood in terms of the interaction between shared interests—“advantages and disadvantages likely to result from interaction with other groups” (p. 84)—organization, and mobilization, in the context of the repression, power, and opportunity/threat of a group’s collective action. He also asserts that the ability to use opportunities to increase power or avoid repression has a significant bearing on the actuation of social movements, to the extent that the adherents are willing to expend effort and spend resources. This premise favors pre-existing groups and networks. He delineates four group strategies of collective action that are applicable to Iranian Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. First are the zealots, who place high value on a collective good; willing to incur net loss to gain it. Second are the misers, who value resources highly, and are unlikely to use them for the purposes of collective action. Third are the run-of-the-mill contenders, who seek limited selected goods, but have modest resources to acquire them, and who are not likely to take action if there is a perceived risk of net loss. Finally there are the opportunists, who seek to maximize net return without regard for the collective good acquired.
Three opportunity variables are considered in Tilly’s (1978) mobilization model: (a) repression/facilitation, (b) power, and (c) opportunity/threat. Authorities, that is, those who wield social control, have the capability to either repress (raise the cost) or facilitate (lower the cost) of collective action by a group. According to Tilly, an authority wishing to repress or facilitate another group’s action will either focus on the group’s mobilization, or focus directly on its collective action. Tilly posits that the “repressiveness of a government is never a simple matter of more or less. It is always selective, and always consists of some combination of repression, toleration, and facilitation” (Tilly, 1978, p. 106). This point is important in understanding how groups respond with particular kinds of social movements in various milieus and under different types of regimes (repressive, tolerant, or facilitative). According to Tilly, while repression impedes and facilitation enables collective action, governments sometimes do not react, leading to toleration. Tilly (1978) goes on to explain, “Governments respond selectively to different sorts of groups, and different sorts of actions” (p. 106). Likewise he differentiates between the types of governments that respond to various levels of action and different types of groups as shown in Figure 2. The first two apply to Iranian regimes in modern Iran.
TOLERANT
WEAK
TOLTALITARIAN
REPRESSIVE
Acceptability of Group
Low
HHigh
F
R
R
T
T
(F) FACILITATION
(T) TOLERATION
(R) Repression
T
R
R
R
HHigh
T
T
T
F
F
F
Figure 2. Repressive patterns in different types of regimes (Tilly, 1978, p. 111).
Although the political process approach has developed since Tilly’s (1973, 1978) early work, to include elements of the culturalist perspective (i.e., the framing process that is discussed below), it has received criticism.[4] By the mid- to late 1990s, many political process theorists (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996) were including the centrality of cultural dynamics in the emergence and development of social movements (Morris, 2000).
Framing Process Framing accounts for the internal and qualitative underpinnings of mobilization and collective action. Prominent framing scholars (Benford & Snow 2000; Gameson, 1975; Morris, 2000) focus on ideology and cultural significance in the making of social movements. Framing is another tool for understanding different types of social movements and processes, how they are constructed, and how the infusion of meaning into action, symbols, and issues influence mobilization and collective action. Those using the framing concept take into consideration factors, such as political and cultural opportunities and audience effects (Benford & Snow, 2000).
In essence, framing adds the dimensions of culture, meaning, belief, and values to the analytical understanding of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). The term framing, as Benford and Snow explain, explicitly represented an active and process-oriented exercise with human agency at its core. It is an interpretive tool that places actions and events in the context of constructed meaning. In other words, as they explain, framing may be used to simplify or recast the happenings of the world with the intention of mobilizing potential supporters for a social movement. Thus, “collective action frames” are constructed interpretations of problems, solutions, and the motivations of people who mobilize and take action.
Benford and Snow (2000) outline three main tasks associated with collective action framing: (a) diagnostic framing; (b) prognostic framing; and (c) motivational framing. They describe diagnostic framing as defining problems facing a group, such as injustice and its source. Benford and Snow define prognostic framing as the proposed solution to a problem (often limited to how framing is constructed). Finally, they explain motivational framing as a “call-to-arms” or launch of mobility to action.
Of particular importance to framers, Benford and Snow (2000) assert, is how the frame resonates with its target audience; thus, credibility is at the heart of the resonant factor, where higher resonance with the frame will lead to a more effective mobilizing potential. They acknowledge the impact of context on the framing process, as well as the influence of framing on creating context. They point out how the framing of political opportunities is a central component of collective action. They assert that SMOs or leaders frame political space in terms of opportunity versus constraints, sometimes creating a virtual space for collective action. Similarly, framing embellishes identities and ideology, positioning them in the midst of a range of collaborative and conflictive groups or contexts. Framing is a vital ingredient in the educational strategy selection of Iranian religious minority groups.
Contentious Politics Several case studies illustrate the failure of employing only one model to adequately explain social movements.[5] A number of social movement scholars have shifted focus from one theoretical perspective to a more holistic explanatory model (Cohen, 1985; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996; Tilly, 2004). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) develop an integrative model by focusing on the causal mechanisms and processes of various types of contention, such as social movements, ethnic movements, and revolutions. They call this the contentious politics approach (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001).
Drawing on the tools developed by different approaches over the years (resource mobilization, political processes and structures, framing, and repertoires of contention), McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) move past the older social movement agenda characterized by general approaches discussed above, asserting that these analyses were static. Instead, they look to similar causal mechanisms that span various forms of contention and result in different consequences in diverse historical settings, emerging from dynamic processes of interaction. By looking at the causal mechanisms and processes, the authors contend that observers can learn more from considering all forms of connection by comparing their dynamic, rather than looking at specialized forms in isolation. While contentious politics may be interpreted in a variety of ways, the authors narrow their focus, stating: “The contentious politics that concerns us is episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of claims and others, is recognized by those others as bearing on their interests, and brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 5).
McAdam et al. (2001) criticize the narrow focus and increasing divisions that have come out of the general study of social movements because these scholars fail to look at related topics despite striking similarities in dynamics. For this reason, the authors’ main objective is to look for similar causal mechanisms and processes that occur in a broad spectrum of struggles. To this end, the authors develop analytical lenses and tools to examine a series of cases.
The first set of lenses identified by McAdam et al. (2001) is the distinction between “contained” and “transgressive” contention. Contained contention involves pre-established actors and institutions practicing claim-making through established means. Those involved are considered constituted political actors using conventional means of claim-making. According to McAdam et al. (2001), transgressive contention involves claim-making by a newly self-identified political actor or when one party employs innovative collective action that may be unprecedented or forbidden within the regime. McAdam et al. (2001) proceed to describe three key features of the study of contentious politics: (a) mechanisms, (b) processes, and (c) episodes. By looking at parallels in various forms of contentious politics, the authors assert, they search for explanatory mechanisms that drive contention in different directions. They define the terms as follows (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 24):
1. Mechanisms--a delimited class of events which alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations
2. Processes--regular sequences of such mechanisms that process similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements
3. Episodes--segments of continuous streams of contention including collective claim-making that bears on other parties’ interests
According to the authors, mechanisms are noticeable when their elements interact, connecting them with one another.[6] Because mechanisms seldom occur in a vacuum, but are rather linked with other mechanisms, the authors point to processes, which are “recurring causal chains, sequences, and combinations of mechanisms” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 27). The authors summarize: “we employ mechanisms and processes as our workhorses of explanation, and episodes as our workhorses of description” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 30). I have adopted this as the analytical framework and discuss its application to this study in the methods section (Chapter 3) and more specifically to educational strategy selection (Chapter 6).
McAdam et al. (2001) suggest focusing on social interaction and therefore look for two features in all contention: (a) recurring mechanisms and processes and (b) principles of variation. They propose a dynamic model that looks at mobilization structures, political processes, frames, and different forms of transgressive action as relational to one another with interactive actors. In this dissertation, the proposed features of group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations emerge from social interactions and illustrate principles of variation.
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) explain that contention involves the actuation of a claim bearing on someone else’s interests. Thus, three components arise in any contentious exchange: subjects, objects, and claims. Collective action plays out as the coordinated efforts of some on behalf of “shared interests or programs” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 5). The importance of politics in contention, as briefly dealt with earlier by McAdam et al. (2001), is supported by three overarching issues: (a) people in control of government have advantages over people who are not in control of government; (b) governments always set the rules of contention (i.e., what is allowed, tolerated, or forbidden); and (c) governments control coercive apparatuses and institutions (e.g., armies, police, prisons). These three issues come together to form the basis for contentious politics.
Claim-making and collective action around claims takes on different forms and manifests itself through what the authors call different “contentious performances.” Contentious performances are “relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actors” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 11). Contentious performances aggregate into contentious repertoires, representing an array of performances used by political actors in making claims and taking collective action.
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) offer three general reasons why the mechanism-process approach helps us understand mobilization. First, reducing the process of mobilization to its mechanisms and analyzing what particular mechanisms contribute toward the success or failure of mobilization gives us a more precise picture of specific mobilization efforts. Second, by comparing similar mechanisms across different types of contention (e.g., social movement versus civil war), the identification of key mechanisms in the transition from one type of contention to another is more evident. Finally, by examining the coexistence of two or more mechanisms, the environmental factors can be studied in order to determine what circumstances contribute to larger and less noticeable processes.
Building on Tilly’s earlier works, Durable Inequality (1998a), and Regimes and Repertoires (2006b), Tilly and Tarrow (2007) continue to argue that regimes matter in determining types of contention, and subsequently types of performances that political actors will choose in making claims. The authors employ two categories to label different regimes across the world: democracy and capacity, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4.
According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), political opportunity structures are affected by regimes based on the fragmentation or concentration of its power, the extent of a regime’s openness to new actors, availability of allies and supporters for challengers, as well as the extent to which the regime represses, tolerates, or facilitates collective claim-making. The primary vehicle by which a regime controls the political opportunity structure is through institutions. They describe how states control institutional operations by prescribing some institutions (e.g., requiring membership in a political party), tolerating others (e.g., allowing different religious groups to congregate insofar as it is done in private space), and forbidding still others (e.g., banning private militias). Tilly and Tarrow emphatically state that in any type of regime, limits on acceptable forms of claim-making are always set by the state. However, the authors claim that social movements are more likely to arise in the political opportunity structure of democracies—because they are either facilitated or tolerated—whereas in undemocratic settings, they will usually either die out or morph into other forms of contention.
The premise of the contentious politics approach is that social contention, by its very nature, is interactive, involving different political actors. Political actors emerge, the authors explain, when a recognizable set of people make collective claims and identify themselves as a group of claimants. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) suggest that an important mechanism in solidifying political actors as a collective entity is through certification by a recognized external authority that supports their existence and claims. Such certification is more effective if international visibility and heft is associated with those certifying, especially if they signal readiness to support the actors’ claims. An antithetical response, decertification, would have a similar, but reverse, effect, opening the way for repression. As Tilly and Tarrow argue, a regime will counter such claims (e.g., to rights) by purposefully not recognizing the group as identifiable. This is especially relevant to the case of recognized vs. unrecognized religious minorities in Iran.
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue that boundary formation most often happens outside of contention. However, they also state that those boundaries are amplified in the processes of contention. Identity becomes important here in infusing meaning into such boundaries, providing a shared understanding of “who are we?”, “what do we stand for?” and “what is our relationship to each other and to them?” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, pp. 81–82)
The authors also discuss how demobilization takes place, including the processes and mechanisms found in many different cases. By looking at demobilization, the authors want to know why groups which were making claims at one point stop doing so at a later point. To address several key inquiries, they first look at processes leading to the demobilization of prostitute protesters in Lyons who demanded workers’ rights. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) identified five general processes for their demobilization: (a) competition among different sources of support; (b) defection of leaders who left the trade after having gained experience and the skills needed for other work opportunities; (c) disillusionment after bitter experience with collective action; (d) repression encountered by police who raided their protests; and (e) institutionalization into the state system when magistrates reframed their situation as exploited workers. These five processes are found in most cases of demobilization. Tilly and Tarrow argue that another reason for demobilization is disunity of purpose, vision, and adopted tactics. In particular, two routes are taken that end in demobilization:
• Institutionalization--the substitution of the routines of organized politics for the disorder of life in the streets, buttressed by mass organization and purposive incentives
• Escalation--the substitution of more extreme goals and robust tactics for more moderate ones, in order to maintain the interest of their supporters and attract new ones (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 101)
As the authors explain, the selection of either of these routes by different movement members leads to a polarization of those unsatisfied by routines (seeking escalation) and those avoiding risk and danger (seeking institutionalization). These processes are explained here to explain the cases of educational strategy selection by religious minorities in Chapter 6.
A key feature of social movements is social networks (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). The network of social movement bases often make social movement campaigns possible, In other words, groups that ally themselves with other groups are part of the diffusion and brokerage of different performances, increasing the sustainability of movements.
Institutions are also an important element in the formation of social movements. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), social movement bases can form within and outside of institutions, but more importantly, movements also act within, against, and outside of them. Movements can give rise to new institutions, but institutions can also co-opt movements, leading to demobilization. Political opportunities for the emergence of social movements are made available by political institutions; however, as Tilly and Tarrow note, political institutions also repress and process movement claims.
They point to the importance of legalization as an integral element of internationalization, which includes international agreements, the creation of international agencies, and cooperation among different countries. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007) when threats or incentives arise to support particular interests transnational coalitions and movements result. The topic of transnational activism will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section.
Summary In the thematic field of contention, a series of complementary theories have emerged, including mobilization, political processes and opportunity structures, and framing. In the 1990s, Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam, offered an integrative model and a new perspective of movements. They recast the broader study of various forms of contention and movements into the “contentious politics” approach (McAdam et al., 2001; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996; Tarrow & Tilly, 2007).
This latter body of literature has become the theoretical and methodological basis of this study. Within the context of “new” transnational connections in an internationalized world, I turn to the literature on international relations theories of globalization, internationalization, and transnationalism to complete what I consider the three central theoretical foundations for the study of the contentious politics of education.
International Relations Theories and Contentious Politics My discussion of international relations draws from literature on globalization, internationalization, and transnationalism, which I discuss briefly in order to provide background for the concept of new transnational activism, which looks at transnational contentious politics through the lens of international relations and social movement theories.
Globalization and Internationalization While globalization has been framed and defined in different terms, Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton (1999) define it as the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life…” (Held et al., 1999, p. 2). Held et al. (1999) situate the prevailing scholarship on globalization within the categories of three schools of thought: hyperglobalists, skeptics, and transformationalists.
Hyperglobalist views are concisely summarized in Ohmae (1995), who asserts that, “traditional nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy” (p. 5). Hyperglobalist thought relegate nation-states to facilitators of a global exchange of goods, ideas, and culture subject to the demands of a world market. Skeptics, however, reject globalization as a myth. Beyond the increased intensity of internationalization, the economic integration of a world market is unfounded. Skeptics have argued that internationalization has not lessened the role of the nation-state in world affairs, but rather increased its importance. According to the skeptics, internationalization and the rise of the interdependence of states is the outcome of state design (Held et al., 1999).
Between the extreme positions of the hyperglobalists and skeptics stand what Held et al. (1999) call the “transformationalists.” Globalization for the transformationalists is a driving force in reconfiguring power relationships that bring about social, political and economic change. However, the outcome of globalization is as yet undetermined, subject to the happenings of historical processes (Hirst & Thompson, 1999). They claim that internationalization is taking place is an unprecedented way. Transformationalists emphasize the emergence of new centers of authority and power outside the nation-state, separating past internationalization from that of the present.[7] They call the rise of nonstate authority a “new sovereignty regime,” whereby power is now also shared with multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international regularity agencies, among others within the global domain (Held et al., 1999).
Transnationalism and Transnational Contention Concepts in the above general theories help us to consider the impact of globalization and internationalization on transnational activism, on the one hand, and interstate relations, on the other. Tarrow (2005) draws on multiple disciplines and theoretical paradigms to address what he calls “new” transnational activism. His outlook is akin to that of transformationalist scholars, as he adopts bits and pieces from the three international relations paradigms—realism, constructivism, and neoliberal institutionalism—to address the rise of transnational activism. Like the neorealists (Jervis, 1978, 1999; Levy, 1989), he concurs that states are still the key actors in international affairs. In harmony with neoliberal institutionalists (Keohane, 1989; Keohane & Martin, 1995), he believes that institutions are created by states to increase cooperation and maintain security. Finally, drawing heavily on constructivist arguments (Bob, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998), Tarrow (2005) also asserts that norms and identities influence state behaviors.
Tarrow (2005) defines internationalism as the “institutional and informal framework within which transnational activism—some of it aimed at globalization but much of it independent of that process—takes shape” (p. 19). Tarrow (2005) goes on to explain that “internationalism provides a framework within which transnational activists respond to threats and seize opportunities that empower their activism” (p. 19).
Other studies on internationalization have examined NGO and international organizations (Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnucco, 1997), and activist networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Including these in his discussion, Tarrow (2005) defines transnational contention as, “conflicts that link transnational activists to one another, to states, and to international institutions” (p. 25). In this context, nonstate and state actors can build coalitions, make claims, and engage in forms of contention that go beyond borders—a process which Tarrow asserts is not as well understood by scholars of globalization and internationalization.
While Tarrow (2005) suggests that states build international institutions to meet their particular interests, he also argues that international institutions create norms that are diffused into member states, sometimes creating new identities in relation to other states.[8] As O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte, and Williams (2002) explain, international institutions represent a core around which NGOs, social movements, ethnic and religious groups, and trade and business groups gather. Upon this presumption, Tarrow hypothesizes that “the openness of the opportunity structure for non-state actors is a function of the institutionalization of interstate ties and of the degree to which they have produced multilateral interaction” (p. 27).
Tarrow (2005, p. 32) identifies the following six fundamental processes of transnational contention:
1. Global framing (international symbols to frame domestic issues)
2. Internalization (response to international pressure on domestic politics)
3. Diffusion
4. Scale shift
5. Externalization (projection of domestic claims onto international actors)
6. Transnational coalition formation
According to Tarrow (2005) two factors determine which processes are present: (a) the site of contention (domestic or international) and (b) the range of the issue (domestic or international). I will discuss each of these processes according to their relevance to the theme of this dissertation.
The first set of processes, global issue framing and internalization, occur at the domestic level and deal with domestic issues. Tarrow (2005) argues that while global framing draws more international attention and resonance with the transformed claim, it can isolate the local participants. The power of global framing is that, according to Tarrow (2005), it can “dignify and generalize claims that might otherwise remain narrow and parochial” (p. 76).
The second process of transnational contention is what Tarrow (2005) refers to as internalization (not to be confused with psychological references). Tarrow argues that internalization implies three inherent claims: the first is that international pressure on domestic politics foments reaction to their implementation by the government; second, governments react to pressure by protests from civil societies by addressing the international institutions and their citizens; finally, in the act of responding to both groups (i.e., international institutions and local citizens), they can act as mediators of international pressure and domestic claims.
The second set of processes in transnational contention includes diffusion and scaling. These concepts were discussed in some detail in the section about contentious politics (see McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). The internationalization of diffusion and scaling is important because it accounts for how something domestic becomes transnational, and how new communication technologies are used in these processes.
The final set of processes in transnational contention, as discussed by Tarrow (2005), includes externalization and coalition building. Externalization is the process whereby actors change their claims into universalistic terms that would appeal to international allies. Tarrow argues that the primary purpose for externalizing claims is to solicit the support of external allies, when redress from one’s own government is lacking or when one is unable to obtain it. Keck and Sikkink (1998), writing along these lines, state that “nonstate actors, faced with repression and blockage at home, seek out state and nonstate allies in the international arena, and in some cases are able to bring pressure to bear from above on their government to carry out domestic political change” (p. 154). Risse and Sikkink (1998) called this the “boomerang” effect (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). I have reproduced the visual diagram of the boomerang model in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The boomerang model (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 13).
Tarrow (2005) describes externalization processes in phases, beginning with the relationship of externalization to domestic contexts, followed by the framing of contention, moving finally through various forms of collective action. For Tarrow (2005), the domestic context can vary from unresponsiveness to outright repression. Framing can range from simple frame extension to a more drastic frame transformation. Finally, collective action, as previously mentioned, can take on different forms, such as informational monitoring (when agencies and supranational organizations monitor human rights violations), institutional access (working within the framework of courts and international law), and direct action (using traditional instruments such as strikes and novel employment of community protests which governments would have a hard time repressing without incurring public criticism; Tarrow, 2005).
As Tarrow (2005) explains, informational politics, like human rights advocacy, is often the only approach groups can adopt when faced with brutal persecution and high levels of repression. The rise of the “human rights regime” allows advocates to frame domestic oppositions in terms of human rights violations, garnering the support of human rights groups across borders. Finally, direct action appears to be more common in contexts where groups have little access or ability to utilize informational politics or institutional access, or where domestic direct action is the only means to actuate international pressures.
Tarrow (2005) suggests that transnational coalition building is part and parcel of transnational contention. Citing the work of Levi and Murphy (2006), Tarrow (2005) outlines five sets of criteria that must be met for increasing the probability of coalition formation and endurance: framing, trust, credible commitments, management of differences, and selective incentives. Tarrow (2005) describes the combination of four main mechanisms—diffusion, brokerage, mobilization, and certification (discussed above) as being essential for transnational activism to be effective in domestic politics.
Summary In this section, I have discussed internationalization and globalization, and subsequently transnationalism. The concepts explained in this literature are relevant and important to this study not only because they frame the sites of contention for the claim makers, the receiver and target of claims, and all other subjected parties; they also help us to answer the following questions: How are those who make claims affected by these larger contextual processes in international affairs? How do these processes affect the reactions of regimes to claims? What impact do nonstate and nonlocal actors involved in the contentious event have on the regimes and claim-makers?
While different perspectives have emerged in explaining the phenomenon of globalization, no one denies the presence of a heightened internationalization. Tarrow’s (2005) work, among that of others, suggests that this new era of internationalization has produced a new international opportunity structure with the presence of nonstate powers, including international institutions and nonstate actors. The proliferation of norms as an influence on state behavior is also relevant to the study of transnational activism and state responses to international pressure, as nonstate actors make claims across borders. In other words, how a state treats its own people—whether representing an open or repressive polity—may be influenced by nondomestic forces.
[1] The theory that people who feel they are deprived of something that others have (wealth, privilege, access, etc.) and who arise and collectively act to acquire it. For more on relative deprivation theory see Davis (1959), Gurr (1970), Runciman (1966); for criticism of the theory see Gurney and Tierney (1982); Jenkins (1983); McCarthy and Zald (1977); Oberschall (1973); Tilly (1971, 1978); Wood (1975).
[2] See Tarrow (1996) for a typology of opportunity structures.
[3] Although other theories and empirical studies have been proposed in the 21st century using the political process approach, I focus on Tilly’s work because the theory nominally changed to include the development of framing analysis, which will be discussed below.
[4] Tilly’s argument that collective action decreases as repression increases does not adequately address the findings of other studies which demonstrate the positive impact of a government’s use of negative sanctions on collective action (see Khawaja, 1993; Loveman, 1998; Muller, 1980).
[5] For example, Meijer (2005) discusses Islamic social movements in the context of a combination of theories, explaining that one theory alone does not take fully into consideration other characteristics associated with the movements in Egypt. Khawaja (1993) argues that the Palestinian movement, embedded in an extremely repressive setting, is insufficiently addressed by classic theories, which generally suggest a negative relationship between repression and collective action. Similarly, Loveman (1998) compares the rise of social human rights movements in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina, at a time when political opportunity was very low, and the prospects of collective action entailed high risk.
[6] The three elements addressed by McAdam et al. (2001) include environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms. Environmental mechanisms refer to exogenous influences on conditions affecting social life, such as resource accessibility. Cognitive mechanisms consist of changes in individual and collective perceptions—e.g., when a group of people become aware of the risks in taking collective action, but do not opt out because of emotional ties to those involved. Relational mechanisms have to do with changes in the connections in networks of people and groups—e.g., brokerage between previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates relations between two actors and sites.
[7] For example, Goodman and Watts (1997, cited in Held et al., 1999) point to new sovereign powers such as the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and others that have entered the international scene.
[8] See Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink (1999) for a fuller discussion of this topic.
Conflict Theories of Education These prominent strands of conflict theory—reproduction and resistance sub-theories—are useful on multiple levels for contextualizing a discussion on the contentious politics of education. At the foundational level, conflict theories provide us with insights about the site of contention (i.e., schools) and the actors involved (i.e., individuals, groups, and both state and nonstate institutions that desire access to schools and the rights associated with education). At a more intermediate level, conflict theories give us an idea of what is at stake in terms of the claims in contention, such as the risks associated with gains and losses in needs, development, solidarity, and agenda fulfillment. Finally, at a more advanced level, conflict theories illuminate domestic, international, and supranational relationships that have an impact on the foundational and intermediate level issues addressed above.
Reproduction Theories Classic conflict theory explains power relations exclusively in terms of the relation of people to the mode of production. Subsequently, two predominant “classes” emerge in capitalist societies: those who own the means of production, and those who produce goods and services but do not have ownership of the means (i.e., the “haves” and the “have-nots”; Kolakowski & Falla, 2005). Those controlling the means of production set out to subordinate workers through both coercive and noncoercive means. Thus, classical reproduction theorists contend that within any given society, an elite few control all aspects of the superstructure, insofar as it serves their own interests and maintains the status quo of existing economic relationships (Kolakowski & Falla, 2005). This includes educational institutions. However, by the 1930s, many Marxists saw problems with the classical model and could not explain why working class people in industrialized countries did not rise in revolt (Gramsci, 1971). These scholars began to develop more sophisticated theories of reproduction to reconcile failures in the classical model of Marxism. Two different categories capture the various developments made in reproduction theory in this era: (a) hegemonic-state reproduction and (b) cultural reproduction—both of which have elements of economic reproduction.
Hegemony and ideological state apparatus. Antonio Gramsci argued that in addition to using coercive means of repression, the state controls the ideological milieu of a society by maintaining cultural or ideological hegemony over the population (Gramsci, 1971). About Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Burke (2005) writes:
By hegemony, Gramsci meant the permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations. Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an “organising principle” that is diffused by the process of socialisation into every area of daily life. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalised by the population it becomes part of what is generally called “common sense” so that the philosophy, culture and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things. (para. 9)
According to Gramsci (1971), the state uses various strategies and institutions to maintain control, and the education system is one key example. In schools, the teaching of values, ideas, and identities, Gramsci argues, were used to serve the interests of those in power to the detriment of the lower classes. Moreover, from his perspective schooling was both a coercive and noncoercive arm of the state in maintaining ideological hegemony, since the treatment of children in schools could include violent or threatening measures of control as well as the more subtle variety.
Gramsci (1971) also asserts that breaking away from state hegemonic control is a challenge because the socialized masses are not aware of the need to change the status quo. Based on the premise that states control educational institutions, Gramsci asserts that if schools are left unchecked, they will continue to reproduce the ideology that serves to legitimate the dominant class and ensure the ideological hegemony of the elite.
On an international scale, theories of dependency maintain that core states hold developing states in a perpetual condition of underdevelopment, while serving the economic interests of the developed countries (Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 1974). Educational theorists have drawn on dependency theories and Gramsci’s (1971) ideas about hegemony to analyze power in institutions of higher education, referring to the intellectual and academic dependency of the nations of the developing world on core countries of the West (Alatas, 2003; Altbach, 1977).
Drawing from Gramsci’s early work, Althusser (1971) argues that powerful regimes adopt noncoercive means of repression to maintain control over their populations in addition to the more costly coercive means, because it is impractical to constantly maintain a state of open repression. To this end, the state employs formal and informal institutions that range from religious organizations to the media to, most importantly, educational systems (Althusser, 1971). These ideological state apparatuses, as Althusser calls them, indoctrinate the masses into accepting circumstances that they might otherwise have been inclined to resist (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004). Through this process, the ruling-elite maintains control over the working-class, ultimately reproducing the unequal relationships of power with the tacit acceptance of the majority of the population.
Cultural reproduction: Symbolic violence, cultural capital, and social capital. By the 1980s, many conflict theories were expanding theories of reproduction to include the struggle for power equity of noneconomic groups such as ethnic minorities and women (Peet, 1999; Pincus, 2002). These later cultural reproduction theorists do not undervalue the importance of class but contend that all struggles are multifaceted. Cultural reproduction theorists argue that schools favor the dominant culture, leaving minority cultures at a disadvantage (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004).
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), pioneers of cultural reproduction theory, have argued that certain elements are always at play, which sustain the dominant culture through institutions such as communications, the media, and schools. They call this symbolic violence because it does not manifest itself in physical form, but nonetheless has a detrimental impact on the subordinate class. This process can be extremely alienating to society’s subordinate groups. For example, school exams that are ostensibly unbiased inherently favor the culture and ideology of the dominant group, marginalizing others because of the linguistic, cultural, and social privileges that draw on the dominant cultural standard (Dika & Singh, 2002; Sissoko & Shiau, 2005).
Similarly, some scholars discuss how schools, and the curriculum in particular, legitimize the history, culture, and identity of the dominant group, leaving little room for any alternative stories (Apple, 1993). When minority groups do not see themselves represented in this tapestry of culture, they are disinclined to engage with the material, while the privileged students excel and thereby reproduce unequal relations of power and domination (Li, Savage, & Pickles, 2003). According to cultural reproduction theorists, the place of contestation, or the field of competition, always favors the dominant class, while the subordinate group has no choice but to adopt and acquire the know-how of the dominant culture in order to engage in the struggle for power (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Lareau & Weininger, 2003).
Resistance Theories Building upon reproduction theories, the resistance theories that have been emerging since the 1980s place a new emphasis on the role of human agency in struggles of inequality and repression. Resistance theorists of the conflict paradigm reject the idea of the inability of students to fend off the hegemonic messages of the school (Peet, 1999). While these theorists do not deny that educational institutions favor the dominant culture, they insist that students have the ability to recognize falsehood or discrimination. Some scholars argue that students who feel alienated by the culture of the classroom will choose to tune out (Shor, 1992), while others point to the way students will reject textbook content that does not resonate with their own lived experiences (Apple, 1993).
Freire (1970) and other critical pedagogy scholars suggest that by empowering students to frame problems with their own understanding of the world, they will learn using their own ideas rather than those of the elite. In other words, agency is in the hands of the individual and not the dominant power. While there is no naïve dismissal of the role of the dominant group in maintaining power and hegemonic control over schools, resistance theorists simply contend that every educational institution is a contested arena.
Summary The strength of conflict theories rests in their critical perspective on schooling. Particularly important to this area of inquiry is the issue of why and how the state uses the educational system to repress certain groups while privileging others. In this dissertation, I implicitly draw on components of both reproduction and resistance theory as the backdrop for the educational landscape in Iran. The Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes used schools to serve national interests both economically and ideologically. Resistance theories lend insight into why individuals and groups perceive access to educational opportunities to be beneficial and continue to seek schooling despite repressive conditions. As Carnoy and Levin (1985) suggest, “education is an arena of conflict over the production of knowledge, ideology and employment, a place where social movements try to meet their needs and business attempts to reproduce its hegemony” (p. 50).
Social Movement and Contentious Politics Literature The study of social movements is a precarious endeavor for many reasons. There are salient issues that arise when explaining how individuals make claims, mobilize, and take collective action toward a perceived transgression or unmet need. Some factors bearing on the formation and maintenance of social movements include agreement on common grievances, available resources to respondents, opportunities and structures affecting mobilization efforts, how actors frame challenges and solutions when mobilizing and taking action, and what mechanisms and processes set the latter factors into motion (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007).
Resource Mobilization Theory and Political Process Theories A group of scholars in the 1970s, drawing on rational choice theories with elements of neo-Marxism, began to question why some individuals experiencing grievance mobilize and participate in social movements, while others facing similar levels of grievances do not. For many discontented scholars in the 1970s, interests and grievances[1] were insufficient to explain why and how people mobilized (Jenkins, 1983; McAdam, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly 1971). Instead, some scholars began to explain mobilization and social movements in terms of the resources and pre-existing structures available to individuals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). These perspectives came to be known as the theory of resource mobilization and political processes or opportunity structures. Some early developers of this approach to social movements include, among others, Oberschall (1973), McCarthy & Zald (1977), Gameson (1975), Tilly (1973, 1978), Tarrow (1983), McAdam (1982) and Jenkins (1981, 1983; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977). Thus two sub-theories paralleled one another, drawing from the Millian and neo-Marxist perspectives, respectively: (a) the economic or organizational perspective; and (b) the political processes perspective (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996).
Resource mobilization theory. In 1977, McCarthy and Zald formulated a resource mobilization theory to explain the emergence of social movements. They identify three key concepts: (a) the social movement organization; (b) the social movement industry; and (c) the social movement sector. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), social movements are “preference structures directed toward social change” (p. 1218). Furthermore, they suggest that pre-existing preference structures are more likely to organize and collectively act. In this study, I treat religious groups as pre-existing preference structures. They define a social movement organization (SMO) as a formal organization that identifies and seeks to achieve its objectives through a social movement. McCarthy and Zald suggest that more than one social movement organization can participate in a particular social movement. Social movement organizations working in a common social movement, addressing similar issues, constitute what McCarthy and Zald call a social movement industry (SMI). Finally, a social movement sector (SMS), as defined by McCarthy and Zald, includes all social movement industries in society. This larger, more liberal categorization accounts for social movement organizations which function in more than one social movement industry.
McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasize that resource mobilization is determined by “the interaction between resource availability, the pre-existing organization of preference structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demands” (p. 1236). In other words, social movements arise when there are resources available to actors and organizations, or more broadly in the SMS—so long as the imposition of repression by authority regimes does not impede mobilization.
Much of the criticism against organizational RM is based on McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) reduction of collective action to economic terms and rational choice. Their assessment leaves little room for values, ideology, and commitment (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996). By focusing on economic changes, McCarthy and Zald overlooked the importance of cultural and value shifts within society (Jenkins, 1983).
In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, in reaction to the criticisms leveled against resource mobilization, both McCarthy and Zald began to shift focus to the political process approach that had been developing throughout the 1970s, and which will be the subject of the next section (Tilly, 1973, 1978). In 2004, Edwards and McCarthy expanded resource mobilization to include five types of resources:
1. Material--money and physical capital—part of McCarthy and Zald’s original thesis
2. Moral--solidarity and support for the movement’s goals
3. Social-organizational--organizational strategies, social networks, and bloc recruitment
4. Human--volunteers, staff, and leaders
5. Cultural--prior activist experience, understanding of the issues, and collective action know-how
This enhanced version of resource mobilization still maintains the importance of material resources in mobilization and collective action, but draws significantly on political opportunity structures and includes ideological factors, such as constructivist use of frames as modes of altering perceived resources and opportunities (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).
Political processes and opportunity approach. Charles Tilly’s (1978) work on opportunity models addresses the preconditions for mobilization and collective action. Others have also significantly shared in the theory’s formulation over the years, such as Tarrow (1994), McAdam, (1982; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996), Jenkins and Perrow (1977), and Morris (2000). Most political process theorists emphasize the significance of opportunity structures that facilitate or impede the feasibility of social movements (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984; Tilly, 1978). Classic political process theorists argue that political opportunities must be available to people before they can mobilize.[2] Therefore, it is argued that the step from mobilization to collective action does not result solely from deprivation or resource availability (Tilly, 1978).
Tilly’s (1978) work deals with the foundation of the political process approach.[3] He identifies five components of collective action: (a) interest; (b) organization; (c) mobilization; (d) opportunity; and (e) collective action. However, he focuses mainly on organization, mobilization, and opportunity in understanding collective action. Tilly defines organization as the capacity of a group to act on its interests. Mobilization is defined as the process of securing necessary resources for a group to take action. Finally, opportunity has to do with the relationship between a group and the world in which it exists (i.e., limits to opportunity are directly related to the repression, facilitation and power of various groups). For Tilly, the intersection of at least two of the following three areas results in a movement: beliefs, populations, and/or actions.
Tilly (1978) contends that collective action can be understood in terms of the interaction between shared interests—“advantages and disadvantages likely to result from interaction with other groups” (p. 84)—organization, and mobilization, in the context of the repression, power, and opportunity/threat of a group’s collective action. He also asserts that the ability to use opportunities to increase power or avoid repression has a significant bearing on the actuation of social movements, to the extent that the adherents are willing to expend effort and spend resources. This premise favors pre-existing groups and networks. He delineates four group strategies of collective action that are applicable to Iranian Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. First are the zealots, who place high value on a collective good; willing to incur net loss to gain it. Second are the misers, who value resources highly, and are unlikely to use them for the purposes of collective action. Third are the run-of-the-mill contenders, who seek limited selected goods, but have modest resources to acquire them, and who are not likely to take action if there is a perceived risk of net loss. Finally there are the opportunists, who seek to maximize net return without regard for the collective good acquired.
Three opportunity variables are considered in Tilly’s (1978) mobilization model: (a) repression/facilitation, (b) power, and (c) opportunity/threat. Authorities, that is, those who wield social control, have the capability to either repress (raise the cost) or facilitate (lower the cost) of collective action by a group. According to Tilly, an authority wishing to repress or facilitate another group’s action will either focus on the group’s mobilization, or focus directly on its collective action. Tilly posits that the “repressiveness of a government is never a simple matter of more or less. It is always selective, and always consists of some combination of repression, toleration, and facilitation” (Tilly, 1978, p. 106). This point is important in understanding how groups respond with particular kinds of social movements in various milieus and under different types of regimes (repressive, tolerant, or facilitative). According to Tilly, while repression impedes and facilitation enables collective action, governments sometimes do not react, leading to toleration. Tilly (1978) goes on to explain, “Governments respond selectively to different sorts of groups, and different sorts of actions” (p. 106). Likewise he differentiates between the types of governments that respond to various levels of action and different types of groups as shown in Figure 2. The first two apply to Iranian regimes in modern Iran.
TOLERANT
WEAK
TOLTALITARIAN
REPRESSIVE
Acceptability of Group
Low
HHigh
F
R
R
T
T
(F) FACILITATION
(T) TOLERATION
(R) Repression
T
R
R
R
HHigh
T
T
T
F
F
F
Figure 2. Repressive patterns in different types of regimes (Tilly, 1978, p. 111).
Although the political process approach has developed since Tilly’s (1973, 1978) early work, to include elements of the culturalist perspective (i.e., the framing process that is discussed below), it has received criticism.[4] By the mid- to late 1990s, many political process theorists (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996) were including the centrality of cultural dynamics in the emergence and development of social movements (Morris, 2000).
Framing Process Framing accounts for the internal and qualitative underpinnings of mobilization and collective action. Prominent framing scholars (Benford & Snow 2000; Gameson, 1975; Morris, 2000) focus on ideology and cultural significance in the making of social movements. Framing is another tool for understanding different types of social movements and processes, how they are constructed, and how the infusion of meaning into action, symbols, and issues influence mobilization and collective action. Those using the framing concept take into consideration factors, such as political and cultural opportunities and audience effects (Benford & Snow, 2000).
In essence, framing adds the dimensions of culture, meaning, belief, and values to the analytical understanding of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). The term framing, as Benford and Snow explain, explicitly represented an active and process-oriented exercise with human agency at its core. It is an interpretive tool that places actions and events in the context of constructed meaning. In other words, as they explain, framing may be used to simplify or recast the happenings of the world with the intention of mobilizing potential supporters for a social movement. Thus, “collective action frames” are constructed interpretations of problems, solutions, and the motivations of people who mobilize and take action.
Benford and Snow (2000) outline three main tasks associated with collective action framing: (a) diagnostic framing; (b) prognostic framing; and (c) motivational framing. They describe diagnostic framing as defining problems facing a group, such as injustice and its source. Benford and Snow define prognostic framing as the proposed solution to a problem (often limited to how framing is constructed). Finally, they explain motivational framing as a “call-to-arms” or launch of mobility to action.
Of particular importance to framers, Benford and Snow (2000) assert, is how the frame resonates with its target audience; thus, credibility is at the heart of the resonant factor, where higher resonance with the frame will lead to a more effective mobilizing potential. They acknowledge the impact of context on the framing process, as well as the influence of framing on creating context. They point out how the framing of political opportunities is a central component of collective action. They assert that SMOs or leaders frame political space in terms of opportunity versus constraints, sometimes creating a virtual space for collective action. Similarly, framing embellishes identities and ideology, positioning them in the midst of a range of collaborative and conflictive groups or contexts. Framing is a vital ingredient in the educational strategy selection of Iranian religious minority groups.
Contentious Politics Several case studies illustrate the failure of employing only one model to adequately explain social movements.[5] A number of social movement scholars have shifted focus from one theoretical perspective to a more holistic explanatory model (Cohen, 1985; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996; Tilly, 2004). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) develop an integrative model by focusing on the causal mechanisms and processes of various types of contention, such as social movements, ethnic movements, and revolutions. They call this the contentious politics approach (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001).
Drawing on the tools developed by different approaches over the years (resource mobilization, political processes and structures, framing, and repertoires of contention), McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) move past the older social movement agenda characterized by general approaches discussed above, asserting that these analyses were static. Instead, they look to similar causal mechanisms that span various forms of contention and result in different consequences in diverse historical settings, emerging from dynamic processes of interaction. By looking at the causal mechanisms and processes, the authors contend that observers can learn more from considering all forms of connection by comparing their dynamic, rather than looking at specialized forms in isolation. While contentious politics may be interpreted in a variety of ways, the authors narrow their focus, stating: “The contentious politics that concerns us is episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of claims and others, is recognized by those others as bearing on their interests, and brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 5).
McAdam et al. (2001) criticize the narrow focus and increasing divisions that have come out of the general study of social movements because these scholars fail to look at related topics despite striking similarities in dynamics. For this reason, the authors’ main objective is to look for similar causal mechanisms and processes that occur in a broad spectrum of struggles. To this end, the authors develop analytical lenses and tools to examine a series of cases.
The first set of lenses identified by McAdam et al. (2001) is the distinction between “contained” and “transgressive” contention. Contained contention involves pre-established actors and institutions practicing claim-making through established means. Those involved are considered constituted political actors using conventional means of claim-making. According to McAdam et al. (2001), transgressive contention involves claim-making by a newly self-identified political actor or when one party employs innovative collective action that may be unprecedented or forbidden within the regime. McAdam et al. (2001) proceed to describe three key features of the study of contentious politics: (a) mechanisms, (b) processes, and (c) episodes. By looking at parallels in various forms of contentious politics, the authors assert, they search for explanatory mechanisms that drive contention in different directions. They define the terms as follows (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 24):
1. Mechanisms--a delimited class of events which alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations
2. Processes--regular sequences of such mechanisms that process similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements
3. Episodes--segments of continuous streams of contention including collective claim-making that bears on other parties’ interests
According to the authors, mechanisms are noticeable when their elements interact, connecting them with one another.[6] Because mechanisms seldom occur in a vacuum, but are rather linked with other mechanisms, the authors point to processes, which are “recurring causal chains, sequences, and combinations of mechanisms” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 27). The authors summarize: “we employ mechanisms and processes as our workhorses of explanation, and episodes as our workhorses of description” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 30). I have adopted this as the analytical framework and discuss its application to this study in the methods section (Chapter 3) and more specifically to educational strategy selection (Chapter 6).
McAdam et al. (2001) suggest focusing on social interaction and therefore look for two features in all contention: (a) recurring mechanisms and processes and (b) principles of variation. They propose a dynamic model that looks at mobilization structures, political processes, frames, and different forms of transgressive action as relational to one another with interactive actors. In this dissertation, the proposed features of group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations emerge from social interactions and illustrate principles of variation.
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) explain that contention involves the actuation of a claim bearing on someone else’s interests. Thus, three components arise in any contentious exchange: subjects, objects, and claims. Collective action plays out as the coordinated efforts of some on behalf of “shared interests or programs” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 5). The importance of politics in contention, as briefly dealt with earlier by McAdam et al. (2001), is supported by three overarching issues: (a) people in control of government have advantages over people who are not in control of government; (b) governments always set the rules of contention (i.e., what is allowed, tolerated, or forbidden); and (c) governments control coercive apparatuses and institutions (e.g., armies, police, prisons). These three issues come together to form the basis for contentious politics.
Claim-making and collective action around claims takes on different forms and manifests itself through what the authors call different “contentious performances.” Contentious performances are “relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actors” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 11). Contentious performances aggregate into contentious repertoires, representing an array of performances used by political actors in making claims and taking collective action.
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) offer three general reasons why the mechanism-process approach helps us understand mobilization. First, reducing the process of mobilization to its mechanisms and analyzing what particular mechanisms contribute toward the success or failure of mobilization gives us a more precise picture of specific mobilization efforts. Second, by comparing similar mechanisms across different types of contention (e.g., social movement versus civil war), the identification of key mechanisms in the transition from one type of contention to another is more evident. Finally, by examining the coexistence of two or more mechanisms, the environmental factors can be studied in order to determine what circumstances contribute to larger and less noticeable processes.
Building on Tilly’s earlier works, Durable Inequality (1998a), and Regimes and Repertoires (2006b), Tilly and Tarrow (2007) continue to argue that regimes matter in determining types of contention, and subsequently types of performances that political actors will choose in making claims. The authors employ two categories to label different regimes across the world: democracy and capacity, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4.
According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), political opportunity structures are affected by regimes based on the fragmentation or concentration of its power, the extent of a regime’s openness to new actors, availability of allies and supporters for challengers, as well as the extent to which the regime represses, tolerates, or facilitates collective claim-making. The primary vehicle by which a regime controls the political opportunity structure is through institutions. They describe how states control institutional operations by prescribing some institutions (e.g., requiring membership in a political party), tolerating others (e.g., allowing different religious groups to congregate insofar as it is done in private space), and forbidding still others (e.g., banning private militias). Tilly and Tarrow emphatically state that in any type of regime, limits on acceptable forms of claim-making are always set by the state. However, the authors claim that social movements are more likely to arise in the political opportunity structure of democracies—because they are either facilitated or tolerated—whereas in undemocratic settings, they will usually either die out or morph into other forms of contention.
The premise of the contentious politics approach is that social contention, by its very nature, is interactive, involving different political actors. Political actors emerge, the authors explain, when a recognizable set of people make collective claims and identify themselves as a group of claimants. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) suggest that an important mechanism in solidifying political actors as a collective entity is through certification by a recognized external authority that supports their existence and claims. Such certification is more effective if international visibility and heft is associated with those certifying, especially if they signal readiness to support the actors’ claims. An antithetical response, decertification, would have a similar, but reverse, effect, opening the way for repression. As Tilly and Tarrow argue, a regime will counter such claims (e.g., to rights) by purposefully not recognizing the group as identifiable. This is especially relevant to the case of recognized vs. unrecognized religious minorities in Iran.
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue that boundary formation most often happens outside of contention. However, they also state that those boundaries are amplified in the processes of contention. Identity becomes important here in infusing meaning into such boundaries, providing a shared understanding of “who are we?”, “what do we stand for?” and “what is our relationship to each other and to them?” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, pp. 81–82)
The authors also discuss how demobilization takes place, including the processes and mechanisms found in many different cases. By looking at demobilization, the authors want to know why groups which were making claims at one point stop doing so at a later point. To address several key inquiries, they first look at processes leading to the demobilization of prostitute protesters in Lyons who demanded workers’ rights. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) identified five general processes for their demobilization: (a) competition among different sources of support; (b) defection of leaders who left the trade after having gained experience and the skills needed for other work opportunities; (c) disillusionment after bitter experience with collective action; (d) repression encountered by police who raided their protests; and (e) institutionalization into the state system when magistrates reframed their situation as exploited workers. These five processes are found in most cases of demobilization. Tilly and Tarrow argue that another reason for demobilization is disunity of purpose, vision, and adopted tactics. In particular, two routes are taken that end in demobilization:
• Institutionalization--the substitution of the routines of organized politics for the disorder of life in the streets, buttressed by mass organization and purposive incentives
• Escalation--the substitution of more extreme goals and robust tactics for more moderate ones, in order to maintain the interest of their supporters and attract new ones (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 101)
As the authors explain, the selection of either of these routes by different movement members leads to a polarization of those unsatisfied by routines (seeking escalation) and those avoiding risk and danger (seeking institutionalization). These processes are explained here to explain the cases of educational strategy selection by religious minorities in Chapter 6.
A key feature of social movements is social networks (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). The network of social movement bases often make social movement campaigns possible, In other words, groups that ally themselves with other groups are part of the diffusion and brokerage of different performances, increasing the sustainability of movements.
Institutions are also an important element in the formation of social movements. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), social movement bases can form within and outside of institutions, but more importantly, movements also act within, against, and outside of them. Movements can give rise to new institutions, but institutions can also co-opt movements, leading to demobilization. Political opportunities for the emergence of social movements are made available by political institutions; however, as Tilly and Tarrow note, political institutions also repress and process movement claims.
They point to the importance of legalization as an integral element of internationalization, which includes international agreements, the creation of international agencies, and cooperation among different countries. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007) when threats or incentives arise to support particular interests transnational coalitions and movements result. The topic of transnational activism will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section.
Summary In the thematic field of contention, a series of complementary theories have emerged, including mobilization, political processes and opportunity structures, and framing. In the 1990s, Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam, offered an integrative model and a new perspective of movements. They recast the broader study of various forms of contention and movements into the “contentious politics” approach (McAdam et al., 2001; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996; Tarrow & Tilly, 2007).
This latter body of literature has become the theoretical and methodological basis of this study. Within the context of “new” transnational connections in an internationalized world, I turn to the literature on international relations theories of globalization, internationalization, and transnationalism to complete what I consider the three central theoretical foundations for the study of the contentious politics of education.
International Relations Theories and Contentious Politics My discussion of international relations draws from literature on globalization, internationalization, and transnationalism, which I discuss briefly in order to provide background for the concept of new transnational activism, which looks at transnational contentious politics through the lens of international relations and social movement theories.
Globalization and Internationalization While globalization has been framed and defined in different terms, Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton (1999) define it as the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life…” (Held et al., 1999, p. 2). Held et al. (1999) situate the prevailing scholarship on globalization within the categories of three schools of thought: hyperglobalists, skeptics, and transformationalists.
Hyperglobalist views are concisely summarized in Ohmae (1995), who asserts that, “traditional nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy” (p. 5). Hyperglobalist thought relegate nation-states to facilitators of a global exchange of goods, ideas, and culture subject to the demands of a world market. Skeptics, however, reject globalization as a myth. Beyond the increased intensity of internationalization, the economic integration of a world market is unfounded. Skeptics have argued that internationalization has not lessened the role of the nation-state in world affairs, but rather increased its importance. According to the skeptics, internationalization and the rise of the interdependence of states is the outcome of state design (Held et al., 1999).
Between the extreme positions of the hyperglobalists and skeptics stand what Held et al. (1999) call the “transformationalists.” Globalization for the transformationalists is a driving force in reconfiguring power relationships that bring about social, political and economic change. However, the outcome of globalization is as yet undetermined, subject to the happenings of historical processes (Hirst & Thompson, 1999). They claim that internationalization is taking place is an unprecedented way. Transformationalists emphasize the emergence of new centers of authority and power outside the nation-state, separating past internationalization from that of the present.[7] They call the rise of nonstate authority a “new sovereignty regime,” whereby power is now also shared with multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international regularity agencies, among others within the global domain (Held et al., 1999).
Transnationalism and Transnational Contention Concepts in the above general theories help us to consider the impact of globalization and internationalization on transnational activism, on the one hand, and interstate relations, on the other. Tarrow (2005) draws on multiple disciplines and theoretical paradigms to address what he calls “new” transnational activism. His outlook is akin to that of transformationalist scholars, as he adopts bits and pieces from the three international relations paradigms—realism, constructivism, and neoliberal institutionalism—to address the rise of transnational activism. Like the neorealists (Jervis, 1978, 1999; Levy, 1989), he concurs that states are still the key actors in international affairs. In harmony with neoliberal institutionalists (Keohane, 1989; Keohane & Martin, 1995), he believes that institutions are created by states to increase cooperation and maintain security. Finally, drawing heavily on constructivist arguments (Bob, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998), Tarrow (2005) also asserts that norms and identities influence state behaviors.
Tarrow (2005) defines internationalism as the “institutional and informal framework within which transnational activism—some of it aimed at globalization but much of it independent of that process—takes shape” (p. 19). Tarrow (2005) goes on to explain that “internationalism provides a framework within which transnational activists respond to threats and seize opportunities that empower their activism” (p. 19).
Other studies on internationalization have examined NGO and international organizations (Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnucco, 1997), and activist networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Including these in his discussion, Tarrow (2005) defines transnational contention as, “conflicts that link transnational activists to one another, to states, and to international institutions” (p. 25). In this context, nonstate and state actors can build coalitions, make claims, and engage in forms of contention that go beyond borders—a process which Tarrow asserts is not as well understood by scholars of globalization and internationalization.
While Tarrow (2005) suggests that states build international institutions to meet their particular interests, he also argues that international institutions create norms that are diffused into member states, sometimes creating new identities in relation to other states.[8] As O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte, and Williams (2002) explain, international institutions represent a core around which NGOs, social movements, ethnic and religious groups, and trade and business groups gather. Upon this presumption, Tarrow hypothesizes that “the openness of the opportunity structure for non-state actors is a function of the institutionalization of interstate ties and of the degree to which they have produced multilateral interaction” (p. 27).
Tarrow (2005, p. 32) identifies the following six fundamental processes of transnational contention:
1. Global framing (international symbols to frame domestic issues)
2. Internalization (response to international pressure on domestic politics)
3. Diffusion
4. Scale shift
5. Externalization (projection of domestic claims onto international actors)
6. Transnational coalition formation
According to Tarrow (2005) two factors determine which processes are present: (a) the site of contention (domestic or international) and (b) the range of the issue (domestic or international). I will discuss each of these processes according to their relevance to the theme of this dissertation.
The first set of processes, global issue framing and internalization, occur at the domestic level and deal with domestic issues. Tarrow (2005) argues that while global framing draws more international attention and resonance with the transformed claim, it can isolate the local participants. The power of global framing is that, according to Tarrow (2005), it can “dignify and generalize claims that might otherwise remain narrow and parochial” (p. 76).
The second process of transnational contention is what Tarrow (2005) refers to as internalization (not to be confused with psychological references). Tarrow argues that internalization implies three inherent claims: the first is that international pressure on domestic politics foments reaction to their implementation by the government; second, governments react to pressure by protests from civil societies by addressing the international institutions and their citizens; finally, in the act of responding to both groups (i.e., international institutions and local citizens), they can act as mediators of international pressure and domestic claims.
The second set of processes in transnational contention includes diffusion and scaling. These concepts were discussed in some detail in the section about contentious politics (see McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). The internationalization of diffusion and scaling is important because it accounts for how something domestic becomes transnational, and how new communication technologies are used in these processes.
The final set of processes in transnational contention, as discussed by Tarrow (2005), includes externalization and coalition building. Externalization is the process whereby actors change their claims into universalistic terms that would appeal to international allies. Tarrow argues that the primary purpose for externalizing claims is to solicit the support of external allies, when redress from one’s own government is lacking or when one is unable to obtain it. Keck and Sikkink (1998), writing along these lines, state that “nonstate actors, faced with repression and blockage at home, seek out state and nonstate allies in the international arena, and in some cases are able to bring pressure to bear from above on their government to carry out domestic political change” (p. 154). Risse and Sikkink (1998) called this the “boomerang” effect (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). I have reproduced the visual diagram of the boomerang model in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The boomerang model (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 13).
Tarrow (2005) describes externalization processes in phases, beginning with the relationship of externalization to domestic contexts, followed by the framing of contention, moving finally through various forms of collective action. For Tarrow (2005), the domestic context can vary from unresponsiveness to outright repression. Framing can range from simple frame extension to a more drastic frame transformation. Finally, collective action, as previously mentioned, can take on different forms, such as informational monitoring (when agencies and supranational organizations monitor human rights violations), institutional access (working within the framework of courts and international law), and direct action (using traditional instruments such as strikes and novel employment of community protests which governments would have a hard time repressing without incurring public criticism; Tarrow, 2005).
As Tarrow (2005) explains, informational politics, like human rights advocacy, is often the only approach groups can adopt when faced with brutal persecution and high levels of repression. The rise of the “human rights regime” allows advocates to frame domestic oppositions in terms of human rights violations, garnering the support of human rights groups across borders. Finally, direct action appears to be more common in contexts where groups have little access or ability to utilize informational politics or institutional access, or where domestic direct action is the only means to actuate international pressures.
Tarrow (2005) suggests that transnational coalition building is part and parcel of transnational contention. Citing the work of Levi and Murphy (2006), Tarrow (2005) outlines five sets of criteria that must be met for increasing the probability of coalition formation and endurance: framing, trust, credible commitments, management of differences, and selective incentives. Tarrow (2005) describes the combination of four main mechanisms—diffusion, brokerage, mobilization, and certification (discussed above) as being essential for transnational activism to be effective in domestic politics.
Summary In this section, I have discussed internationalization and globalization, and subsequently transnationalism. The concepts explained in this literature are relevant and important to this study not only because they frame the sites of contention for the claim makers, the receiver and target of claims, and all other subjected parties; they also help us to answer the following questions: How are those who make claims affected by these larger contextual processes in international affairs? How do these processes affect the reactions of regimes to claims? What impact do nonstate and nonlocal actors involved in the contentious event have on the regimes and claim-makers?
While different perspectives have emerged in explaining the phenomenon of globalization, no one denies the presence of a heightened internationalization. Tarrow’s (2005) work, among that of others, suggests that this new era of internationalization has produced a new international opportunity structure with the presence of nonstate powers, including international institutions and nonstate actors. The proliferation of norms as an influence on state behavior is also relevant to the study of transnational activism and state responses to international pressure, as nonstate actors make claims across borders. In other words, how a state treats its own people—whether representing an open or repressive polity—may be influenced by nondomestic forces.
[1] The theory that people who feel they are deprived of something that others have (wealth, privilege, access, etc.) and who arise and collectively act to acquire it. For more on relative deprivation theory see Davis (1959), Gurr (1970), Runciman (1966); for criticism of the theory see Gurney and Tierney (1982); Jenkins (1983); McCarthy and Zald (1977); Oberschall (1973); Tilly (1971, 1978); Wood (1975).
[2] See Tarrow (1996) for a typology of opportunity structures.
[3] Although other theories and empirical studies have been proposed in the 21st century using the political process approach, I focus on Tilly’s work because the theory nominally changed to include the development of framing analysis, which will be discussed below.
[4] Tilly’s argument that collective action decreases as repression increases does not adequately address the findings of other studies which demonstrate the positive impact of a government’s use of negative sanctions on collective action (see Khawaja, 1993; Loveman, 1998; Muller, 1980).
[5] For example, Meijer (2005) discusses Islamic social movements in the context of a combination of theories, explaining that one theory alone does not take fully into consideration other characteristics associated with the movements in Egypt. Khawaja (1993) argues that the Palestinian movement, embedded in an extremely repressive setting, is insufficiently addressed by classic theories, which generally suggest a negative relationship between repression and collective action. Similarly, Loveman (1998) compares the rise of social human rights movements in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina, at a time when political opportunity was very low, and the prospects of collective action entailed high risk.
[6] The three elements addressed by McAdam et al. (2001) include environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms. Environmental mechanisms refer to exogenous influences on conditions affecting social life, such as resource accessibility. Cognitive mechanisms consist of changes in individual and collective perceptions—e.g., when a group of people become aware of the risks in taking collective action, but do not opt out because of emotional ties to those involved. Relational mechanisms have to do with changes in the connections in networks of people and groups—e.g., brokerage between previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates relations between two actors and sites.
[7] For example, Goodman and Watts (1997, cited in Held et al., 1999) point to new sovereign powers such as the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and others that have entered the international scene.
[8] See Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink (1999) for a fuller discussion of this topic.