CHAPTER TWO
CASE STUDY SUBJECTS: JEWS, CHRISTIANS, AND BAHA'IS
Analysis of Variables and Bounds This study sets out to explain the impact that group composition, networks, and regime-group relations have on the educational strategy selection of various religious minority groups. For purposes of clarity, it is imperative to define the limits of each assembled variable. These do not necessarily constitute an exhaustive categorization, but rather explain how, and the extent to which, these factors bear on the strategy selection process for each group. Following general definitions, I will look at the relevant data associated with each case subject.
Group Composition and Characteristics A combination of four features makes up the category composition and characteristics: demography, socioeconomic status, organizational structure, and ideological orientation. Some of these features require more attention and definition than others, and various points even overlap. While each feature may be employed more broadly, I have narrowed aspects that directly relate to the analysis of strategy selection.
Demographic information, as generally used, refers to characteristics of a population. Categories in demography include biological and geographical data such as population count, population distribution, age, gender, birth, death, and migration rates, among other descriptive features. Some additional categories include languages spoken, religious affiliation, ethno-cultural grouping, and political affiliation. For my study, I use demography, where information is available, to identify population counts, distribution, and migration patterns for each minority group. Historically, this information has been difficult to identify in Iran for religious minorities. Therefore, I will rely on a series of sources to triangulate data that vary.
Socioeconomic status sometimes correlates with demographical features. However, unlike the counting of demographic data, socioeconomic status of population members is measured in relation to other population members. It focuses strictly on economic and sociological combinations measuring an individual’s or family’s income, education, and occupation (and, more recently, the acquisition of wealth). These three measures are ranked relative to the economic and social status of other individuals in the population being considered, and can often be broken down into three sub-categories: high, middle, and low status (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2009). Social status is associated with any or all three variables, and thus reflects cultural norms and an individual’s perceived status in the larger community of the population being studied. Socioeconomic status is an important consideration for this study, because it provides insight into educational strategy selection based on economic means, previous educational backgrounds, and occupational experiences and careers sought by the different groups.
While demography and socioeconomic status help inform us about the individual characteristics of the group members, looking at organizational structure provides information on the functioning and social dynamics of each community. I use organizational structure to define (a) a group’s administrative body, which includes its leadership and membership structure; (b) how a group conducts its affairs; and (c) the local, regional, and international organizational branches. The inclusion of organizational structure in a study on organized religious groups provides useful data on how a group mobilizes, how collective resources are organized and used, how issues are framed, and how regime-group relations are formed and augmented by an organization’s institutions, leaders, and members.
The last feature included in the category of group composition and characteristics is ideological orientation. By ideological orientation, I refer to a group’s official stance on specific issues, based on their religious canon and teachings. As is the case for any given group, changes and modifications are made, by re-interpretation or reformation, to address contemporary problems. The ideological orientation of each religious group in this study is determined by three sources: (a) doctrine and canon, (b) religious leadership, and (c) individual interpretation. While an individual’s religious experience has both implicit and explicit aspects, I focus primarily on the explicit. By explicit, I refer to what the community subscribes to in belief (theological issues such as monotheism, source of authority, etc.), what is generally practiced by the majority (rituals, ceremonies, laws), and what is perceived as essential to being considered part of the group (affiliation criteria and identification based on the latter two indicators.
By looking at orientation, the observer will obtain a richer and contextualized understanding of what is important to a group and its members, and thus influences choices to sacrifice one thing for another, or willingness to lose one thing with the prospect of gaining something perceived as having equal or greater value. Ideological orientation bears significantly on the effectiveness of framing situations and actions. For example, whether an individual sees obedience to religious authority as being of primal importance in an individual’s accepted affiliation will have a significant impact on that person’s choice either to stay within the religion and follow instructions, not to engage in the community but to retain some semblance of affiliation with the religion, or to leave the community and religion altogether. The point of assessing the role of ideological orientation is to examine the extent to which beliefs can alter choices; or, in this case, the selection of plausible educational strategies. However, I address ideological orientation throughout the various descriptive features, and more directly when looking at particular episodes in the chapter on educational strategy selection; in this way, the abstraction of ideology is given more tangible expression through analysis of interactions.
Networks While I do not adopt the network analysis methodology (see Chapter 3), I look to concepts in network analysis to evaluate how the religious minority groups draw on domestic and international networks to meet their educational needs. Suffice it to say that a network is a set of actors or nodes connected by a specific type of relation, where actors or nodes are either individuals, collective actors, or organizations (Diani, 2002). Like organizational structures, networks may influence resource the mobilization, framing, and opportunity structures of a group (Tarrow, 2005).
Domestically, analyzing community and organizational networks provides a closer look at how a group (comprised of leaders and members) interacts with other groups in meeting their needs. Internationally, the examination of networks is important, because it informs any discussion on transnational movements and the efficacy of supranational influences on regime decisions. To this end, I look at how each minority group in Iran networks with its transnational communities (diasporas and otherwise), with other national governments and their agencies, non-Iranian nongovernmental agencies, and other international organizations.
Regime-Group Relations A group’s relation to the regime can be defined in a number of ways. In my analysis, I am concerned with four key factors which constitute regime-group relations: (a) official recognition of the rights of the group by the state regime; (b) representation of the group in state institutions; (c) the extent to which a regime facilitates, tolerates, or represses a group’s claims, and actions; and (d) the extent to which a group accepts, tolerates, resists, or rejects regime policies and claims.
Regimes implicitly and explicitly recognize various sub-groups within the population. Some sub-groups are identified as ethnic, linguistic, religious, or political. A regime’s public recognition comes in the form of legal documentation, such as constitutions, census data, or public edicts and addresses. Sometimes implicit recognition of the groups is made through tolerance of a group’s activities without endorsing or acknowledging the existence of the group. Likewise, a regime may not recognize a group for a variety of reasons, including neglect and lack of awareness; at other times, a regime may purposefully deny recognition of a group, with the result that its members are not accorded certain civil rights offered to the country’s other citizens; in other cases, a regime may claim plausible denial of any ill-treatment of that group.
The importance of looking at the representation of the group in state institutions has a number of advantages in gauging regime-group relations. First, and most obvious, is that inclusion of a group in the state structure implies immediate recognition and legitimacy of that group as part of the body politic. Second, it provides an outlet for voicing claims by the group to the regime, to seek further rights to particular state services or group liberties. Third, representation also means institutionalization of the group, which comes with both group privileges as well as limitations.
Representation is only one way that a group might be facilitated, tolerated, or repressed by the regime. Any given regime engages in these three behaviors toward every group. The government’s treatment of groups could be considered part of the opportunity structure provided for a group to make claims and mobilize toward collective action. By looking at government policies and practices as related to the case subjects, general patterns emerge to indicate what actions and groups are proscribed, tolerated, or prohibited.
In turn, looking at a group’s actions and the extent to which a group accepts, tolerates, resists, or rejects regime policies and claims, indicates the group’s relational approach to a regime. For the purpose of this study, I look at the extent to which a group selects educational strategies, based on how a group sees its current relation to the regime, how it perceives itself as being treated by the state, what opportunity structures exist under each regime, and how situations might be framed to benefit the group. Generally, the claims and actions of each case subject can be characterized as accepting, tolerating, resisting, or rejecting. Accepting would mean conforming to regime policies and practices, maintaining the status quo, and participating in the government’s facilitation processes. Tolerating actions refer to situations where a group consciously bears the brunt of unfavorable policies and actions, and takes no significant action to openly counter the regime’s decision. Resisting would entail a range of actions including disengagement, isolation, and contained actions, in response to regime policies and practices. Finally, rejecting involves the wholesale refusal of a government claim or action, leading to initiatives that may be condemned by the government, the formation of alliances with nongovernmental and international organizations in pressuring the government, and leaving the country.
Group Composition and Characteristics of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is As previously outlined, a combination of four features constitutes the category composition and characteristics: demography, socioeconomic status, organizational structure, and ideological orientation. These features as they relate to the three subject groups will be presented where information is available, and the three groups will be treated in a comparative analysis.
Demography The population count of the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities has significantly shifted over time. Different challenges and opportunities propelled emigration or caused stagnation, while other periods facilitated opportunities for growth. Obtaining accurate data on these groups has been challenging, as it has been much overlooked, leading to re-use of common but uncritically reviewed citations. To this end, I have triangulated sources to ascertain the population counts within each minority group, and made it a point to highlight estimates that may be vague, suspect, or which diverge from other sources.
Jewish Population in Iran. The Jewish community was reported to be about 100,000 in number in 1935. The population increased to 120,000 in 1948 according to one source (Jewish Agency in Tehran, as cited in Shiloah & Netzer, 2006) but declined to 90,000–100,000 according to another (Rahimiyan, 2008a, 2008b), and even lower by the Iranian Census which estimated 65,232. By 1966, according to the Iranian Census there were 60,683 Jews living in Iran. Numbers grew in the 1950s, despite emigration to Israel by Jews in the lower socioeconomic segment of the community.[1] In 1979, there were reportedly 65,000–70,000 (Aryeh Dulzin, as cited in Anderson, 1979; Yegar, 1993) Jews in Iran, most of whom lived in Tehran.[2] Later sources place the figure higher at 80,000 (Rahimiyan, 2008a, 2008b; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006). After the revolution, an exodus of Jews from Iran resulted in a population decline over the next decade to 26,354 (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, Iranian Census, 1986). According to the Islamic Republic’s census data, there were 12,737 Jews in 1996 and 9,252 in 2006; other sources for this period show close to 11,000 (World Jewish Congress, 2009). See Figure 8 for population trends for Iranian Jewry in the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods, and see Table C1 for estimation by various sources.[3]
Christian population in Iran. Iranians of Armenian descent account for the largest proportion of the Christians in Iran.[4] In 1956, an estimated 190,000 Armenians lived in Iran (Abrahamian, 1982). Firoozi (1974) placed the count of Armenians at 108,421 for 1966, out of the total estimated 149,427 Christians (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, Iranian Census, 1966). The number of Armenian Christians in Iran grew to somewhere between 270,000 (Amurian & Kasheff, 1987) and 300,000 (Minority at Risk Report, 2009b) for 1977, which significantly exceeded the total count of Christians by the Iranian Census for the same period (168,593 for 1976). By several accounts, there were varying estimates, ranging from 130,000 (Pakizegi, 1992), 200,000, and 300,000 Armenians in the 1980s (Sanasarian, 2000). After the revolution, however, the number has fallen significantly. Some approximations for the number of Armenian Iranian Christians place the population count at 112,000 (Marshall, 2000) to 150,000 (Sanasarian, 1995) for the 1990s. Many policy and government reports still place the number of Armenians higher than expected, at around 250,000 to 300,000 for the last decade (Minority at Risk Report, 2009b; United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2009). According to one source, there are only about 100,000 Armenians in Iran as of 2006 (Armenia Diaspora, 2009), which correlates relatively well with the Iranian Census data, which estimates a total of 108,415 Christians for 2006 (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, 2006).
Figure 8. Population of Iranian Jewry in the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods. Sources: American Jewish Yearbook (1950, 1962); Anderson (1979); Higgins (1984); Hourcade (1996); Iranian Census (various years); Rahimiyan (2008); Shiloah and Nezter (2006); World Jewish Congress (2009); Yegar (1993).
Other major Christian sects include the Assyrian and Chaldeans who were collectively estimated to number roughly between 10,000 (Macuch & Ishaya, 1987) in 1950–1951 and 20,000 for 1956 (Abrahamian, 1982). Macuch and Ishaya (1987) estimate that in 1971 the Assyrian population grew to slightly under 20,000. For the 1970s, Sanasarian (2000) estimated 30,000. For the 1980s, the numbers begin to vary significantly, ranging from 27,500 to 58,000 (Macuch and Ishaya, 1987; Pakizegi, 1992), Other numbers indicated a more conservative trajectory of population growth: Marshall (2000) estimated 23,000 Assyrians and 13,000 other Catholics for the 1990s, and Archbishop Youhannan Issayi (as cited in Sanasarian, 2000) put the count at 16,000 to 18,000. The Vatican reports around 17,000 Catholics (comprising Roman Catholics, Armenian, as well as Chaldean sects) in Iran as of 2009 (Thavis, 2009).
Protestant Christians are estimated to number between 5,000 and 15,000 in the population (Sanasarian, 2000); however the number remains uncertain because of the large number of converts that remain uncounted for safety reasons—because they are not a recognized religious minority. Additionally, the rise in Muslim converts to Christianity is undercounted according to some sources, because they would be considered apostates. Some inside sources estimate that between 50,000 to 120,000 Christians hide their religious affiliation in public (Issa Dibaj, cited in Esfandiari, 2004; Iranian Christians International, n.d.; Open Doors USA, 2009). While the Armenian presence in Iran has declined over the years since the revolution, conversion to Christianity has increased; the number however is difficult to ascertain. Figure 9 includes the averages of these figures, and includes Iranian Census reports during the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic Period for all Christian groups (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, Census Data, 1966–2006).
Note. Number of Protestants after 2000 is estimated at 50,000–100,000 because there is no public record.
*Total count for Christians by the Iranian National Census (Statistical Centre of Iran,1956–2006)
**Numbers reflect averages of available sources: Abrahamian (1982), Amurian & Kasheff (1987), Armenia Diaspora (2009), Cheney (2009), Esfandiari (2004), Firoozi (1974), Issayi (1992, as cited in Sanasarian, 2000), Macuch & Ishaya (1987), Marshall (2000), Minority at Risk Report (2001), Pakizegi (1992), and Sanasarian (1995).
Figure 9. Iranian Christian population averages by decade.
Baha’i population in Iran. During the Pahlavi era, statistics gathered in the earlier epochs were both unreliable and unsystematic, and did not include the Baha’is as a recognized minority. After the Revolution, the Baha’is again went unrecognized as a legitimate minority group in Iran. In 1915, Wilson (1915/1970) approximated the Baha’i population to be 100,000–200,000. There were a reported 192,000 Baha’is living in Iran in 1956 (Abrahamian, 1982), while Berges (1954) offers a ranged figure of 100,000–200,000 for the same decade. For 1975, Barrett (1982) estimated 295,000 Baha’is, similar to most other estimates of 300,000 by other early sources.[5] Baha’i sources outside Iran initially reported 300,000 to 400,000 members, but the estimates were reduced by Baha’i institutions to 300,000 based on non-Baha’i external sources. This latter figure is the most cited by academics, government organizations, and other accounts. Ahang Rabbani (personal communication, November 5, 2009) provided the author with a conservative calculation for this period. Based on the records of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran, some 75,000 Baha’i adults lived in Iran in 1977. Based on this figure, Rabbani calculated a total of 172,500 Baha’is for the period (including children and youth).[6] After the Revolution, there was a significant emigration of Baha’is, and counting the remaining community membership was next to impossible because of their unrecognized and banned status. The commonly cited figure of 300,000–350,000 has remained in circulation for the last 30 years, and is used by both Baha’i and non-Baha’i sources. While this number appears to be an overestimation, underestimating the number has its deficiencies as well, particularly because the number of Iranian Baha’is continues to increase through conversion and birth.
Geographic Spread of the Three Minority Groups The geographic spread of Jews, Christians and Baha’is also changed over time, but by most accounts, all three groups, like the general population, gravitated toward urban areas whenever possible when there were no opportunities locally. Figure 10 shows the general geographic distribution of the three religious minorities (ca. 1979–2009). A major influence on emigration outside the country for the various groups was domestic pressure and restrictions on mobility and freedom, as well as the lack of opportunity—whether as a result of discrimination or general disparity. For example, a large number of Iranian Jews left Iran for Israel in the 1950s, in search of opportunities unavailable to them in their home country. The pervasive the Islamic Republic and public sentiment after the 1979 Revolution in Iran played a role in motivating members of minority groups to leave Iran. This was especially critical for groups which perceived that their survival was threatened. A further motive for leaving the country after the 1979 Revolution was the war with Iraq, followed by a deteriorating economy. Other significant attractions for emigration were the perceived opportunities outside Iran, such as education, social freedom, economic, and political opportunity.[7]
Notwithstanding the varying and sometimes unreliable estimates of the numbers of the three religious minorities, it is important to note that the ebb and flow of growth and decline, whether influenced by an internal (domestic) or external (international) impetus has had a direct effect on other elements of the groups’ composition. Population count, clustering, and dispersion have a bearing on socioeconomic opportunities, the integrity of group organizational structures, and how group members frame and reframe ideological orientation. I argue that population count also affects the resources available to a group, including material, human, organizational, moral, and cultural resources. Similarly, the size and location of a group partially determine the accessibility and availability of strategies and opportunities; thus, a small or a large group will have particular advantages that the other does not. Small groups may not be as noticeable and thus be tolerated, while larger and more visible groups may face harsher scrutiny. Conversely, larger groups have a wider pool to draw from in mobilizing resources for community affairs, while a smaller community generally has fewer. Actions can also be framed in a similar context.
Note: The size of each symbol corresponds to the population count relative to own-group total, and is used to denote, high, medium, and small population size. While there are a number of other locations where group members live, this map shows noticeable populations as observed by various sources. For Christians (Assyrian and Chaldeans primarily live in Urmieh, Ahvaz; Armenian Christians primarily live in Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan. The majority of Baha’is and Jews live in Tehran and Shiraz and the surrounding cities.
Figure 10. Religious minorities in Iran (ca. 1979–2009)
Migration is particularly important in considering network ties and collective resources. Diaspora communities’ relationship with their home population can aid or impair a group’s ability to strategize and act collectively. Prior to the Pahlavi era, religious minority groups were fairly scattered throughout Iran. However, as in other segments of the population, many migrated to the cities where the government spent most of its development resources. In other words, greater opportunities for employment and education were perceived in such cities as Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, and other urban areas, especially for members of minorities.
All three groups moved to bigger cities over the decades, particularly Jews and Baha’is. However, Baha’is remained in many smaller localities because of their commitment to engage in local propagation of their religion and in order to sustain local communities. Christians also moved to urban areas like Tehran, but most maintained their communities in Isfahan, Urmieh, Tabriz, and Ahvaz. In 1946–1947 large numbers of Armenians moved to Soviet Armenia, following an open call to them from the Catholics of Soviet Armenia to help repopulate the homeland after the devastation and population decline of World War II (Amurian & Kasheff, 1987). The move to central cities changed other characteristics of the groups, notably the educational and professional opportunities that facilitated the Jewish and Baha’i communities’ social and economic mobility during the Pahlavi era.
While some Christians emigrated because of persecution during the time of Reza Pahlavi, significant migration occurred only after the Revolution. With the exodus of Christians and Jews, the communities in smaller areas suffered from isolation. Similarly, the Jewish population experienced large emigration to Israel beginning in the late 1940s and in the 1960s; however, 5,000 of the 57,111[8] Iranian Jews who moved during this period returned to Iran (Rahimiyan, 2008b). According to Haftvan (2006), half of the entire population of Armenians left Iran in the years immediately following the Islamic Revolution, moving primarily to the United States and Europe. The Minority Assessment Report (2009b) indicates that Christians had been leaving the country at a rate of 15,000 to 20,000 per year since 2001. Jewish émigrés during the 1970s and 1980s consisted primarily of those with financial means, opportunities outside the country, or ties abroad (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, November 2, 2009). The primary destinations for Jewish émigrés were the United States (35,000), Israel (20,000)[9] and Western Europe (5,000; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).[10] Many Baha’is also fled the country during and after the revolution because of heightened persecution of community members, leaders, and institutions. Most Baha’is who emigrated moved to the United States, Canada, Australasia, and Western Europe, although a smaller number went to countries in the Middle East, southern Asia, Africa, and South America. The precise number of Iranian Baha’i emigrants is unknown. However, based on records and estimates of Baha’i immigrants to the other countries, it seems that the number is relatively small, indicating that only some 20,000–50,000 have left since the early 1900s up to the present.[11] Many individuals and families who did not or could not leave the country moved to the hubs of their respective communities, but others remained in place out of a sense of service, duty, or because it was impractical for them to do otherwise. The loss of so many people had a noticeable impact on the vitality and organization of all three groups.
Socioeconomic Status of the Three Minority Groups There has been little serious study of the socioeconomic status of the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities in Iran, and for good reason. The data traditionally available in such assessments is generally unreliable, missing, or inaccessible. When discussing socioeconomic status of individuals or the average status of a group, four indicators are usually measured: family income, education, occupation, and wealth. While exact figures for each of these indices are unavailable, there have been generalizations made by insiders and outsiders based on observation of related indicators.
The Jewish community. Prior to the Pahlavi era, many urban Iranian Jews lived in distinct areas of a city (called mahalleh) having high concentrations of community members. In these special districts, shops, hospitals, schools, houses, synagogues, and other venues were run and used by Jews (Sarshar, 2002). Before the secularization efforts of Reza Shah, Jews had faced gross discrimination, and were prohibited from buying products from some Muslim-owned shops, baths, and public spaces; moreover, Muslims were often discouraged from buying products from Jews because of their najes or “impure” status. The mahalleh were not ghettos, nor were they mandatory, but they served the practical functions of everyday life (Sarshar, 2002). Before the Pahlavi era, Jewish children were not permitted in government or Muslim schools, but did not actually require this service, as Jewish-run schools and other religious minority schools proved to be higher in quality. Certain jobs or industries were off limits to Jews as well, such as banking or government posts. As a result, many became entrepreneurs and performed other services needed in their own community. One informant[12] relates that, because of the generally hostile attitude toward the Jewish community over the centuries, many members of the Jewish community sought professions that were mobile and less subject to long term disadvantage—such as goldsmithing, peddling, trading, etc. Socioeconomic status was tied directly to one’s religious affiliation and place of dwelling. While some Jews were able to successfully run businesses, or even work outside the Jewish community, the vast majority did not do so with ease.
The advent of Reza Shah’s rule of Iran ushered in new economic and educational opportunities for Iranian Jews. Due to Reza Shah’s nationalistic agenda, the primary identity of the citizen was secular rather than religious. Jews, like most religious minorities, were able to retain both national and religious identities, while benefiting from privileges that were usually reserved for Muslims. For example, Jews were allowed to serve in the military and higher posts in the government, able to buy land, open shops more freely outside the Jewish Quarters (mahalle-ye yuhudiyan), go to public schools and build new ones, and benefit from the new higher education sector that was being developed (Rahimiyan, 2008b). Despite the fluctuating strain of worsening Israel-Iran relations on Iranian Jews, most individuals were able to integrate into the burgeoning national Iranian identity that was characteristic of the political ideology of the Shah. Despite these gains, the majority of Iranian Jews were still relatively poor by the time Reza Shah abdicated the throne (Rahimiyan, 2008a).
Some refer to the period of Muhammad Reza Shah as the “Golden Age for Iranian Jews,” because of the significant improvement in the economic status of Jews during that period (Menashri, 2002; Rahimiyan, 2008a). Occupationally, those who rose in socioeconomic status were entrepreneurs, international dealers and importers, academics, industrialists, insurance brokers, developers, and real estate investors[13] (Loeb, 1996; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006). [14] According to Faryar Nikbakht (2002), one reason Jews were able to rise economically and socially was because they had been attending the French Alliance Israel Universelle school (established in 1898) for several decades prior to the Pahlavi era. Equipped with both English and French, they were the ideal candidates to supervise, manage, or work as intermediaries between the foreign technical industrialists brought by the Shah from abroad to help modernize Iran and its workers. These opportunities facilitated the movement of a segment of Iranian Jews, particularly those in urban areas, into the middle and higher class. The rising status of the Iranian Jewry was even more noticeable because of the migration of lower class Iranian Jews to Israel—seeking opportunities unavailable or inaccessible to them in Iran—as early as the late 1940s. By 1968, according to Haddad (1984), Iranian Jews were the wealthiest community of Jews in Asia and Africa.
The secular environment encouraged by the Pahlavi regime also had a bearing on Jewish status. Despite still being considered najes (impure) by Islamic standards, the focus on national identity facilitated the integration of Iranian Jews into the larger community. Nearly 68 percent of all Jews in Iran lived in Tehran by the 1970s. Some 10 percent became extremely wealthy, 80 percent were roughly middle class, and another 10 percent counted among the poor (usually in rural areas, but also in poor areas of the city (Nezter, 1981, as cited in Rahimiyan, 2008a). Although most of the original mahalleh still exist today in some form, most Iranian Jews were integrated and dispersed in the general population by the mid-1960s (Sarshar, 2002).
As mentioned earlier, the impetus for the social mobility of the Iranian Jewish community was due in part to open opportunity structures under the Pahlavis Shahs, and educational training decades earlier in various Jewish and other religious minority-run schools,[15] particularly the Alliance Israelite Universelle.[16] Jewish children also attended schools run by American and European Christian missionaries as well as Baha’is during the late 19th and early 20th century (Nikbakht, 2002). During both regimes of the Pahlavis,[17] Jewish children were able to attend government schools as well. The importance of the Alliance schools in developing the Jewish Iranian community—contributing to both the educational opportunities as well as status—cannot be overestimated. Their role as a hub promoting culture, networking, and training a new generation of “modern” youth prepared thousands of Jewish young men for service in the professions and set the stage for rapid development during the Pahlavi era (Nikbakht, 2002). The schools reflected the French ideological orientation toward liberalization, modern education, and extended into the cultural arena. The reputation of the schools attracted non-Jewish children (Muslims, Armenians, Assyrians, and Baha’is) who eventually made up 10 percent of the enrollment and included the children of some prominent government officials (Nikbakht, 2002).[18] Before the Alliance (Ettehad) and other Jewish schools, literacy in the Jewish community was limited to Persian-Hebrew (reading Hebrew with Persian letters), while attendance in these schools eventually resulted in literacy in Persian as well as other European languages for many thousands (Nikbakht, 2002).[19]
By 1968, there were 13 Alliance schools with 5,158 pupils (Schwarzfuchs & Malino, 2006), while other figures place the count for this period at 15 schools with 6,500 students (Netzer, 1985). Other locally based and foreign Iranian Jewish schools were opened throughout Iran as well, such as the Koresh School of Rast (1922), the Koresh School of Tehran (1931), Otzar Hatorah[20] (ca. 1947–1979; 31 schools), ORT (vocational and technical training schools), the Ettefaugh School in Tehran (1947), Abrisami, Ruhi Sad, and Saybani in Shiraz. By 1961, a reported 13,200 Jewish children attended the 37 various Jewish schools in Iran, and another 2,000–3,000 attended non-Jewish schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, American Jewish Yearbook, 1962).[21] By 1973, the number had dropped to some 10,647 students enrolled in Jewish-run schools, 45 percent of whom were Jewish children (American Jewish Committee Archives, American Jewish Yearbook, 1975). The decrease in attendance in Jewish schools from 14,000 to a little over 10,000 can be explained by the proliferation of government-run schools accessible to Jews and others during the period of Muhammad Reza Shah, as well as to migration outside Iran.[22]
Scholarships were usually extended to Jewish children who could not afford to attend Jewish-run schools, and additional clothing, hot lunches, and health services were made available to poor students. Funding for these schools came from wealthy donors in Iraq, France, and England, as well as from organizations and synagogue congregations. By the 1970s, organizations and committees were the primary financial managers of these institutions (including the Sanduk Melli or the Jewish National Treasury Committee; American Jewish Committee Archives, 1975). In other words, schools and learning institutions constituted the primary means of distribution of “wealth” through material, social, and cultural capital—the channels for social mobility. In turn, many Jewish graduates entered the new universities throughout the country, and, after graduating, some joined the various faculties. The significant boost in economic status also helped the newly schooled generation of Jews to change the lives of their families for generations to come.
The Christian community. The different Christian communities in Iran benefited from similar processes of socioeconomic status mobility experienced by many Iranian Jews, but with significant differences. The foreign Christian missionary and Armenian schools served as an important first step in equipping students with the skills and knowledge to meet the demands of the modernization and industrialization agenda during the Pahlavi regimes. Traditionally made up of artisans, many were able, during the first half of the 20th century, to adjust to the modernizing efforts of the new government. According to Bournoutian (1994), because of transnational ties and language advantages (French and English in schools), Armenian Iranians thrived as both fine and performing artists, tailors, cobblers, photographers, managers of cafes and restaurants, but also as traders, auto-mechanics, truckers, technicians, and business owners. Others who attended Christian schools experienced similar advantages. Only a very small number rose to the upper class, with the majority remaining in the low and new middle class (Bournoutian, 1994; Burke, 1993).[23] Christians experienced moderate upward mobility during the Pahlavi era, as compared with the tour-de-force carried out by the Jews and Baha’is of the same period. The long tradition of guilds among Armenians and Assyrians assisted in facilitating opportunities as Iran was modernizing (Yaghoubian, 1993).
While reliable figures are difficult to obtain, we have good evidence that during the years 1925–1979 there were some 48 Armenian schools (several small, one-class, as well as more established multi-grade schools; Bournoutian, 1994; Sanasarian, 2000). Some scholars have suggested that the initial rise of modern schooling among Apostolic Armenians was spurred by the rivalry between Presbyterian and Catholic missions which were perceived as a threat because they attempted to convert others (Rostam-Kolayi, 2008; Zirinsky, 1993a; discussed in Chapter 6). By the time Reza Shah came into power, there were already 13 Presbyterian schools in Tehran, Hamadan, Rasht, Tabriz, and Urmia (Zirinsky, 1993a). The French Lazarist Catholic missionaries established one of the first nonreligious oriented schools in 1938, which attracted students from various faiths (Shahvar, 2009). Around 1975, the Chaldean Church had a school “Sarq,” which had 370 students and 15 teachers, and a national school “Susan” with over 750 students and 14 teachers (Macuch and Ishaya, 1987).
Initially, the missionary school curriculum emphasized practical and technical education, but later this expanded to include foundations for business, industrial work, training in the trades, business, engineering, and medicine (Zirinksy, 1993a, 1993b). Some Christian schools enjoyed a prestigious reputation, such as the Alborz College of Tehran, as well as the Nurbakhsh girl’s school, and attracted students from all religious communities and prominent government officials (Armajani, 1985; Doolittle, 1983; Zirinsky, 2009). While there are no accurate figures for the total number of students that attended the schools—much less for their ethno-religious composition—the closest estimate based on trajectory and representation indicate some 10,000–15,000 students.[24]
The Baha’i community. Like the Jewish community, the more nascent Baha’i community in Iran benefited from its own schools during the late 19th and early 20th century, and was primed for the opportunities available to them during the Pahlavi Era. Unlike the many Jews who lived in the mahalleh or the Christians who were concentrated in specific regions of Iran (such as New Julfa), Baha’is were the most dispersed of the three groups, and represented membership from an array of social-economic classes. This was in part due to the speedy growth of the religion which had attracted converts from the time of its earliest beginnings in the 1840s (Smith, 1987). However, because of the persecution and stigma associated with the Baha’is, they were often isolated and their mobility restricted. Public government schools were rare during this period in Iran, and Islamic schools were inaccessible, if not dangerous, for Baha’i children to attend (Banani, 1961). However, from the outset, education was a religious injunction in the Baha’i Faith, set by its founder and his successors, and by 1899, the first modern school was established. By 1938, there were 50 Baha’i schools open to children of all religions throughout Iran (Shahvar, 2009). While no exact figure is given, approximately 10,000 to 25,000 children attended these schools during the years that they were in operation. Some estimate that about 10 percent of all school children attended Baha’i-run schools (Baha’i International Community, 2005a). Baha’is and many non-Baha’is attended these schools, making it difficult to provide reliable figures for number of Baha’i pupils.
The schools increased one after another in large and small cities throughout Iran, and were further supported by members of the American Baha’i community, who played a significant role in developing the structure and philosophy of the schools (Shahvar, 2009). The schools strictly adhered to the curricular requirements of the new Pahlavi Ministry of Education, and refrained from including Baha’i education (Banani, 1961). With the Pahlavi focus on modernity, the Baha’is were able to implement their own modern principles, pioneering in a variety of fields, despite being stigmatized as an aberrant group by large segments of the general society.[25] The schools were highly regarded by many non-Baha’is, and even government officials and prominent families of Muslims sent their children there.
With the more liberal policies toward religious minorities that characterized the later Pahlavi period, Baha’is continued to seek education from modern schools which had been established decades earlier, and began to pursue higher education in Iran’s new universities. Some even joined the growing number of students abroad (particularly in the United States and Western Europe). As several scholars have indicated, the education and progressive orientation of Baha’is, coupled with open opportunities, led to the social mobility of many of its community members during the period of Muhammad Reza Shah, much as it had for the Jews (Keddie, 1981; Naficy, 1981; Shahvar, 2009). Even though the Baha’is were a nonrecognized religious minority, their growing affluence and prominence in positions of influence and in education was noticeable to many (Abrahamian, 2008). This fact would later be used against the Baha’is during the time of the Islamic Republic, when opponents of the Baha’is accused them of collaborating with the Shah, with the imperialist interests of the United States and Great Britain, and with Zionism. Baha’is who were members of the new middle and upper classes of modern Iran included businessmen and entrepreneurs, doctors and nurses, engineers and architects, international traders, academics, government sector employees, as well as managers and supervisors. As with other minority groups, they occupied their share of the traditional middle class (teachers, artisans, and the merchants known as bazaari) and lower class, engaged in common trades (e.g., peddling, tailoring, etc.).
The rise of a segment of their population to the upper and middle class strengthened their community organization, structures and property, and services offered. This, in turn, boosted their status within society as modernists, progressives, and socially mobile members of society. Baha’is, however, remained out of favor and were often the target of more radical and conservative factions of the Muslim community,[26] the Baha’is nonetheless experienced significant and unprecedented social mobility during the Pahlavi period, particularly economically and educationally. According to one 1973 report (Baha’i World Centre, 1968–1973, Vol. 15, p. 248), illiteracy had been eradicated among Baha’i women under the age of 40. Literacy for boys was equally advanced, similar to that of those who attended the Jewish, Christian, and foreign schools. Baha’is were accepted into many government posts at all levels, including the civil service, the military (as noncombatants), and even high appointed positions (Banani, 1961; Keddie, 1981; Milani, 2008).
Status of Minority Groups Under the Islamic Republic of Iran With the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), conditions, opportunities, and status immediately changed for religious minority groups. Several key factors led to the rapid reorganization of the socioeconomic structure of the Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. Over the 30-year span of the Islamic Republic (1979–2009), virtually all members of the upper class belonging to any of the three groups left the country, because of the threat to their well-being and safety. It is extremely difficult to assess with any accuracy the real socioeconomic status of religious minorities in the Islamic Republic, and thus a general overview of their economic, educational, and occupational conditions will have to suffice.
The victory and aftermath of the Islamic Revolution aroused uncertainty in many members of the Jewish population, prompting the largest emigration of Iranian Jews—particularly from the upper and middle class—during these three decades.[27] Nonetheless, recognized religious minority groups were included in the new Iranian constitution, and given representation in Parliament. The rights and privileges prescribed to these groups were insignificant, but dhimma (protected) status was extended to them. As with the general population, Jews and Christians in rural areas who were part of the lower class probably benefited from the literacy campaigns of the Islamic Republic, resulting in a 99 percent literacy rate in the new generation. However, because Christians and Jews were considered second-class citizens—not being Muslims—they did not benefit equally from the social services extended to Muslim supporters of the Revolution. With the exodus of many of their leaders and prominent, educated community members, the cultural and social aspects of both Jewish and Christian communities suffered.
Jewish and Christians schools were reorganized to reflect the agenda of the Islamic Republic and gain regime approval. Name changes to schools and buildings, reformation of the curriculum, and restructuring of the administrative and teaching staff of minority-run schools were at the top of the agenda, and had an inevitable affect on the educational quality being offered to Christian and Jewish students. The heavy-handed dogmatic curriculum and overt domination of Shi’i ideology had a detrimental impact on minority populations, often leading to higher rates of emigration, by means of which parents sought better conditions, especially educational opportunity, for their children (Mossayeb & Shirazi, 2006).
The Islamic Republic never recognized the Baha’is as a legitimate religious minority. Moreover, the Minister of Education, Mohammad Ali Raja’i, an open opponent of the Baha’is, called for the immediate expulsion of all Baha’i children from schools and universities, and demanded the firing of any Baha’i who worked for the education system (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006). Ultimately, Baha’is were allowed to enroll in primary, elementary, and secondary schools, but still faced sporadic harassment and on occasion expulsion or suspension when identified as Baha’is. A ban was placed on self-identified Baha’is seeking access to higher education, even if they were able to successfully pass the university entrance exam. Those who slipped through the filtering process were expelled once identified. To date, there is no record of any Baha’i graduate from a public university since the Cultural Revolution. This was a blow to the Iranian Baha’i community. Many of those with means among the middle and upper class left the country during the first few years, when there was unabated violence by the regime against Baha’i families, institutions, businesses, and social service organizations. However, as with the other religious minority groups, some prominent Baha’is members deliberately remained to tend to the needs of the remaining community. In 1987, desperate to meet the educational needs of its young members, Baha’is started a distance-learning university, the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education (BIHE), made up of volunteer instructors and professors—a university which is not only unaccredited in Iran, but which also undergoes raids and closure from time to time (discussed in Chapter 6). Thus, while no real number is given for the educational status of Baha’is under the Islamic Republic, it is safe to say that many seek education as they did during the Pahlavi era. Children attend government-run schools when possible, and, as of this writing, only a few thousand now participate in the Baha’i university. According to an administrator of the Institute (personal communication, October 21 and 28, 2009), some 500 are admitted each year, with the most recent enrolment for the academic year 2010 totaling about 3,000.[28]
Consultation with several sources from different groups both inside and outside Iran reveals that there is a generally conviction that the economic and educational status of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is has deteriorated significantly during the Islamic Republic. Public statements by members of Iran’s Jewish community claim that they enjoy equal rights under the Islamic Republic, but such comments have received much criticism by other community members, who suggest that they do not correspond to the geopolitical and social realities and pressures of life in Iran (Cohen, 2009; Melamed, 2009; “MP: Iran only country,” 2010; Tugend, 2009). However, it is possible that those who have made such statements are lower class and rural residents who benefit from a wider range of social services under the Islamic Republic than were made available during the Pahlavi era. It is important to note that most of the modernization and industrialization developments during the Pahlavi era benefited urban areas and the elite in other regions. While Jews and Christians are allowed by the Islamic Republic to work for the government, they are barred from certain positions (in both public and private sectors). Baha’is are banned from employment at any level of the government, and even private businesses are discouraged from hiring Baha’is. The private sector, however, has been the arena where Baha’is have been able to maneuver and secure livelihoods, and in a few cases thrive in Iran like members of other religious minorities, although not on an equal footing with their Shi’i Muslim countryman.
Whereas in the time of the Pahlavis, nationalism was the primary agenda, during the Islamic Republic, Islamization of society is at the heart of the Islamic Republic. Thus, religious identity has become political. The idea of equality based on national identity was replaced by religious status. According to Shi’i doctrine, while the “People of the Book” are given protective status, they are not equal to Muslims. For example, all non-Muslims are considered to be ritually impure. Some Muslim leaders, such as Ayatollah Montazeri (2008), have adopted a more liberal orientation toward religious minorities. Nonetheless, he has repeatedly voiced in public his conviction that religious minorities in Iran are entitled to equal rights as Iranian citizens (while not denying their status according to Islamic teachings; Fani-Yazdi, 2008; Sanasarian, 2000).
Organizational Structure The organization of religious groups is too broad a topic to discuss in detail here. Therefore, I have narrowed my discussion to its functionality in communal and public life. Under this heading, three structural elements will be addressed in brief: (a) administrative body; (b) operation of affairs; and (c) organizational international branches. While this categorization of organizational structure is limited, it will suffice for the analysis of the mobilization and collective action undertaken by minority communities, the extent to which a group can gather and employ resources, and the role of community leaders in framing situations as opportunities or challenges. For the sake of brevity, I will also refrain from elaborating on the historical development of these institutions.
Organization of the Jewish Community. As of 1938, the Hebra (the governing assembly of the Jewish community), was registered as the Tehran Jewish Committee (TJC), and this body operates to the present day as the main administrative arm of the Jewish community, under the supervision of the government (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). Appointed subcommittees under the Tehran Jewish Committee look to the provision of a variety of community services and activities.[29] Jewish religious authority is vested in three sources: the Chief Rabbi,[30] the elected Jewish representative to Majles, and the Board of Directors of the Central Tehran Jewish Committee (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). The Chief Rabbi oversees the spiritual affairs of the community, and those elements that relate to Jewish law; the Majles representative is the official spokesman for the community regarding policies, statements, and proclamations about the Iranian Jewish community. Finally, while each locality has its own elected committee, the Board of Directors of the Tehran Jewish Committee oversees the social affairs of the community, including health care, education, social services, publications,[31] event organization, facilities, and property management.[32] The Iranian Jewish community in Iran is centralized through its administrative arm, but regional communities maintain religious autonomy through their local synagogues. Funds to support facilities and services in various regions, including the posts of rabbis and other religious functionaries, come from collections gathered from the local community. Sometimes, affluent members of the community, and even individuals outside the country made large donations, but this has become more infrequent over the last 20 years.
Since the early 1900s, Jews were offered the opportunity to have representation in Parliament, but the influence of the successive individuals who held this post was negligible, and was largely confined to their own community (Loeb, 1996). As a result of being institutionalized during the Pahlavi era, and even after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the Jewish community has, by and large, been able to establish and maintain many of its facilities, organizations, and public services. In 2007, there were 100 synagogues throughout the country, 26 of which were located in Tehran (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). As a result of the emigration of large numbers of Iranian Jews and the acquisition of Jewish schools by the state,[33] there are only five special Jewish schools remaining today (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). From the end of the Pahlavi era to the present, Tehran remains the main hub for the community; according to several sources, there is a noticeable disconnect between the Jews of Tehran and Shiraz.[34]
Today, most Iranian Jews live outside of Iran, the largest concentration being in the United States, Israel, and Western Europe. Confirmed by several sources, the connection between the community in Iran and its diaspora was very strong shortly after the Revolution, but has weakened continually since that time.[35] While individuals and some relief organizations provide donations to the Jewish hospital, nursing home, synagogues, and schools, the efforts are uncoordinated. There exists no transnational organization unifying Iranian Jews with those outside the country; rather, Jewish organizations and leaders inside and outside of Iran function separately. Immediately following the Revolution, the spiritual leader of the Jewish community, After the execution of several prominent community members after the Revolution, Jewish leaders made it clear that the Jewish community in Iran would be loyal to the Islamic Republic of Iran and would disavow any association with Zionism and the State of Israel (Menashri, 2002).
Organization of the Christian community. Unlike the Jews and Baha’is, there is no one coherent way to describe the organizational structure of Christians because of the multiplicity of their denominations in Iran. The three major denominations in Iran are the Armenian Apostolic and Catholic Church, the Assyrian Church of the East, and the Chaldean Catholic Church. Other Christian denominations, consisting of Armenians and Assyrians, as well as converts, include Protestants, such as Presbyterians (Evangelical Church of Iran), Pentecostals (Assyrian Pentecostal Church, Assemblies of God or Jama’iate Rabbani), and Anglicans (Cheney, 2009; Diocese of Iran, n.d.; Macuch & Ishaya, 1985; World Council of Churches, 2009). The denominations are highly fragmented, and observations indicate that there have been tense relationships over the centuries between and among particular groups (Sanasarian, 2000).
Hierarchical structures vary among the denominations, but generally follow a similar overarching model. For instance, the Catholic churches (such as the Assyrian, Chaldean, and Armenian churches in Iran) have priests or bishops who can be elevated to the higher rank of archbishop. Parishes exist in various localities under the auspices of a diocese or archdiocese (sometimes referred to as eparchy or archeparchy). The Chaldean Catholics adhere to the authority of the Vatican in Rome, while it is only since 1994 that the Assyrian Church of the East has begun to reconcile with the Church in Rome and their Chaldean counterpart (Vatican, 2001). The Assyrian Church of the East has three major churches and 15 missions in Iran, guided by their international spiritual leader, Mar Dinkha IV, the Assyrian Catholic Patriarch. The Armenian Apostolic Church follows a similar hierarchical model, and pays its allegiance to the Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia, the spiritual leader of the Church.[36] There are three diocese of the Apostolic Church in Iran, one each in Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz.[37] The Apostolic leadership ranks follow a line of hierarchy beginning with the clergy or laity and ending ultimately with the catholicos.. While there was some growth of organizational leadership for both groups during the Pahlavi era, there has been a consistent decline in the number of bishops, priests, clergy, and parishes throughout Iran for both denominations since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.[38]
Although all of these mainstream Christian churches are officially under the leadership of supranational organizations, they have tended to the affairs of their community with little guidance with regard to policies and practices outside of religious practice. The two government-recognized Christian denominations are the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Assyrian Church (including the Chaldeans); this recognition was extended during the Pahlavi regimes and the Islamic Republic. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Armenians receive two seats (a representative from north and south) and Assyrians receive one seat.[39] Protestant denominations are not recognized as legitimate branches within the country, and are tolerated as part of the total collective of Iran’s Christians.
The organization of the evangelical churches is more difficult to define because of their nonrecognized status and diverse affiliations with Western churches in the United States and Europe. Their spiritual leadership is based on a hierarchical model. One important development among Protestant (particularly evangelical) converts is private worship in homes. Because conversion from Islam to Christianity is considered an act of apostasy, many meet privately in what some adherents call “home-worship.” Unlike the Apostolic and Assyro-Chaldean[40] churches, which remain insular, these other groups engage in active proselytizing among Muslims and other religious minorities.
Several of the Christian denominations created committees and appointed delegates to run various organizations, publications, and other services provided to the community. Funding for running these activities came primarily from members of the congregation. However, missionary schools established in the 19th and early 20th centuries received both material and human resources from groups outside the country. In the case of protestant groups, external resources were the primary means of running schools, hospitals and clinics, and other services under the supervision of the missions.[41] Nominal aid was also extended to the Armenian and Assyrian schools by their respective heads outside Iran at various points during the Pahlavi dynasty.
Organization of the Baha’i community. In contrast to Judaism and Christianity, there is no clergy in the Baha’i Faith. There are, however, two branches of leadership: elected administrative bodies and appointed individuals. The local administrative body of the Baha’is is called the Local Spiritual Assembly (LSA), a council comprised of nine democratically elected individuals from the total population of a given city or locality. These nine individuals elect officers from among their own number for a one-year term of service. In Baha’i elections at all levels, the nine individuals serve on a voluntary basis. Such service is considered a sacred duty, does not require formal training, and is not accompanied by ordination or other ritual. The individuals who are elected have no special rank or station, are not privy to arcane knowledge, nor do they have individual power over other members of the community (Effendi, 1973). There is no institutional concept of a “professional” religious leader in the Baha’i community. In Iran, the above structure existed until the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which formally banned all Baha’i organizations, national and local, in 1983.
The elected Assemblies are responsible for the guidance of the religious and social affairs and development of their respective communities, and appoint committees to meet special needs at the national, regional, and local level within their jurisdiction. Members of each National Spiritual Assembly (NSA) of the Baha’is elect the international governing institution of the Baha’i community, called the Universal House of Justice. This body was first established in 1963, and is elected every five years. The prophet founder of the Baha’i Faith (1817–1892) indicated that the individual members of the international body also held no special rank or station, but that the collective decisions were binding on every Baha’i (Baha’u’llah, 1873/1992). The issue of binding authority is important when considering the impact of framing situations in Iran. The Baha’i Faith functions within an umbrella organizational structure..Both appointed and elected positions are generally unpaid, except for those roles which require significant dedication of time, such as the elected executive officers of some Local or National Assemblies where there are large concentrations of Baha’is.
Staffing of the administrative bodies varies from country to country. As elsewhere, the Iranian NSA and some 400 LSAs appointed committees to provide services to the community. As elsewhere in the world, the funds of the community came from voluntary donations from individual community members only,[42] and are managed by local and national elected treasurers (officers of the Local or National Assembly). During the time of the Pahlavi Shahs, the National and Local Spiritual Assemblies in Iran appointed directors for special service institutions established by the community, such as hospitals or schools.
During the Pahlavi era, the Iranian Baha’i community was considered one of the most developed in the Baha’i world. In 1934, it formed its first NSA.[43] Soon after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, many of the members of the Baha’i administration, including two iterations of the NSA, as well as many LSA members were arrested, often tortured, and killed. In 1983, the Prosecutor General Seyyed Hossein Mussavi-Tabrizi pronounced a ban on any formal or informal organization and administrative activity of the Baha’is in Iran (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006).[44] The Baha’is immediately responded by dismantling the National and all Local Spiritual Assemblies, showing no sign of rejection toward the government. To retain some semblance of organization, the Universal House of Justice appointed an ad hoc committee, called the Yaran (Friends), to oversee the basic affairs of the Iranian Baha’i community, and local working groups called Khademin (Servants). In 2008, with the arrest and imprisonment of the seven members of the Yaran and threat to their life, the Baha’is voluntarily dissolved the committee, after it was declared illegal. Several Baha’i sources in Iran have reported that Baha’i activities since then have been minimal, reduced to children’s classes, prayer meetings in homes, the only Baha’i organization still in operation being the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education (anonymous Baha’i in Iran, personal communication, 13 December 2009).
Networks of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is To assess the social and organizational networks of the Jews, Christians, and Baha’is in Iran with other actors, I will draw on concepts found in network analysis studies. In the Methods section, I discussed how technical concepts of network analysis were adjusted in order to conceptualize network relations of religious minority groups. The network diagrams which follow are of my own design, and are used to identify ties and interaction among groups, regimes, and transnational actors. The networks include consideration of nodes (i.e., actors), geographic level, type of ties (direct, indirect, or independent), strength, and content (resources, advocacy, and information). The reader may refer to Chapter 3 for more detailed discussion of technical information.
Network Ties of the Jewish Community Over the centuries, as a result of compounding factors, the network configuration of the community changed, but ultimately created strong local and regional ties, and moderate domestic ties between localities. By the early 20th century, Jewish communities in Europe extended their ties to the Iranian Jewish community, notably from the Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU) organization and the British Jewish Council. During the Pahlavi era, the Iranian Jewish communities benefited significantly from the AIU’s services, including education and social welfare, and in turn created the opportunity to form and strengthen ties to Western Europe. The Iraqi Jewish community, one of the largest in the Middle East, experienced its own exodus because of the threat of genocide to Jewry, many of whom left for Israel and Iran.
By the 1930s, there was a strong Iraqi Jewish presence in Iran that would ultimately become integrated by the nationalization campaign of Reza Shah. The tie between Iraqi-Iranian Jews and those in Iraq remained strong during the early years of the Pahlavi dynasty, particularly in facilitating guidance and resources from wealthy individuals of Iraqi descent as well as leadership of the Iraqi Jewish Council (Nikbakht, 1999; personal communication, 2 November 2009). Despite degraded status and treatment of Jews in the past, Jews during the Pahlavi era were accorded representation in Parliament, official recognition, and, toward the second epoch, experienced near equal rights with other citizens, including access to high-ranking government positions. As mentioned earlier, with the formation of Israel, there were many in the Iranian Jewish community who supported Zionist efforts, including the eminent Jewish leader Habib Elghanian (Milani, 2008). Some, however, opposed Zionist efforts, and sought an exclusive Iranian Jewish identity. By the 1960s, ties to the American, British, and Israeli Jewish communities were strong (see Figure 10). In contrast, the tie between the communities in Tehran and Shirazi was weak, because of tensions over issues of religious observance, with Tehran Jews leaning toward the more secular, nationalist agenda, while the Jews of Shiraz were more sympathetic to overt religious identity and conservative values.
The modernization and nationalization that took place in Iran permeated the Jewish community, strengthening ties of community members with the regime, and simultaneously strengthening ties with Western Jewish communities, particularly the American Jewish community. Like other religious minorities during this period, the relative flexibility afforded the Jewish community during the Pahlavi era facilitated the sharing of resources, education, and services with other religious minorities—for example, Jews attended both Christian and Baha’i schools and vice versa. There was no supranational body that bound the communities together, and even though there was a leader for all Jews in Iran, the local communities shared only moderate ties from region to region, depending primarily on local leadership. As illustrated in the diagram, the Iranian Jewish community was able to draw from a wide range of resources to meet various needs. Most of its ties were direct and unilateral. Existing independent ties provided a more open opportunity structure for Jews during the Pahlavi era.
With the advent of the Islamic Republic, the national Jewish community was still allowed its seat in Parliament, conditioned upon its representative disassociating with any Zionist sentiments, and completely breaking ties with Western and Israeli Jewish communities. This isolated the Iranian Jewish leadership and its community from others around the world. Those who attempted to retain ties with the West and Israel were repressed through various means, including execution, arrest, torture, property and wealth confiscation and destruction, and exile, among other harsh treatment.
Over the three decades of the Islamic Republic, sources outside Iran identify three different group-ties with the Iranian Jewish community.[45] The first are those who left Iran, but retain national pride and sympathy for those who remain, and thus extend support to Iranian Jews, usually in the form of monetary donations (moderate ties remain). The second group consists of those who left Iran, reject the validity of the regime, and urge others to leave the country as well; of this group there are those who do and do not extend aid to Iranian Jews (weak and moderate ties remain). The third group, mostly younger Iranian Jews outside Iran, has weak or no ties with the Jewish community in Iran, choosing, instead to integrate into the general Jewish population. However, among all three groups, a move toward cautious advocacy has emerged particular since the late 1990s. Some have collaborated with NGOs, non-Iranian state agencies, and even formed their own coalitions to assist in ameliorating the depressed condition of Iranian Jews. This has taken the form of news articles, reports, statements, and even aid to assist Iranian Jews who experience hardship and persecution. On rare occasions, Jewish organizations, primarily in the United States and England, extend significant support to the Iranian Jewish community when situations of grave danger arise. The best example is the case of the arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz who were accused of espionage and put on trial for treason in 1999.
The Jewish community in Iran claims no tie whatsoever to this latter movement of advocacy, and often state their absolute contentment under the Islamic Republic of Iran, stressing their strong ties with the government (“MP: Iran only country,” 2010; see Figure 11).[46] Ties between Iranian Jewish communities inside and outside Iran are mostly fragmented or invisible to the general public. There is no substantial collaboration between the Iranian Jewish communities in Western Europe, the United States, and Israel. Some Iranian and non-Iranian Jewish individuals and organizations have voiced concern for the situation facing Iran’s Jews today, and some even offer services to Jews who wish to leave Iran. But no advocacy campaign or highly organized connection exists today between the Iranian Jewish communities inside the country and those outside.[47] While the network diagram in Figure 11 illustrates the high level of independent connections (and activity) among various non-Iranian nodes, it also reflects the Iranian Jewish community’s relative isolation from them under current conditions. In other words, there is an increase in advocacy on behalf of the Iranian Jewish community, but the community within Iran disassociates itself from it. This isolationist behavior constitutes the primary survival strategy of the Jewish community in Iran, which has ultimately made it even more dependent on its relationship with the current regime. It is also the residual effect of the regime’s own political isolation from countries with which the Iranian Jewish community used to have ties.
Figure 11. Jewish networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 12. Jewish networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009)
Network Ties of the Christian Community Much like the Jewish communities of the early 20th century, the Christians benefited significantly from exchanges with missionary services and interaction with foreigners. By the 1930s, many Armenians, Assyrians, Protestant converts, and other denominations had made connections with transnational communities, and received foreign aid from them during the industrialization initiatives of Reza Shah. There was some cross-religious exchange through institutions and services provided by Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. Two groups in particular developed strong ties with Christians in Iran during the Pahlavi era: the American Presbyterians and the British Anglican Church. While their connection to the leadership in Iran was almost nonexistent, these organizations were a source of funding and advocacy for schooling efforts.
Ethno-religious Christian leadership and organizations became more separatist (from other denominations) during this period. Not only was interdenominational collaboration absent, but rivalry was frequent between and among the different groups. While the Assyrians and Chaldeans follow almost identical doctrinal foundations, cultural and religio-political tensions over past centuries divided them. The Armenians were among the most vocal protesters against missionary activity by Western Europeans who actively recruited from their congregation. The Pahlavi regime only recognized the Apostolic Armenian Church and the Assyrian Church of the East, allotting two Parliamentary seats to the former and one to the latter. However, Armenian ties to the regime were weak and even strained during the first half of the Pahlavi era, due, in part, to the ethnic and national concerns which were incompatible with Reza Shah’s monolithic Persian identity campaign. Armenian-Iranians strengthened ties with their transnational community, drawing on their expertise particularly in the running of schools and cultural programs. The Protestant churches were never officially recognized by the government, and thus never had direct ties, other than through the governments in the countries from which they originated.
The guilds were another strong tie connecting Assyrians and Armenians with fellow community members. Significant material, organizational, and human resources were brought in from Europe and America to found schools and health clinics, as well as other organizations that served the Christian community. The Armenian Apostolic Church received social, organizational, and moral support through the coordinated efforts of the Catholicos of Cilicia. But other than some human resources from Armenia, material resources came mostly from the local community. The same was true for the Assyrian Church of the East as well as the Chaldeans. Supranational ties to organizations such as the World Council of Churches and the Middle East Council of Churches were fairly strong, and although valuable as a means of visible unity and eucharistic fellowship, did not confer anything on the local community other than recognition and awareness.
While missionaries and foreign control of facilities were prohibited during the regime of Reza Shah, the move toward amicable relations with the West in the time of Muhammad Reza Shah (1960s and 1970s) offered opportunities of domestic and transnational social mobility among all Christian groups. Although network ties were weak among Christian denominations, there were moderate to strong ties between each group and its own superior organization and community outside the country. Figure 13 illustrates the Christian Network during the Pahlavi period, and how most ties were direct, moderately strong, and few.
The ties between the various Western affiliated denominational groups were strengthened in one respect and weakened in another under the Islamic Republic. The non-Iranian denominations in countries like the United States jeopardized their local Iranian counter-parts by associating them with imperial powers. This led many Protestants to leave the country after the Revolution. However, even after the Revolution, there was a noticeable rise in activity among evangelical Christians in Iran, including proselytizing and conversion of Muslims and other religious minorities. This strained existing weak ties between missionaries and the government, and ultimately led to a rise in persecution in the 1990s targeting leaders in the Protestant Christian community. The persecution of Christians in Iran strengthened their ties with both Iranian and non-Iranian counterparts in the United States, Britain, and other countries and groups of the World Evangelical Alliance (World Evangelical Alliance, n.d.). This also led to the rise of NGO ties and advocacy on behalf of Protestant Christians in Iran. Resources were also extended to the community in Iran by transnational community members and organizations, such as Iranian Christian International affiliates (mostly in the United States), Elam Ministries (centered in England with international reach), and the Open Doors USA/UK campaign. Ties with the government of the Islamic Republic were very weak and officially did not exist. Recognized and institutionally represented Christians, on the other hand, avoided any association with Western institutions and organizations, and followed their typical practice of insular communal activity.
By the middle of the 1990s, the Assyrian Church, led by Catholicos Patriarch Mar Dinkha IV—based in Chicago since the early 1980s—moved the Assyrian Church toward reconciliation with the Chaldeans and the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, ties of collaboration between the Catholic groups strengthened during this period—although this was not necessarily the result of the situation in Iran, and is thus not reflected in the network diagram in Figure 14. Nonetheless, independent support was given by communities outside Iran for the situation facing Iranian Catholics, as evidenced by the most recent statement of the Pope to the Iranian Ambassador to the Vatican (Thavis, 2009).
For the most part, the ties between denominations remain nonexistent to weak, only sharing knowledge to keep some semblance of solidarity when addressing issues related to Parliament (Sanasarian, 2000). Moreover, some sources have indicated that even discord between leaders of some of the different communities continues today.[48] It is important to note that although resources are forthcoming from superior institutions outside Iran, as is the case for the Protestants, the actual amount of aid remains undetermined by this author. Community affairs seem to be primarily managed by national and local leadership.
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a proliferation of human rights organizations and nongovernmental groups that either work with the nonrecognized Christian groups in Iran, or address the general situation facing different denominational Christians in Iran. While activity seems to have increased, there would appear to be more information than resources or advocacy in the relational content of the networks of the Iranian Christian community. As illustrated in Figure 14, indirect ties increased while direct ties have decreased. As a result of having to downplay ties with outside organizations and countries —thus weakening them—in order to maintain good standing with the government, the Christian groups represented in the Majles (Armenians and Assyrians), have become more isolated, more dependent on the current regime, and strengthened their ties to it.
Network Ties of the Baha’i Community During the Pahlavi period, the Iranian Baha’i community shared very strong ties with the Baha’i World Centre (BWC), the administrative center of all Baha’i communities and headed by the Universal House of Justice (est. 1963).[49] There were strong ties, as well, with the American and Canadian national and local Baha’i communities. Since universal identity is given precedence over national loyalty in the Baha’i Faith, the Iranian Baha’i diasporas (marginal at the outset of the Pahlavi era) did not see themselves as being religiously separated from their non-Iranian counterparts. Nonetheless, family ties played a role in independently supporting individuals and communities in Iran.
As illustrated in Figure 15, the relationship between the Iranian Baha’i community and the international Baha’i community was initially not very strong, because it was linked through the BWC. However, with the encouragement of Baha’i leaders (i.e., Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi), small numbers of Iranian Baha’is left their homes and
Figure 13. Christian networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 14. Christian networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009).
committed themselves to assisting the development of Baha’i communities in Africa, South America, Asia and other parts of the world.[50] The United States, Canadian, and United Kingdom Baha’i communities were able to assist the Iranian community in developing modern schools and other institution of service (e.g., hospitals) under the central leadership of the BWC and other Baha’i institutions. However, the relationship between Iranian Baha’is and their Western counterparts was collaborative and characterized by equality is status. The ties between different Baha’i communities were not only strengthened over time but also systematized.
The persecution of the Baha’is throughout the 19th and early 20th century was generally met with fortitude and advocacy from within Iran, or by other National Spiritual Assemblies from different countries, and of course the BWC. By the mid-1950s, when persecution began to intensify, the BWC drew on its highly developed network of national and regional organizations to marshal assistance for the Iranian Baha’is, directing them to appeal to their respective governments and supranational ties (Baha’i International Community, 1956). This and other similar campaigns, was considered effective, and led to the establishment by the Universal House of Justice of the Baha’i International Community (BIC) as the official representative of the worldwide Baha’i community (For example, see Baha’i International Community, 1956).
The network between local Baha’i communities under the leadership of the NSA of Iran was fully developed by the early 1960s, and represented a unified structure with clear channels of leadership, organization, and operation. Many of the prominent and affluent members of the Baha’i community contributed their expertise and material resources to the development of the Baha’i community not only in Iran, but internationally, supporting the development of the BWC and service projects around the world. While there was no official tie between the Baha’i community of Iran and the government, members of the Baha’i community served as individuals in nonpolitical government positions, including influential offices (Milani, 2008), and continued, when called upon, to appeal to the government during times of intense persecution of the Baha’i community. The network between religious minorities is hard to measure, but there was noticeable interaction in the form of shared services, such as schools, clinics and hospitals. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Iranian Baha’i institutions and community had benefited from collaboration with other developed Baha’i communities around the world. However, the Iranian NSA focused primarily on ministering to the affairs of its own burgeoning community. The BIC and other communities worked as the main vehicle of advocacy, with the BWC providing cultural, moral, and sometimes material resources. The United States Baha’i community was a partner in providing material and human resources during this period. As Figure 15 illustrates, the Baha’i network consisted of a large number of indirect ties that worked in favor of the Iranian Baha’i community, with several key direct ties. Additional indirect ties to governments and organizations would become a designed strategy of the Baha’i community in marshaling various kinds of resources, in information collection and distribution, and in advocacy.
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the network configuration within the Baha’i community changed in several respects. With the dismantling of the NSA and all LSAs throughout Iran in June of 1983, the closure, confiscation, and destruction of Baha’i buildings, centers, and services, as well as the killing and exodus of many of its leaders and prominent community members, the community was left with no formal organization-to-organization tie. Thus the node illustrating the Iranian Baha’i community in Figure 16 represents the Baha’i community and not any form of official leadership. With only the Yaran, an ad hoc committee appointed by the Universal House of Justice to meet the basic needs of the community, the Baha’is had to deal with administrative matters privately through that informal body. As a result of the developed network system outside of Iran, national Baha’i communities around the world, under the guidance of the Baha’i World Centre, collaborated to support the Baha’is in Iran by a variety of means, including resources to sustain the community, assistance to leave Iran (for those in extreme danger), as well as social, organizational and moral support. Since the onset of the Revolution, the BIC has continued to be in the forefront of advocacy on behalf of a highly restricted and often repressed Iranian Baha’i community (Ghanea, 2002). The BIC guided national communities and their external affairs offices to work with their national governments and other agencies in pressing for the rights of the Baha’is in Iran. The Iranian Baha’i diaspora maintained strong ties with their families, often sending material resources to sustain daily living, and even sponsoring them if they chose to leave as refugees. With the exodus and dispersion during and after the Revolution, the Iranian Baha’i diaspora developed and strengthened the indirect ties between the Iranian Baha’i community and their destination communities. Ironically, as a result of a crippled internal administrative structure, the Iranian Baha’i community (and the Baha’i community as a whole) strengthened its network ties, drawing on them more readily and systematically.
Another significant shift in the network configuration was the rise of NGOs and government agencies dedicated to human rights and freedoms, and the indirect ties with them which served the Iranian Baha’i community. These relationships offered not only moral support and advocacy, and the opportunity to share information about the situation of the Baha’is, but subsequently provided the impetus for minor opportunity structure changes in Iran (see Figure 16). It is as yet unclear what the precise connection of the BWC or the BIC is with the national community in Iran since the arrest and dissolution of the Yaran in May 2008. It is interesting to note that the number of human rights organizations inside and outside Iran have increased over the decades, and now play a prominent role in advocating the case of Baha’is and other religious minorities in Iran. Because of the banned, nonrecognized status of Baha’is since the Revolution, no tie exists between the Baha’i community in Iran and the government of the Islamic Republic. Similarly, because of the “untouchable” status of Baha’is, no other religious minority organization is at liberty to associate with Baha’is publicly—as this may put them at risk of reprisal. During this period, although ties became stronger (albeit more indirect) across the Baha’i transnational network and Iran, and ties with NGOs and other governments increased in frequency and prominence, this has not altered the relationship with the regime itself. It is evident that relying on networks has been and continues to be a central feature of mobilization and coordination of the Iranian Baha’i community and those abroad.
Figure 15. Baha’i networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 16. Baha’i networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009)
Regime-Group Relations of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is As they relate to the study of educational strategy selection, I have narrowed my discussion of regime-group relations to four particular factors which I believe clarify their interactions: (a) official recognition of rights of the group by the government; (b) representation of the group in government institutions; (c) the extent to which a regime facilitates, tolerates, and represses groups, claims, and actions; and (d) the extent to which a group accepts, resists, or rejects regime policies and actions.
Recognition In the Electoral Law of 1909 of the Iranian Constitution, formal recognition by the government was extended to certain ethnic and religious minority groups, including the Armenian Christians, the Assyrian Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians—long considered by Muslims as “People of the Book”[51] (Iranian Constitution, Electoral Law of 1909, Article 7:1). Baha’is were excluded from this recognition, but individual members may have been accorded the theoretical equal rights extended to all citizens (Iranian Constitution of 1906, Article 8). With the advent of Reza Shah’s rule, the constitution was reaffirmed, with only minor alterations until the 1963 Referendum spurred by the White Revolution launched by Mohammad Reza Shah. The most significant changes made to the Iranian constitution since its original draft came with the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution of 1979 explicitly delimits the recognition of religious minorities to Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Armenian and Assyrian Christian Iranians, who “within the limit of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.” Article 26 further secures their right to form societies and organizations within the bounds of the law. Drafters of constitutional articles addressing religious minorities included recognized leaders of religious minorities. The Chaldeans, although demanding separate representation, were not given a seat, and were identified with the Assyrians. Other nonethnic Christian denominations were not given a voice at all. Despite being the largest non-Muslim religious minority, Baha’is were once again not recognized. In various public proclamations, policy papers, and other official arenas, Baha’is are often referred to as a “misguided and wayward sect,” or as a “political movement” (Higgins, 1984); and there was clear evidence in various court edicts, press statements, and private policy papers, that the government identified the Baha’is as a group (see Appendix E for copies of official documents).
Considering recognition status is important in any discussion regarding minority groups because it brings with it certain advantages and disadvantages. For example, official recognition may entitle a group to certain rights, while simultaneously limiting others. Moreover, by recognizing a separate group, there is an implicit admission of “otherness” that separates one group from the majority. Higgins (1984) suggests that nonrecognition under certain circumstances could be considered an advantage, particularly when religious identity is not a concern. Nonetheless, Tilly and Tarrow (2007), using the example of the Baha’is, point out that a regime may refrain from recognizing a group to decertify their legitimacy to claim any rights and to reinforce regime policies.
Representation As an extension of recognition of religious minority communities, representation followed.[52] During both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods, the recognized religious minority groups were accorded representation in Parliament with one seat in parliament. During the Islamic Republic, one seat each was accorded to the Zoroastrians, the Jews, and the Assyrian Christians (including Chaldeans). Two seats were offered to the Armenian Christians (one for the north and another for the south of the country). All these groups expressed loyalty to the Islamic Republic and to Ayatollah Khomeini, rejecting ties to any countries considered by the regime to be enemy states.
By various accounts, during both the Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic era, the role and influence of the representatives in the Majles was nominal. By having a representative in a formal institution of the state, recognized minority groups had an arena to voice concerns and make claims in the manner of contained contention. However, unrecognized groups had no proper channel in which to file complaints for group affairs, and often association with an unrecognized status would simply be dismissed. Despite representation, some have argued that religious minority Parliamentary deputies are easily influenced by the government, lamenting it as a necessity to survive the climate of heightened scrutiny (Pirnazar, personal communication, 21 October, 2009).
Providing representation in the government is a form of institutionalizing a group. This carries significant bearing on mobilization, claim-making, and collective action. As Tilly and Tarrow (2007) suggest, institutionalization can lead to demobilization of movement activity and alter the way a group presents claims to the state. In this way, noninstitutionalization may lead to bolder claims, or what McAdam et al. (2001) call transgressive contention (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). Conversely, representation is another strong form of domestic certification, where the authority is ready to recognize and listen to the recognized group. In order to explore these two concepts of institutionalization and certification, among other related features regime-group relations, I turn to regime and group interactions.
Regime Facilitation, Tolerance, and Repression of Groups Recognition and representation, however useful as categories, inadequately capture the nuances of contentious politics and dynamics at various levels of analysis. On the one hand, they can be considered constructive qualifiers. Interactions, on the other hand, are dynamic observable quantifiers of the relationship. The work of scholars of contentious politics (McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2005; Tilly, 2006b; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) and of some scholars of international relations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999) indicate that the following five interactive elements bear on a regime’s treatment of groups and their actions, particularly when considering the configuration of how a regime prescribes, tolerates, and forbids actions: (a) a regime’s acceptance level of a particular group and action; (b) a regime’s governmental form, capacity, and ideology; (c) the influence and impact of other power holders, parallel domestic authorities,[53] social and economic elites, and pressure from the masses; (d) the influence and impact of international pressure, standards, relations; (e) responses of targeted groups. Thus, a regime’s actions toward a group are not decided in a vacuum. Rather, the decisions of the regime have a reciprocal impact on the other factors discussed.
Figure 17. Interactive elements bearing on a regime’s approach toward groups.
Figure 17 illustrates one way the above-mentioned five factors interact in producing policies and practices that affect a group. By categorizing regime actions within the bounds of facilitation, tolerance, and repression, I identified repeated sets of performances that each regime used in addressing Jews, Christians, and Baha’is, in order to contextualize regime-group relations through interaction.
The categorized actions, or as Tilly (2006b) calls them, performances, are presented Tables C2, C3, and C4 for the period of Pahlavi rule and Tables C5, C6, and C7 for the period of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although these tables do not include actions by parallel authorities or mobs, they do include recurring actions associated with government agents at the local, regional, or national level. Finally, in describing the actions of Iranian regimes toward these three minorities, it is important to bear in mind that at different junctures in time, various levels of facilitation, tolerance, and repression were present[54].
Regime Performance in the Pahlavi Era Jews. With the secularization of the Pahlavi rulers, the Jewish community experienced a series of shifts in regime policies. As Rahimiyan (2008b) illustrates, despite Muslim stigmatization of Jews, with equal rights officially extended by the government, Jewish Iranians were being assimilated into a broader Iranian identity, and thus integrated into society. As Table C2 shows, allowing Jews to attend government schools, hold government jobs, and open shops outside the Jewish quarter are only a few examples of the facilitation process during the Reza Shah period. In turn, most members of the Jewish community did not see a contradiction between religious and national identity, and took advantage of the secular-nationalist facilitation of the regime. Despite noticeable local and regional anti-Semitism among segments of the population, and sporadic vilification by state-media, tolerance at the national level toward Jews was unaffected. Like other religious and ethnic minorities, Jews faced uncompromising policies requiring stricter alignment with the Shah’s nationalization campaign, including impositions on community run schools. It was during the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–1978) that Jews saw the greatest level of facilitation, similar to that of other religious minorities. Iranian Jews were allowed to register their own organizations on a level that was unprecedented (Menashri, 2002; Rahimiyan, 2008a). The Jewish community also rise in socioeconomic status during this period was facilitated primarily by a degree of tolerance during the second Pahlavi epoch.
Christians. During the rule of Reza Shah, ethnic Christians, like the Armenians and Assyrians, experienced turbulence when the regime made efforts to assimilate them into the general Iranian population, as with other ethnic minorities. Although they enjoyed the same rights as those of the Jews and Zoroastrians, Armenians and Assyrians found the language and cultural policies of the Shah highly restrictive (see Table C3). For Reza Shah, the Armenians in particular, as well as some other ethno-linguistic groups, represented a barrier—even a threat—to the smooth implementation of the nationalist campaign that would present Iran as a monolithic entity. While the religious element of recognized groups did not pose problems for the regime, the ethnic features were more problematic. Missionaries, who experienced the brunt of intolerance by Reza Shah, were singled out more because of their foreign influence than their religious affiliation.
After the abdication of Reza Shah and the rise in American and British influence, tolerance significantly increased, and facilitation of Christians into the system likewise improved. Like many Jewish organizations, the various Christian sects saw an expansion of their institutions, membership, and services—developing their community as in no other time in Iranian history because of the tolerance accorded to them in the second epoch. In general, all rights were reinstated to Christian groups by the time of Muhammad Reza Shah, particularly in the 1950s.
Baha’is. Unlike the Jews and Christians, whose rights were restored with the affirmation of the Iranian constitution, Baha’is remained unrecognized and unrepresented. Yet, with the focus being placed on nationalism and modernity, religious identity was relegated to the sidelines and remained a concern only for the Shi’i religious establishment and some of its ardent supporters. Thus, despite their formally unrecognized status, Iranian Baha’is were able to enjoy those rights and liberties extended to all Iranian nationals. Community members were tolerated in many sectors, and thus were able to individually access or benefit from the facilitation process of the regime. However, as with Jews and Christians, the unique features of the Baha’i community caused them to encounter the same restrictions that were placed on all those who were perceived to be a roadblock on the path of the nationalization campaign. The most significant barrier faced by the Baha’is came from the strong influence wielded by parallel authorities on and inside the government. The fact that Baha’is were not recognized or represented made their situation doubly unpredictable. As illustrated in Table C4, despite enjoying unprecedented social and economic mobility during this period, Baha’is still faced arbitrary persecution at the hands of religious leaders, and as a result of collaboration between government and parallel authorities (Choubine, 2008). Yet, as with the Jewish community, many Baha’is took advantage of social freedom during the Muhammad Reza Shah period, and, in spite of sporadic outbreaks of repression, made significant strides in developing their organizations and community.
What is noticeable about the actions used by the Pahlavi regime in addressing all three groups is the similarity in repertoires of facilitation and tolerance. The actions affecting Christians and Jews were most alike—no doubt the result of their similar recognized status. The greatest obstacles originated in challenges to assimilation into the regime’s nationalization and solidarity process. From the data examined, tolerance appears to have been prominent when the regime was focused on other agenda issues. Facilitation for all three groups was offered with a view to bringing about integration and assimilation into a modern nation-state as envisioned by the Shahs. Parallel authorities played a highly significant role in the treatment of minority groups by the regime. Regime tolerance noticeably increased when the influence of the parallel Islamic establishment was held in check by the legitimate authorities.
Regime Performances in the Islamic Republic Era Jews. During the first epoch of the Islamic Republic, many Iranian Jews did not know what to expect, given the years of harassment and rising anti-Israel tide that came with the Revolution. With the execution of several Jewish community leaders, a shockwave traveled through the Jewish community. Despite the fomenting calumny and anti-Zionist attacks by new government leaders and agents, Jews and Christians were guaranteed protective status in the Koran. As a result, in the drafting of the new Constitution, official recognition and representation was extended to these groups. Although faced with harsh treatment, including arbitrary arrest, property and asset seizure, and police harassment shortly after the Revolution, Khomeini’s regime began a process of institutionalization of the Jewish community. Over time, those who remained were continually being assimilated into the system. With decreased direct assault over consecutive epochs, the quarter percent of Jews that remained in Iran operated within the infrastructure of the regime. The government successfully divorced the Iranian Jewish community from its sister communities in Israel and America (“MP: Iran only country,” 2010; Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009).
Notwithstanding facilitation and tolerance, the Jewish community experienced sporadic incidents of repression with varying levels of severity, such as the arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz, charged with espionage for Israel. Similarly, there have been several reports by individuals who have revealed that, the constant social and economic pressures make it necessary for Jews in Iran to be cautious and secretive. Government-run schools (curriculum and instruction) only reinforce negative stereotypes and stigmatization of Jews in society (Farahani, 2005). Not surprisingly, the traditional Shi’i belief that non-Muslims are najes, or ritually impure, has been legalized and is taught in schools. Thus, Jews are not able to engage in certain professions or jobs that involve food preparation or contact with liquids. Nonetheless, by various accounts, the daily private practice of Judaism is, for the most part, tolerated, but they remain the most marginalized and compromised of the formally recognized religious minority groups in Iran.
Christians. Ethnic Christians during the Islamic Republic saw the least agitation and repression in the first epoch of the regime, but foreign Christians and Protestants experienced a harsh backlash for a number of reasons, namely, association with Western countries. Again, the primary goal of the regime was the institutionalization of its recognized minority groups, and the elimination or marginalization of its unrecognized groups. For example, the Anglican Church was deemed dysfunctional and all missionary activities of Anglicans and Presbyterians from abroad came to a halt. Likewise leaders of various nonethnic Christian groups were pressured by government agencies to stop their activities, to refrain from including any non-Christians, and have sometimes been threatened, arrested, and tortured if they proselytized and converted Muslims. This was most noticeable when several Christian pastors and new converts were arrested, and some executed throughout Iran.
Like Jews, Christians are considered najes by the regime. However, they are likewise given rights to practice their religion, and given privileges exclusive to their religious rituals and customs. Although some Christian schools and facilities (e.g., hospitals, nurseries, gardens) were confiscated by the government, Armenians and Assyrians were allowed to maintain their own schools, on condition that they follow government guidelines. Apart from the Protestant and Catholic groups which are not recognized by the regime, Armenians and Assyrians generally experience high levels of tolerance within the confines of prescribed government ordinances. It is important to note that treatment by civilians and lower level government agents is another story, and experiences vary considerably throughout Iran.
Baha’is. Baha’is under the Islamic Republic have experienced the highest level of regime repression among religious minorities in Iran. Unlike the Jews or Christians, the Baha’is are not only not represented in any governmental institution and not recognized as a religious minority, but are labeled as heretics, infidels, and apostates. Throughout the 30 years of the Islamic Republic, the regime has always given Baha’is opportunities to integrate and assimilate into society, namely by recanting their faith and disavowing affiliation with anything having to do with the Baha’i Faith. The first epoch was characterized by high levels of regime violence, physical assault, and infrastructure destruction. Subsequent administrations, demarked by epochs, shifted strategies to deal with the ideologically incongruent group, including giving them permission to leave the country freely, denying them the right to higher education and government jobs, continued harassment, and blocked social and economic development. On the other hand, the various iterations of the regime also incorporated strategies of tolerance and relative neglect, with some agents not viewing the Baha’is as a threat, and allowing them to leave forms blank where religious affiliation was usually required.
The actions of the regime of the Islamic Republic in addressing religious minorities employ the same differentiating factor which was applied during the previous regime: recognized status. Jews and Christians are accepted as legitimate communities, with restricted actions, whereas Baha’is are an unacceptable group, variously described as a “political movement,” “a misguided sect,” and without the rights extended to other minorities.. The Islamic Republic facilitated recognized religious minorities through institutionalization and assimilation into the broader Khomeini brand of Shi’ism and the revised Constitution. This was an effort to incorporate a doctrinal pluralism constituted originally in the Koran. The government of Iran has been highly repressive, but also draws on actions that facilitate and tolerate different groups in order to maintain control and to steer the country along a path aligned with the ideology of the regime’s founders.
Group Acceptance, Tolerance, Resistance, and Rejection of Regime In examining the relationship of the three minorities toward regimes, actions again become the key unit of analysis. There are four basic categories within which I place general group claims and actions: (a) acceptance[55] of government policies and practices; (b) tolerance[56]of unfavorable policies and practices; (c) resistance[57] to policies and practices through mostly contained and mild transgressive contention; (d) rejection[58] of policies and practices by turning to options outside the polity or by engaging in transgressive contention.
In order to understand broader strategies (both short- and long-term), I place group claims, actions, and reactions within this framework. To this end, Table C8 represents some of the general but salient actions of groups in relation to regimes over time. The sorts of actions concerning this study are those that recur, because they point to coalescing strategies to meet needs, including educational ones. The listing and order does not identify the frequency, the magnitude, or prominence of each action as a strategy. However, these features were considered in including them in this Table. The purpose of Table C8 is to provide a manageable, general description of the range of actions carried out by religious minority groups in relation to regime actions and responses.
Even from this cursory overview, it is evident that all groups performed actions that could fall under virtually any of the four categories (i.e. accept, tolerate, resist, and reject), just as a regime will engage in various levels of repression and facilitation. Beyond this study is the thorough measurement of the extent and frequency with which these actions were performed by each group. However, in Chapter 6, a closer examination will be made of those actions which have coalesced into educational strategies.
As reflected in Table C8, those groups that are institutionalized and recognized seem to be more accepting and tolerant than those that are not. Similarly, those groups that are institutionalized and recognized do not take as many transgressive actions as do the unrecognized groups, even when resisting. From an organizational viewpoint, the Jewish leadership during the Pahlavi era leaned primarily toward accepting-tolerant actions, and only slightly shifted toward a tolerant-accepting mode after the revolution. Their case is very similar to that of the recognized ethnic Christian groups. Resistance only took place through proper legally sanctioned channels, such as letters, addresses to government bodies, and sometimes statements to the media. The nonrecognized Christian denominations, specifically the evangelical groups, began by being accepting-tolerant during the Pahlavi era, but drew closer to tolerating-resisting actions after the Revolution, particularly during the third and fourth epochs. Similarly, the Baha’is who were not recognized or represented, were tolerant-accepting during the Pahlavi era, with intermittent episodes of resistance. However, after the Revolution and the radical shift in the new regime’s treatment behavior toward the community, the Baha’i community initiated resistant-tolerant actions, and even rejecting actions, drawing on a network of support outside of Iran.
Outright rejection of the regime by recognized groups did not occur, except that large numbers of all three groups left Iran after the Revolution. Despite official recognition by the government, the largest percentage of those who chose to leave were members of the Jewish, Armenian, and Assyrian communities. This strategy should not be overlooked. Exodus by the majority of the members of these communities has had a significant impact on subsequent actions selected by group leaders and remaining members.
The secular nature of the Pahlavi dynasty provided more opportunities for religious minorities to integrate into society and the public sector than did the religiously charged epochs of the Islamic Republic. The nature of regime-group dynamics and contentious interaction is political, and when religious identity was transformed into a political category after the Revolution, it became more difficult to maintain community integrity and development. International pressure and intervention has had an important impact on the regime’s actions toward groups, even if minimal. While some argue that this argument is hard to prove (Afshari, 2008), there are several cases regarding religious minorities in Iran that illustrate the notion of the “boomerang” effect, as described by Keck and Sikkink (1998). Networks and group composition, as well as group standing, also had a bearing on the kinds of strategies that were available and adopted. Moreover, some actions engendered or facilitated other subsequent actions, while limiting the accessibility of others.
Conclusion This chapter has addressed the particular dimensions of three group features which I argue will have an impact on the selection of education strategies: composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations. Ultimately, the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities during both the Pahlavi era and the epochs of the Islamic Republic shifted in various directions based on the dynamic interplay between the features, as well as differing in scale. In other words, neither groups nor actions exist or develop in a vacuum. The impact of the government and its regime is omnipresent in influencing and even shaping the composition and characteristics of groups, how they form and develop networks, and, ultimately, altering the status and interaction found in regime-group relations. The same applies to the impact of groups on regimes. Thus, the features become significant factors in determining a trend of actions which coalesce into strategies to meet certain needs. This idea will be tested further in Chapter 6, in which I incorporate a mechanism-process approach, in order to examine specific episodes of contention and actuation for each group over the two periods. I argue that these three factors bear on strategy selection, and point toward some of the actions that are more often adopted by and available to various groups. Building on this, the following chapter will also illustrate how, and to what extent, these factors influenced the selection of educational strategies.
[1] There was a reverse migration from Israel back to Iran by many; reports record up to 5,000 returned only five years after leaving Iran (Rahimiyan, 2008b). This reverse trend may be explained by possible difficulties of adjustment in a foreign territory, lack of actual opportunity, or unfavorable conditions, resulting in a return to a familiar setting, family, and community life.
[2] This correlates more closely with the Iranian census data, which found 62,258 for 1976.
[3] See Appendix C for this chapter’s Tables.
[4] Most Armenian Christians belong to the Apostolic Church, an ancient, autocephalous branch of Eastern Christianity. A very small minority of Armenians are also Catholic or Protestant.
[5] See Smith, 1984 for an overview of statistical information on Baha’is in th19th- and early th20th-century Iran.
[6] Using the United Nations Statistical and Demographic database, Ahang Rabbani (personal communication, November 5, 2009) used the factor of 1.3 children/youth for every adult. The following formula was employed: (1+1.3)*75,000 = 2.3 * 75,000 = 172,500.
[7] See Hakimzadeh (2006) for a detailed analysis of international migration of Iranians by date and country.
[8] The Statistical Abstract of Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009) provides the following record: 21,910 in 1948–1951, 15,699 in 1952–1960, and 19,502 in 1961–1971.
[9] According to the Statistical Abstract of Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009), 9,550 Iranians came to Israel between 1972 and 1979 and another 8,487 between 1980 and 1989.
[10] The move to Europe was mainly to England, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland (Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).
[11] Based on figures of the United States Baha’i National Center (2009), 1,413 Iranian Baha’is arrived in the United States between 1901 and 1977, and 19,195 between 1978 and 2009. Baha’is emigrated to other places, including Canada, Australia, India, and various countries in Europe, but also to countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America. In 1978, when there were only 50 to 60 Baha’is in all of Australia, the arrival of 538 Iranian Baha’is in 1986 brought the number to approximately 2,500 in 1988 (Hassel, 2000). According to Moojan Momen’s (1991) calculations, 60 percent of the European Baha’i community consisted of Iranian Baha’is by the 1970s.
[12] Sam Kermanian, personal communication, June 2, 2009.
[13] Prior to 1925, Jews were generally not permitted to own land (Loeb, 1996).
[14] According to various sources, some of the significant careers industries included banking, jewelry, insurance, textiles, plastics, paper, pharmaceuticals, aluminum production, liquor distillery and distribution, shipping, imports, industrial machinery, clothing and retail, automobiles, medicine, engineering, and tile manufacturing (Rahimiyan, 2008b; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).
[15] In addition to the Alliance schools established in the late 19th and early 20th century throughout Iran, other schools included the famed Ettefagh and Shamash Schools (Nikbakht, 1999).
[16] The Alliance schools first opened in Tehran in 1898, and then in other Jewish communities; Hamadan (1900), Isfahan (1901), Shiraz (1903), Sanandaj (1903), Nahavand (1904), Kermanshah (1904), Bijar (1906), Borujerd (1913), Yazd (1926), and Kashan (1929).
[17] According the American Jewish Yearbook (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1950), 1500 students were enrolled at religious minority schools and another 4500 were attending government schools. However, 8000 Jewish children (less than half) did not attend any school.
[18] It is important to note that institutions like the Alliance school assisted the vitality and cohesion of the Iranian Jewish community whose membership was increasingly attracted and converted to either Christianity or the Baha’i Faith.
[19] In 1926, Persian language instruction was mandated by the government (Netzer, 1985).
[20] The Otzar Hatorah school was established by an American Orthodox educational movement, and stressed Hebrew and ritual knowledge, and observance of the Sabbath and kashrut (dietary law). The Otzar Hatorah was central to the revitalization of the Shirazi Jewry, particularly in providing a thorough educational model (Loeb, 1981). According to the American Jewish Yearbook (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1950), there were 3,800 students registered in Otzar Hatorah schools.
[21] By 1961, a reported 13,200 children attended the 37 various Jewish schools in Iran, and another 2000–3000 Jewish children attended non-Jewish schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1962). In 1966, 14,000 children attended the 37 Jewish schools and another 2000–3000 Jewish children attended other schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1966).
[22] It is important to note that with the modern school system, traditional schools and old learning models became less popular. Even the Jewish religious schools saw a significant decline in attendance. As Loeb (1981) describes: “The curriculum consisted of a prayer book, readings from the Torah, particularly the prophetic portions read on Sabbath in the synagogue, and for the astute, Mishna. By age nine or ten, most boys had completed their education, and began working as apprentices to their fathers or other close kinsman” (p. 315).
[23] By the 1970s, only 0.1 percent had succeeded in penetrating the upper class (Pahlavi family, military officers, senior civil servants, and high end entrepreneurs); some 23 percent were among the middle class (occupying both traditional and new roles), and the vast majority of the population at large (77 percent ) were part of the lower class (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 140). This is why the leap made by the small Jewish population to middle and upper class positions was so noticeable; as was the case with the Baha’is during this period (Abrahamian, 2008; Keddie, 1981; Naficy, 1981; Sanasarian, 2000).
[24] This figure may appear insignificant unless compared with the total of some 55,000 students attending Iranian government and private schools when Reza Shah came into power. By 1935, however there were an estimated 170,077 students, spurred by the government’s education initiatives (Matthee, 1993).
[25] It is significant that, even though other religious minorities received harsh and inequitable treatment at the hands of the authorities because of their “impure” status, they were still protected officially by their designation as ahl al-kitab, (People of the Book). However, Baha’is were considered murtadd (unprotected) and mahdur al-damm (whose blood could be shed), maslub al-huquq (without rights), and whose property was mubah (belonging to no one), and thus subject to manhub al-mal (plundering). In other words, they occupied the lowest run of the ladder of Iranian society.
[26] There was a surge of violence against Baha’is throughout Iran during the 1950s, including attacks on and beatings of individuals, the destruction of some of their most holy sites, and other violent measures (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006).
[27] However, there were a few Jewish political groups and individuals—particularly communist-oriented organizations—who participated in the Revolution and stood against both the Pahlavi regime and Zionism.
[28] The enrollment number has increased over the years since its inception: 250 in 1987, 600 in 1996, 900 in 1998, 1200 in 2003, 2500 in 2008, 3000 in 2009 (Baha’i International Community, 2005a; BIHE management, personal interview, October 21, 2009).
[29] Some of the subcommittees deal with cultural affairs, youth affairs, conflict resolution, and poor relief
[30] The qualification of a rabbi (khakham) is his training in the Torah and Talmud, and other significant canon and texts. Such training begins in the yeshiva (Jewish religious school). Additional advanced learning in the Talmud, Rishonim and Acharonim (early and late medieval commentaries), as well as in Jewish law, is also a prerequisite for someone wishing to be recognized as a rabbi.
[31] In addition to a collection of books made available for sale, and those in libraries, there were two major Jewish periodicals: Tamouz, which functioned until 1989, and Ofegh-BINA, run by the Tehran Jewish Committee since 1999; these were responsible for publishing works on Jewish culture and education, as well as providing a social and news source.
[32] According to the Tehran Jewish Committee (2009) , there are many synagogues, special Jewish schools, cultural complexes, youth and student centers and organizations, such as the Iranian Jewish Students’ Organization, women’s centers, nursing homes, a hospital, libraries, computer and music training centers, assembly halls, and Jewish slaughter houses throughout the country.
[33] According to Haroun Yashayaei (2003), chairman of the Tehran Jewish Committee, one reason for the take-over of Jewish parochial schools by the state was overpopulation in state-run schools.
[34] The divide between Tehran and Shiraz has been described as a schism in Jewish identification, with those in Tehran leaning toward a more secular orientation, and those in Shiraz being associated with a greater attachment to religious observance (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, 2 November 2009). The fact that there has been significant relocation by Jews of Shiraz to Israel, has led leaders of Tehran’s Jewish community to express the view that such emigration can harm the relationship between the regime and the Jewish community (Bahgat, 2005).
[35] Personal communication: Faryar Nikbakht (16 May 2009), Sam Kermanian (2 June 2009), and Nahid Pirnazar (21 October 2009).
[36] There are two Catholicos with equal powers, each of which respects the other’s jurisdiction; the Armenians in Iran fall under the leadership of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia (Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, n.d.).
[37] According to one source there are 12 churches in New Julfa, 10 in Tehran, 2 in Tabriz, 1 in Urmieh, and another in Azerbaijan (Armeniapedia, n.d.).
[38] For example, in 1980, there were 41 priests (diocesan and religious) associated with Iranian Catholic churches (Chaldean and Armenian), as compared to only 11 in 2004 (Cheney, 2009).
[39] The number of deputy representatives to the Majles was based on the estimate of one deputy for every 150,000 members of the community, counted every ten years (Sanasarian, 2000).
[40] This is an arbitrary term used to refer to both Assyrians and Chaldeans, but does not denote a new subgroup or their union.
[41] This includes the famed Alborz School, Nurbakhsh School, Sage College, Community High School, and others.
[42] On principle, Baha’is do not accept funds from any individual who is not a registered member of the community, or form non-Baha’i organizations.
[43] By 1946, there were 694 Local Spiritual Assemblies throughout the country. In 1963, there were 521 Local Spiritual Assemblies and 1,271 localities where Baha’is resided (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391). During the same period there were some 150 national committees functioning under the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391). By the mid-1960s, in Tehran alone, 3,000 Baha’is served on various administrative bodies and approximately the same number worked with the education of youth and children (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391).
[44] Prosecutor General of the Islamic Republic, Seyyed Hossein Mussavi-Tabrizi, in the published Tehran daily, Kayhan (September 21, 1983) stated that the Baha’i religious and spiritual administration was banned and considered a crime..
[45] Personal communications: anonymous Iranian-American Jewish leader (June 8, 2009); David Shofet (March 23, 2009); Faryar Nikbakht (May 16, 2009); Karmel Melamed (March 3, 2009); Sam Kermanian (June 2, 2009).
[46] It is important to note that many those who leave Iran convey their dissatisfaction with the situation in Iran, relating the lack of opportunity, harsh treatment, denial of access to certain services, and the generalized fear associated with living openly in Iran as a Jew.
[47] There are individuals with whom I spoke who have taken the initiative to highlight the difficulties and discrimination against Jews in Iran; however, even they concur that there is no real organized and coherent campaign. As Kermanian (personal interview, June 2, 2009) suggests, “we do not engage in confrontation unless it is a matter of life or death.”
[48] Personal communication: Sanasarian (April 14, 2009).
[49] The Baha’i World Centre is a title referring to several institutions and structures that constitute the focal point of administrative and spiritual life of Baha’is around the world. After the founder of the Baha’i Faith (Baha’u’llah) was exiled and died in what was then part of the Ottoman Empire, the successive leaders of the Baha’i community (his son Abdu’l-Baha and then great-grandson Shoghi Effendi) remained and established a center in Haifa, which developed over decades. In 1963, the institution of the Universal House of Justice was elected, and has since led the world-wide Baha’i community.
[50] For the sake of clarify and focus, I have refrained from representing the direct ties between national Baha’i communities (although they existed).
[51] The “Book” refers to the Koran, and within it the provision to extend protective status to religious minorities included Jews and Christians, and later Zoroastrians. Protective (dhimma) status meant that they could not be killed or forced to convert, while still being regarded as infidels and impure.
[52] This was not the case for Muslim minorities or many ethnic minorities in Iran.
[53] Parallel authorities are those individuals, institutions, and organizations that share power in a country. In Iran, parallel authorities are the Islamic scholars and religious leaders, who can issue farman (orders) which become binding injunctions on Shi’i Muslims. Although alienated during the Pahlavi era, Shi’i leaders have always played a significant and influential role as parallel authorities (Arjomand, 1984, 1988).
[54] This occurs when two different actions were carried out during different time periods, or when two different actions were executed during the same time period, but in separate locations in the country (regional or local variation).
[55] The group accepts policies of the regime, integrates into the system, and even assimilates according to the ideological agenda of the state.
[56] The group members tolerate policies by integrating into the system, going along with obligatory laws and policies, while privately disagreeing or contradicting the regime’s exhortations and agenda. In other words, the action and policy of the regime is unfavorable to the group members, but no active resistance or counterclaim is made to oppose it. Members or group may also retreat into isolation—an action bordering on resistance.
[57] The group or a collection of its members make a counterclaim or take action contrary to regime policy or action. This can range from writing letters, signing petitions, participating in street demonstrations, and boycotting, to initiating parallel projects and innovations. In other words, resistance includes primarily contained performances, but may also entail transgressive performances.
[58] The group or collection of its members rejects outright the policy and action by open acts contrary to state policy or action. This may occur through a series of performances having varying degrees of seriousness, including leaving the country, seeking aid from international bodies to bring pressure on the regime to change, as well as engaging in transgressive actions, such as disrupting daily life through sit-ins, boycotts, graffiti, rioting, and even seeking to overthrow the government.
Group Composition and Characteristics A combination of four features makes up the category composition and characteristics: demography, socioeconomic status, organizational structure, and ideological orientation. Some of these features require more attention and definition than others, and various points even overlap. While each feature may be employed more broadly, I have narrowed aspects that directly relate to the analysis of strategy selection.
Demographic information, as generally used, refers to characteristics of a population. Categories in demography include biological and geographical data such as population count, population distribution, age, gender, birth, death, and migration rates, among other descriptive features. Some additional categories include languages spoken, religious affiliation, ethno-cultural grouping, and political affiliation. For my study, I use demography, where information is available, to identify population counts, distribution, and migration patterns for each minority group. Historically, this information has been difficult to identify in Iran for religious minorities. Therefore, I will rely on a series of sources to triangulate data that vary.
Socioeconomic status sometimes correlates with demographical features. However, unlike the counting of demographic data, socioeconomic status of population members is measured in relation to other population members. It focuses strictly on economic and sociological combinations measuring an individual’s or family’s income, education, and occupation (and, more recently, the acquisition of wealth). These three measures are ranked relative to the economic and social status of other individuals in the population being considered, and can often be broken down into three sub-categories: high, middle, and low status (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2009). Social status is associated with any or all three variables, and thus reflects cultural norms and an individual’s perceived status in the larger community of the population being studied. Socioeconomic status is an important consideration for this study, because it provides insight into educational strategy selection based on economic means, previous educational backgrounds, and occupational experiences and careers sought by the different groups.
While demography and socioeconomic status help inform us about the individual characteristics of the group members, looking at organizational structure provides information on the functioning and social dynamics of each community. I use organizational structure to define (a) a group’s administrative body, which includes its leadership and membership structure; (b) how a group conducts its affairs; and (c) the local, regional, and international organizational branches. The inclusion of organizational structure in a study on organized religious groups provides useful data on how a group mobilizes, how collective resources are organized and used, how issues are framed, and how regime-group relations are formed and augmented by an organization’s institutions, leaders, and members.
The last feature included in the category of group composition and characteristics is ideological orientation. By ideological orientation, I refer to a group’s official stance on specific issues, based on their religious canon and teachings. As is the case for any given group, changes and modifications are made, by re-interpretation or reformation, to address contemporary problems. The ideological orientation of each religious group in this study is determined by three sources: (a) doctrine and canon, (b) religious leadership, and (c) individual interpretation. While an individual’s religious experience has both implicit and explicit aspects, I focus primarily on the explicit. By explicit, I refer to what the community subscribes to in belief (theological issues such as monotheism, source of authority, etc.), what is generally practiced by the majority (rituals, ceremonies, laws), and what is perceived as essential to being considered part of the group (affiliation criteria and identification based on the latter two indicators.
By looking at orientation, the observer will obtain a richer and contextualized understanding of what is important to a group and its members, and thus influences choices to sacrifice one thing for another, or willingness to lose one thing with the prospect of gaining something perceived as having equal or greater value. Ideological orientation bears significantly on the effectiveness of framing situations and actions. For example, whether an individual sees obedience to religious authority as being of primal importance in an individual’s accepted affiliation will have a significant impact on that person’s choice either to stay within the religion and follow instructions, not to engage in the community but to retain some semblance of affiliation with the religion, or to leave the community and religion altogether. The point of assessing the role of ideological orientation is to examine the extent to which beliefs can alter choices; or, in this case, the selection of plausible educational strategies. However, I address ideological orientation throughout the various descriptive features, and more directly when looking at particular episodes in the chapter on educational strategy selection; in this way, the abstraction of ideology is given more tangible expression through analysis of interactions.
Networks While I do not adopt the network analysis methodology (see Chapter 3), I look to concepts in network analysis to evaluate how the religious minority groups draw on domestic and international networks to meet their educational needs. Suffice it to say that a network is a set of actors or nodes connected by a specific type of relation, where actors or nodes are either individuals, collective actors, or organizations (Diani, 2002). Like organizational structures, networks may influence resource the mobilization, framing, and opportunity structures of a group (Tarrow, 2005).
Domestically, analyzing community and organizational networks provides a closer look at how a group (comprised of leaders and members) interacts with other groups in meeting their needs. Internationally, the examination of networks is important, because it informs any discussion on transnational movements and the efficacy of supranational influences on regime decisions. To this end, I look at how each minority group in Iran networks with its transnational communities (diasporas and otherwise), with other national governments and their agencies, non-Iranian nongovernmental agencies, and other international organizations.
Regime-Group Relations A group’s relation to the regime can be defined in a number of ways. In my analysis, I am concerned with four key factors which constitute regime-group relations: (a) official recognition of the rights of the group by the state regime; (b) representation of the group in state institutions; (c) the extent to which a regime facilitates, tolerates, or represses a group’s claims, and actions; and (d) the extent to which a group accepts, tolerates, resists, or rejects regime policies and claims.
Regimes implicitly and explicitly recognize various sub-groups within the population. Some sub-groups are identified as ethnic, linguistic, religious, or political. A regime’s public recognition comes in the form of legal documentation, such as constitutions, census data, or public edicts and addresses. Sometimes implicit recognition of the groups is made through tolerance of a group’s activities without endorsing or acknowledging the existence of the group. Likewise, a regime may not recognize a group for a variety of reasons, including neglect and lack of awareness; at other times, a regime may purposefully deny recognition of a group, with the result that its members are not accorded certain civil rights offered to the country’s other citizens; in other cases, a regime may claim plausible denial of any ill-treatment of that group.
The importance of looking at the representation of the group in state institutions has a number of advantages in gauging regime-group relations. First, and most obvious, is that inclusion of a group in the state structure implies immediate recognition and legitimacy of that group as part of the body politic. Second, it provides an outlet for voicing claims by the group to the regime, to seek further rights to particular state services or group liberties. Third, representation also means institutionalization of the group, which comes with both group privileges as well as limitations.
Representation is only one way that a group might be facilitated, tolerated, or repressed by the regime. Any given regime engages in these three behaviors toward every group. The government’s treatment of groups could be considered part of the opportunity structure provided for a group to make claims and mobilize toward collective action. By looking at government policies and practices as related to the case subjects, general patterns emerge to indicate what actions and groups are proscribed, tolerated, or prohibited.
In turn, looking at a group’s actions and the extent to which a group accepts, tolerates, resists, or rejects regime policies and claims, indicates the group’s relational approach to a regime. For the purpose of this study, I look at the extent to which a group selects educational strategies, based on how a group sees its current relation to the regime, how it perceives itself as being treated by the state, what opportunity structures exist under each regime, and how situations might be framed to benefit the group. Generally, the claims and actions of each case subject can be characterized as accepting, tolerating, resisting, or rejecting. Accepting would mean conforming to regime policies and practices, maintaining the status quo, and participating in the government’s facilitation processes. Tolerating actions refer to situations where a group consciously bears the brunt of unfavorable policies and actions, and takes no significant action to openly counter the regime’s decision. Resisting would entail a range of actions including disengagement, isolation, and contained actions, in response to regime policies and practices. Finally, rejecting involves the wholesale refusal of a government claim or action, leading to initiatives that may be condemned by the government, the formation of alliances with nongovernmental and international organizations in pressuring the government, and leaving the country.
Group Composition and Characteristics of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is As previously outlined, a combination of four features constitutes the category composition and characteristics: demography, socioeconomic status, organizational structure, and ideological orientation. These features as they relate to the three subject groups will be presented where information is available, and the three groups will be treated in a comparative analysis.
Demography The population count of the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities has significantly shifted over time. Different challenges and opportunities propelled emigration or caused stagnation, while other periods facilitated opportunities for growth. Obtaining accurate data on these groups has been challenging, as it has been much overlooked, leading to re-use of common but uncritically reviewed citations. To this end, I have triangulated sources to ascertain the population counts within each minority group, and made it a point to highlight estimates that may be vague, suspect, or which diverge from other sources.
Jewish Population in Iran. The Jewish community was reported to be about 100,000 in number in 1935. The population increased to 120,000 in 1948 according to one source (Jewish Agency in Tehran, as cited in Shiloah & Netzer, 2006) but declined to 90,000–100,000 according to another (Rahimiyan, 2008a, 2008b), and even lower by the Iranian Census which estimated 65,232. By 1966, according to the Iranian Census there were 60,683 Jews living in Iran. Numbers grew in the 1950s, despite emigration to Israel by Jews in the lower socioeconomic segment of the community.[1] In 1979, there were reportedly 65,000–70,000 (Aryeh Dulzin, as cited in Anderson, 1979; Yegar, 1993) Jews in Iran, most of whom lived in Tehran.[2] Later sources place the figure higher at 80,000 (Rahimiyan, 2008a, 2008b; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006). After the revolution, an exodus of Jews from Iran resulted in a population decline over the next decade to 26,354 (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, Iranian Census, 1986). According to the Islamic Republic’s census data, there were 12,737 Jews in 1996 and 9,252 in 2006; other sources for this period show close to 11,000 (World Jewish Congress, 2009). See Figure 8 for population trends for Iranian Jewry in the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods, and see Table C1 for estimation by various sources.[3]
Christian population in Iran. Iranians of Armenian descent account for the largest proportion of the Christians in Iran.[4] In 1956, an estimated 190,000 Armenians lived in Iran (Abrahamian, 1982). Firoozi (1974) placed the count of Armenians at 108,421 for 1966, out of the total estimated 149,427 Christians (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, Iranian Census, 1966). The number of Armenian Christians in Iran grew to somewhere between 270,000 (Amurian & Kasheff, 1987) and 300,000 (Minority at Risk Report, 2009b) for 1977, which significantly exceeded the total count of Christians by the Iranian Census for the same period (168,593 for 1976). By several accounts, there were varying estimates, ranging from 130,000 (Pakizegi, 1992), 200,000, and 300,000 Armenians in the 1980s (Sanasarian, 2000). After the revolution, however, the number has fallen significantly. Some approximations for the number of Armenian Iranian Christians place the population count at 112,000 (Marshall, 2000) to 150,000 (Sanasarian, 1995) for the 1990s. Many policy and government reports still place the number of Armenians higher than expected, at around 250,000 to 300,000 for the last decade (Minority at Risk Report, 2009b; United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2009). According to one source, there are only about 100,000 Armenians in Iran as of 2006 (Armenia Diaspora, 2009), which correlates relatively well with the Iranian Census data, which estimates a total of 108,415 Christians for 2006 (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, 2006).
Figure 8. Population of Iranian Jewry in the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods. Sources: American Jewish Yearbook (1950, 1962); Anderson (1979); Higgins (1984); Hourcade (1996); Iranian Census (various years); Rahimiyan (2008); Shiloah and Nezter (2006); World Jewish Congress (2009); Yegar (1993).
Other major Christian sects include the Assyrian and Chaldeans who were collectively estimated to number roughly between 10,000 (Macuch & Ishaya, 1987) in 1950–1951 and 20,000 for 1956 (Abrahamian, 1982). Macuch and Ishaya (1987) estimate that in 1971 the Assyrian population grew to slightly under 20,000. For the 1970s, Sanasarian (2000) estimated 30,000. For the 1980s, the numbers begin to vary significantly, ranging from 27,500 to 58,000 (Macuch and Ishaya, 1987; Pakizegi, 1992), Other numbers indicated a more conservative trajectory of population growth: Marshall (2000) estimated 23,000 Assyrians and 13,000 other Catholics for the 1990s, and Archbishop Youhannan Issayi (as cited in Sanasarian, 2000) put the count at 16,000 to 18,000. The Vatican reports around 17,000 Catholics (comprising Roman Catholics, Armenian, as well as Chaldean sects) in Iran as of 2009 (Thavis, 2009).
Protestant Christians are estimated to number between 5,000 and 15,000 in the population (Sanasarian, 2000); however the number remains uncertain because of the large number of converts that remain uncounted for safety reasons—because they are not a recognized religious minority. Additionally, the rise in Muslim converts to Christianity is undercounted according to some sources, because they would be considered apostates. Some inside sources estimate that between 50,000 to 120,000 Christians hide their religious affiliation in public (Issa Dibaj, cited in Esfandiari, 2004; Iranian Christians International, n.d.; Open Doors USA, 2009). While the Armenian presence in Iran has declined over the years since the revolution, conversion to Christianity has increased; the number however is difficult to ascertain. Figure 9 includes the averages of these figures, and includes Iranian Census reports during the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic Period for all Christian groups (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, Census Data, 1966–2006).
Note. Number of Protestants after 2000 is estimated at 50,000–100,000 because there is no public record.
*Total count for Christians by the Iranian National Census (Statistical Centre of Iran,1956–2006)
**Numbers reflect averages of available sources: Abrahamian (1982), Amurian & Kasheff (1987), Armenia Diaspora (2009), Cheney (2009), Esfandiari (2004), Firoozi (1974), Issayi (1992, as cited in Sanasarian, 2000), Macuch & Ishaya (1987), Marshall (2000), Minority at Risk Report (2001), Pakizegi (1992), and Sanasarian (1995).
Figure 9. Iranian Christian population averages by decade.
Baha’i population in Iran. During the Pahlavi era, statistics gathered in the earlier epochs were both unreliable and unsystematic, and did not include the Baha’is as a recognized minority. After the Revolution, the Baha’is again went unrecognized as a legitimate minority group in Iran. In 1915, Wilson (1915/1970) approximated the Baha’i population to be 100,000–200,000. There were a reported 192,000 Baha’is living in Iran in 1956 (Abrahamian, 1982), while Berges (1954) offers a ranged figure of 100,000–200,000 for the same decade. For 1975, Barrett (1982) estimated 295,000 Baha’is, similar to most other estimates of 300,000 by other early sources.[5] Baha’i sources outside Iran initially reported 300,000 to 400,000 members, but the estimates were reduced by Baha’i institutions to 300,000 based on non-Baha’i external sources. This latter figure is the most cited by academics, government organizations, and other accounts. Ahang Rabbani (personal communication, November 5, 2009) provided the author with a conservative calculation for this period. Based on the records of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran, some 75,000 Baha’i adults lived in Iran in 1977. Based on this figure, Rabbani calculated a total of 172,500 Baha’is for the period (including children and youth).[6] After the Revolution, there was a significant emigration of Baha’is, and counting the remaining community membership was next to impossible because of their unrecognized and banned status. The commonly cited figure of 300,000–350,000 has remained in circulation for the last 30 years, and is used by both Baha’i and non-Baha’i sources. While this number appears to be an overestimation, underestimating the number has its deficiencies as well, particularly because the number of Iranian Baha’is continues to increase through conversion and birth.
Geographic Spread of the Three Minority Groups The geographic spread of Jews, Christians and Baha’is also changed over time, but by most accounts, all three groups, like the general population, gravitated toward urban areas whenever possible when there were no opportunities locally. Figure 10 shows the general geographic distribution of the three religious minorities (ca. 1979–2009). A major influence on emigration outside the country for the various groups was domestic pressure and restrictions on mobility and freedom, as well as the lack of opportunity—whether as a result of discrimination or general disparity. For example, a large number of Iranian Jews left Iran for Israel in the 1950s, in search of opportunities unavailable to them in their home country. The pervasive the Islamic Republic and public sentiment after the 1979 Revolution in Iran played a role in motivating members of minority groups to leave Iran. This was especially critical for groups which perceived that their survival was threatened. A further motive for leaving the country after the 1979 Revolution was the war with Iraq, followed by a deteriorating economy. Other significant attractions for emigration were the perceived opportunities outside Iran, such as education, social freedom, economic, and political opportunity.[7]
Notwithstanding the varying and sometimes unreliable estimates of the numbers of the three religious minorities, it is important to note that the ebb and flow of growth and decline, whether influenced by an internal (domestic) or external (international) impetus has had a direct effect on other elements of the groups’ composition. Population count, clustering, and dispersion have a bearing on socioeconomic opportunities, the integrity of group organizational structures, and how group members frame and reframe ideological orientation. I argue that population count also affects the resources available to a group, including material, human, organizational, moral, and cultural resources. Similarly, the size and location of a group partially determine the accessibility and availability of strategies and opportunities; thus, a small or a large group will have particular advantages that the other does not. Small groups may not be as noticeable and thus be tolerated, while larger and more visible groups may face harsher scrutiny. Conversely, larger groups have a wider pool to draw from in mobilizing resources for community affairs, while a smaller community generally has fewer. Actions can also be framed in a similar context.
Note: The size of each symbol corresponds to the population count relative to own-group total, and is used to denote, high, medium, and small population size. While there are a number of other locations where group members live, this map shows noticeable populations as observed by various sources. For Christians (Assyrian and Chaldeans primarily live in Urmieh, Ahvaz; Armenian Christians primarily live in Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan. The majority of Baha’is and Jews live in Tehran and Shiraz and the surrounding cities.
Figure 10. Religious minorities in Iran (ca. 1979–2009)
Migration is particularly important in considering network ties and collective resources. Diaspora communities’ relationship with their home population can aid or impair a group’s ability to strategize and act collectively. Prior to the Pahlavi era, religious minority groups were fairly scattered throughout Iran. However, as in other segments of the population, many migrated to the cities where the government spent most of its development resources. In other words, greater opportunities for employment and education were perceived in such cities as Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, and other urban areas, especially for members of minorities.
All three groups moved to bigger cities over the decades, particularly Jews and Baha’is. However, Baha’is remained in many smaller localities because of their commitment to engage in local propagation of their religion and in order to sustain local communities. Christians also moved to urban areas like Tehran, but most maintained their communities in Isfahan, Urmieh, Tabriz, and Ahvaz. In 1946–1947 large numbers of Armenians moved to Soviet Armenia, following an open call to them from the Catholics of Soviet Armenia to help repopulate the homeland after the devastation and population decline of World War II (Amurian & Kasheff, 1987). The move to central cities changed other characteristics of the groups, notably the educational and professional opportunities that facilitated the Jewish and Baha’i communities’ social and economic mobility during the Pahlavi era.
While some Christians emigrated because of persecution during the time of Reza Pahlavi, significant migration occurred only after the Revolution. With the exodus of Christians and Jews, the communities in smaller areas suffered from isolation. Similarly, the Jewish population experienced large emigration to Israel beginning in the late 1940s and in the 1960s; however, 5,000 of the 57,111[8] Iranian Jews who moved during this period returned to Iran (Rahimiyan, 2008b). According to Haftvan (2006), half of the entire population of Armenians left Iran in the years immediately following the Islamic Revolution, moving primarily to the United States and Europe. The Minority Assessment Report (2009b) indicates that Christians had been leaving the country at a rate of 15,000 to 20,000 per year since 2001. Jewish émigrés during the 1970s and 1980s consisted primarily of those with financial means, opportunities outside the country, or ties abroad (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, November 2, 2009). The primary destinations for Jewish émigrés were the United States (35,000), Israel (20,000)[9] and Western Europe (5,000; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).[10] Many Baha’is also fled the country during and after the revolution because of heightened persecution of community members, leaders, and institutions. Most Baha’is who emigrated moved to the United States, Canada, Australasia, and Western Europe, although a smaller number went to countries in the Middle East, southern Asia, Africa, and South America. The precise number of Iranian Baha’i emigrants is unknown. However, based on records and estimates of Baha’i immigrants to the other countries, it seems that the number is relatively small, indicating that only some 20,000–50,000 have left since the early 1900s up to the present.[11] Many individuals and families who did not or could not leave the country moved to the hubs of their respective communities, but others remained in place out of a sense of service, duty, or because it was impractical for them to do otherwise. The loss of so many people had a noticeable impact on the vitality and organization of all three groups.
Socioeconomic Status of the Three Minority Groups There has been little serious study of the socioeconomic status of the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities in Iran, and for good reason. The data traditionally available in such assessments is generally unreliable, missing, or inaccessible. When discussing socioeconomic status of individuals or the average status of a group, four indicators are usually measured: family income, education, occupation, and wealth. While exact figures for each of these indices are unavailable, there have been generalizations made by insiders and outsiders based on observation of related indicators.
The Jewish community. Prior to the Pahlavi era, many urban Iranian Jews lived in distinct areas of a city (called mahalleh) having high concentrations of community members. In these special districts, shops, hospitals, schools, houses, synagogues, and other venues were run and used by Jews (Sarshar, 2002). Before the secularization efforts of Reza Shah, Jews had faced gross discrimination, and were prohibited from buying products from some Muslim-owned shops, baths, and public spaces; moreover, Muslims were often discouraged from buying products from Jews because of their najes or “impure” status. The mahalleh were not ghettos, nor were they mandatory, but they served the practical functions of everyday life (Sarshar, 2002). Before the Pahlavi era, Jewish children were not permitted in government or Muslim schools, but did not actually require this service, as Jewish-run schools and other religious minority schools proved to be higher in quality. Certain jobs or industries were off limits to Jews as well, such as banking or government posts. As a result, many became entrepreneurs and performed other services needed in their own community. One informant[12] relates that, because of the generally hostile attitude toward the Jewish community over the centuries, many members of the Jewish community sought professions that were mobile and less subject to long term disadvantage—such as goldsmithing, peddling, trading, etc. Socioeconomic status was tied directly to one’s religious affiliation and place of dwelling. While some Jews were able to successfully run businesses, or even work outside the Jewish community, the vast majority did not do so with ease.
The advent of Reza Shah’s rule of Iran ushered in new economic and educational opportunities for Iranian Jews. Due to Reza Shah’s nationalistic agenda, the primary identity of the citizen was secular rather than religious. Jews, like most religious minorities, were able to retain both national and religious identities, while benefiting from privileges that were usually reserved for Muslims. For example, Jews were allowed to serve in the military and higher posts in the government, able to buy land, open shops more freely outside the Jewish Quarters (mahalle-ye yuhudiyan), go to public schools and build new ones, and benefit from the new higher education sector that was being developed (Rahimiyan, 2008b). Despite the fluctuating strain of worsening Israel-Iran relations on Iranian Jews, most individuals were able to integrate into the burgeoning national Iranian identity that was characteristic of the political ideology of the Shah. Despite these gains, the majority of Iranian Jews were still relatively poor by the time Reza Shah abdicated the throne (Rahimiyan, 2008a).
Some refer to the period of Muhammad Reza Shah as the “Golden Age for Iranian Jews,” because of the significant improvement in the economic status of Jews during that period (Menashri, 2002; Rahimiyan, 2008a). Occupationally, those who rose in socioeconomic status were entrepreneurs, international dealers and importers, academics, industrialists, insurance brokers, developers, and real estate investors[13] (Loeb, 1996; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006). [14] According to Faryar Nikbakht (2002), one reason Jews were able to rise economically and socially was because they had been attending the French Alliance Israel Universelle school (established in 1898) for several decades prior to the Pahlavi era. Equipped with both English and French, they were the ideal candidates to supervise, manage, or work as intermediaries between the foreign technical industrialists brought by the Shah from abroad to help modernize Iran and its workers. These opportunities facilitated the movement of a segment of Iranian Jews, particularly those in urban areas, into the middle and higher class. The rising status of the Iranian Jewry was even more noticeable because of the migration of lower class Iranian Jews to Israel—seeking opportunities unavailable or inaccessible to them in Iran—as early as the late 1940s. By 1968, according to Haddad (1984), Iranian Jews were the wealthiest community of Jews in Asia and Africa.
The secular environment encouraged by the Pahlavi regime also had a bearing on Jewish status. Despite still being considered najes (impure) by Islamic standards, the focus on national identity facilitated the integration of Iranian Jews into the larger community. Nearly 68 percent of all Jews in Iran lived in Tehran by the 1970s. Some 10 percent became extremely wealthy, 80 percent were roughly middle class, and another 10 percent counted among the poor (usually in rural areas, but also in poor areas of the city (Nezter, 1981, as cited in Rahimiyan, 2008a). Although most of the original mahalleh still exist today in some form, most Iranian Jews were integrated and dispersed in the general population by the mid-1960s (Sarshar, 2002).
As mentioned earlier, the impetus for the social mobility of the Iranian Jewish community was due in part to open opportunity structures under the Pahlavis Shahs, and educational training decades earlier in various Jewish and other religious minority-run schools,[15] particularly the Alliance Israelite Universelle.[16] Jewish children also attended schools run by American and European Christian missionaries as well as Baha’is during the late 19th and early 20th century (Nikbakht, 2002). During both regimes of the Pahlavis,[17] Jewish children were able to attend government schools as well. The importance of the Alliance schools in developing the Jewish Iranian community—contributing to both the educational opportunities as well as status—cannot be overestimated. Their role as a hub promoting culture, networking, and training a new generation of “modern” youth prepared thousands of Jewish young men for service in the professions and set the stage for rapid development during the Pahlavi era (Nikbakht, 2002). The schools reflected the French ideological orientation toward liberalization, modern education, and extended into the cultural arena. The reputation of the schools attracted non-Jewish children (Muslims, Armenians, Assyrians, and Baha’is) who eventually made up 10 percent of the enrollment and included the children of some prominent government officials (Nikbakht, 2002).[18] Before the Alliance (Ettehad) and other Jewish schools, literacy in the Jewish community was limited to Persian-Hebrew (reading Hebrew with Persian letters), while attendance in these schools eventually resulted in literacy in Persian as well as other European languages for many thousands (Nikbakht, 2002).[19]
By 1968, there were 13 Alliance schools with 5,158 pupils (Schwarzfuchs & Malino, 2006), while other figures place the count for this period at 15 schools with 6,500 students (Netzer, 1985). Other locally based and foreign Iranian Jewish schools were opened throughout Iran as well, such as the Koresh School of Rast (1922), the Koresh School of Tehran (1931), Otzar Hatorah[20] (ca. 1947–1979; 31 schools), ORT (vocational and technical training schools), the Ettefaugh School in Tehran (1947), Abrisami, Ruhi Sad, and Saybani in Shiraz. By 1961, a reported 13,200 Jewish children attended the 37 various Jewish schools in Iran, and another 2,000–3,000 attended non-Jewish schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, American Jewish Yearbook, 1962).[21] By 1973, the number had dropped to some 10,647 students enrolled in Jewish-run schools, 45 percent of whom were Jewish children (American Jewish Committee Archives, American Jewish Yearbook, 1975). The decrease in attendance in Jewish schools from 14,000 to a little over 10,000 can be explained by the proliferation of government-run schools accessible to Jews and others during the period of Muhammad Reza Shah, as well as to migration outside Iran.[22]
Scholarships were usually extended to Jewish children who could not afford to attend Jewish-run schools, and additional clothing, hot lunches, and health services were made available to poor students. Funding for these schools came from wealthy donors in Iraq, France, and England, as well as from organizations and synagogue congregations. By the 1970s, organizations and committees were the primary financial managers of these institutions (including the Sanduk Melli or the Jewish National Treasury Committee; American Jewish Committee Archives, 1975). In other words, schools and learning institutions constituted the primary means of distribution of “wealth” through material, social, and cultural capital—the channels for social mobility. In turn, many Jewish graduates entered the new universities throughout the country, and, after graduating, some joined the various faculties. The significant boost in economic status also helped the newly schooled generation of Jews to change the lives of their families for generations to come.
The Christian community. The different Christian communities in Iran benefited from similar processes of socioeconomic status mobility experienced by many Iranian Jews, but with significant differences. The foreign Christian missionary and Armenian schools served as an important first step in equipping students with the skills and knowledge to meet the demands of the modernization and industrialization agenda during the Pahlavi regimes. Traditionally made up of artisans, many were able, during the first half of the 20th century, to adjust to the modernizing efforts of the new government. According to Bournoutian (1994), because of transnational ties and language advantages (French and English in schools), Armenian Iranians thrived as both fine and performing artists, tailors, cobblers, photographers, managers of cafes and restaurants, but also as traders, auto-mechanics, truckers, technicians, and business owners. Others who attended Christian schools experienced similar advantages. Only a very small number rose to the upper class, with the majority remaining in the low and new middle class (Bournoutian, 1994; Burke, 1993).[23] Christians experienced moderate upward mobility during the Pahlavi era, as compared with the tour-de-force carried out by the Jews and Baha’is of the same period. The long tradition of guilds among Armenians and Assyrians assisted in facilitating opportunities as Iran was modernizing (Yaghoubian, 1993).
While reliable figures are difficult to obtain, we have good evidence that during the years 1925–1979 there were some 48 Armenian schools (several small, one-class, as well as more established multi-grade schools; Bournoutian, 1994; Sanasarian, 2000). Some scholars have suggested that the initial rise of modern schooling among Apostolic Armenians was spurred by the rivalry between Presbyterian and Catholic missions which were perceived as a threat because they attempted to convert others (Rostam-Kolayi, 2008; Zirinsky, 1993a; discussed in Chapter 6). By the time Reza Shah came into power, there were already 13 Presbyterian schools in Tehran, Hamadan, Rasht, Tabriz, and Urmia (Zirinsky, 1993a). The French Lazarist Catholic missionaries established one of the first nonreligious oriented schools in 1938, which attracted students from various faiths (Shahvar, 2009). Around 1975, the Chaldean Church had a school “Sarq,” which had 370 students and 15 teachers, and a national school “Susan” with over 750 students and 14 teachers (Macuch and Ishaya, 1987).
Initially, the missionary school curriculum emphasized practical and technical education, but later this expanded to include foundations for business, industrial work, training in the trades, business, engineering, and medicine (Zirinksy, 1993a, 1993b). Some Christian schools enjoyed a prestigious reputation, such as the Alborz College of Tehran, as well as the Nurbakhsh girl’s school, and attracted students from all religious communities and prominent government officials (Armajani, 1985; Doolittle, 1983; Zirinsky, 2009). While there are no accurate figures for the total number of students that attended the schools—much less for their ethno-religious composition—the closest estimate based on trajectory and representation indicate some 10,000–15,000 students.[24]
The Baha’i community. Like the Jewish community, the more nascent Baha’i community in Iran benefited from its own schools during the late 19th and early 20th century, and was primed for the opportunities available to them during the Pahlavi Era. Unlike the many Jews who lived in the mahalleh or the Christians who were concentrated in specific regions of Iran (such as New Julfa), Baha’is were the most dispersed of the three groups, and represented membership from an array of social-economic classes. This was in part due to the speedy growth of the religion which had attracted converts from the time of its earliest beginnings in the 1840s (Smith, 1987). However, because of the persecution and stigma associated with the Baha’is, they were often isolated and their mobility restricted. Public government schools were rare during this period in Iran, and Islamic schools were inaccessible, if not dangerous, for Baha’i children to attend (Banani, 1961). However, from the outset, education was a religious injunction in the Baha’i Faith, set by its founder and his successors, and by 1899, the first modern school was established. By 1938, there were 50 Baha’i schools open to children of all religions throughout Iran (Shahvar, 2009). While no exact figure is given, approximately 10,000 to 25,000 children attended these schools during the years that they were in operation. Some estimate that about 10 percent of all school children attended Baha’i-run schools (Baha’i International Community, 2005a). Baha’is and many non-Baha’is attended these schools, making it difficult to provide reliable figures for number of Baha’i pupils.
The schools increased one after another in large and small cities throughout Iran, and were further supported by members of the American Baha’i community, who played a significant role in developing the structure and philosophy of the schools (Shahvar, 2009). The schools strictly adhered to the curricular requirements of the new Pahlavi Ministry of Education, and refrained from including Baha’i education (Banani, 1961). With the Pahlavi focus on modernity, the Baha’is were able to implement their own modern principles, pioneering in a variety of fields, despite being stigmatized as an aberrant group by large segments of the general society.[25] The schools were highly regarded by many non-Baha’is, and even government officials and prominent families of Muslims sent their children there.
With the more liberal policies toward religious minorities that characterized the later Pahlavi period, Baha’is continued to seek education from modern schools which had been established decades earlier, and began to pursue higher education in Iran’s new universities. Some even joined the growing number of students abroad (particularly in the United States and Western Europe). As several scholars have indicated, the education and progressive orientation of Baha’is, coupled with open opportunities, led to the social mobility of many of its community members during the period of Muhammad Reza Shah, much as it had for the Jews (Keddie, 1981; Naficy, 1981; Shahvar, 2009). Even though the Baha’is were a nonrecognized religious minority, their growing affluence and prominence in positions of influence and in education was noticeable to many (Abrahamian, 2008). This fact would later be used against the Baha’is during the time of the Islamic Republic, when opponents of the Baha’is accused them of collaborating with the Shah, with the imperialist interests of the United States and Great Britain, and with Zionism. Baha’is who were members of the new middle and upper classes of modern Iran included businessmen and entrepreneurs, doctors and nurses, engineers and architects, international traders, academics, government sector employees, as well as managers and supervisors. As with other minority groups, they occupied their share of the traditional middle class (teachers, artisans, and the merchants known as bazaari) and lower class, engaged in common trades (e.g., peddling, tailoring, etc.).
The rise of a segment of their population to the upper and middle class strengthened their community organization, structures and property, and services offered. This, in turn, boosted their status within society as modernists, progressives, and socially mobile members of society. Baha’is, however, remained out of favor and were often the target of more radical and conservative factions of the Muslim community,[26] the Baha’is nonetheless experienced significant and unprecedented social mobility during the Pahlavi period, particularly economically and educationally. According to one 1973 report (Baha’i World Centre, 1968–1973, Vol. 15, p. 248), illiteracy had been eradicated among Baha’i women under the age of 40. Literacy for boys was equally advanced, similar to that of those who attended the Jewish, Christian, and foreign schools. Baha’is were accepted into many government posts at all levels, including the civil service, the military (as noncombatants), and even high appointed positions (Banani, 1961; Keddie, 1981; Milani, 2008).
Status of Minority Groups Under the Islamic Republic of Iran With the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), conditions, opportunities, and status immediately changed for religious minority groups. Several key factors led to the rapid reorganization of the socioeconomic structure of the Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. Over the 30-year span of the Islamic Republic (1979–2009), virtually all members of the upper class belonging to any of the three groups left the country, because of the threat to their well-being and safety. It is extremely difficult to assess with any accuracy the real socioeconomic status of religious minorities in the Islamic Republic, and thus a general overview of their economic, educational, and occupational conditions will have to suffice.
The victory and aftermath of the Islamic Revolution aroused uncertainty in many members of the Jewish population, prompting the largest emigration of Iranian Jews—particularly from the upper and middle class—during these three decades.[27] Nonetheless, recognized religious minority groups were included in the new Iranian constitution, and given representation in Parliament. The rights and privileges prescribed to these groups were insignificant, but dhimma (protected) status was extended to them. As with the general population, Jews and Christians in rural areas who were part of the lower class probably benefited from the literacy campaigns of the Islamic Republic, resulting in a 99 percent literacy rate in the new generation. However, because Christians and Jews were considered second-class citizens—not being Muslims—they did not benefit equally from the social services extended to Muslim supporters of the Revolution. With the exodus of many of their leaders and prominent, educated community members, the cultural and social aspects of both Jewish and Christian communities suffered.
Jewish and Christians schools were reorganized to reflect the agenda of the Islamic Republic and gain regime approval. Name changes to schools and buildings, reformation of the curriculum, and restructuring of the administrative and teaching staff of minority-run schools were at the top of the agenda, and had an inevitable affect on the educational quality being offered to Christian and Jewish students. The heavy-handed dogmatic curriculum and overt domination of Shi’i ideology had a detrimental impact on minority populations, often leading to higher rates of emigration, by means of which parents sought better conditions, especially educational opportunity, for their children (Mossayeb & Shirazi, 2006).
The Islamic Republic never recognized the Baha’is as a legitimate religious minority. Moreover, the Minister of Education, Mohammad Ali Raja’i, an open opponent of the Baha’is, called for the immediate expulsion of all Baha’i children from schools and universities, and demanded the firing of any Baha’i who worked for the education system (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006). Ultimately, Baha’is were allowed to enroll in primary, elementary, and secondary schools, but still faced sporadic harassment and on occasion expulsion or suspension when identified as Baha’is. A ban was placed on self-identified Baha’is seeking access to higher education, even if they were able to successfully pass the university entrance exam. Those who slipped through the filtering process were expelled once identified. To date, there is no record of any Baha’i graduate from a public university since the Cultural Revolution. This was a blow to the Iranian Baha’i community. Many of those with means among the middle and upper class left the country during the first few years, when there was unabated violence by the regime against Baha’i families, institutions, businesses, and social service organizations. However, as with the other religious minority groups, some prominent Baha’is members deliberately remained to tend to the needs of the remaining community. In 1987, desperate to meet the educational needs of its young members, Baha’is started a distance-learning university, the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education (BIHE), made up of volunteer instructors and professors—a university which is not only unaccredited in Iran, but which also undergoes raids and closure from time to time (discussed in Chapter 6). Thus, while no real number is given for the educational status of Baha’is under the Islamic Republic, it is safe to say that many seek education as they did during the Pahlavi era. Children attend government-run schools when possible, and, as of this writing, only a few thousand now participate in the Baha’i university. According to an administrator of the Institute (personal communication, October 21 and 28, 2009), some 500 are admitted each year, with the most recent enrolment for the academic year 2010 totaling about 3,000.[28]
Consultation with several sources from different groups both inside and outside Iran reveals that there is a generally conviction that the economic and educational status of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is has deteriorated significantly during the Islamic Republic. Public statements by members of Iran’s Jewish community claim that they enjoy equal rights under the Islamic Republic, but such comments have received much criticism by other community members, who suggest that they do not correspond to the geopolitical and social realities and pressures of life in Iran (Cohen, 2009; Melamed, 2009; “MP: Iran only country,” 2010; Tugend, 2009). However, it is possible that those who have made such statements are lower class and rural residents who benefit from a wider range of social services under the Islamic Republic than were made available during the Pahlavi era. It is important to note that most of the modernization and industrialization developments during the Pahlavi era benefited urban areas and the elite in other regions. While Jews and Christians are allowed by the Islamic Republic to work for the government, they are barred from certain positions (in both public and private sectors). Baha’is are banned from employment at any level of the government, and even private businesses are discouraged from hiring Baha’is. The private sector, however, has been the arena where Baha’is have been able to maneuver and secure livelihoods, and in a few cases thrive in Iran like members of other religious minorities, although not on an equal footing with their Shi’i Muslim countryman.
Whereas in the time of the Pahlavis, nationalism was the primary agenda, during the Islamic Republic, Islamization of society is at the heart of the Islamic Republic. Thus, religious identity has become political. The idea of equality based on national identity was replaced by religious status. According to Shi’i doctrine, while the “People of the Book” are given protective status, they are not equal to Muslims. For example, all non-Muslims are considered to be ritually impure. Some Muslim leaders, such as Ayatollah Montazeri (2008), have adopted a more liberal orientation toward religious minorities. Nonetheless, he has repeatedly voiced in public his conviction that religious minorities in Iran are entitled to equal rights as Iranian citizens (while not denying their status according to Islamic teachings; Fani-Yazdi, 2008; Sanasarian, 2000).
Organizational Structure The organization of religious groups is too broad a topic to discuss in detail here. Therefore, I have narrowed my discussion to its functionality in communal and public life. Under this heading, three structural elements will be addressed in brief: (a) administrative body; (b) operation of affairs; and (c) organizational international branches. While this categorization of organizational structure is limited, it will suffice for the analysis of the mobilization and collective action undertaken by minority communities, the extent to which a group can gather and employ resources, and the role of community leaders in framing situations as opportunities or challenges. For the sake of brevity, I will also refrain from elaborating on the historical development of these institutions.
Organization of the Jewish Community. As of 1938, the Hebra (the governing assembly of the Jewish community), was registered as the Tehran Jewish Committee (TJC), and this body operates to the present day as the main administrative arm of the Jewish community, under the supervision of the government (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). Appointed subcommittees under the Tehran Jewish Committee look to the provision of a variety of community services and activities.[29] Jewish religious authority is vested in three sources: the Chief Rabbi,[30] the elected Jewish representative to Majles, and the Board of Directors of the Central Tehran Jewish Committee (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). The Chief Rabbi oversees the spiritual affairs of the community, and those elements that relate to Jewish law; the Majles representative is the official spokesman for the community regarding policies, statements, and proclamations about the Iranian Jewish community. Finally, while each locality has its own elected committee, the Board of Directors of the Tehran Jewish Committee oversees the social affairs of the community, including health care, education, social services, publications,[31] event organization, facilities, and property management.[32] The Iranian Jewish community in Iran is centralized through its administrative arm, but regional communities maintain religious autonomy through their local synagogues. Funds to support facilities and services in various regions, including the posts of rabbis and other religious functionaries, come from collections gathered from the local community. Sometimes, affluent members of the community, and even individuals outside the country made large donations, but this has become more infrequent over the last 20 years.
Since the early 1900s, Jews were offered the opportunity to have representation in Parliament, but the influence of the successive individuals who held this post was negligible, and was largely confined to their own community (Loeb, 1996). As a result of being institutionalized during the Pahlavi era, and even after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the Jewish community has, by and large, been able to establish and maintain many of its facilities, organizations, and public services. In 2007, there were 100 synagogues throughout the country, 26 of which were located in Tehran (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). As a result of the emigration of large numbers of Iranian Jews and the acquisition of Jewish schools by the state,[33] there are only five special Jewish schools remaining today (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). From the end of the Pahlavi era to the present, Tehran remains the main hub for the community; according to several sources, there is a noticeable disconnect between the Jews of Tehran and Shiraz.[34]
Today, most Iranian Jews live outside of Iran, the largest concentration being in the United States, Israel, and Western Europe. Confirmed by several sources, the connection between the community in Iran and its diaspora was very strong shortly after the Revolution, but has weakened continually since that time.[35] While individuals and some relief organizations provide donations to the Jewish hospital, nursing home, synagogues, and schools, the efforts are uncoordinated. There exists no transnational organization unifying Iranian Jews with those outside the country; rather, Jewish organizations and leaders inside and outside of Iran function separately. Immediately following the Revolution, the spiritual leader of the Jewish community, After the execution of several prominent community members after the Revolution, Jewish leaders made it clear that the Jewish community in Iran would be loyal to the Islamic Republic of Iran and would disavow any association with Zionism and the State of Israel (Menashri, 2002).
Organization of the Christian community. Unlike the Jews and Baha’is, there is no one coherent way to describe the organizational structure of Christians because of the multiplicity of their denominations in Iran. The three major denominations in Iran are the Armenian Apostolic and Catholic Church, the Assyrian Church of the East, and the Chaldean Catholic Church. Other Christian denominations, consisting of Armenians and Assyrians, as well as converts, include Protestants, such as Presbyterians (Evangelical Church of Iran), Pentecostals (Assyrian Pentecostal Church, Assemblies of God or Jama’iate Rabbani), and Anglicans (Cheney, 2009; Diocese of Iran, n.d.; Macuch & Ishaya, 1985; World Council of Churches, 2009). The denominations are highly fragmented, and observations indicate that there have been tense relationships over the centuries between and among particular groups (Sanasarian, 2000).
Hierarchical structures vary among the denominations, but generally follow a similar overarching model. For instance, the Catholic churches (such as the Assyrian, Chaldean, and Armenian churches in Iran) have priests or bishops who can be elevated to the higher rank of archbishop. Parishes exist in various localities under the auspices of a diocese or archdiocese (sometimes referred to as eparchy or archeparchy). The Chaldean Catholics adhere to the authority of the Vatican in Rome, while it is only since 1994 that the Assyrian Church of the East has begun to reconcile with the Church in Rome and their Chaldean counterpart (Vatican, 2001). The Assyrian Church of the East has three major churches and 15 missions in Iran, guided by their international spiritual leader, Mar Dinkha IV, the Assyrian Catholic Patriarch. The Armenian Apostolic Church follows a similar hierarchical model, and pays its allegiance to the Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia, the spiritual leader of the Church.[36] There are three diocese of the Apostolic Church in Iran, one each in Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz.[37] The Apostolic leadership ranks follow a line of hierarchy beginning with the clergy or laity and ending ultimately with the catholicos.. While there was some growth of organizational leadership for both groups during the Pahlavi era, there has been a consistent decline in the number of bishops, priests, clergy, and parishes throughout Iran for both denominations since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.[38]
Although all of these mainstream Christian churches are officially under the leadership of supranational organizations, they have tended to the affairs of their community with little guidance with regard to policies and practices outside of religious practice. The two government-recognized Christian denominations are the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Assyrian Church (including the Chaldeans); this recognition was extended during the Pahlavi regimes and the Islamic Republic. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Armenians receive two seats (a representative from north and south) and Assyrians receive one seat.[39] Protestant denominations are not recognized as legitimate branches within the country, and are tolerated as part of the total collective of Iran’s Christians.
The organization of the evangelical churches is more difficult to define because of their nonrecognized status and diverse affiliations with Western churches in the United States and Europe. Their spiritual leadership is based on a hierarchical model. One important development among Protestant (particularly evangelical) converts is private worship in homes. Because conversion from Islam to Christianity is considered an act of apostasy, many meet privately in what some adherents call “home-worship.” Unlike the Apostolic and Assyro-Chaldean[40] churches, which remain insular, these other groups engage in active proselytizing among Muslims and other religious minorities.
Several of the Christian denominations created committees and appointed delegates to run various organizations, publications, and other services provided to the community. Funding for running these activities came primarily from members of the congregation. However, missionary schools established in the 19th and early 20th centuries received both material and human resources from groups outside the country. In the case of protestant groups, external resources were the primary means of running schools, hospitals and clinics, and other services under the supervision of the missions.[41] Nominal aid was also extended to the Armenian and Assyrian schools by their respective heads outside Iran at various points during the Pahlavi dynasty.
Organization of the Baha’i community. In contrast to Judaism and Christianity, there is no clergy in the Baha’i Faith. There are, however, two branches of leadership: elected administrative bodies and appointed individuals. The local administrative body of the Baha’is is called the Local Spiritual Assembly (LSA), a council comprised of nine democratically elected individuals from the total population of a given city or locality. These nine individuals elect officers from among their own number for a one-year term of service. In Baha’i elections at all levels, the nine individuals serve on a voluntary basis. Such service is considered a sacred duty, does not require formal training, and is not accompanied by ordination or other ritual. The individuals who are elected have no special rank or station, are not privy to arcane knowledge, nor do they have individual power over other members of the community (Effendi, 1973). There is no institutional concept of a “professional” religious leader in the Baha’i community. In Iran, the above structure existed until the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which formally banned all Baha’i organizations, national and local, in 1983.
The elected Assemblies are responsible for the guidance of the religious and social affairs and development of their respective communities, and appoint committees to meet special needs at the national, regional, and local level within their jurisdiction. Members of each National Spiritual Assembly (NSA) of the Baha’is elect the international governing institution of the Baha’i community, called the Universal House of Justice. This body was first established in 1963, and is elected every five years. The prophet founder of the Baha’i Faith (1817–1892) indicated that the individual members of the international body also held no special rank or station, but that the collective decisions were binding on every Baha’i (Baha’u’llah, 1873/1992). The issue of binding authority is important when considering the impact of framing situations in Iran. The Baha’i Faith functions within an umbrella organizational structure..Both appointed and elected positions are generally unpaid, except for those roles which require significant dedication of time, such as the elected executive officers of some Local or National Assemblies where there are large concentrations of Baha’is.
Staffing of the administrative bodies varies from country to country. As elsewhere, the Iranian NSA and some 400 LSAs appointed committees to provide services to the community. As elsewhere in the world, the funds of the community came from voluntary donations from individual community members only,[42] and are managed by local and national elected treasurers (officers of the Local or National Assembly). During the time of the Pahlavi Shahs, the National and Local Spiritual Assemblies in Iran appointed directors for special service institutions established by the community, such as hospitals or schools.
During the Pahlavi era, the Iranian Baha’i community was considered one of the most developed in the Baha’i world. In 1934, it formed its first NSA.[43] Soon after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, many of the members of the Baha’i administration, including two iterations of the NSA, as well as many LSA members were arrested, often tortured, and killed. In 1983, the Prosecutor General Seyyed Hossein Mussavi-Tabrizi pronounced a ban on any formal or informal organization and administrative activity of the Baha’is in Iran (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006).[44] The Baha’is immediately responded by dismantling the National and all Local Spiritual Assemblies, showing no sign of rejection toward the government. To retain some semblance of organization, the Universal House of Justice appointed an ad hoc committee, called the Yaran (Friends), to oversee the basic affairs of the Iranian Baha’i community, and local working groups called Khademin (Servants). In 2008, with the arrest and imprisonment of the seven members of the Yaran and threat to their life, the Baha’is voluntarily dissolved the committee, after it was declared illegal. Several Baha’i sources in Iran have reported that Baha’i activities since then have been minimal, reduced to children’s classes, prayer meetings in homes, the only Baha’i organization still in operation being the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education (anonymous Baha’i in Iran, personal communication, 13 December 2009).
Networks of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is To assess the social and organizational networks of the Jews, Christians, and Baha’is in Iran with other actors, I will draw on concepts found in network analysis studies. In the Methods section, I discussed how technical concepts of network analysis were adjusted in order to conceptualize network relations of religious minority groups. The network diagrams which follow are of my own design, and are used to identify ties and interaction among groups, regimes, and transnational actors. The networks include consideration of nodes (i.e., actors), geographic level, type of ties (direct, indirect, or independent), strength, and content (resources, advocacy, and information). The reader may refer to Chapter 3 for more detailed discussion of technical information.
Network Ties of the Jewish Community Over the centuries, as a result of compounding factors, the network configuration of the community changed, but ultimately created strong local and regional ties, and moderate domestic ties between localities. By the early 20th century, Jewish communities in Europe extended their ties to the Iranian Jewish community, notably from the Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU) organization and the British Jewish Council. During the Pahlavi era, the Iranian Jewish communities benefited significantly from the AIU’s services, including education and social welfare, and in turn created the opportunity to form and strengthen ties to Western Europe. The Iraqi Jewish community, one of the largest in the Middle East, experienced its own exodus because of the threat of genocide to Jewry, many of whom left for Israel and Iran.
By the 1930s, there was a strong Iraqi Jewish presence in Iran that would ultimately become integrated by the nationalization campaign of Reza Shah. The tie between Iraqi-Iranian Jews and those in Iraq remained strong during the early years of the Pahlavi dynasty, particularly in facilitating guidance and resources from wealthy individuals of Iraqi descent as well as leadership of the Iraqi Jewish Council (Nikbakht, 1999; personal communication, 2 November 2009). Despite degraded status and treatment of Jews in the past, Jews during the Pahlavi era were accorded representation in Parliament, official recognition, and, toward the second epoch, experienced near equal rights with other citizens, including access to high-ranking government positions. As mentioned earlier, with the formation of Israel, there were many in the Iranian Jewish community who supported Zionist efforts, including the eminent Jewish leader Habib Elghanian (Milani, 2008). Some, however, opposed Zionist efforts, and sought an exclusive Iranian Jewish identity. By the 1960s, ties to the American, British, and Israeli Jewish communities were strong (see Figure 10). In contrast, the tie between the communities in Tehran and Shirazi was weak, because of tensions over issues of religious observance, with Tehran Jews leaning toward the more secular, nationalist agenda, while the Jews of Shiraz were more sympathetic to overt religious identity and conservative values.
The modernization and nationalization that took place in Iran permeated the Jewish community, strengthening ties of community members with the regime, and simultaneously strengthening ties with Western Jewish communities, particularly the American Jewish community. Like other religious minorities during this period, the relative flexibility afforded the Jewish community during the Pahlavi era facilitated the sharing of resources, education, and services with other religious minorities—for example, Jews attended both Christian and Baha’i schools and vice versa. There was no supranational body that bound the communities together, and even though there was a leader for all Jews in Iran, the local communities shared only moderate ties from region to region, depending primarily on local leadership. As illustrated in the diagram, the Iranian Jewish community was able to draw from a wide range of resources to meet various needs. Most of its ties were direct and unilateral. Existing independent ties provided a more open opportunity structure for Jews during the Pahlavi era.
With the advent of the Islamic Republic, the national Jewish community was still allowed its seat in Parliament, conditioned upon its representative disassociating with any Zionist sentiments, and completely breaking ties with Western and Israeli Jewish communities. This isolated the Iranian Jewish leadership and its community from others around the world. Those who attempted to retain ties with the West and Israel were repressed through various means, including execution, arrest, torture, property and wealth confiscation and destruction, and exile, among other harsh treatment.
Over the three decades of the Islamic Republic, sources outside Iran identify three different group-ties with the Iranian Jewish community.[45] The first are those who left Iran, but retain national pride and sympathy for those who remain, and thus extend support to Iranian Jews, usually in the form of monetary donations (moderate ties remain). The second group consists of those who left Iran, reject the validity of the regime, and urge others to leave the country as well; of this group there are those who do and do not extend aid to Iranian Jews (weak and moderate ties remain). The third group, mostly younger Iranian Jews outside Iran, has weak or no ties with the Jewish community in Iran, choosing, instead to integrate into the general Jewish population. However, among all three groups, a move toward cautious advocacy has emerged particular since the late 1990s. Some have collaborated with NGOs, non-Iranian state agencies, and even formed their own coalitions to assist in ameliorating the depressed condition of Iranian Jews. This has taken the form of news articles, reports, statements, and even aid to assist Iranian Jews who experience hardship and persecution. On rare occasions, Jewish organizations, primarily in the United States and England, extend significant support to the Iranian Jewish community when situations of grave danger arise. The best example is the case of the arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz who were accused of espionage and put on trial for treason in 1999.
The Jewish community in Iran claims no tie whatsoever to this latter movement of advocacy, and often state their absolute contentment under the Islamic Republic of Iran, stressing their strong ties with the government (“MP: Iran only country,” 2010; see Figure 11).[46] Ties between Iranian Jewish communities inside and outside Iran are mostly fragmented or invisible to the general public. There is no substantial collaboration between the Iranian Jewish communities in Western Europe, the United States, and Israel. Some Iranian and non-Iranian Jewish individuals and organizations have voiced concern for the situation facing Iran’s Jews today, and some even offer services to Jews who wish to leave Iran. But no advocacy campaign or highly organized connection exists today between the Iranian Jewish communities inside the country and those outside.[47] While the network diagram in Figure 11 illustrates the high level of independent connections (and activity) among various non-Iranian nodes, it also reflects the Iranian Jewish community’s relative isolation from them under current conditions. In other words, there is an increase in advocacy on behalf of the Iranian Jewish community, but the community within Iran disassociates itself from it. This isolationist behavior constitutes the primary survival strategy of the Jewish community in Iran, which has ultimately made it even more dependent on its relationship with the current regime. It is also the residual effect of the regime’s own political isolation from countries with which the Iranian Jewish community used to have ties.
Figure 11. Jewish networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 12. Jewish networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009)
Network Ties of the Christian Community Much like the Jewish communities of the early 20th century, the Christians benefited significantly from exchanges with missionary services and interaction with foreigners. By the 1930s, many Armenians, Assyrians, Protestant converts, and other denominations had made connections with transnational communities, and received foreign aid from them during the industrialization initiatives of Reza Shah. There was some cross-religious exchange through institutions and services provided by Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. Two groups in particular developed strong ties with Christians in Iran during the Pahlavi era: the American Presbyterians and the British Anglican Church. While their connection to the leadership in Iran was almost nonexistent, these organizations were a source of funding and advocacy for schooling efforts.
Ethno-religious Christian leadership and organizations became more separatist (from other denominations) during this period. Not only was interdenominational collaboration absent, but rivalry was frequent between and among the different groups. While the Assyrians and Chaldeans follow almost identical doctrinal foundations, cultural and religio-political tensions over past centuries divided them. The Armenians were among the most vocal protesters against missionary activity by Western Europeans who actively recruited from their congregation. The Pahlavi regime only recognized the Apostolic Armenian Church and the Assyrian Church of the East, allotting two Parliamentary seats to the former and one to the latter. However, Armenian ties to the regime were weak and even strained during the first half of the Pahlavi era, due, in part, to the ethnic and national concerns which were incompatible with Reza Shah’s monolithic Persian identity campaign. Armenian-Iranians strengthened ties with their transnational community, drawing on their expertise particularly in the running of schools and cultural programs. The Protestant churches were never officially recognized by the government, and thus never had direct ties, other than through the governments in the countries from which they originated.
The guilds were another strong tie connecting Assyrians and Armenians with fellow community members. Significant material, organizational, and human resources were brought in from Europe and America to found schools and health clinics, as well as other organizations that served the Christian community. The Armenian Apostolic Church received social, organizational, and moral support through the coordinated efforts of the Catholicos of Cilicia. But other than some human resources from Armenia, material resources came mostly from the local community. The same was true for the Assyrian Church of the East as well as the Chaldeans. Supranational ties to organizations such as the World Council of Churches and the Middle East Council of Churches were fairly strong, and although valuable as a means of visible unity and eucharistic fellowship, did not confer anything on the local community other than recognition and awareness.
While missionaries and foreign control of facilities were prohibited during the regime of Reza Shah, the move toward amicable relations with the West in the time of Muhammad Reza Shah (1960s and 1970s) offered opportunities of domestic and transnational social mobility among all Christian groups. Although network ties were weak among Christian denominations, there were moderate to strong ties between each group and its own superior organization and community outside the country. Figure 13 illustrates the Christian Network during the Pahlavi period, and how most ties were direct, moderately strong, and few.
The ties between the various Western affiliated denominational groups were strengthened in one respect and weakened in another under the Islamic Republic. The non-Iranian denominations in countries like the United States jeopardized their local Iranian counter-parts by associating them with imperial powers. This led many Protestants to leave the country after the Revolution. However, even after the Revolution, there was a noticeable rise in activity among evangelical Christians in Iran, including proselytizing and conversion of Muslims and other religious minorities. This strained existing weak ties between missionaries and the government, and ultimately led to a rise in persecution in the 1990s targeting leaders in the Protestant Christian community. The persecution of Christians in Iran strengthened their ties with both Iranian and non-Iranian counterparts in the United States, Britain, and other countries and groups of the World Evangelical Alliance (World Evangelical Alliance, n.d.). This also led to the rise of NGO ties and advocacy on behalf of Protestant Christians in Iran. Resources were also extended to the community in Iran by transnational community members and organizations, such as Iranian Christian International affiliates (mostly in the United States), Elam Ministries (centered in England with international reach), and the Open Doors USA/UK campaign. Ties with the government of the Islamic Republic were very weak and officially did not exist. Recognized and institutionally represented Christians, on the other hand, avoided any association with Western institutions and organizations, and followed their typical practice of insular communal activity.
By the middle of the 1990s, the Assyrian Church, led by Catholicos Patriarch Mar Dinkha IV—based in Chicago since the early 1980s—moved the Assyrian Church toward reconciliation with the Chaldeans and the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, ties of collaboration between the Catholic groups strengthened during this period—although this was not necessarily the result of the situation in Iran, and is thus not reflected in the network diagram in Figure 14. Nonetheless, independent support was given by communities outside Iran for the situation facing Iranian Catholics, as evidenced by the most recent statement of the Pope to the Iranian Ambassador to the Vatican (Thavis, 2009).
For the most part, the ties between denominations remain nonexistent to weak, only sharing knowledge to keep some semblance of solidarity when addressing issues related to Parliament (Sanasarian, 2000). Moreover, some sources have indicated that even discord between leaders of some of the different communities continues today.[48] It is important to note that although resources are forthcoming from superior institutions outside Iran, as is the case for the Protestants, the actual amount of aid remains undetermined by this author. Community affairs seem to be primarily managed by national and local leadership.
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a proliferation of human rights organizations and nongovernmental groups that either work with the nonrecognized Christian groups in Iran, or address the general situation facing different denominational Christians in Iran. While activity seems to have increased, there would appear to be more information than resources or advocacy in the relational content of the networks of the Iranian Christian community. As illustrated in Figure 14, indirect ties increased while direct ties have decreased. As a result of having to downplay ties with outside organizations and countries —thus weakening them—in order to maintain good standing with the government, the Christian groups represented in the Majles (Armenians and Assyrians), have become more isolated, more dependent on the current regime, and strengthened their ties to it.
Network Ties of the Baha’i Community During the Pahlavi period, the Iranian Baha’i community shared very strong ties with the Baha’i World Centre (BWC), the administrative center of all Baha’i communities and headed by the Universal House of Justice (est. 1963).[49] There were strong ties, as well, with the American and Canadian national and local Baha’i communities. Since universal identity is given precedence over national loyalty in the Baha’i Faith, the Iranian Baha’i diasporas (marginal at the outset of the Pahlavi era) did not see themselves as being religiously separated from their non-Iranian counterparts. Nonetheless, family ties played a role in independently supporting individuals and communities in Iran.
As illustrated in Figure 15, the relationship between the Iranian Baha’i community and the international Baha’i community was initially not very strong, because it was linked through the BWC. However, with the encouragement of Baha’i leaders (i.e., Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi), small numbers of Iranian Baha’is left their homes and
Figure 13. Christian networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 14. Christian networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009).
committed themselves to assisting the development of Baha’i communities in Africa, South America, Asia and other parts of the world.[50] The United States, Canadian, and United Kingdom Baha’i communities were able to assist the Iranian community in developing modern schools and other institution of service (e.g., hospitals) under the central leadership of the BWC and other Baha’i institutions. However, the relationship between Iranian Baha’is and their Western counterparts was collaborative and characterized by equality is status. The ties between different Baha’i communities were not only strengthened over time but also systematized.
The persecution of the Baha’is throughout the 19th and early 20th century was generally met with fortitude and advocacy from within Iran, or by other National Spiritual Assemblies from different countries, and of course the BWC. By the mid-1950s, when persecution began to intensify, the BWC drew on its highly developed network of national and regional organizations to marshal assistance for the Iranian Baha’is, directing them to appeal to their respective governments and supranational ties (Baha’i International Community, 1956). This and other similar campaigns, was considered effective, and led to the establishment by the Universal House of Justice of the Baha’i International Community (BIC) as the official representative of the worldwide Baha’i community (For example, see Baha’i International Community, 1956).
The network between local Baha’i communities under the leadership of the NSA of Iran was fully developed by the early 1960s, and represented a unified structure with clear channels of leadership, organization, and operation. Many of the prominent and affluent members of the Baha’i community contributed their expertise and material resources to the development of the Baha’i community not only in Iran, but internationally, supporting the development of the BWC and service projects around the world. While there was no official tie between the Baha’i community of Iran and the government, members of the Baha’i community served as individuals in nonpolitical government positions, including influential offices (Milani, 2008), and continued, when called upon, to appeal to the government during times of intense persecution of the Baha’i community. The network between religious minorities is hard to measure, but there was noticeable interaction in the form of shared services, such as schools, clinics and hospitals. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Iranian Baha’i institutions and community had benefited from collaboration with other developed Baha’i communities around the world. However, the Iranian NSA focused primarily on ministering to the affairs of its own burgeoning community. The BIC and other communities worked as the main vehicle of advocacy, with the BWC providing cultural, moral, and sometimes material resources. The United States Baha’i community was a partner in providing material and human resources during this period. As Figure 15 illustrates, the Baha’i network consisted of a large number of indirect ties that worked in favor of the Iranian Baha’i community, with several key direct ties. Additional indirect ties to governments and organizations would become a designed strategy of the Baha’i community in marshaling various kinds of resources, in information collection and distribution, and in advocacy.
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the network configuration within the Baha’i community changed in several respects. With the dismantling of the NSA and all LSAs throughout Iran in June of 1983, the closure, confiscation, and destruction of Baha’i buildings, centers, and services, as well as the killing and exodus of many of its leaders and prominent community members, the community was left with no formal organization-to-organization tie. Thus the node illustrating the Iranian Baha’i community in Figure 16 represents the Baha’i community and not any form of official leadership. With only the Yaran, an ad hoc committee appointed by the Universal House of Justice to meet the basic needs of the community, the Baha’is had to deal with administrative matters privately through that informal body. As a result of the developed network system outside of Iran, national Baha’i communities around the world, under the guidance of the Baha’i World Centre, collaborated to support the Baha’is in Iran by a variety of means, including resources to sustain the community, assistance to leave Iran (for those in extreme danger), as well as social, organizational and moral support. Since the onset of the Revolution, the BIC has continued to be in the forefront of advocacy on behalf of a highly restricted and often repressed Iranian Baha’i community (Ghanea, 2002). The BIC guided national communities and their external affairs offices to work with their national governments and other agencies in pressing for the rights of the Baha’is in Iran. The Iranian Baha’i diaspora maintained strong ties with their families, often sending material resources to sustain daily living, and even sponsoring them if they chose to leave as refugees. With the exodus and dispersion during and after the Revolution, the Iranian Baha’i diaspora developed and strengthened the indirect ties between the Iranian Baha’i community and their destination communities. Ironically, as a result of a crippled internal administrative structure, the Iranian Baha’i community (and the Baha’i community as a whole) strengthened its network ties, drawing on them more readily and systematically.
Another significant shift in the network configuration was the rise of NGOs and government agencies dedicated to human rights and freedoms, and the indirect ties with them which served the Iranian Baha’i community. These relationships offered not only moral support and advocacy, and the opportunity to share information about the situation of the Baha’is, but subsequently provided the impetus for minor opportunity structure changes in Iran (see Figure 16). It is as yet unclear what the precise connection of the BWC or the BIC is with the national community in Iran since the arrest and dissolution of the Yaran in May 2008. It is interesting to note that the number of human rights organizations inside and outside Iran have increased over the decades, and now play a prominent role in advocating the case of Baha’is and other religious minorities in Iran. Because of the banned, nonrecognized status of Baha’is since the Revolution, no tie exists between the Baha’i community in Iran and the government of the Islamic Republic. Similarly, because of the “untouchable” status of Baha’is, no other religious minority organization is at liberty to associate with Baha’is publicly—as this may put them at risk of reprisal. During this period, although ties became stronger (albeit more indirect) across the Baha’i transnational network and Iran, and ties with NGOs and other governments increased in frequency and prominence, this has not altered the relationship with the regime itself. It is evident that relying on networks has been and continues to be a central feature of mobilization and coordination of the Iranian Baha’i community and those abroad.
Figure 15. Baha’i networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 16. Baha’i networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009)
Regime-Group Relations of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is As they relate to the study of educational strategy selection, I have narrowed my discussion of regime-group relations to four particular factors which I believe clarify their interactions: (a) official recognition of rights of the group by the government; (b) representation of the group in government institutions; (c) the extent to which a regime facilitates, tolerates, and represses groups, claims, and actions; and (d) the extent to which a group accepts, resists, or rejects regime policies and actions.
Recognition In the Electoral Law of 1909 of the Iranian Constitution, formal recognition by the government was extended to certain ethnic and religious minority groups, including the Armenian Christians, the Assyrian Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians—long considered by Muslims as “People of the Book”[51] (Iranian Constitution, Electoral Law of 1909, Article 7:1). Baha’is were excluded from this recognition, but individual members may have been accorded the theoretical equal rights extended to all citizens (Iranian Constitution of 1906, Article 8). With the advent of Reza Shah’s rule, the constitution was reaffirmed, with only minor alterations until the 1963 Referendum spurred by the White Revolution launched by Mohammad Reza Shah. The most significant changes made to the Iranian constitution since its original draft came with the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution of 1979 explicitly delimits the recognition of religious minorities to Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Armenian and Assyrian Christian Iranians, who “within the limit of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.” Article 26 further secures their right to form societies and organizations within the bounds of the law. Drafters of constitutional articles addressing religious minorities included recognized leaders of religious minorities. The Chaldeans, although demanding separate representation, were not given a seat, and were identified with the Assyrians. Other nonethnic Christian denominations were not given a voice at all. Despite being the largest non-Muslim religious minority, Baha’is were once again not recognized. In various public proclamations, policy papers, and other official arenas, Baha’is are often referred to as a “misguided and wayward sect,” or as a “political movement” (Higgins, 1984); and there was clear evidence in various court edicts, press statements, and private policy papers, that the government identified the Baha’is as a group (see Appendix E for copies of official documents).
Considering recognition status is important in any discussion regarding minority groups because it brings with it certain advantages and disadvantages. For example, official recognition may entitle a group to certain rights, while simultaneously limiting others. Moreover, by recognizing a separate group, there is an implicit admission of “otherness” that separates one group from the majority. Higgins (1984) suggests that nonrecognition under certain circumstances could be considered an advantage, particularly when religious identity is not a concern. Nonetheless, Tilly and Tarrow (2007), using the example of the Baha’is, point out that a regime may refrain from recognizing a group to decertify their legitimacy to claim any rights and to reinforce regime policies.
Representation As an extension of recognition of religious minority communities, representation followed.[52] During both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods, the recognized religious minority groups were accorded representation in Parliament with one seat in parliament. During the Islamic Republic, one seat each was accorded to the Zoroastrians, the Jews, and the Assyrian Christians (including Chaldeans). Two seats were offered to the Armenian Christians (one for the north and another for the south of the country). All these groups expressed loyalty to the Islamic Republic and to Ayatollah Khomeini, rejecting ties to any countries considered by the regime to be enemy states.
By various accounts, during both the Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic era, the role and influence of the representatives in the Majles was nominal. By having a representative in a formal institution of the state, recognized minority groups had an arena to voice concerns and make claims in the manner of contained contention. However, unrecognized groups had no proper channel in which to file complaints for group affairs, and often association with an unrecognized status would simply be dismissed. Despite representation, some have argued that religious minority Parliamentary deputies are easily influenced by the government, lamenting it as a necessity to survive the climate of heightened scrutiny (Pirnazar, personal communication, 21 October, 2009).
Providing representation in the government is a form of institutionalizing a group. This carries significant bearing on mobilization, claim-making, and collective action. As Tilly and Tarrow (2007) suggest, institutionalization can lead to demobilization of movement activity and alter the way a group presents claims to the state. In this way, noninstitutionalization may lead to bolder claims, or what McAdam et al. (2001) call transgressive contention (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). Conversely, representation is another strong form of domestic certification, where the authority is ready to recognize and listen to the recognized group. In order to explore these two concepts of institutionalization and certification, among other related features regime-group relations, I turn to regime and group interactions.
Regime Facilitation, Tolerance, and Repression of Groups Recognition and representation, however useful as categories, inadequately capture the nuances of contentious politics and dynamics at various levels of analysis. On the one hand, they can be considered constructive qualifiers. Interactions, on the other hand, are dynamic observable quantifiers of the relationship. The work of scholars of contentious politics (McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2005; Tilly, 2006b; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) and of some scholars of international relations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999) indicate that the following five interactive elements bear on a regime’s treatment of groups and their actions, particularly when considering the configuration of how a regime prescribes, tolerates, and forbids actions: (a) a regime’s acceptance level of a particular group and action; (b) a regime’s governmental form, capacity, and ideology; (c) the influence and impact of other power holders, parallel domestic authorities,[53] social and economic elites, and pressure from the masses; (d) the influence and impact of international pressure, standards, relations; (e) responses of targeted groups. Thus, a regime’s actions toward a group are not decided in a vacuum. Rather, the decisions of the regime have a reciprocal impact on the other factors discussed.
Figure 17. Interactive elements bearing on a regime’s approach toward groups.
Figure 17 illustrates one way the above-mentioned five factors interact in producing policies and practices that affect a group. By categorizing regime actions within the bounds of facilitation, tolerance, and repression, I identified repeated sets of performances that each regime used in addressing Jews, Christians, and Baha’is, in order to contextualize regime-group relations through interaction.
The categorized actions, or as Tilly (2006b) calls them, performances, are presented Tables C2, C3, and C4 for the period of Pahlavi rule and Tables C5, C6, and C7 for the period of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although these tables do not include actions by parallel authorities or mobs, they do include recurring actions associated with government agents at the local, regional, or national level. Finally, in describing the actions of Iranian regimes toward these three minorities, it is important to bear in mind that at different junctures in time, various levels of facilitation, tolerance, and repression were present[54].
Regime Performance in the Pahlavi Era Jews. With the secularization of the Pahlavi rulers, the Jewish community experienced a series of shifts in regime policies. As Rahimiyan (2008b) illustrates, despite Muslim stigmatization of Jews, with equal rights officially extended by the government, Jewish Iranians were being assimilated into a broader Iranian identity, and thus integrated into society. As Table C2 shows, allowing Jews to attend government schools, hold government jobs, and open shops outside the Jewish quarter are only a few examples of the facilitation process during the Reza Shah period. In turn, most members of the Jewish community did not see a contradiction between religious and national identity, and took advantage of the secular-nationalist facilitation of the regime. Despite noticeable local and regional anti-Semitism among segments of the population, and sporadic vilification by state-media, tolerance at the national level toward Jews was unaffected. Like other religious and ethnic minorities, Jews faced uncompromising policies requiring stricter alignment with the Shah’s nationalization campaign, including impositions on community run schools. It was during the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–1978) that Jews saw the greatest level of facilitation, similar to that of other religious minorities. Iranian Jews were allowed to register their own organizations on a level that was unprecedented (Menashri, 2002; Rahimiyan, 2008a). The Jewish community also rise in socioeconomic status during this period was facilitated primarily by a degree of tolerance during the second Pahlavi epoch.
Christians. During the rule of Reza Shah, ethnic Christians, like the Armenians and Assyrians, experienced turbulence when the regime made efforts to assimilate them into the general Iranian population, as with other ethnic minorities. Although they enjoyed the same rights as those of the Jews and Zoroastrians, Armenians and Assyrians found the language and cultural policies of the Shah highly restrictive (see Table C3). For Reza Shah, the Armenians in particular, as well as some other ethno-linguistic groups, represented a barrier—even a threat—to the smooth implementation of the nationalist campaign that would present Iran as a monolithic entity. While the religious element of recognized groups did not pose problems for the regime, the ethnic features were more problematic. Missionaries, who experienced the brunt of intolerance by Reza Shah, were singled out more because of their foreign influence than their religious affiliation.
After the abdication of Reza Shah and the rise in American and British influence, tolerance significantly increased, and facilitation of Christians into the system likewise improved. Like many Jewish organizations, the various Christian sects saw an expansion of their institutions, membership, and services—developing their community as in no other time in Iranian history because of the tolerance accorded to them in the second epoch. In general, all rights were reinstated to Christian groups by the time of Muhammad Reza Shah, particularly in the 1950s.
Baha’is. Unlike the Jews and Christians, whose rights were restored with the affirmation of the Iranian constitution, Baha’is remained unrecognized and unrepresented. Yet, with the focus being placed on nationalism and modernity, religious identity was relegated to the sidelines and remained a concern only for the Shi’i religious establishment and some of its ardent supporters. Thus, despite their formally unrecognized status, Iranian Baha’is were able to enjoy those rights and liberties extended to all Iranian nationals. Community members were tolerated in many sectors, and thus were able to individually access or benefit from the facilitation process of the regime. However, as with Jews and Christians, the unique features of the Baha’i community caused them to encounter the same restrictions that were placed on all those who were perceived to be a roadblock on the path of the nationalization campaign. The most significant barrier faced by the Baha’is came from the strong influence wielded by parallel authorities on and inside the government. The fact that Baha’is were not recognized or represented made their situation doubly unpredictable. As illustrated in Table C4, despite enjoying unprecedented social and economic mobility during this period, Baha’is still faced arbitrary persecution at the hands of religious leaders, and as a result of collaboration between government and parallel authorities (Choubine, 2008). Yet, as with the Jewish community, many Baha’is took advantage of social freedom during the Muhammad Reza Shah period, and, in spite of sporadic outbreaks of repression, made significant strides in developing their organizations and community.
What is noticeable about the actions used by the Pahlavi regime in addressing all three groups is the similarity in repertoires of facilitation and tolerance. The actions affecting Christians and Jews were most alike—no doubt the result of their similar recognized status. The greatest obstacles originated in challenges to assimilation into the regime’s nationalization and solidarity process. From the data examined, tolerance appears to have been prominent when the regime was focused on other agenda issues. Facilitation for all three groups was offered with a view to bringing about integration and assimilation into a modern nation-state as envisioned by the Shahs. Parallel authorities played a highly significant role in the treatment of minority groups by the regime. Regime tolerance noticeably increased when the influence of the parallel Islamic establishment was held in check by the legitimate authorities.
Regime Performances in the Islamic Republic Era Jews. During the first epoch of the Islamic Republic, many Iranian Jews did not know what to expect, given the years of harassment and rising anti-Israel tide that came with the Revolution. With the execution of several Jewish community leaders, a shockwave traveled through the Jewish community. Despite the fomenting calumny and anti-Zionist attacks by new government leaders and agents, Jews and Christians were guaranteed protective status in the Koran. As a result, in the drafting of the new Constitution, official recognition and representation was extended to these groups. Although faced with harsh treatment, including arbitrary arrest, property and asset seizure, and police harassment shortly after the Revolution, Khomeini’s regime began a process of institutionalization of the Jewish community. Over time, those who remained were continually being assimilated into the system. With decreased direct assault over consecutive epochs, the quarter percent of Jews that remained in Iran operated within the infrastructure of the regime. The government successfully divorced the Iranian Jewish community from its sister communities in Israel and America (“MP: Iran only country,” 2010; Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009).
Notwithstanding facilitation and tolerance, the Jewish community experienced sporadic incidents of repression with varying levels of severity, such as the arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz, charged with espionage for Israel. Similarly, there have been several reports by individuals who have revealed that, the constant social and economic pressures make it necessary for Jews in Iran to be cautious and secretive. Government-run schools (curriculum and instruction) only reinforce negative stereotypes and stigmatization of Jews in society (Farahani, 2005). Not surprisingly, the traditional Shi’i belief that non-Muslims are najes, or ritually impure, has been legalized and is taught in schools. Thus, Jews are not able to engage in certain professions or jobs that involve food preparation or contact with liquids. Nonetheless, by various accounts, the daily private practice of Judaism is, for the most part, tolerated, but they remain the most marginalized and compromised of the formally recognized religious minority groups in Iran.
Christians. Ethnic Christians during the Islamic Republic saw the least agitation and repression in the first epoch of the regime, but foreign Christians and Protestants experienced a harsh backlash for a number of reasons, namely, association with Western countries. Again, the primary goal of the regime was the institutionalization of its recognized minority groups, and the elimination or marginalization of its unrecognized groups. For example, the Anglican Church was deemed dysfunctional and all missionary activities of Anglicans and Presbyterians from abroad came to a halt. Likewise leaders of various nonethnic Christian groups were pressured by government agencies to stop their activities, to refrain from including any non-Christians, and have sometimes been threatened, arrested, and tortured if they proselytized and converted Muslims. This was most noticeable when several Christian pastors and new converts were arrested, and some executed throughout Iran.
Like Jews, Christians are considered najes by the regime. However, they are likewise given rights to practice their religion, and given privileges exclusive to their religious rituals and customs. Although some Christian schools and facilities (e.g., hospitals, nurseries, gardens) were confiscated by the government, Armenians and Assyrians were allowed to maintain their own schools, on condition that they follow government guidelines. Apart from the Protestant and Catholic groups which are not recognized by the regime, Armenians and Assyrians generally experience high levels of tolerance within the confines of prescribed government ordinances. It is important to note that treatment by civilians and lower level government agents is another story, and experiences vary considerably throughout Iran.
Baha’is. Baha’is under the Islamic Republic have experienced the highest level of regime repression among religious minorities in Iran. Unlike the Jews or Christians, the Baha’is are not only not represented in any governmental institution and not recognized as a religious minority, but are labeled as heretics, infidels, and apostates. Throughout the 30 years of the Islamic Republic, the regime has always given Baha’is opportunities to integrate and assimilate into society, namely by recanting their faith and disavowing affiliation with anything having to do with the Baha’i Faith. The first epoch was characterized by high levels of regime violence, physical assault, and infrastructure destruction. Subsequent administrations, demarked by epochs, shifted strategies to deal with the ideologically incongruent group, including giving them permission to leave the country freely, denying them the right to higher education and government jobs, continued harassment, and blocked social and economic development. On the other hand, the various iterations of the regime also incorporated strategies of tolerance and relative neglect, with some agents not viewing the Baha’is as a threat, and allowing them to leave forms blank where religious affiliation was usually required.
The actions of the regime of the Islamic Republic in addressing religious minorities employ the same differentiating factor which was applied during the previous regime: recognized status. Jews and Christians are accepted as legitimate communities, with restricted actions, whereas Baha’is are an unacceptable group, variously described as a “political movement,” “a misguided sect,” and without the rights extended to other minorities.. The Islamic Republic facilitated recognized religious minorities through institutionalization and assimilation into the broader Khomeini brand of Shi’ism and the revised Constitution. This was an effort to incorporate a doctrinal pluralism constituted originally in the Koran. The government of Iran has been highly repressive, but also draws on actions that facilitate and tolerate different groups in order to maintain control and to steer the country along a path aligned with the ideology of the regime’s founders.
Group Acceptance, Tolerance, Resistance, and Rejection of Regime In examining the relationship of the three minorities toward regimes, actions again become the key unit of analysis. There are four basic categories within which I place general group claims and actions: (a) acceptance[55] of government policies and practices; (b) tolerance[56]of unfavorable policies and practices; (c) resistance[57] to policies and practices through mostly contained and mild transgressive contention; (d) rejection[58] of policies and practices by turning to options outside the polity or by engaging in transgressive contention.
In order to understand broader strategies (both short- and long-term), I place group claims, actions, and reactions within this framework. To this end, Table C8 represents some of the general but salient actions of groups in relation to regimes over time. The sorts of actions concerning this study are those that recur, because they point to coalescing strategies to meet needs, including educational ones. The listing and order does not identify the frequency, the magnitude, or prominence of each action as a strategy. However, these features were considered in including them in this Table. The purpose of Table C8 is to provide a manageable, general description of the range of actions carried out by religious minority groups in relation to regime actions and responses.
Even from this cursory overview, it is evident that all groups performed actions that could fall under virtually any of the four categories (i.e. accept, tolerate, resist, and reject), just as a regime will engage in various levels of repression and facilitation. Beyond this study is the thorough measurement of the extent and frequency with which these actions were performed by each group. However, in Chapter 6, a closer examination will be made of those actions which have coalesced into educational strategies.
As reflected in Table C8, those groups that are institutionalized and recognized seem to be more accepting and tolerant than those that are not. Similarly, those groups that are institutionalized and recognized do not take as many transgressive actions as do the unrecognized groups, even when resisting. From an organizational viewpoint, the Jewish leadership during the Pahlavi era leaned primarily toward accepting-tolerant actions, and only slightly shifted toward a tolerant-accepting mode after the revolution. Their case is very similar to that of the recognized ethnic Christian groups. Resistance only took place through proper legally sanctioned channels, such as letters, addresses to government bodies, and sometimes statements to the media. The nonrecognized Christian denominations, specifically the evangelical groups, began by being accepting-tolerant during the Pahlavi era, but drew closer to tolerating-resisting actions after the Revolution, particularly during the third and fourth epochs. Similarly, the Baha’is who were not recognized or represented, were tolerant-accepting during the Pahlavi era, with intermittent episodes of resistance. However, after the Revolution and the radical shift in the new regime’s treatment behavior toward the community, the Baha’i community initiated resistant-tolerant actions, and even rejecting actions, drawing on a network of support outside of Iran.
Outright rejection of the regime by recognized groups did not occur, except that large numbers of all three groups left Iran after the Revolution. Despite official recognition by the government, the largest percentage of those who chose to leave were members of the Jewish, Armenian, and Assyrian communities. This strategy should not be overlooked. Exodus by the majority of the members of these communities has had a significant impact on subsequent actions selected by group leaders and remaining members.
The secular nature of the Pahlavi dynasty provided more opportunities for religious minorities to integrate into society and the public sector than did the religiously charged epochs of the Islamic Republic. The nature of regime-group dynamics and contentious interaction is political, and when religious identity was transformed into a political category after the Revolution, it became more difficult to maintain community integrity and development. International pressure and intervention has had an important impact on the regime’s actions toward groups, even if minimal. While some argue that this argument is hard to prove (Afshari, 2008), there are several cases regarding religious minorities in Iran that illustrate the notion of the “boomerang” effect, as described by Keck and Sikkink (1998). Networks and group composition, as well as group standing, also had a bearing on the kinds of strategies that were available and adopted. Moreover, some actions engendered or facilitated other subsequent actions, while limiting the accessibility of others.
Conclusion This chapter has addressed the particular dimensions of three group features which I argue will have an impact on the selection of education strategies: composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations. Ultimately, the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities during both the Pahlavi era and the epochs of the Islamic Republic shifted in various directions based on the dynamic interplay between the features, as well as differing in scale. In other words, neither groups nor actions exist or develop in a vacuum. The impact of the government and its regime is omnipresent in influencing and even shaping the composition and characteristics of groups, how they form and develop networks, and, ultimately, altering the status and interaction found in regime-group relations. The same applies to the impact of groups on regimes. Thus, the features become significant factors in determining a trend of actions which coalesce into strategies to meet certain needs. This idea will be tested further in Chapter 6, in which I incorporate a mechanism-process approach, in order to examine specific episodes of contention and actuation for each group over the two periods. I argue that these three factors bear on strategy selection, and point toward some of the actions that are more often adopted by and available to various groups. Building on this, the following chapter will also illustrate how, and to what extent, these factors influenced the selection of educational strategies.
[1] There was a reverse migration from Israel back to Iran by many; reports record up to 5,000 returned only five years after leaving Iran (Rahimiyan, 2008b). This reverse trend may be explained by possible difficulties of adjustment in a foreign territory, lack of actual opportunity, or unfavorable conditions, resulting in a return to a familiar setting, family, and community life.
[2] This correlates more closely with the Iranian census data, which found 62,258 for 1976.
[3] See Appendix C for this chapter’s Tables.
[4] Most Armenian Christians belong to the Apostolic Church, an ancient, autocephalous branch of Eastern Christianity. A very small minority of Armenians are also Catholic or Protestant.
[5] See Smith, 1984 for an overview of statistical information on Baha’is in th19th- and early th20th-century Iran.
[6] Using the United Nations Statistical and Demographic database, Ahang Rabbani (personal communication, November 5, 2009) used the factor of 1.3 children/youth for every adult. The following formula was employed: (1+1.3)*75,000 = 2.3 * 75,000 = 172,500.
[7] See Hakimzadeh (2006) for a detailed analysis of international migration of Iranians by date and country.
[8] The Statistical Abstract of Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009) provides the following record: 21,910 in 1948–1951, 15,699 in 1952–1960, and 19,502 in 1961–1971.
[9] According to the Statistical Abstract of Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009), 9,550 Iranians came to Israel between 1972 and 1979 and another 8,487 between 1980 and 1989.
[10] The move to Europe was mainly to England, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland (Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).
[11] Based on figures of the United States Baha’i National Center (2009), 1,413 Iranian Baha’is arrived in the United States between 1901 and 1977, and 19,195 between 1978 and 2009. Baha’is emigrated to other places, including Canada, Australia, India, and various countries in Europe, but also to countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America. In 1978, when there were only 50 to 60 Baha’is in all of Australia, the arrival of 538 Iranian Baha’is in 1986 brought the number to approximately 2,500 in 1988 (Hassel, 2000). According to Moojan Momen’s (1991) calculations, 60 percent of the European Baha’i community consisted of Iranian Baha’is by the 1970s.
[12] Sam Kermanian, personal communication, June 2, 2009.
[13] Prior to 1925, Jews were generally not permitted to own land (Loeb, 1996).
[14] According to various sources, some of the significant careers industries included banking, jewelry, insurance, textiles, plastics, paper, pharmaceuticals, aluminum production, liquor distillery and distribution, shipping, imports, industrial machinery, clothing and retail, automobiles, medicine, engineering, and tile manufacturing (Rahimiyan, 2008b; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).
[15] In addition to the Alliance schools established in the late 19th and early 20th century throughout Iran, other schools included the famed Ettefagh and Shamash Schools (Nikbakht, 1999).
[16] The Alliance schools first opened in Tehran in 1898, and then in other Jewish communities; Hamadan (1900), Isfahan (1901), Shiraz (1903), Sanandaj (1903), Nahavand (1904), Kermanshah (1904), Bijar (1906), Borujerd (1913), Yazd (1926), and Kashan (1929).
[17] According the American Jewish Yearbook (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1950), 1500 students were enrolled at religious minority schools and another 4500 were attending government schools. However, 8000 Jewish children (less than half) did not attend any school.
[18] It is important to note that institutions like the Alliance school assisted the vitality and cohesion of the Iranian Jewish community whose membership was increasingly attracted and converted to either Christianity or the Baha’i Faith.
[19] In 1926, Persian language instruction was mandated by the government (Netzer, 1985).
[20] The Otzar Hatorah school was established by an American Orthodox educational movement, and stressed Hebrew and ritual knowledge, and observance of the Sabbath and kashrut (dietary law). The Otzar Hatorah was central to the revitalization of the Shirazi Jewry, particularly in providing a thorough educational model (Loeb, 1981). According to the American Jewish Yearbook (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1950), there were 3,800 students registered in Otzar Hatorah schools.
[21] By 1961, a reported 13,200 children attended the 37 various Jewish schools in Iran, and another 2000–3000 Jewish children attended non-Jewish schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1962). In 1966, 14,000 children attended the 37 Jewish schools and another 2000–3000 Jewish children attended other schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1966).
[22] It is important to note that with the modern school system, traditional schools and old learning models became less popular. Even the Jewish religious schools saw a significant decline in attendance. As Loeb (1981) describes: “The curriculum consisted of a prayer book, readings from the Torah, particularly the prophetic portions read on Sabbath in the synagogue, and for the astute, Mishna. By age nine or ten, most boys had completed their education, and began working as apprentices to their fathers or other close kinsman” (p. 315).
[23] By the 1970s, only 0.1 percent had succeeded in penetrating the upper class (Pahlavi family, military officers, senior civil servants, and high end entrepreneurs); some 23 percent were among the middle class (occupying both traditional and new roles), and the vast majority of the population at large (77 percent ) were part of the lower class (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 140). This is why the leap made by the small Jewish population to middle and upper class positions was so noticeable; as was the case with the Baha’is during this period (Abrahamian, 2008; Keddie, 1981; Naficy, 1981; Sanasarian, 2000).
[24] This figure may appear insignificant unless compared with the total of some 55,000 students attending Iranian government and private schools when Reza Shah came into power. By 1935, however there were an estimated 170,077 students, spurred by the government’s education initiatives (Matthee, 1993).
[25] It is significant that, even though other religious minorities received harsh and inequitable treatment at the hands of the authorities because of their “impure” status, they were still protected officially by their designation as ahl al-kitab, (People of the Book). However, Baha’is were considered murtadd (unprotected) and mahdur al-damm (whose blood could be shed), maslub al-huquq (without rights), and whose property was mubah (belonging to no one), and thus subject to manhub al-mal (plundering). In other words, they occupied the lowest run of the ladder of Iranian society.
[26] There was a surge of violence against Baha’is throughout Iran during the 1950s, including attacks on and beatings of individuals, the destruction of some of their most holy sites, and other violent measures (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006).
[27] However, there were a few Jewish political groups and individuals—particularly communist-oriented organizations—who participated in the Revolution and stood against both the Pahlavi regime and Zionism.
[28] The enrollment number has increased over the years since its inception: 250 in 1987, 600 in 1996, 900 in 1998, 1200 in 2003, 2500 in 2008, 3000 in 2009 (Baha’i International Community, 2005a; BIHE management, personal interview, October 21, 2009).
[29] Some of the subcommittees deal with cultural affairs, youth affairs, conflict resolution, and poor relief
[30] The qualification of a rabbi (khakham) is his training in the Torah and Talmud, and other significant canon and texts. Such training begins in the yeshiva (Jewish religious school). Additional advanced learning in the Talmud, Rishonim and Acharonim (early and late medieval commentaries), as well as in Jewish law, is also a prerequisite for someone wishing to be recognized as a rabbi.
[31] In addition to a collection of books made available for sale, and those in libraries, there were two major Jewish periodicals: Tamouz, which functioned until 1989, and Ofegh-BINA, run by the Tehran Jewish Committee since 1999; these were responsible for publishing works on Jewish culture and education, as well as providing a social and news source.
[32] According to the Tehran Jewish Committee (2009) , there are many synagogues, special Jewish schools, cultural complexes, youth and student centers and organizations, such as the Iranian Jewish Students’ Organization, women’s centers, nursing homes, a hospital, libraries, computer and music training centers, assembly halls, and Jewish slaughter houses throughout the country.
[33] According to Haroun Yashayaei (2003), chairman of the Tehran Jewish Committee, one reason for the take-over of Jewish parochial schools by the state was overpopulation in state-run schools.
[34] The divide between Tehran and Shiraz has been described as a schism in Jewish identification, with those in Tehran leaning toward a more secular orientation, and those in Shiraz being associated with a greater attachment to religious observance (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, 2 November 2009). The fact that there has been significant relocation by Jews of Shiraz to Israel, has led leaders of Tehran’s Jewish community to express the view that such emigration can harm the relationship between the regime and the Jewish community (Bahgat, 2005).
[35] Personal communication: Faryar Nikbakht (16 May 2009), Sam Kermanian (2 June 2009), and Nahid Pirnazar (21 October 2009).
[36] There are two Catholicos with equal powers, each of which respects the other’s jurisdiction; the Armenians in Iran fall under the leadership of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia (Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, n.d.).
[37] According to one source there are 12 churches in New Julfa, 10 in Tehran, 2 in Tabriz, 1 in Urmieh, and another in Azerbaijan (Armeniapedia, n.d.).
[38] For example, in 1980, there were 41 priests (diocesan and religious) associated with Iranian Catholic churches (Chaldean and Armenian), as compared to only 11 in 2004 (Cheney, 2009).
[39] The number of deputy representatives to the Majles was based on the estimate of one deputy for every 150,000 members of the community, counted every ten years (Sanasarian, 2000).
[40] This is an arbitrary term used to refer to both Assyrians and Chaldeans, but does not denote a new subgroup or their union.
[41] This includes the famed Alborz School, Nurbakhsh School, Sage College, Community High School, and others.
[42] On principle, Baha’is do not accept funds from any individual who is not a registered member of the community, or form non-Baha’i organizations.
[43] By 1946, there were 694 Local Spiritual Assemblies throughout the country. In 1963, there were 521 Local Spiritual Assemblies and 1,271 localities where Baha’is resided (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391). During the same period there were some 150 national committees functioning under the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391). By the mid-1960s, in Tehran alone, 3,000 Baha’is served on various administrative bodies and approximately the same number worked with the education of youth and children (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391).
[44] Prosecutor General of the Islamic Republic, Seyyed Hossein Mussavi-Tabrizi, in the published Tehran daily, Kayhan (September 21, 1983) stated that the Baha’i religious and spiritual administration was banned and considered a crime..
[45] Personal communications: anonymous Iranian-American Jewish leader (June 8, 2009); David Shofet (March 23, 2009); Faryar Nikbakht (May 16, 2009); Karmel Melamed (March 3, 2009); Sam Kermanian (June 2, 2009).
[46] It is important to note that many those who leave Iran convey their dissatisfaction with the situation in Iran, relating the lack of opportunity, harsh treatment, denial of access to certain services, and the generalized fear associated with living openly in Iran as a Jew.
[47] There are individuals with whom I spoke who have taken the initiative to highlight the difficulties and discrimination against Jews in Iran; however, even they concur that there is no real organized and coherent campaign. As Kermanian (personal interview, June 2, 2009) suggests, “we do not engage in confrontation unless it is a matter of life or death.”
[48] Personal communication: Sanasarian (April 14, 2009).
[49] The Baha’i World Centre is a title referring to several institutions and structures that constitute the focal point of administrative and spiritual life of Baha’is around the world. After the founder of the Baha’i Faith (Baha’u’llah) was exiled and died in what was then part of the Ottoman Empire, the successive leaders of the Baha’i community (his son Abdu’l-Baha and then great-grandson Shoghi Effendi) remained and established a center in Haifa, which developed over decades. In 1963, the institution of the Universal House of Justice was elected, and has since led the world-wide Baha’i community.
[50] For the sake of clarify and focus, I have refrained from representing the direct ties between national Baha’i communities (although they existed).
[51] The “Book” refers to the Koran, and within it the provision to extend protective status to religious minorities included Jews and Christians, and later Zoroastrians. Protective (dhimma) status meant that they could not be killed or forced to convert, while still being regarded as infidels and impure.
[52] This was not the case for Muslim minorities or many ethnic minorities in Iran.
[53] Parallel authorities are those individuals, institutions, and organizations that share power in a country. In Iran, parallel authorities are the Islamic scholars and religious leaders, who can issue farman (orders) which become binding injunctions on Shi’i Muslims. Although alienated during the Pahlavi era, Shi’i leaders have always played a significant and influential role as parallel authorities (Arjomand, 1984, 1988).
[54] This occurs when two different actions were carried out during different time periods, or when two different actions were executed during the same time period, but in separate locations in the country (regional or local variation).
[55] The group accepts policies of the regime, integrates into the system, and even assimilates according to the ideological agenda of the state.
[56] The group members tolerate policies by integrating into the system, going along with obligatory laws and policies, while privately disagreeing or contradicting the regime’s exhortations and agenda. In other words, the action and policy of the regime is unfavorable to the group members, but no active resistance or counterclaim is made to oppose it. Members or group may also retreat into isolation—an action bordering on resistance.
[57] The group or a collection of its members make a counterclaim or take action contrary to regime policy or action. This can range from writing letters, signing petitions, participating in street demonstrations, and boycotting, to initiating parallel projects and innovations. In other words, resistance includes primarily contained performances, but may also entail transgressive performances.
[58] The group or collection of its members rejects outright the policy and action by open acts contrary to state policy or action. This may occur through a series of performances having varying degrees of seriousness, including leaving the country, seeking aid from international bodies to bring pressure on the regime to change, as well as engaging in transgressive actions, such as disrupting daily life through sit-ins, boycotts, graffiti, rioting, and even seeking to overthrow the government.