CHAPTER ONE
CASE STUDY SETTING AND OBJECTS
On Regimes An overview of regimes is central to the study of contentious politics, and deals with the inherently dynamic relationship between groups in a sovereign territory and the government managing its state institutions. I use the term regime to denote the organized group in control of the government. Regimes most often determine the political direction (form of government) and practice (capacity) of a state[1] through its control of the government and its agencies.
The regime is a key unit of analysis for several important reasons: First because those people who control the government (i.e., power holders and regimes) experience greater levels of access to and control over information, resources, and coercive means, as compared to other groups (Tilly, 2006b). The form and capacity of regimes significantly bears on how the government distributes advantages in the form of policies and practices (Tilly, 2008). Second, because the orientation of regimes occupying power has a significant impact on the strategies they adopt and the methods they employ in governing the state.
According to Tilly (2006b), the forms of governments range from nondemocratic to democratic. He defines democracy as the “extent to which persons subject to the government’s authority have broad, equal rights to influence governmental affairs and to receive protection from arbitrary governmental action” (Tilly, 2006b, p. 21). However, the type of government must be placed in the context of a government’s capacity to exercise the regime’s will. Tilly (2006b) defines governmental capacity as the: “degree to which governmental actions affect distributions of populations, activities, and resources within the government’s jurisdiction, relative to some standard of quality and efficiency” (Tilly, 2006b, p. 21). Capacity increases the chances of a government to engage in democratic processes, such as including wider participation in government decisions, more equitable distribution of resources, and greater tolerance of groups and actions. Conversely, capacity can also empower a government to control decision-making and engage in arbitrary rule, unevenly distribute resources, and repress targeted groups and actions.
I use the implications of Tilly’s (2006b) regime type-capacity model to highlight governments strategies in dealing with their population. However, I add a third, nuanced category: ideological orientation. By ideological orientation, I mean those ideas and beliefs which direct the course of a regime’s agenda and governance strategy. I suggest that how a state defines itself has a significant bearing on the form of government and how it chooses to exercise its capacity (while not bearing on capacity).
In this chapter I use these classifications to assess changes in the Pahlavi dynasty and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and subsequently how they bear on their educational policies and performances. Educational institutions will almost always become a space in which the form, capacity, and ideological orientation of a regime are manifested. Moreover, I argue that a regime will determine the extent to which it will prescribe, tolerate, and deny educational participants, policies, curricula, and practices based on the above three defining features of a regime. To this end, I retain emphasis on the educational landscape during these periods, each regime’s educational system, and the general characteristics of their ideological orientation toward education.
The Pahlavi Dynasty (1925 to 1979) Reza Shah and Nation Building (1926 to 1941) Decades of government corruption, economic concessions to the British and Russians, frequent revolts and coups, and fragmented state institutions made Iran vulnerable to internal conflict and turmoil. In 1925, Reza Khan, a military colonel claimed the throne for himself. At the top of Reza Shah’s agenda was the drive to modernize and secularize Iran through industrialization, allying with landlord aristocrats, and creating new bureaucratic and educational institutions. European models, including modern universities, superfluous dress codes and standardized Persian lexicon, characterized much of his reforms (Abrahamian, 1982; Axworthy, 2008).
Despite the centuries-old presence of religious authorities within the government, the Shah set out to secularize Iran in judicial and legal spheres, such as a French-modeled civil code adopted by the Majles in 1928 and the Italian-modeled penal code (Abrahamian, 1982). The role of the ulama was further reduced when secular officials replaced them as official judges and document notaries, and the shariah (Islamic law) was only narrowly applied to personal matters and family law. Apart from military advances, the two most noticeable reforms during the time of the Shah were seen in industrialization and education (Abrahamian, 1982).
The Pahlavi regime has been criticized for its lack of effort to offer real educational reform to the largest segment of the Iranian population—rural inhabitants (Cleveland, 2004). However, other than the limited public schooling instituted during the period of the constitutional government at the beginning of the century, the only schools that really functioned outside of madrasas (Islamic schools) were those run by religious minorities and foreigners. As for higher education, there were a few specialized professional and vocational colleges, but nothing comparable to a multi-departmental modern university.
Reza Shah and the Majles mandated compulsory education and increased the number of trained administrators. While limited in scope and execution, it nonetheless had a significant impact.[2] But these efforts yielded only negligible results in rural areas. For example, during this time, the rural majority of Iran—made up of villages, isolated towns, and nomadic tribes—was in no position to facilitate or sustain schools (Matthee, 1992). Moreover, the ulama that had obviously benefited from madrasas or old religious schools steadfastly opposed participation in the new schools (Menashri, 1992). At the direction of the Shah, the first modern multi-departmental institution of higher education, Tehran University, was established in 1934. The university was founded to supply Iran with the experts it needed to support the modernization process, and aimed at lessening dependence on foreign expertise. The university benefited mostly people of privilege and those living in urban areas.[3]
With the counsel of education specialists, Reza Shah began a process of systemizing and standardizing schools throughout Iran (Sadiq, 1931). This involved innovation in curricula, structures, and procedures. Systemization involved repressive practices as well, including bans on ethnic clothing, minority languages, and dissemination of a somewhat mythical version of Persian identity (Kashani-Sabet, 1999; Matthee, 1993; Rostam-Kolayi, 2008). While ethnic and religious minority schools were not closed initially, any school that was perceived to be inconsistent with the regime’s agenda of nationalization and secularization was eventually shut down or suspended until changes were made (Banani, 1961; Sadiq, 1931). In 1936, all foreign elementary schools were nationalized, and by 1939, all high schools as well (Irvine, 2008; Menashri, 1992; Zirinksy, 1993a).
The policies driving the expansion of education in Iran can be understood in terms of Reza Shah’s overall objectives for the state. Reza Shah, who was practically illiterate himself, saw education as a useful tool from a purely utilitarian perspective (Matthee, 1993). For him, education was important, in so far as it helped the state to execute policies and furthered the state’s agenda to socialize the greater population, to centralize government through trained bureaucrats, and to bring about progress in the industrialization of the country (Cleveland, 2004). Not unlike other educational systems of the time, (such as in Turkey and Egypt), a key component of the new schooling system was engendering loyalty and service to the nation (see Kashani-Sabet, 1999, for more on use of education for nationalist agenda of the Pahlavi dynasty). Menashri (1992) explains that for Reza Shah, education was the primary and ideal apparatus to bring cohesion to an otherwise fragmented country, by blurring ethnic identities and supplanting religious loyalties with a homogenous Iranian national identity.
Three educational advances are particularly noteworthy during the 15 years of the reign of Reza Shah: (a) mandatory “modern” mass schooling with a systematized and strong nationalist curriculum; (b) a state-sponsored study-abroad program; and (c) the establishment of a multi-departmental modern university. However deficient and incomplete, these three aspects of education laid the foundation for Iran’s education system and Iran’s first secularized intellectual class (Matthee, 1993; Menashri, 1992).
While Iran was never officially colonized, British and Russian occupation and implicit control was pervasive. When Reza Shah tried to break from this dependency by aligning with Germany, Britain and the Soviet Union persuaded him both to abdicate and escape the country in 1941 (Cleveland, 2004). His son, Muhammad Reza, was placed on the throne. It is interesting to point out that deeply negative impressions about the British and the Russians in Iran led to some receptivity to the French and American presence, including missionary and foreign schools. Several observers of the first half of the reign of the Pahlavi suggest that the interests of the people, of internal power brokers, and even of parliament were suppressed or ignored in favor of consolidated, centralized power (Abrahamian, 1982; Arjomand, 1988; Cleveland, 2004).
Muhammad Reza Shah and an Era of Rapid Reform (1941 to 1978) The first 12 years of Muhammad Reza’s reign were characterized by overbearing power and political struggles, ranging from internal party controversies to debates about the invasive foreign policies of other countries (Arjomand, 1988). Notwithstanding the new Shah’s curtailment of political freedoms and suppressed contests for power to maintain control, social and cultural freedoms were tolerated and even facilitated during this time—as long as they did not threaten the Shah’s vision of a consolidated Iran firmly under his rule.
Economic and social reforms were the hallmarks of Muhammad Reza’s push for solidarity. Muhammad Reza’s agenda for self promotion was pervasive. He tightened his control on political power through coercion and systemic hegemony, as he set out to make Iran a leading world power. However, he turned to social reform to enhance the country’s productivity and solidarity.
In 1963, Muhammad Shah launched what he called “The White Revolution,” implying a nonviolent social reformation. The White Revolution was initially premised on six points, and expanded to 19 articles over the course of 15 years (Arjomand, 1988). Important and understated efforts made through the White Revolution included educational policy. Four of the articles of the White Revolution related, directly or indirectly, to education (Abrahamian, 1982; Pahlavi, 1963).
In the sixth of the original series of articles outlining the agenda of the White Revolution, a literacy corps was established to meet the educational needs of those in rural areas. Upon graduation from high school, young men were required to serve in the military for two years, with the option of spending that time in rural villages engaging in educational activities, either teaching primary school or conducting adult classes (Sabahi, 2001).[4] Article 12 (1967) dealt with reform of the curriculum, and Article 15 (1975) instituted compulsory and free education from primary school to high school, and included one free meal to those who were without means (up to age 14). Article 11 (1967) set out to address infrastructure needs, under the auspice of modernization of urban and rural areas, including building schools and libraries (Abrahamian, 2008).
Some have suggested that the White Revolution was overly ambitious and actually contributed to the downfall of the Shah (Abrahamian, 1982; Sabahi, 2001). Others are more cautious, but assert that the Shah’s agenda marginalized landowners, bazaaris (merchants), and the ulama, and failed to garner the support of the masses to which it ostensibly catered (Arjomand, 1988). In the final analysis, despite some achievements in various areas of infrastructure development and educational expansion, the radical reform campaign fizzled and was additionally stained by the Shah’s increasing totalitarianism and uncompromising drive to modernize Iran along Western lines.
Muhammad Reza recognized education as the primary means to progress. He envisioned expanding education as the means not only to modernization, but also to engendering support of the general public and to establishing solidarity in his kingdom. Education, in the view of Muhammad Reza, was a holistic apparatus for ideological assimilation and skill-building.
While there were varying degrees of tolerance toward ethnic and religious groups, and little to none for political groups, most minorities were included in all of the government’s plans. For the Pahlavis, the primacy of an Iranian identity was essential, and any other identity was inconsequential, as long as it did not interfere with loyalty to the state. Not surprisingly, those who had access to education services and educational opportunities welcomed them. Those who could not began voicing their growing dissatisfaction. Religious minority groups who had been attending their own schools also took advantage of the burgeoning educational system during the time of Muhammad Reza Shah: some integrated into them, while others continued to run isolated community schools (Sanasarian, 2000).
Many have been critical of the educational policies of Muhammad Reza Shah (Arjomand, 1988; Cleveland, 2004; Menashri, 1992). To address the continued educational challenges that were still unmet, new initiatives were put in place. By 1975, the Majles not only ratified the Shah’s proposed Article 15 for free education, but even expanded it to include a wider age range and to include free vocational high school (Menashri, 1992).
Although the numbers of those affected by the new laws may have been nominal, and specific to a largely male, urban population, they still remain significant. To reject the pioneering efforts and strides made, however inadequate, would be underestimating the educational system that was developed from the virtually nonexistent infrastructure that was in place, and the impact it had on its later development (Menashri, 1992).[5] However, the gross disparity between rural and urban populations became a bone of serious contention,[6] and presented a grave problem that would be pivotal for protagonists of the Islamic Revolution and a platform for the Islamic Republic’s social justice campaign (Keddie, 1999; Messkoub, 2006; Sabahi, 2001). In 1978–1979, as a result of years of repressive rule, failed reforms, and demands of more government services, dissident groups—often bearing little resemblance other than opposition to the regime—ignited a revolution that toppled the dynasty (Abrahamian, 2008).
Summary of the Pahlavis Returning to Tilly’s (2006b) outline of regime types, I place the two epochs during the Pahlavi regime at different points in the spectrum of characteristics. When Reza Shah first came to power, he was occupied with building government capacity at the expense of fostering a democracy. His ideology was focused on modernization and secularization through industrialization and nationalism. After establishing relative stability countrywide, Reza Shah was able to make bolder moves toward solidarity and independence from traditional foreign occupants. As Figure 5 shows, democracy ranged in the low zone, but capacity increased over time, ranging in the mid-high zone.
Figure 5. Regime type under Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–1941).
The first 12-year period of Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule saw two strands of movement on the regime type grid: one was of low capacity in the monarch, but mid- to mid-high capacity for Parliament; overall, there was a mid-level democracy. Between 1953 and 1963, the reinvigorated Pahlavi regime increased its capacity to maintain power and security, but this had the effect of blocking political development and restricting democracy. Once Muhammad Reza Shah felt that stability was reestablished, he launched the White Revolution reform campaign. While political rivals were still being repressed, other groups, such a religious minorities, women, and young people benefitted tremendously through the social reforms of the White Revolution. The regime’s capacity increased exponentially, as did its distribution of resources and opportunities for some groups that had been marginalized. Those that did not have access or who were excluded engaged in resistance and, in turn, instigated a fierce backlash against the Shah beginning in the 1970s. Figure 6 illustrates the waxing and waning of capacity and democracy during the Muhammad Reza epoch on Tilly’s (2006b) regime-type grid. Both eras of the Pahlavi dynasty were characterized by an ideological orientation toward modernization, which often took the form of industrialization and Westernization of institutions and policies.
The Islamic Republic of Iran (1979 to the Present) Gestation of a Revolution: “Burn the Shah, End the Pahlavis” The Shah was out of touch with the masses and perhaps overconfident in his abilities to quell rebellion. The tenacious resolve of protesters remained undeterred by his fierce backlash. In 1979, after fleeing the country, the Revolution had toppled the short-lived dynasty. Broadcast over Tehran Radio, the victory of the Revolution was made clear, “This is the voice of Iran, the voice of true Iran, the voice of the Islamic Revolution” (as cited in Abrahamian, 2008, p. 162).
Figure 6. Regime space under Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–1978).
Birth of an Islamic Nation In February of 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran. Without wasting any time, he affirmed the end of the monarchy, replaced the position of Prime Minister with a member from a party in support of the Revolution, and declared himself Guardian of the Islamic Jurist (valeyat-e faqih)—ultimately securing his place as Supreme Leader. Over the course of the past three decades, four epochs within the regime may be observed. These four eras are distinguished primarily by their ideological orientation, as well as by their capacity and form of government.
First Epoch: Khomeini and the Establishment of the Islamic Republic (ca. 1979 to 1989) With the deposing of the Shah and his Parliament, Khomeini’s para-state, made up of the Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Committees (komitehs), and the Revolutionary Guard Corps (sepah-e pasdar) filled the vacuum of power. Dealing with the diverse body of people who had deposed the Shah, Khomeini set out to secure an Islamic regime by cutting down rivals and threats, while preserving state institutions and infrastructure. Khomeini’s new regime may have stripped the old Iran of its flesh, but it did not dispose of the skeleton—its infrastructure—which proved important for a new Iran.
In 1979, the establishment of an Islamic Republic would be based on a novel constitution drafted by a newly elected Assembly of Experts (majles-e khebregan), made up predominantly of individuals aligned with Khomeini (Abrahamian, 2008). For Khomeini, the new Iranian state required thorough ideological reformation. On a platform of religiosity, ethnic unity, and social justice, Khomeini spearheaded the radical transformation of Iranian society. In 1980, Khomeini launched the Cultural Revolution (engelab-e farhangi).
The Cultural Revolution set out to infuse the state and country with Khomeini’s brand of Shi’i ideological orientation in three steps: purification, (re)production, and preservation. Those in positions of influence and prominence—and who were aligned with the regime—were favored and replaced those whom regime leaders considered incompatible with the Republic’s agenda. While recognized religious minorities—Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians—were institutionalized within the Islamic political system, their role in the government seemed cosmetic and nominal at best (Sanasarian, 2000). Educational institutions in particular were completely revamped to accommodate and preserve the Islamic Republic’s ideological orientation and agenda. In addition to changes in the system, the state now instituted significant censorship, publication bans, control of media outlets, literature, dress, school curricula, product exports and imports, and began rewriting laws (Habibi, 1989). The drive of the state to establish hegemony was unyielding. Khomeini used every conceivable means to achieve this goal. In very much the same way that the Shah had employed violent measures to suffocate the voices of perceived opposition, with an effective high-capacity government at his disposal, Khomeini was able to consolidate power by expanding the state on the one hand, and engaging in fierce repressive tactics on the other.
In addition to legitimated violence,[7] education was crucial for disseminating and infusing Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic nation. If coercion was the primary means of purging the secular Iranian state and transforming it into an Islamic hegemony, then education was the apparatus used to sustain its shift through socialization and stabilization. The Khomeini regime believed that education was the key not only to eliminating further protest and dissent, but to raising up a dominant Islamic state.
Three major initiatives shaped the immediate reformation of the Iranian educational system. The first was a complete overhaul of the curriculum, including the rewriting of school textbooks. The second was the institutionalization of a countrywide literacy campaign. The third was the closure and restructuring of universities throughout Iran during the beginning years of the Cultural Revolution, in an effort to purge, purify, and create the new system of higher education of the Islamic Republic. Other significant reforms included gender-separated schools and classes, new regulations for religious minority schools, the firing and expulsion of nonaligned educators and students at all levels of education in Iran, and new standards of behavior and conduct (Habibi, 1989; Mehran, 1989, 1992; Paivandi, 2008).
Compulsory schooling was reinforced by the new regime, yet schools and the curricula used underwent thorough changes. In fact, just nine days after the victory of the Revolution, in February 1979, Khomeini called for the production of new textbooks. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic, one of the most obvious actions by the regime was the rewriting of school textbooks, completed between 1980–1981 (Mehran, 1989; Paivandi, 2008). Golnar Mehran’s (1989) evaluation and critical review of elementary and secondary social studies textbooks concludes that the government’s drive for creating a homogenous and unchallenged Islamic identity is prominent throughout all new and revised textbooks after the Revolution. Not only were religious classes organized to reflect the regime’s view of Islam and other religions, but all subjects were subjected to Islamization.
Critical and supportive scholastic work on post-Revolution Iranian curricula accept that the government intentionally and purposefully uses educational space and curricula (textbooks, lesson plans, instruction of behavior) as a means to socialize children, youth, and young adults with the regime’s ideological foundation for an Islamic Republic (Matini, 1989; Mehran, 1989, 1992, 2007; Paivandi, 2008; Sanasarian, 2000). Additionally, there are high levels of intolerance for diversity and other narratives that deemed to be incongruent with the regime’s ideological agenda.
Khomeini centered considerable attention on Iran’s 63.5 percent illiterates (Sadri, 1999). In December 1979, Khomeini launched a campaign, known as the Literacy Movement of Iran (nehzat-e savad amuzi-ye iran) having various objectives. It was established to help Iran’s masses of illiterate people, comprising primarily regime supporters, but it provided the optimal apparatus to create widespread ideological hegemony in Iran (Menashri, 1992). By one account the program was indeed effective in reducing country-wide illiteracy, as illustrated by literacy rate of 84 percent for adults and 97.6 percent for children and youth in 2006 (UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, 2008).
For the new Islamic regime, the greatest source of resistance within the education system was rooted in universities. Khomeini repeatedly condemned the existing universities in Iran for being the nest of Iran’s continued problems. Under the banner of the Cultural Revolution, the government targeted professors, students, university subjects, and curricula. All three of these sources of agitation which were perceived as contributing to a deficiency in the university system were framed as religio-political issues (see Khomeini, 1980, trans. in Algar, 1981, pp. 295–298). In the following year, all universities (other than medical schools) were shut down. Upon reopening over the course of three years, universities throughout the country experienced the purge to which Khomeini referred, particularly in the form of fired professors and administrators, expelled students, as well as curricula and structural reform. Moreover, universities were set up to filter out those not aligned with the state agenda, as well as perceived dissenters (Sakurai, 2004). Quotas were put in place to ensure favoritism toward ideologically congruent students and faculty (Sakurai, 2004). Finally, a ban was placed on certain targeted groups, and restrictions and difficult procedures were imposed on other minority and politically affiliated groups (Habibi, 1989).[8] Successive conservative regime leaders and institutions continued the legacy begun by Khomeini in the decades that followed.
Second Epoch: The Search for Consolidation and Stabilization (ca. 1989 to 1997) In 1989, the charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution and the new Republic died. Even 30 years after the establishment of the state Khomeini seems still to have had the most noticeable impact on the shaping of the Islamic Republic. However, the succession of leadership on all levels would face the serious challenge of reconciling the innovative state with a burgeoning international world system. In 1989, Seyed Ali Khamenei, succeeded as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In turn, Rafsanjani, the Majles speaker, was elected President. Both relied on a tight network within various sectors of Iranian society, consisting of religious and middle class business leaders, intellectuals, and various organizations (Takeyh, 2009).
In the midst of internal government conflict in the area of economic reform, there were signs of selective liberalization, and also some noticeable social improvements in the social sector (Islamic Republic of Iran, Management and Planning Organization, n.d.). The government’s capacity to implement social policy dramatically increased, with social services and institutions expanding in both structure and allocated expenditure. Educational expenditure also increased to expand services (see Table B2).[9] In a sense, the legacy of the education system set up by Khomeini continued on into the epoch of reconstruction after the 1988 Iran-Iraq War, yet it required changes and modifications to deal with new demands and challenges. Since the Revolution, the country’s educational system showed quantitative improvements on several fronts, including in gender parity, increased enrolments and graduations, increased access for people in rural areas, and the building of new schools and universities (Sadri, 1999; Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, various years between 1989–1998; UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, various dates; World Bank, 2008; and see Table B3). Notwithstanding these advances in education, a number of new challenges faced administrators and government agencies responsible for the education system during this second epoch, including overcrowded classrooms and teacher shortages, lack of vocational and skill building education components, and issues related to reorganization of the structure of schools (Sadri, 1999; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005b). The second set of challenges related specifically to higher education, such as limited enrolment space as a result of high application rates (see Table B4),[10] the poor quality of the education offered, inadequate job preparation, and problems in filtering admissions and censorship (Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007; Torbat, 2002). The filtering and screening of faculty and students along political grounds, curtailment of academic freedom, and admission quotas significantly altered Iran’s intellectual community (Sakurai, 2004; Torbat, 2002). Several researchers and educational experts both within and outside Iran have noted the deteriorating quality of education in Iran as a result of restrictive government policies instituted primarily by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.[11] The problems cause mass discontent with traditional conservative governance.
The Third Epoch: From Revolution to Reform (ca. 1997 to 2005) Disillusioned with conservative rule, Seyed Mohammad Khatami, an unlikely presidential candidate, stepped in to meet existing and new social needs and demands as the leader of a coalition-based reform movement (Clawson, Eisenstadt, Kanovsky, & Menashri, 1998). Rejecting unbridled autocracy characterized by arbitrary rule, Khatami called for a democratic movement that promoted freedom of expression, encouraged the active participation of women and youth in social affairs, insisted upon civil equity among Muslims and non-Muslims, condemned brutality and coercion, sought to build cordial international relations with Islamic countries as well as with the West, and advanced sustainable development in Iran (Ansari, 2006; Khatami, 1997).
In the midst of conflicting policies, challenged reforms, and ideological debates among government leaders, demands for educational opportunity continued to increase. Khatami (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b), an intellectual trained in both Islamic and Western philosophy, saw education as a key component in building civic capacity and an Islamic democracy. However, even a brief look will reveal that the reformists’ ideology had little effect on real educational reform, and that while quantitative and policy improvements were made in some areas, qualitative and practical improvements remained deficient (Mehran, 2003; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005a; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007).
Within the context of Islam, Khatami (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2004) espoused a progressive outlook toward the education of school children and youth. In several of his public addresses, as well as in his writing, he describes the ideal education system as one designed to meet the needs of youth, characterized by flexibility, tolerance, openness to questions, and the training of critical and inquisitive minds. Despite improvements seen in increased enrolment in higher education, participation of females, and graduation rates (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, 1997–2005), the reformists were faced with several pressing and seemingly insurmountable problems. Amuzegar (2004) and Salehi-Isfahani (2005b), among others, describe the effects of the mismatch between the education being offered in Iran and the country’s occupational needs, suggesting that vast resources were being wasted and that higher education had not changed to meet the practical needs of the marketplace (Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005b; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007). The capacity strain on public higher education and the financial inaccessibility of private universities to the poor delivered a blow to Iran’s educational community. Several scholars have pointed to the resulting low quality of the educational system, shortages, exclusion of capable students, and inadequate evaluations, as evidenced by faculty, graduates, teaching topics, and rate of return for society, among other factors (Bazargan, 2002; Farasatkhah et al., 2008; Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005a; Tavakol, 2007).
Regime members acknowledged in public the increase of emigration and the perceived brain drain,[12] In subsequent years, even the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the conservative arm of the regime, passed several resolutions to this end over the course of the third epoch (see Table B5 for selected resolutions).
Ultimately, however, as promising as Khatami’s vision for a freer and open educational system seemed, it was never realized. Mehran’s (2003) assessment of reformist movement ideas and their impact on the education system shows that none of the post-reformist elements are reflected in the educational goals and values of schools. Mehran correctly observes that the reason for this is that conservative organs of the government control schools. Those who had hoped for and sought change and reform once again became disillusioned with the government.
The Fourth Epoch: The Resurgence of Conservatism (2005 to 2009) The 2005 presidential elections resulted in the surprise victory by a new conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While the reformists were playing out their agenda, a series of young revolutionaries who had a decade earlier engaged in the Iran-Iraq War, had joined the Revolutionary Guard, and taken advantage of privileges.[13] The new conservatives in reality carried on the Khomeini legacy, while the traditional conservatives began to soften in many ways (Takeyh, 2009).
New conservatives disengaged from Iran’s political continuum, entering an idealized continuation of where Khomeini had left off. Although a slight increase in legal rights and loosened restrictions characterized the previous eight years prior to the new conservative regime, human rights violations escalated considerably during this period, including repressive measures against minority groups, political revivals, educational repression of students and faculty, and the brutal treatment of prison detainees (Ehsani, 2006).
Understandably, the education sector did not escape the extended influence of the new conservative administration. However, the new conservative regime approached education with strategies which were increasingly restrictive and which had the effect of further degrading quality in schools and universities (Farasatkhah et al., 2008). A number of issues stand out when looking at education during this epoch, including university faculty purges, curtailed academic freedom and development, a curriculum infused with flagrant intolerance and inflammatory content toward minority groups, and misuse of statistical information to overlook serious structural problems (Haghighatjoo, 2009; Elmi, 2009; Paivandi, 2008).
Some reports indicate improvements resulting from years of development in education, such as steadily rising enrolment rates, increased literacy, increased graduation rates, gender parity, a rise in the number of advanced and professional degrees granted, and expansion and further development of educational facilities (World Bank, 2008; Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, Iranian Census, 1986–2006). Nevertheless, problems such as classroom overcrowding, mistreatment of minorities in schools, degraded quality of education, lack of access to universities, credentialism, and inadequate training at higher education levels persisted (Paivandi, 2008; Salehi-Isfahani, 2009a; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007; Shavarini, 2006). Curricula remained biased against minorities. As Paivandi (2008) asserts, “Discrimination and intolerance are neither accidental nor sporadic. They are consistent and systematic throughout the textbook at the core of the curriculum in Iranian schools” (p. 4).
Youth who seek higher education upon graduating are faced with new challenges outside curricular and instructional prejudices—namely access and equity issues, as well as problems with quality accountability. During this period, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution executed a series of policies[14] that would purge those perceived as ideologically incompatible with the regime agenda, and placed in their stead like-minded supporters (Haghighatjoo, 2009; Rasoulpour, 2007; Sanati, 2006).[15]
Summary of the Islamic Republic of Iran As Abrahamian (2008) recollects, most observers, journalists, and politicians, would have bet against the sustainability of a theocratic state run by a cadre of clerical radicals. Yet, 30 years later, after several economic, political, and social upheavals, the Republic remains. Dependence on social welfare has permeated popular life, especially among the poor and rural populations, and has enabled the power structure to remain in place. The regime increased its governing capacity with the strengthening and centralization of its state institutions. The clerical elite, holding ultimate power, effectively dominated nongovernmental agencies, institutions, and resources—even if it had a detrimental effect on economic development. Although the Constitution of the Islamic Republic contains an element of selective democracy, power, in reality, is wielded at the discretion of one leading figure and several like-minded senior clerics (Carothers, 2002). Thus, as shown by others, the Islamic Republic is not a dictatorship, but rather an autocracy made up of a fragmented elite (Kamrava & Hassan-Yari, 2004; Keshavarzian, 2005).
The Islamic Republic has a novel and sophisticated governmental structure with both elected and appointed officials, both subject to approval by others. Yet, upon closer examination, the structure is ultimately set up to secure and perpetuate the systemic power of a few who share a similar orientation. Considering this nuanced governmental form, Figure 7 shows a modified version of Tilly’s (2006b) governmental capacity grid reflecting the shifts made by the elected executive branch (e.g., President, Cabinet, and Majles) and the ecclesiastical branch (e.g., the Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts, and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution).
0
DEMOCRATIC FORM
1
0
1
1997a
1979a
1979–1989
First Epoch: Khomeinism
1989–1997
Reconstruction / Pragmatism
1997–2004
Reformist Era
2004–2009
New Conservatism
EPOCHS OF CAPACITY/DEMOCRACY SHIFTS
1989ab
2004a
2009ab
2004b
1979b
1997b
Elected Executive Branch (B)
Ecclesiastical Branch (A)
Figure 7. Regime space under Islamic Republic (1979–2009).
Conclusion The study of any group and its efforts to make claims, mobilize, and take collective action in the public arena will implicitly or explicitly interact with regimes in one way or another. The study of the form, capacity, and ideological orientation of a government provides the context in which groups in a given territory select strategies which either respond to, or cause a response from, the government. In the case of two distinct Iranian governments over time, one a secular monarchy and the other a theocratic republic, I have examined the shifts, however slight, in form, capacity, and ideological orientation. Moreover, I have focused on the educational landscape during selected epochs in order to lay the foundation for the following chapters which deal directly with three minority groups during each period. Part of the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze to what extent and how regime-group relations have a bearing on the educational strategy selected by each of the case studies.
In the final analysis, regimes matter. Whether in dictatorships, democracies, or autocracies, regimes play a critical role in the interaction of people’s and group’s interests. The Iranian state, under the Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic, made decisions that were intended to secure its own longevity and prescribe that which would mold the country into what it envisioned would serve its interests. Thus, the question before us is: how did groups manage to meet their needs despite these fluxes in these regime situations? How did groups—which the regime facilitated, tolerated, or repressed—respond under these various governments? In Chapter 5, I will examine the three groups and their group composition, their networks, and their relations with each of these governments in both periods.
[1] I define the parameters of the state with reference to those collective institutions operated by the government of a sovereign territory, such as the legislative, judicial, and executive bodies responsible for managing public affairs. However, I also use the term state to describe public institutions within a sovereign territory that are controlled by the government, such as schools, trade unions, select religious institutions, and the media.
[2] For example, between 1921 and 1941, expenditure on education increased 12-fold (Messkoub, 2006; see Table B1), and the number of students in public elementary and secondary schools increased from 44,819 in 1922–1923 to 314,173 in 1940–1941 (Menashri, 1992, p. 121).
[3] The number of participants doubled within five years creating a cadre of new intellectuals, as illustrated by the enrolment of 1,043 students in 1934–1935, a figure which increased to 2,113 in 1939–40 (Menashri, 1992).
[4] A corps of approximately 200,000 participants enlisted, reaching 2.2 million children and another million adults. As a note of interest, the first UNESCO World Congress on the Eradication of Illiteracy was hosted in Tehran in 1965, at which the Shah pledged US$700,000 to UNESCO for the purpose of eradicating illiteracy (Sabahi, 2001).
[5] For example, in 1941–1942, only 286,598 children were enrolled in elementary schools, but by 1977–1978, a total of 5,200,000 children were enrolled (Menashri, 1992, p. 186); similarly in 1941–1942, only 315,355 children were enrolled in elementary and secondary school, compared to 7,701,000 in 1977–1978 (Menashri, 1992, p. 191).
[6] For example, by the mid-1960s, literacy rates for women were at 17 percent (half of that of men), and only 15 percent of the rural population was literate, compared to 50 percent literacy among urban dwellers. By the mid-1970s, as a result of efforts made by the Literacy Corps, some improvement was seen, with 31 percent literacy among male rural dwellers and 7 percent among female rural dwellers. (Messkoub, 2006, p. 234).
[7] For theocratic and legal basis of violence see ideas associated with mufsid fil-ard (corruptors on earth) in Esposito (2003), Milani (2000), and Khalkhali (2001).
[8] Libraries were purged of books that were deemed un- or anti-Islamic. For example, one account reports that five tons of books of a major university were auctioned for “pulping” in 1985–1986 (Matini, 1989).
[9] See Appendix B for all tables in this chapter.
[10] In 1991–1992, only a few years after Khamenei and Rafsanjani took over the reins of the regime, only 10 percent of candidates (831,152) were accepted. A decade later, the rate of admission in proportion to applicants remained relatively unchanged (10.7 percent, or 1,593,489) (Sakurai, 2004).
[11] For further reading on the topic of educational equity in higher education, admissions, policies, educational quality, and the paucity of resources see Bazargan (1999); Farasatkhah, Ghazi, & Bazargan (2008); Habibi (1989); Hamdhaidari (2008); Mossayeb and Shirazi (2006); Sakurai (2004); Tavakol (2007); and Torbat (2002).
[12] See addresses by Khatami mentioned in IRNA (2001a, 28 February) and Rafsanjani in IRNA (2001b, 28 February).
[13] The rise in violence, censorship, and other repressive acts during Khatami’s era was primarily spearheaded by the new conservatives—acts including the closure of newspapers, violent attacks against progressive clerics, and heightened persecution of religious minorities.
[14] See a list of the Resolutions passed by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (Islamic Republic of Iran, Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, n.d.).
[15] In October 2008, 109 Iranian university professors wrote an open letter to Ahmadinejad (Gozaar, 2008) decrying the state policies being implemented in universities. The letter focused on three central issues: (a) weakening of the structural and planning foundations of scientific development; (b) complete transformation of both the culture and functions of the university; and (c) the decrease in participation of faculty and students.
The regime is a key unit of analysis for several important reasons: First because those people who control the government (i.e., power holders and regimes) experience greater levels of access to and control over information, resources, and coercive means, as compared to other groups (Tilly, 2006b). The form and capacity of regimes significantly bears on how the government distributes advantages in the form of policies and practices (Tilly, 2008). Second, because the orientation of regimes occupying power has a significant impact on the strategies they adopt and the methods they employ in governing the state.
According to Tilly (2006b), the forms of governments range from nondemocratic to democratic. He defines democracy as the “extent to which persons subject to the government’s authority have broad, equal rights to influence governmental affairs and to receive protection from arbitrary governmental action” (Tilly, 2006b, p. 21). However, the type of government must be placed in the context of a government’s capacity to exercise the regime’s will. Tilly (2006b) defines governmental capacity as the: “degree to which governmental actions affect distributions of populations, activities, and resources within the government’s jurisdiction, relative to some standard of quality and efficiency” (Tilly, 2006b, p. 21). Capacity increases the chances of a government to engage in democratic processes, such as including wider participation in government decisions, more equitable distribution of resources, and greater tolerance of groups and actions. Conversely, capacity can also empower a government to control decision-making and engage in arbitrary rule, unevenly distribute resources, and repress targeted groups and actions.
I use the implications of Tilly’s (2006b) regime type-capacity model to highlight governments strategies in dealing with their population. However, I add a third, nuanced category: ideological orientation. By ideological orientation, I mean those ideas and beliefs which direct the course of a regime’s agenda and governance strategy. I suggest that how a state defines itself has a significant bearing on the form of government and how it chooses to exercise its capacity (while not bearing on capacity).
In this chapter I use these classifications to assess changes in the Pahlavi dynasty and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and subsequently how they bear on their educational policies and performances. Educational institutions will almost always become a space in which the form, capacity, and ideological orientation of a regime are manifested. Moreover, I argue that a regime will determine the extent to which it will prescribe, tolerate, and deny educational participants, policies, curricula, and practices based on the above three defining features of a regime. To this end, I retain emphasis on the educational landscape during these periods, each regime’s educational system, and the general characteristics of their ideological orientation toward education.
The Pahlavi Dynasty (1925 to 1979) Reza Shah and Nation Building (1926 to 1941) Decades of government corruption, economic concessions to the British and Russians, frequent revolts and coups, and fragmented state institutions made Iran vulnerable to internal conflict and turmoil. In 1925, Reza Khan, a military colonel claimed the throne for himself. At the top of Reza Shah’s agenda was the drive to modernize and secularize Iran through industrialization, allying with landlord aristocrats, and creating new bureaucratic and educational institutions. European models, including modern universities, superfluous dress codes and standardized Persian lexicon, characterized much of his reforms (Abrahamian, 1982; Axworthy, 2008).
Despite the centuries-old presence of religious authorities within the government, the Shah set out to secularize Iran in judicial and legal spheres, such as a French-modeled civil code adopted by the Majles in 1928 and the Italian-modeled penal code (Abrahamian, 1982). The role of the ulama was further reduced when secular officials replaced them as official judges and document notaries, and the shariah (Islamic law) was only narrowly applied to personal matters and family law. Apart from military advances, the two most noticeable reforms during the time of the Shah were seen in industrialization and education (Abrahamian, 1982).
The Pahlavi regime has been criticized for its lack of effort to offer real educational reform to the largest segment of the Iranian population—rural inhabitants (Cleveland, 2004). However, other than the limited public schooling instituted during the period of the constitutional government at the beginning of the century, the only schools that really functioned outside of madrasas (Islamic schools) were those run by religious minorities and foreigners. As for higher education, there were a few specialized professional and vocational colleges, but nothing comparable to a multi-departmental modern university.
Reza Shah and the Majles mandated compulsory education and increased the number of trained administrators. While limited in scope and execution, it nonetheless had a significant impact.[2] But these efforts yielded only negligible results in rural areas. For example, during this time, the rural majority of Iran—made up of villages, isolated towns, and nomadic tribes—was in no position to facilitate or sustain schools (Matthee, 1992). Moreover, the ulama that had obviously benefited from madrasas or old religious schools steadfastly opposed participation in the new schools (Menashri, 1992). At the direction of the Shah, the first modern multi-departmental institution of higher education, Tehran University, was established in 1934. The university was founded to supply Iran with the experts it needed to support the modernization process, and aimed at lessening dependence on foreign expertise. The university benefited mostly people of privilege and those living in urban areas.[3]
With the counsel of education specialists, Reza Shah began a process of systemizing and standardizing schools throughout Iran (Sadiq, 1931). This involved innovation in curricula, structures, and procedures. Systemization involved repressive practices as well, including bans on ethnic clothing, minority languages, and dissemination of a somewhat mythical version of Persian identity (Kashani-Sabet, 1999; Matthee, 1993; Rostam-Kolayi, 2008). While ethnic and religious minority schools were not closed initially, any school that was perceived to be inconsistent with the regime’s agenda of nationalization and secularization was eventually shut down or suspended until changes were made (Banani, 1961; Sadiq, 1931). In 1936, all foreign elementary schools were nationalized, and by 1939, all high schools as well (Irvine, 2008; Menashri, 1992; Zirinksy, 1993a).
The policies driving the expansion of education in Iran can be understood in terms of Reza Shah’s overall objectives for the state. Reza Shah, who was practically illiterate himself, saw education as a useful tool from a purely utilitarian perspective (Matthee, 1993). For him, education was important, in so far as it helped the state to execute policies and furthered the state’s agenda to socialize the greater population, to centralize government through trained bureaucrats, and to bring about progress in the industrialization of the country (Cleveland, 2004). Not unlike other educational systems of the time, (such as in Turkey and Egypt), a key component of the new schooling system was engendering loyalty and service to the nation (see Kashani-Sabet, 1999, for more on use of education for nationalist agenda of the Pahlavi dynasty). Menashri (1992) explains that for Reza Shah, education was the primary and ideal apparatus to bring cohesion to an otherwise fragmented country, by blurring ethnic identities and supplanting religious loyalties with a homogenous Iranian national identity.
Three educational advances are particularly noteworthy during the 15 years of the reign of Reza Shah: (a) mandatory “modern” mass schooling with a systematized and strong nationalist curriculum; (b) a state-sponsored study-abroad program; and (c) the establishment of a multi-departmental modern university. However deficient and incomplete, these three aspects of education laid the foundation for Iran’s education system and Iran’s first secularized intellectual class (Matthee, 1993; Menashri, 1992).
While Iran was never officially colonized, British and Russian occupation and implicit control was pervasive. When Reza Shah tried to break from this dependency by aligning with Germany, Britain and the Soviet Union persuaded him both to abdicate and escape the country in 1941 (Cleveland, 2004). His son, Muhammad Reza, was placed on the throne. It is interesting to point out that deeply negative impressions about the British and the Russians in Iran led to some receptivity to the French and American presence, including missionary and foreign schools. Several observers of the first half of the reign of the Pahlavi suggest that the interests of the people, of internal power brokers, and even of parliament were suppressed or ignored in favor of consolidated, centralized power (Abrahamian, 1982; Arjomand, 1988; Cleveland, 2004).
Muhammad Reza Shah and an Era of Rapid Reform (1941 to 1978) The first 12 years of Muhammad Reza’s reign were characterized by overbearing power and political struggles, ranging from internal party controversies to debates about the invasive foreign policies of other countries (Arjomand, 1988). Notwithstanding the new Shah’s curtailment of political freedoms and suppressed contests for power to maintain control, social and cultural freedoms were tolerated and even facilitated during this time—as long as they did not threaten the Shah’s vision of a consolidated Iran firmly under his rule.
Economic and social reforms were the hallmarks of Muhammad Reza’s push for solidarity. Muhammad Reza’s agenda for self promotion was pervasive. He tightened his control on political power through coercion and systemic hegemony, as he set out to make Iran a leading world power. However, he turned to social reform to enhance the country’s productivity and solidarity.
In 1963, Muhammad Shah launched what he called “The White Revolution,” implying a nonviolent social reformation. The White Revolution was initially premised on six points, and expanded to 19 articles over the course of 15 years (Arjomand, 1988). Important and understated efforts made through the White Revolution included educational policy. Four of the articles of the White Revolution related, directly or indirectly, to education (Abrahamian, 1982; Pahlavi, 1963).
In the sixth of the original series of articles outlining the agenda of the White Revolution, a literacy corps was established to meet the educational needs of those in rural areas. Upon graduation from high school, young men were required to serve in the military for two years, with the option of spending that time in rural villages engaging in educational activities, either teaching primary school or conducting adult classes (Sabahi, 2001).[4] Article 12 (1967) dealt with reform of the curriculum, and Article 15 (1975) instituted compulsory and free education from primary school to high school, and included one free meal to those who were without means (up to age 14). Article 11 (1967) set out to address infrastructure needs, under the auspice of modernization of urban and rural areas, including building schools and libraries (Abrahamian, 2008).
Some have suggested that the White Revolution was overly ambitious and actually contributed to the downfall of the Shah (Abrahamian, 1982; Sabahi, 2001). Others are more cautious, but assert that the Shah’s agenda marginalized landowners, bazaaris (merchants), and the ulama, and failed to garner the support of the masses to which it ostensibly catered (Arjomand, 1988). In the final analysis, despite some achievements in various areas of infrastructure development and educational expansion, the radical reform campaign fizzled and was additionally stained by the Shah’s increasing totalitarianism and uncompromising drive to modernize Iran along Western lines.
Muhammad Reza recognized education as the primary means to progress. He envisioned expanding education as the means not only to modernization, but also to engendering support of the general public and to establishing solidarity in his kingdom. Education, in the view of Muhammad Reza, was a holistic apparatus for ideological assimilation and skill-building.
While there were varying degrees of tolerance toward ethnic and religious groups, and little to none for political groups, most minorities were included in all of the government’s plans. For the Pahlavis, the primacy of an Iranian identity was essential, and any other identity was inconsequential, as long as it did not interfere with loyalty to the state. Not surprisingly, those who had access to education services and educational opportunities welcomed them. Those who could not began voicing their growing dissatisfaction. Religious minority groups who had been attending their own schools also took advantage of the burgeoning educational system during the time of Muhammad Reza Shah: some integrated into them, while others continued to run isolated community schools (Sanasarian, 2000).
Many have been critical of the educational policies of Muhammad Reza Shah (Arjomand, 1988; Cleveland, 2004; Menashri, 1992). To address the continued educational challenges that were still unmet, new initiatives were put in place. By 1975, the Majles not only ratified the Shah’s proposed Article 15 for free education, but even expanded it to include a wider age range and to include free vocational high school (Menashri, 1992).
Although the numbers of those affected by the new laws may have been nominal, and specific to a largely male, urban population, they still remain significant. To reject the pioneering efforts and strides made, however inadequate, would be underestimating the educational system that was developed from the virtually nonexistent infrastructure that was in place, and the impact it had on its later development (Menashri, 1992).[5] However, the gross disparity between rural and urban populations became a bone of serious contention,[6] and presented a grave problem that would be pivotal for protagonists of the Islamic Revolution and a platform for the Islamic Republic’s social justice campaign (Keddie, 1999; Messkoub, 2006; Sabahi, 2001). In 1978–1979, as a result of years of repressive rule, failed reforms, and demands of more government services, dissident groups—often bearing little resemblance other than opposition to the regime—ignited a revolution that toppled the dynasty (Abrahamian, 2008).
Summary of the Pahlavis Returning to Tilly’s (2006b) outline of regime types, I place the two epochs during the Pahlavi regime at different points in the spectrum of characteristics. When Reza Shah first came to power, he was occupied with building government capacity at the expense of fostering a democracy. His ideology was focused on modernization and secularization through industrialization and nationalism. After establishing relative stability countrywide, Reza Shah was able to make bolder moves toward solidarity and independence from traditional foreign occupants. As Figure 5 shows, democracy ranged in the low zone, but capacity increased over time, ranging in the mid-high zone.
Figure 5. Regime type under Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–1941).
The first 12-year period of Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule saw two strands of movement on the regime type grid: one was of low capacity in the monarch, but mid- to mid-high capacity for Parliament; overall, there was a mid-level democracy. Between 1953 and 1963, the reinvigorated Pahlavi regime increased its capacity to maintain power and security, but this had the effect of blocking political development and restricting democracy. Once Muhammad Reza Shah felt that stability was reestablished, he launched the White Revolution reform campaign. While political rivals were still being repressed, other groups, such a religious minorities, women, and young people benefitted tremendously through the social reforms of the White Revolution. The regime’s capacity increased exponentially, as did its distribution of resources and opportunities for some groups that had been marginalized. Those that did not have access or who were excluded engaged in resistance and, in turn, instigated a fierce backlash against the Shah beginning in the 1970s. Figure 6 illustrates the waxing and waning of capacity and democracy during the Muhammad Reza epoch on Tilly’s (2006b) regime-type grid. Both eras of the Pahlavi dynasty were characterized by an ideological orientation toward modernization, which often took the form of industrialization and Westernization of institutions and policies.
The Islamic Republic of Iran (1979 to the Present) Gestation of a Revolution: “Burn the Shah, End the Pahlavis” The Shah was out of touch with the masses and perhaps overconfident in his abilities to quell rebellion. The tenacious resolve of protesters remained undeterred by his fierce backlash. In 1979, after fleeing the country, the Revolution had toppled the short-lived dynasty. Broadcast over Tehran Radio, the victory of the Revolution was made clear, “This is the voice of Iran, the voice of true Iran, the voice of the Islamic Revolution” (as cited in Abrahamian, 2008, p. 162).
Figure 6. Regime space under Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–1978).
Birth of an Islamic Nation In February of 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran. Without wasting any time, he affirmed the end of the monarchy, replaced the position of Prime Minister with a member from a party in support of the Revolution, and declared himself Guardian of the Islamic Jurist (valeyat-e faqih)—ultimately securing his place as Supreme Leader. Over the course of the past three decades, four epochs within the regime may be observed. These four eras are distinguished primarily by their ideological orientation, as well as by their capacity and form of government.
First Epoch: Khomeini and the Establishment of the Islamic Republic (ca. 1979 to 1989) With the deposing of the Shah and his Parliament, Khomeini’s para-state, made up of the Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Committees (komitehs), and the Revolutionary Guard Corps (sepah-e pasdar) filled the vacuum of power. Dealing with the diverse body of people who had deposed the Shah, Khomeini set out to secure an Islamic regime by cutting down rivals and threats, while preserving state institutions and infrastructure. Khomeini’s new regime may have stripped the old Iran of its flesh, but it did not dispose of the skeleton—its infrastructure—which proved important for a new Iran.
In 1979, the establishment of an Islamic Republic would be based on a novel constitution drafted by a newly elected Assembly of Experts (majles-e khebregan), made up predominantly of individuals aligned with Khomeini (Abrahamian, 2008). For Khomeini, the new Iranian state required thorough ideological reformation. On a platform of religiosity, ethnic unity, and social justice, Khomeini spearheaded the radical transformation of Iranian society. In 1980, Khomeini launched the Cultural Revolution (engelab-e farhangi).
The Cultural Revolution set out to infuse the state and country with Khomeini’s brand of Shi’i ideological orientation in three steps: purification, (re)production, and preservation. Those in positions of influence and prominence—and who were aligned with the regime—were favored and replaced those whom regime leaders considered incompatible with the Republic’s agenda. While recognized religious minorities—Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians—were institutionalized within the Islamic political system, their role in the government seemed cosmetic and nominal at best (Sanasarian, 2000). Educational institutions in particular were completely revamped to accommodate and preserve the Islamic Republic’s ideological orientation and agenda. In addition to changes in the system, the state now instituted significant censorship, publication bans, control of media outlets, literature, dress, school curricula, product exports and imports, and began rewriting laws (Habibi, 1989). The drive of the state to establish hegemony was unyielding. Khomeini used every conceivable means to achieve this goal. In very much the same way that the Shah had employed violent measures to suffocate the voices of perceived opposition, with an effective high-capacity government at his disposal, Khomeini was able to consolidate power by expanding the state on the one hand, and engaging in fierce repressive tactics on the other.
In addition to legitimated violence,[7] education was crucial for disseminating and infusing Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic nation. If coercion was the primary means of purging the secular Iranian state and transforming it into an Islamic hegemony, then education was the apparatus used to sustain its shift through socialization and stabilization. The Khomeini regime believed that education was the key not only to eliminating further protest and dissent, but to raising up a dominant Islamic state.
Three major initiatives shaped the immediate reformation of the Iranian educational system. The first was a complete overhaul of the curriculum, including the rewriting of school textbooks. The second was the institutionalization of a countrywide literacy campaign. The third was the closure and restructuring of universities throughout Iran during the beginning years of the Cultural Revolution, in an effort to purge, purify, and create the new system of higher education of the Islamic Republic. Other significant reforms included gender-separated schools and classes, new regulations for religious minority schools, the firing and expulsion of nonaligned educators and students at all levels of education in Iran, and new standards of behavior and conduct (Habibi, 1989; Mehran, 1989, 1992; Paivandi, 2008).
Compulsory schooling was reinforced by the new regime, yet schools and the curricula used underwent thorough changes. In fact, just nine days after the victory of the Revolution, in February 1979, Khomeini called for the production of new textbooks. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic, one of the most obvious actions by the regime was the rewriting of school textbooks, completed between 1980–1981 (Mehran, 1989; Paivandi, 2008). Golnar Mehran’s (1989) evaluation and critical review of elementary and secondary social studies textbooks concludes that the government’s drive for creating a homogenous and unchallenged Islamic identity is prominent throughout all new and revised textbooks after the Revolution. Not only were religious classes organized to reflect the regime’s view of Islam and other religions, but all subjects were subjected to Islamization.
Critical and supportive scholastic work on post-Revolution Iranian curricula accept that the government intentionally and purposefully uses educational space and curricula (textbooks, lesson plans, instruction of behavior) as a means to socialize children, youth, and young adults with the regime’s ideological foundation for an Islamic Republic (Matini, 1989; Mehran, 1989, 1992, 2007; Paivandi, 2008; Sanasarian, 2000). Additionally, there are high levels of intolerance for diversity and other narratives that deemed to be incongruent with the regime’s ideological agenda.
Khomeini centered considerable attention on Iran’s 63.5 percent illiterates (Sadri, 1999). In December 1979, Khomeini launched a campaign, known as the Literacy Movement of Iran (nehzat-e savad amuzi-ye iran) having various objectives. It was established to help Iran’s masses of illiterate people, comprising primarily regime supporters, but it provided the optimal apparatus to create widespread ideological hegemony in Iran (Menashri, 1992). By one account the program was indeed effective in reducing country-wide illiteracy, as illustrated by literacy rate of 84 percent for adults and 97.6 percent for children and youth in 2006 (UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, 2008).
For the new Islamic regime, the greatest source of resistance within the education system was rooted in universities. Khomeini repeatedly condemned the existing universities in Iran for being the nest of Iran’s continued problems. Under the banner of the Cultural Revolution, the government targeted professors, students, university subjects, and curricula. All three of these sources of agitation which were perceived as contributing to a deficiency in the university system were framed as religio-political issues (see Khomeini, 1980, trans. in Algar, 1981, pp. 295–298). In the following year, all universities (other than medical schools) were shut down. Upon reopening over the course of three years, universities throughout the country experienced the purge to which Khomeini referred, particularly in the form of fired professors and administrators, expelled students, as well as curricula and structural reform. Moreover, universities were set up to filter out those not aligned with the state agenda, as well as perceived dissenters (Sakurai, 2004). Quotas were put in place to ensure favoritism toward ideologically congruent students and faculty (Sakurai, 2004). Finally, a ban was placed on certain targeted groups, and restrictions and difficult procedures were imposed on other minority and politically affiliated groups (Habibi, 1989).[8] Successive conservative regime leaders and institutions continued the legacy begun by Khomeini in the decades that followed.
Second Epoch: The Search for Consolidation and Stabilization (ca. 1989 to 1997) In 1989, the charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution and the new Republic died. Even 30 years after the establishment of the state Khomeini seems still to have had the most noticeable impact on the shaping of the Islamic Republic. However, the succession of leadership on all levels would face the serious challenge of reconciling the innovative state with a burgeoning international world system. In 1989, Seyed Ali Khamenei, succeeded as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In turn, Rafsanjani, the Majles speaker, was elected President. Both relied on a tight network within various sectors of Iranian society, consisting of religious and middle class business leaders, intellectuals, and various organizations (Takeyh, 2009).
In the midst of internal government conflict in the area of economic reform, there were signs of selective liberalization, and also some noticeable social improvements in the social sector (Islamic Republic of Iran, Management and Planning Organization, n.d.). The government’s capacity to implement social policy dramatically increased, with social services and institutions expanding in both structure and allocated expenditure. Educational expenditure also increased to expand services (see Table B2).[9] In a sense, the legacy of the education system set up by Khomeini continued on into the epoch of reconstruction after the 1988 Iran-Iraq War, yet it required changes and modifications to deal with new demands and challenges. Since the Revolution, the country’s educational system showed quantitative improvements on several fronts, including in gender parity, increased enrolments and graduations, increased access for people in rural areas, and the building of new schools and universities (Sadri, 1999; Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, various years between 1989–1998; UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, various dates; World Bank, 2008; and see Table B3). Notwithstanding these advances in education, a number of new challenges faced administrators and government agencies responsible for the education system during this second epoch, including overcrowded classrooms and teacher shortages, lack of vocational and skill building education components, and issues related to reorganization of the structure of schools (Sadri, 1999; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005b). The second set of challenges related specifically to higher education, such as limited enrolment space as a result of high application rates (see Table B4),[10] the poor quality of the education offered, inadequate job preparation, and problems in filtering admissions and censorship (Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007; Torbat, 2002). The filtering and screening of faculty and students along political grounds, curtailment of academic freedom, and admission quotas significantly altered Iran’s intellectual community (Sakurai, 2004; Torbat, 2002). Several researchers and educational experts both within and outside Iran have noted the deteriorating quality of education in Iran as a result of restrictive government policies instituted primarily by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.[11] The problems cause mass discontent with traditional conservative governance.
The Third Epoch: From Revolution to Reform (ca. 1997 to 2005) Disillusioned with conservative rule, Seyed Mohammad Khatami, an unlikely presidential candidate, stepped in to meet existing and new social needs and demands as the leader of a coalition-based reform movement (Clawson, Eisenstadt, Kanovsky, & Menashri, 1998). Rejecting unbridled autocracy characterized by arbitrary rule, Khatami called for a democratic movement that promoted freedom of expression, encouraged the active participation of women and youth in social affairs, insisted upon civil equity among Muslims and non-Muslims, condemned brutality and coercion, sought to build cordial international relations with Islamic countries as well as with the West, and advanced sustainable development in Iran (Ansari, 2006; Khatami, 1997).
In the midst of conflicting policies, challenged reforms, and ideological debates among government leaders, demands for educational opportunity continued to increase. Khatami (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b), an intellectual trained in both Islamic and Western philosophy, saw education as a key component in building civic capacity and an Islamic democracy. However, even a brief look will reveal that the reformists’ ideology had little effect on real educational reform, and that while quantitative and policy improvements were made in some areas, qualitative and practical improvements remained deficient (Mehran, 2003; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005a; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007).
Within the context of Islam, Khatami (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2004) espoused a progressive outlook toward the education of school children and youth. In several of his public addresses, as well as in his writing, he describes the ideal education system as one designed to meet the needs of youth, characterized by flexibility, tolerance, openness to questions, and the training of critical and inquisitive minds. Despite improvements seen in increased enrolment in higher education, participation of females, and graduation rates (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, 1997–2005), the reformists were faced with several pressing and seemingly insurmountable problems. Amuzegar (2004) and Salehi-Isfahani (2005b), among others, describe the effects of the mismatch between the education being offered in Iran and the country’s occupational needs, suggesting that vast resources were being wasted and that higher education had not changed to meet the practical needs of the marketplace (Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005b; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007). The capacity strain on public higher education and the financial inaccessibility of private universities to the poor delivered a blow to Iran’s educational community. Several scholars have pointed to the resulting low quality of the educational system, shortages, exclusion of capable students, and inadequate evaluations, as evidenced by faculty, graduates, teaching topics, and rate of return for society, among other factors (Bazargan, 2002; Farasatkhah et al., 2008; Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005a; Tavakol, 2007).
Regime members acknowledged in public the increase of emigration and the perceived brain drain,[12] In subsequent years, even the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the conservative arm of the regime, passed several resolutions to this end over the course of the third epoch (see Table B5 for selected resolutions).
Ultimately, however, as promising as Khatami’s vision for a freer and open educational system seemed, it was never realized. Mehran’s (2003) assessment of reformist movement ideas and their impact on the education system shows that none of the post-reformist elements are reflected in the educational goals and values of schools. Mehran correctly observes that the reason for this is that conservative organs of the government control schools. Those who had hoped for and sought change and reform once again became disillusioned with the government.
The Fourth Epoch: The Resurgence of Conservatism (2005 to 2009) The 2005 presidential elections resulted in the surprise victory by a new conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While the reformists were playing out their agenda, a series of young revolutionaries who had a decade earlier engaged in the Iran-Iraq War, had joined the Revolutionary Guard, and taken advantage of privileges.[13] The new conservatives in reality carried on the Khomeini legacy, while the traditional conservatives began to soften in many ways (Takeyh, 2009).
New conservatives disengaged from Iran’s political continuum, entering an idealized continuation of where Khomeini had left off. Although a slight increase in legal rights and loosened restrictions characterized the previous eight years prior to the new conservative regime, human rights violations escalated considerably during this period, including repressive measures against minority groups, political revivals, educational repression of students and faculty, and the brutal treatment of prison detainees (Ehsani, 2006).
Understandably, the education sector did not escape the extended influence of the new conservative administration. However, the new conservative regime approached education with strategies which were increasingly restrictive and which had the effect of further degrading quality in schools and universities (Farasatkhah et al., 2008). A number of issues stand out when looking at education during this epoch, including university faculty purges, curtailed academic freedom and development, a curriculum infused with flagrant intolerance and inflammatory content toward minority groups, and misuse of statistical information to overlook serious structural problems (Haghighatjoo, 2009; Elmi, 2009; Paivandi, 2008).
Some reports indicate improvements resulting from years of development in education, such as steadily rising enrolment rates, increased literacy, increased graduation rates, gender parity, a rise in the number of advanced and professional degrees granted, and expansion and further development of educational facilities (World Bank, 2008; Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, Iranian Census, 1986–2006). Nevertheless, problems such as classroom overcrowding, mistreatment of minorities in schools, degraded quality of education, lack of access to universities, credentialism, and inadequate training at higher education levels persisted (Paivandi, 2008; Salehi-Isfahani, 2009a; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007; Shavarini, 2006). Curricula remained biased against minorities. As Paivandi (2008) asserts, “Discrimination and intolerance are neither accidental nor sporadic. They are consistent and systematic throughout the textbook at the core of the curriculum in Iranian schools” (p. 4).
Youth who seek higher education upon graduating are faced with new challenges outside curricular and instructional prejudices—namely access and equity issues, as well as problems with quality accountability. During this period, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution executed a series of policies[14] that would purge those perceived as ideologically incompatible with the regime agenda, and placed in their stead like-minded supporters (Haghighatjoo, 2009; Rasoulpour, 2007; Sanati, 2006).[15]
Summary of the Islamic Republic of Iran As Abrahamian (2008) recollects, most observers, journalists, and politicians, would have bet against the sustainability of a theocratic state run by a cadre of clerical radicals. Yet, 30 years later, after several economic, political, and social upheavals, the Republic remains. Dependence on social welfare has permeated popular life, especially among the poor and rural populations, and has enabled the power structure to remain in place. The regime increased its governing capacity with the strengthening and centralization of its state institutions. The clerical elite, holding ultimate power, effectively dominated nongovernmental agencies, institutions, and resources—even if it had a detrimental effect on economic development. Although the Constitution of the Islamic Republic contains an element of selective democracy, power, in reality, is wielded at the discretion of one leading figure and several like-minded senior clerics (Carothers, 2002). Thus, as shown by others, the Islamic Republic is not a dictatorship, but rather an autocracy made up of a fragmented elite (Kamrava & Hassan-Yari, 2004; Keshavarzian, 2005).
The Islamic Republic has a novel and sophisticated governmental structure with both elected and appointed officials, both subject to approval by others. Yet, upon closer examination, the structure is ultimately set up to secure and perpetuate the systemic power of a few who share a similar orientation. Considering this nuanced governmental form, Figure 7 shows a modified version of Tilly’s (2006b) governmental capacity grid reflecting the shifts made by the elected executive branch (e.g., President, Cabinet, and Majles) and the ecclesiastical branch (e.g., the Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts, and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution).
0
DEMOCRATIC FORM
1
0
1
1997a
1979a
1979–1989
First Epoch: Khomeinism
1989–1997
Reconstruction / Pragmatism
1997–2004
Reformist Era
2004–2009
New Conservatism
EPOCHS OF CAPACITY/DEMOCRACY SHIFTS
1989ab
2004a
2009ab
2004b
1979b
1997b
Elected Executive Branch (B)
Ecclesiastical Branch (A)
Figure 7. Regime space under Islamic Republic (1979–2009).
Conclusion The study of any group and its efforts to make claims, mobilize, and take collective action in the public arena will implicitly or explicitly interact with regimes in one way or another. The study of the form, capacity, and ideological orientation of a government provides the context in which groups in a given territory select strategies which either respond to, or cause a response from, the government. In the case of two distinct Iranian governments over time, one a secular monarchy and the other a theocratic republic, I have examined the shifts, however slight, in form, capacity, and ideological orientation. Moreover, I have focused on the educational landscape during selected epochs in order to lay the foundation for the following chapters which deal directly with three minority groups during each period. Part of the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze to what extent and how regime-group relations have a bearing on the educational strategy selected by each of the case studies.
In the final analysis, regimes matter. Whether in dictatorships, democracies, or autocracies, regimes play a critical role in the interaction of people’s and group’s interests. The Iranian state, under the Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic, made decisions that were intended to secure its own longevity and prescribe that which would mold the country into what it envisioned would serve its interests. Thus, the question before us is: how did groups manage to meet their needs despite these fluxes in these regime situations? How did groups—which the regime facilitated, tolerated, or repressed—respond under these various governments? In Chapter 5, I will examine the three groups and their group composition, their networks, and their relations with each of these governments in both periods.
[1] I define the parameters of the state with reference to those collective institutions operated by the government of a sovereign territory, such as the legislative, judicial, and executive bodies responsible for managing public affairs. However, I also use the term state to describe public institutions within a sovereign territory that are controlled by the government, such as schools, trade unions, select religious institutions, and the media.
[2] For example, between 1921 and 1941, expenditure on education increased 12-fold (Messkoub, 2006; see Table B1), and the number of students in public elementary and secondary schools increased from 44,819 in 1922–1923 to 314,173 in 1940–1941 (Menashri, 1992, p. 121).
[3] The number of participants doubled within five years creating a cadre of new intellectuals, as illustrated by the enrolment of 1,043 students in 1934–1935, a figure which increased to 2,113 in 1939–40 (Menashri, 1992).
[4] A corps of approximately 200,000 participants enlisted, reaching 2.2 million children and another million adults. As a note of interest, the first UNESCO World Congress on the Eradication of Illiteracy was hosted in Tehran in 1965, at which the Shah pledged US$700,000 to UNESCO for the purpose of eradicating illiteracy (Sabahi, 2001).
[5] For example, in 1941–1942, only 286,598 children were enrolled in elementary schools, but by 1977–1978, a total of 5,200,000 children were enrolled (Menashri, 1992, p. 186); similarly in 1941–1942, only 315,355 children were enrolled in elementary and secondary school, compared to 7,701,000 in 1977–1978 (Menashri, 1992, p. 191).
[6] For example, by the mid-1960s, literacy rates for women were at 17 percent (half of that of men), and only 15 percent of the rural population was literate, compared to 50 percent literacy among urban dwellers. By the mid-1970s, as a result of efforts made by the Literacy Corps, some improvement was seen, with 31 percent literacy among male rural dwellers and 7 percent among female rural dwellers. (Messkoub, 2006, p. 234).
[7] For theocratic and legal basis of violence see ideas associated with mufsid fil-ard (corruptors on earth) in Esposito (2003), Milani (2000), and Khalkhali (2001).
[8] Libraries were purged of books that were deemed un- or anti-Islamic. For example, one account reports that five tons of books of a major university were auctioned for “pulping” in 1985–1986 (Matini, 1989).
[9] See Appendix B for all tables in this chapter.
[10] In 1991–1992, only a few years after Khamenei and Rafsanjani took over the reins of the regime, only 10 percent of candidates (831,152) were accepted. A decade later, the rate of admission in proportion to applicants remained relatively unchanged (10.7 percent, or 1,593,489) (Sakurai, 2004).
[11] For further reading on the topic of educational equity in higher education, admissions, policies, educational quality, and the paucity of resources see Bazargan (1999); Farasatkhah, Ghazi, & Bazargan (2008); Habibi (1989); Hamdhaidari (2008); Mossayeb and Shirazi (2006); Sakurai (2004); Tavakol (2007); and Torbat (2002).
[12] See addresses by Khatami mentioned in IRNA (2001a, 28 February) and Rafsanjani in IRNA (2001b, 28 February).
[13] The rise in violence, censorship, and other repressive acts during Khatami’s era was primarily spearheaded by the new conservatives—acts including the closure of newspapers, violent attacks against progressive clerics, and heightened persecution of religious minorities.
[14] See a list of the Resolutions passed by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (Islamic Republic of Iran, Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, n.d.).
[15] In October 2008, 109 Iranian university professors wrote an open letter to Ahmadinejad (Gozaar, 2008) decrying the state policies being implemented in universities. The letter focused on three central issues: (a) weakening of the structural and planning foundations of scientific development; (b) complete transformation of both the culture and functions of the university; and (c) the decrease in participation of faculty and students.