Educational Strategy Selection of Religious Minorities in Modern Iran: The Case of the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i Communities

Sina Mossayeb

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ABSTRACT

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Sina Mossayeb

Based on the concept of education as a universal right, this dissertation analyzes the impact of government repression on the access to and quality of educational opportunities of minority groups, and the strategies used by marginalized and discriminated groups in response to educational inequity under authoritarian regimes. Do minority groups accept, tolerate, resist, or reject the limitations imposed on them? Do they establish their own institutions and services, or leave the country in pursuit of educational opportunity? This dissertation describes and illustrates the situation of three groups: Jews, Christians, and Baha’is, living in modern Iran. I argue that group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations significantly shape the strategies developed, selected, and deployed by minority groups in meeting educational needs. Relational dynamics between the groups (and their internal communities) and the regime, and other transnational actors are critical motivating factors in the pursuit of educational opportunities. I draw on historical analysis and the mechanism-process approach to identify educational strategies and explain how they are selected, and argue that group features both affect educational strategy selection, and are affected by previous strategies. The relational dynamics of interactions, conditions, processes, and outcomes are considered as causal factors in educational strategy selection.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

As governments over the last century have successively become the main providers of modern schooling, a large body of literature has developed based on theories which suggest that governments (or their regimes) implicitly or explicitly use the educational system as a vehicle for cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1971), an ideological apparatus of the state for controlling populations (Althusser, 1971), or as a field that privileges dominant cultures and groups over others (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). Several studies about Iran’s educational system during both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic era reinforce these critical and conflict theories (Habibi, 1989, Kashani-Sabet, 1999; Mehran, 1989; Menashri, 1992; Sakurai, 2004; Torbat, 2002). Notwithstanding the burden of educational repression, what can be said about the ways in which groups facing authoritarianism meet their educational needs?

When people feel they have a right to education, but authorities restrict their access to it or compromise its quality, what do people do about it? Do they accept, tolerate, resist, or reject these impositions? Do they establish their own institutions and services, or leave the country in pursuit of educational opportunity elsewhere? In other words, what is their educational strategy?

Research Problem and Question

Surprisingly, we know little about how minority groups in repressive settings react to, cope with, and counter purposeful policies and practices that diminish some level of educational quality or access. For example, we do not know if the brand of authoritarianism makes a difference on the kinds of strategies subjected groups select to
seek educational opportunities. Neither do we know much about how or whether the composition and characteristics of a group, its networks, or its relations with the state affect the strategies selected to offset educational repression.

While there is ample literature on mobilization and popular movements around education in democracies or relatively open societies (for example: Berkman & Plutzer, 2005; Kahlenberg, 2001; Shirley, 1997; Stone, 2001), there is a dearth of research about cases in autocratic states. The bulk of literature on minority education movements in repressive settings primarily addresses individual-based initiatives rather than community mobilization. I have yet to find any substantial study which systematically explains the reasons for educational strategy selection by discriminated minority communities in repressive settings: the ways and to what extent these groups mobilize, make claims to education rights, and collectively act to meet educational needs. Moreover, existing studies do not discuss the dynamic interaction between the state and the group, and how strategies and counter-strategies play out. For this reason, drawing on the case of religious minorities in modern Iran, I directly address the following questions:

*To what extent and how did the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities in Iran select different strategies to meet educational needs under the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes? To what extent and how does a group’s composition and characteristics, networks, and relation to the regime affect their educational strategy selection?*

This dissertation provides, for the first time, a monographic study on educational strategies of religious minorities in modern Iran. In order to better understand how groups meet educational needs, I argue that three aspects of educational strategy must be
described and explained: (a) conditions for strategy adoption, (b) processes of strategy adoption and implementation, and (c) outcomes of the strategies. In this dissertation, I argue that conditions, processes, and desired outcomes constitute the driving force for educational strategy selection, which are, in turn, shaped by them.

I propose that three features: group characteristics and composition, networks, and regime-group relations have a bearing on the strategies selected by these minority groups, and examine the extent to which they influenced those strategies. Through this study I found that these three features take shape from the relational dynamics of a given group’s interactions within its own community, with outside community members, with regimes, and with other actors.

The comparison of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is in Iran was chosen for two reasons. First, they are categorically similar and thus suitable for comparison. Second, their group features differed enough to trace the effects of variations on educational strategy selection over a long period of time—distinguishable by three important elements: (a) the group’s composition and characteristics; (b) the group’s networks; and (c) the group’s relationship with the regime in power. I propose that variations existing in the combination of these three factors bear on educational strategies (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1](image)

*Figure 1*. Three group elements influencing group educational strategies.
However two other elements are important in this analysis: case objects and sites. After all, religious minorities and their strategies do not actualize in a vacuum, but rather both are invariably shaped by interactions with other actors. To this end I include analysis of two different Iranian regimes—the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes—spanning 85 years of history. I agree with Charles Tilly (2005), who suggests that “every significant political phenomenon lives in history, and requires historically grounded analysis for its explanation” (p. 20). Situating these groups and their educational strategies in historical contexts is critical for explaining how changes in a group’s features affected their development, selection, and deployment. The cross-regime analysis in this dissertation contextualizes educational strategy selection by looking at how a group responds to regime changes and actions. Furthermore, it explains the extent to which regime-group relations shape the conditions, processes, and outcomes of the educational strategies selected by each group.

I suggest that the chronological multi-case study is an optimal research strategy to examine parallel case subjects as they developed over the two different regimes, providing more substantial leverage to identify recurring causal elements. Looking at how three different, but categorically similar, groups select educational strategies under a secular and theocratic regime is useful for several reasons. This configuration allows us to look at a single group in different settings to observe how strategies shape and shift based on internal group changes (individual factors), intra-regime and regime changes (domestic factors), and changes in relations in the international sphere. This pattern of
illustration is optimal for a comparative study that produces substantial information for analyzing variations and similarities in strategy selection processes.

**Theoretical Approach**

The questions posed above are important, but remain challenging because they cross three different fields of academic inquiry: (a) educational inequity, (b) social movements and contentious politics, and (c) international relations subjects of internationalization and transnationalism. Each field provides a unique and complementary contribution to addressing this problem. In the Literature Review I examine a range of literature in these three fields, to gain the theoretical grounding for approaching the study of minority group educational strategy selection and deployment in authoritarian settings.

Literature from conflict and critical theories of education provides interpretations of government educational policies deliberately imposed on religious minority groups as an initiative to meet the regime’s agenda. For example, in the early stages of state building, both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic targeted educational content and schools for ideological reorientation of society in order to align them with regime agendas. In later periods, schooling was used to maintain stability and continue the socialization of an envisioned ideal citizen. The literature on social movements and contentious politics not only informs the study of social and political processes relating to educational opportunities and obstacles, but provides the analytical framework to identify mechanisms and processes explaining how groups mobilized and collectively acted to meet their needs. This body of literature also provides a basis for understanding how the
two regimes interact with the groups through facilitation, toleration, and repression. Finally, the literature on international relations, globalization, internationalization, and transnationalism sheds light on the dynamics involved in network connections and how global and transnational processes affected local processes shaping the various groups’ educational strategy selection, as well as state-state relation impact on regime-group relations and other features.

Methodological Approach

To explain how Jews, Christians, and Baha’is met their educational needs in authoritarian settings, I use a multi-case study design and employed two major and interrelated methods of analysis: first, historical analysis to identify developments affecting regimes and groups and their features, and describe their educational opportunities, challenges, and strategies. In order to address tangential issues related to educational strategies, I relied on some analytical tools and concepts, specifically those related to regime capacity and form (Chapter 4), and group networks (Chapter 5). Second, to explain how those educational strategies were developed and selected (Chapter 6), I used the contentious politics’ mechanism-process approach to divide long streams of history dealing with a particular phenomenon (in this case education) into smaller episodes. In some cases episodes were difficult to identify, so I retained focus on chunks of thematic streams. Within these streams and episodes of interaction among groups, governments, and other actors, I looked for processes and mechanisms that shaped the specific interactions and ultimately educational strategies.

Information on religious minorities in modern Iran is fragmented, in multiple languages, and generally scarce. Secondary analysis is no exception. For example, there
is only one published monograph about multiple religious minorities in modern Iran (Eliz Sanasarian, *Religious Minorities of Iran*, 2000). To offset the dearth of sources, threats to validity, and other limitations, I employed triangulation of sources and collection instruments, and included archival sources, interviews, and applied secondary analysis.

A significant part of the data collection and organization included assessing the reliability of and bias in various sources. While there are various isolated sources on Jews, Christians, and Baha’is during the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods, their number is modest and of noticeably varying quality. It is not uncommon to find disparate accounts of historical and relational phenomenon due to author bias. More specific to the study of education and religious minorities, there are several important primary archival sources available, to which I refer in the methods section (Chapter 3). These were useful in informing historical developments, but also shed light on the nuances in relationships between actors and the orientation of religious minority groups. Included in a fragmentary body of secondary sources on individual religious minorities, was a small number of extremely useful articles and books which provided valuable insights into actors, events, and the educational pursuits of one or another of the minority groups under study. In retrieving histories, I relied heavily on some of these in order to analyze and interpret my findings, using my proposed theoretical propositions and analytical framework.

**Analysis**

In Chapter 4, I examine the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes in some detail, and discuss governmental form, capacity, and ideological orientation, all of which are highly significant in assessing regime-group relations and their educational agendas. To
analyze changes in regime policies and practices, both regime periods are divided into
epochs according to noticeable political shifts and variations in political orientation of
those running the government. I draw on Tilly’s (2006b) work on governmental capacity
and form to identify the characteristics that shaped much of the regime’s decisions. Both
regimes were high capacity nondemocratic, as determined by applying the rubric
developed by Tilly (2006b). I argue that the ideological orientation of the regime
leadership was equally important in determining government actions toward other states
and the country’s population. I include this factor in assessing government behaviour
toward specific groups and education in general. The Pahlavi regime was explicitly
secular and modernist in its orientation, while the Islamic Republic has continued to be
theocratic. Both regimes used education as a means to push self-interested agendas, often
at the expense of significant segments of the population. While the Pahlavi and the
Islamic Republic regimes set out to provide services to meet the needs of the population,
both were driven by regime priorities. This led to tension manifested as facilitation and
tolerance of some group actions, and repression of other group actions. Although
outwardly similar, as Tilly’s (1979) general typology accurately describes, the Pahlavi
dynasty typically reflected characteristics of a totalitarian government and the Islamic
Republic continues rely on measures characteristic of a repressive government. In review,
it becomes evident that facilitative, tolerant, and repressive interactions were in
simultaneously in motion, but the extent to and manner in which each was employed
varied according to the regime’s acceptability of actions and actors.

In Chapter 5, I define the composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-
group relations of each of the three minority groups, which I argue have significant
causal impact on educational strategy selection. After providing definitions for each, I contextualize the case subjects in light of these three features and their sub-categories to identify assessable changes in each, and their subsequent affect on the selection of educational strategies. By presenting each group within the framework of composition and characteristics, network ties, and regime-group relations, I move beyond a static analysis of groups as monolithic and unchanging, and treated them as active and complex bodies, whose own features are shaped by the cycle of interactions springing from ongoing changes in community features, and focusing attention on the agency of actors in both open and restricted circumstances. Moreover, I argue that changes in any one feature had a bearing on the others. Since this is the first study which categorizes group features using a combination of such propositions, I believe it will be useful for analyzing other settings and groups and identifying their selection of educational strategies. While statistical generalizations cannot be made from this study, analytical generalizations may be applicable elsewhere. By the end of Chapter 5, I systematically categorize groups within these features, which presents an abundant empirical base for analysis.

In Chapter 6 these classifications are essential for interpreting the social processes related to educational strategies. For in this chapter, I focus on explaining the chronological development and selection of educational strategies by each group over the two regime periods. I simultaneously engage in historical interpretation and the mechanism-process approach in analyzing different identified streams and episodes. The range and depth of information for each group and period varies because of the availability of sources. I use different scales of observation when looking for processes and mechanisms, as well as for the identified episodes and streams. The educational
landscape for each group is analyzed historically, with actions and events categorized according to their educational strategies.

I then identify streams and episodes, which are examined for mechanisms and processes that took the shape of educational strategies. As defined by Tilly and Tarrow (2007), “episodes are bounded sequences of continuous interaction, usually produced by an investigator’s chopping up longer streams of contention into segments for purposes of systematic observation, comparison, and explanation” (p. 36). I refer to streams as interactions over longer periods of time, dictated by policies and ongoing practices. Episodes occur within streams, denoting (a) when the regime responds to a particular group claim or action, (b) when a group responds to a regime policy or decision by taking specific action, or c) when either group or regime takes initial action that makes a claim affecting the other’s claims. I argue that by identifying recurring mechanisms and processes which combined to shape broad strategies, variations and similarities in group strategies become readily explainable. The strategies that I identified are not exhaustive but recur for Iranian Jews, Christians, and Baha’is during the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods. Sometimes strategies were processes, and tactics mechanisms, at other times strategies never materialized or failed to find fruition.

Throughout my analysis, I critically examine the role of group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations in influencing the various combinations of mechanisms and processes involved in educational strategies. I argue that these three features work within the relational dynamics of political opportunity structure, resources available to groups, and framing processes. In the context of educational strategies, I model this intricate dynamic of the former and latter sets as the
education opportunity dynamic. The benefit of having conducted a historical case study confirmed what I had presupposed to be a pervasive phenomenon: namely, that the proposed three group features influenced educational strategy selection. It was evident, after historical interpretation using the mechanism-process analyses, that selected strategies themselves cause, in turn, shifts in group features. I refer to this as a bi-cycle effect, in which shifts in either strategies or features, not only change internal elements within each, but also have significantly bearing on each other. In other words, conditions, processes, and outcomes are all causal factors in strategy selection.

The mechanism-process approach which was applied to each case over a long period of time reveals several important and sometimes counterintuitive findings about how strategies are selected, how they change group features, and how they, in turn, determine subsequent strategies. For example, while institutionalization of groups may have provided opportunities for specific strategies, the restrictions inherent in incorporation into the state curtailed other strategies. The strength and reliance on international network ties was heavily dependent on a group’s relation with the regime, but within context of the regime’s relation with the states wherein those ties existed.

While strategies resemble one another in most cases, the processes that went into the specific manifestation of their deployment often vary. Most groups relied on past strategies, and augmented them to meet their educational needs. However, changes in group features led to emphasis on strategies that remained open and acceptable, based on the new configuration of community features. The selection of specific strategies not only influenced the choice of future ones, but sometimes limited strategies available to the community even if other strategies might have been preferred. Remarkably, some
educational strategies radically changed group features, which shaped new strategies in some situations and limited them in others.

In the final analysis this dissertation empirically, theoretically, and methodologically contributes to the field of comparative education, social movement and contentious politics studies, and international relations. It will be of interest to those looking at educational inequity and repression by its novel approach to group responses and methods of analyzing education strategies of minority groups. It will no doubt be a valuable consideration for social movement and contentious politics scholars who could benefit from focusing more attention on education and educational space as a terrain of contention. Finally, for international relations and human rights scholars it provides a unique but analytically generalizable study on how relational dynamics in transnational networks, state-state relations, and human rights norms influence specific communities and the governments with which they interact.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review traces paradigms within three different fields of study, each of which informs the theoretical foundations of the contentious politics of educational strategy selection: (a) education as a terrain of conflict; (b) movement theories and contentious politics; and (c) international relations theories of internationalization and transnationalization. This literature review is not a comprehensive overview of all three different fields of study. However, it does aim to capture those contributions that relate to the problem addressed in this dissertation. To this end, I critique some literature more than others, and emphasize concepts that inform my own theoretical framework.

Conflict Theories of Education

These prominent strands of conflict theory—reproduction and resistance sub-theories—are useful on multiple levels for contextualizing a discussion on the contentious politics of education. At the foundational level, conflict theories provide us with insights about the site of contention (i.e., schools) and the actors involved (i.e., individuals, groups, and both state and nonstate institutions that desire access to schools and the rights associated with education). At a more intermediate level, conflict theories give us an idea of what is at stake in terms of the claims in contention, such as the risks associated with gains and losses in needs, development, solidarity, and agenda fulfillment. Finally, at a more advanced level, conflict theories illuminate domestic, international, and supranational relationships that have an impact on the foundational and intermediate level issues addressed above.
Reproduction Theories

Classic conflict theory explains power relations exclusively in terms of the relation of people to the mode of production. Subsequently, two predominant “classes” emerge in capitalist societies: those who own the means of production, and those who produce goods and services but do not have ownership of the means (i.e., the “haves” and the “have-nots”; Kolakowski & Falla, 2005). Those controlling the means of production set out to subordinate workers through both coercive and noncoercive means. Thus, classical reproduction theorists contend that within any given society, an elite few control all aspects of the superstructure, insofar as it serves their own interests and maintains the status quo of existing economic relationships (Kolakowski & Falla, 2005). This includes educational institutions. However, by the 1930s, many Marxists saw problems with the classical model and could not explain why working class people in industrialized countries did not rise in revolt (Gramsci, 1971). These scholars began to develop more sophisticated theories of reproduction to reconcile failures in the classical model of Marxism. Two different categories capture the various developments made in reproduction theory in this era: (a) hegemonic-state reproduction and (b) cultural reproduction—both of which have elements of economic reproduction.

Hegemony and ideological state apparatus. Antonio Gramsci argued that in addition to using coercive means of repression, the state controls the ideological milieu of a society by maintaining cultural or ideological hegemony over the population (Gramsci, 1971). About Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Burke (2005) writes:

By hegemony, Gramsci meant the permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations. Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an “organising principle” that is diffused by the process of socialisation into every
area of daily life. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalised by the population it becomes part of what is generally called “common sense” so that the philosophy, culture and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things. (para. 9)

According to Gramsci (1971), the state uses various strategies and institutions to maintain control, and the education system is one key example. In schools, the teaching of values, ideas, and identities, Gramsci argues, were used to serve the interests of those in power to the detriment of the lower classes. Moreover, from his perspective schooling was both a coercive and noncoercive arm of the state in maintaining ideological hegemony, since the treatment of children in schools could include violent or threatening measures of control as well as the more subtle variety.

Gramsci (1971) also asserts that breaking away from state hegemonic control is a challenge because the socialized masses are not aware of the need to change the status quo. Based on the premise that states control educational institutions, Gramsci asserts that if schools are left unchecked, they will continue to reproduce the ideology that serves to legitimate the dominant class and ensure the ideological hegemony of the elite.

On an international scale, theories of dependency maintain that core states hold developing states in a perpetual condition of underdevelopment, while serving the economic interests of the developed countries (Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 1974). Educational theorists have drawn on dependency theories and Gramsci’s (1971) ideas about hegemony to analyze power in institutions of higher education, referring to the intellectual and academic dependency of the nations of the developing world on core countries of the West (Alatas, 2003; Altbach, 1977).

Drawing from Gramsci’s early work, Althusser (1971) argues that powerful regimes adopt noncoercive means of repression to maintain control over their populations
in addition to the more costly coercive means, because it is impractical to constantly maintain a state of open repression. To this end, the state employs formal and informal institutions that range from religious organizations to the media to, most importantly, educational systems (Althusser, 1971). These ideological state apparatuses, as Althusser calls them, indoctrinate the masses into accepting circumstances that they might otherwise have been inclined to resist (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004). Through this process, the ruling-elite maintains control over the working-class, ultimately reproducing the unequal relationships of power with the tacit acceptance of the majority of the population.

**Cultural reproduction: Symbolic violence, cultural capital, and social capital.**

By the 1980s, many conflict theories were expanding theories of reproduction to include the struggle for power equity of noneconomic groups such as ethnic minorities and women (Peet, 1999; Pincus, 2002). These later cultural reproduction theorists do not undervalue the importance of class but contend that all struggles are multifaceted. Cultural reproduction theorists argue that schools favor the dominant culture, leaving minority cultures at a disadvantage (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004).

Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), pioneers of cultural reproduction theory, have argued that certain elements are always at play, which sustain the dominant culture through institutions such as communications, the media, and schools. They call this symbolic violence because it does not manifest itself in physical form, but nonetheless has a detrimental impact on the subordinate class. This process can be extremely alienating to society’s subordinate groups. For example, school exams that are ostensibly unbiased inherently favor the culture and ideology of the dominant group, marginalizing others
because of the linguistic, cultural, and social privileges that draw on the dominant cultural standard (Dika & Singh, 2002; Sissoko & Shiau, 2005).

Similarly, some scholars discuss how schools, and the curriculum in particular, legitimize the history, culture, and identity of the dominant group, leaving little room for any alternative stories (Apple, 1993). When minority groups do not see themselves represented in this tapestry of culture, they are disinclined to engage with the material, while the privileged students excel and thereby reproduce unequal relations of power and domination (Li, Savage, & Pickles, 2003). According to cultural reproduction theorists, the place of contestation, or the field of competition, always favors the dominant class, while the subordinate group has no choice but to adopt and acquire the know-how of the dominant culture in order to engage in the struggle for power (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Lareau & Weininger, 2003).

**Resistance Theories**

Building upon reproduction theories, the resistance theories that have been emerging since the 1980s place a new emphasis on the role of human agency in struggles of inequality and repression. Resistance theorists of the conflict paradigm reject the idea of the inability of students to fend off the hegemonic messages of the school (Peet, 1999). While these theorists do not deny that educational institutions favor the dominant culture, they insist that students have the ability to recognize falsehood or discrimination. Some scholars argue that students who feel alienated by the culture of the classroom will choose to tune out (Shor, 1992), while others point to the way students will reject textbook content that does not resonate with their own lived experiences (Apple, 1993).
Freire (1970) and other critical pedagogy scholars suggest that by empowering students to frame problems with their own understanding of the world, they will learn using their own ideas rather than those of the elite. In other words, agency is in the hands of the individual and not the dominant power. While there is no naïve dismissal of the role of the dominant group in maintaining power and hegemonic control over schools, resistance theorists simply contend that every educational institution is a contested arena.

**Summary**

The strength of conflict theories rests in their critical perspective on schooling. Particularly important to this area of inquiry is the issue of why and how the state uses the educational system to repress certain groups while privileging others. In this dissertation, I implicitly draw on components of both reproduction and resistance theory as the backdrop for the educational landscape in Iran. The Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes used schools to serve national interests both economically and ideologically. Resistance theories lend insight into why individuals and groups perceive access to educational opportunities to be beneficial and continue to seek schooling despite repressive conditions. As Carnoy and Levin (1985) suggest, “education is an arena of conflict over the production of knowledge, ideology and employment, a place where social movements try to meet their needs and business attempts to reproduce its hegemony” (p. 50).

**Social Movement and Contentious Politics Literature**

The study of social movements is a precarious endeavor for many reasons. There are salient issues that arise when explaining how individuals make claims, mobilize, and take collective action toward a perceived transgression or unmet need. Some factors
bearing on the formation and maintenance of social movements include agreement on common grievances, available resources to respondents, opportunities and structures affecting mobilization efforts, how actors frame challenges and solutions when mobilizing and taking action, and what mechanisms and processes set the latter factors into motion (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007).

**Resource Mobilization Theory and Political Process Theories**

A group of scholars in the 1970s, drawing on rational choice theories with elements of neo-Marxism, began to question why some individuals experiencing grievance mobilize and participate in social movements, while others facing similar levels of grievances do not. For many discontented scholars in the 1970s, interests and grievances\(^1\) were insufficient to explain why and how people mobilized (Jenkins, 1983; McAdam, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly 1971). Instead, some scholars began to explain mobilization and social movements in terms of the resources and pre-existing structures available to individuals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). These perspectives came to be known as the theory of resource mobilization and political processes or opportunity structures. Some early developers of this approach to social movements include, among others, Oberschall (1973), McCarthy & Zald (1977), Gameson (1975), Tilly (1973, 1978), Tarrow (1983), McAdam (1982) and Jenkins (1981, 1983; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977). Thus two sub-theories paralleled one another, drawing from the Millian and neo-Marxist perspectives, respectively: (a) the economic or organizational perspective; and (b) the political processes perspective (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996).

\(^1\) The theory that people who feel they are deprived of something that others have (wealth, privilege, access, etc.) and who arise and collectively act to acquire it. For more on relative deprivation theory see Davis (1959), Gurr (1970), Runciman (1966); for criticism of the theory see Gurney and Tierney (1982); Jenkins (1983); McCarthy and Zald (1977); Oberschall (1973); Tilly (1971, 1978); Wood (1975).
Resource mobilization theory. In 1977, McCarthy and Zald formulated a resource mobilization theory to explain the emergence of social movements. They identify three key concepts: (a) the social movement organization; (b) the social movement industry; and (c) the social movement sector. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), social movements are “preference structures directed toward social change” (p. 1218). Furthermore, they suggest that pre-existing preference structures are more likely to organize and collectively act. In this study, I treat religious groups as pre-existing preference structures. They define a social movement organization (SMO) as a formal organization that identifies and seeks to achieve its objectives through a social movement. McCarthy and Zald suggest that more than one social movement organization can participate in a particular social movement. Social movement organizations working in a common social movement, addressing similar issues, constitute what McCarthy and Zald call a social movement industry (SMI). Finally, a social movement sector (SMS), as defined by McCarthy and Zald, includes all social movement industries in society. This larger, more liberal categorization accounts for social movement organizations which function in more than one social movement industry.

McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasize that resource mobilization is determined by “the interaction between resource availability, the pre-existing organization of preference structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demands” (p. 1236). In other words, social movements arise when there are resources available to actors and organizations, or more broadly in the SMS—so long as the imposition of repression by authority regimes does not impede mobilization.
Much of the criticism against organizational RM is based on McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) reduction of collective action to economic terms and rational choice. Their assessment leaves little room for values, ideology, and commitment (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996). By focusing on economic changes, McCarthy and Zald overlooked the importance of cultural and value shifts within society (Jenkins, 1983).

In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, in reaction to the criticisms leveled against resource mobilization, both McCarthy and Zald began to shift focus to the political process approach that had been developing throughout the 1970s, and which will be the subject of the next section (Tilly, 1973, 1978). In 2004, Edwards and McCarthy expanded resource mobilization to include five types of resources:

1. *Material*—money and physical capital—part of McCarthy and Zald’s original thesis
2. *Moral*—solidarity and support for the movement’s goals
3. *Social-organizational*—organizational strategies, social networks, and bloc recruitment
4. *Human*—volunteers, staff, and leaders
5. *Cultural*—prior activist experience, understanding of the issues, and collective action know-how

This enhanced version of resource mobilization still maintains the importance of material resources in mobilization and collective action, but draws significantly on political opportunity structures and includes ideological factors, such as constructivist use of frames as modes of altering perceived resources and opportunities (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).
Political processes and opportunity approach. Charles Tilly’s (1978) work on opportunity models addresses the preconditions for mobilization and collective action. Others have also significantly shared in the theory’s formulation over the years, such as Tarrow (1994), McAdam, (1982; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996), Jenkins and Perrow (1977), and Morris (2000). Most political process theorists emphasize the significance of opportunity structures that facilitate or impede the feasibility of social movements (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984; Tilly, 1978). Classic political process theorists argue that political opportunities must be available to people before they can mobilize. Therefore, it is argued that the step from mobilization to collective action does not result solely from deprivation or resource availability (Tilly, 1978).

Tilly’s (1978) work deals with the foundation of the political process approach. He identifies five components of collective action: (a) interest; (b) organization; (c) mobilization; (d) opportunity; and (e) collective action. However, he focuses mainly on organization, mobilization, and opportunity in understanding collective action. Tilly defines organization as the capacity of a group to act on its interests. Mobilization is defined as the process of securing necessary resources for a group to take action. Finally, opportunity has to do with the relationship between a group and the world in which it exists (i.e., limits to opportunity are directly related to the repression, facilitation and power of various groups). For Tilly, the intersection of at least two of the following three areas results in a movement: beliefs, populations, and/or actions.

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2 See Tarrow (1996) for a typology of opportunity structures.

3 Although other theories and empirical studies have been proposed in the 21st century using the political process approach, I focus on Tilly’s work because the theory nominally changed to include the development of framing analysis, which will be discussed below.
Tilly (1978) contends that collective action can be understood in terms of the interaction between shared interests—“advantages and disadvantages likely to result from interaction with other groups” (p. 84)—organization, and mobilization, in the context of the repression, power, and opportunity/threat of a group’s collective action. He also asserts that the ability to use opportunities to increase power or avoid repression has a significant bearing on the actuation of social movements, to the extent that the adherents are willing to expend effort and spend resources. This premise favors pre-existing groups and networks. He delineates four group strategies of collective action that are applicable to Iranian Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. First are the zealots, who place high value on a collective good; willing to incur net loss to gain it. Second are the misers, who value resources highly, and are unlikely to use them for the purposes of collective action. Third are the run-of-the-mill contenders, who seek limited selected goods, but have modest resources to acquire them, and who are not likely to take action if there is a perceived risk of net loss. Finally there are the opportunists, who seek to maximize net return without regard for the collective good acquired.

Three opportunity variables are considered in Tilly’s (1978) mobilization model: (a) repression/facilitation, (b) power, and (c) opportunity/threat. Authorities, that is, those who wield social control, have the capability to either repress (raise the cost) or facilitate (lower the cost) of collective action by a group. According to Tilly, an authority wishing to repress or facilitate another group’s action will either focus on the group’s mobilization, or focus directly on its collective action. Tilly posits that the “repressiveness of a government is never a simple matter of more or less. It is always selective, and always consists of some combination of repression, toleration, and
facilitation” (Tilly, 1978, p. 106). This point is important in understanding how groups respond with particular kinds of social movements in various milieus and under different types of regimes (repressive, tolerant, or facilitative). According to Tilly, while repression impedes and facilitation enables collective action, governments sometimes do not react, leading to toleration. Tilly (1978) goes on to explain, “Governments respond selectively to different sorts of groups, and different sorts of actions” (p. 106). Likewise he differentiates between the types of governments that respond to various levels of action and different types of groups as shown in Figure 2. The first two apply to Iranian regimes in modern Iran.

![Figure 2. Repressive patterns in different types of regimes (Tilly, 1978, p. 111).](image)

Although the political process approach has developed since Tilly’s (1973, 1978) early work, to include elements of the culturalist perspective (i.e., the framing process that is discussed below), it has received criticism.4 By the mid- to late 1990s, many

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4 Tilly’s argument that collective action decreases as repression increases does not adequately address the findings of other studies which demonstrate the positive impact of a government’s use of negative sanctions on collective action (see Khawaja, 1993; Loveman, 1998; Muller, 1980).
political process theorists (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996) were including the centrality of cultural dynamics in the emergence and development of social movements (Morris, 2000).

**Framing Process**

*Framing* accounts for the internal and qualitative underpinnings of mobilization and collective action. Prominent framing scholars (Benford & Snow 2000; Gameson, 1975; Morris, 2000) focus on ideology and cultural significance in the making of social movements. Framing is another tool for understanding different types of social movements and processes, how they are constructed, and how the infusion of meaning into action, symbols, and issues influence mobilization and collective action. Those using the framing concept take into consideration factors, such as political and cultural opportunities and audience effects (Benford & Snow, 2000).

In essence, framing adds the dimensions of culture, meaning, belief, and values to the analytical understanding of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). The term framing, as Benford and Snow explain, explicitly represented an active and process-oriented exercise with human agency at its core. It is an interpretive tool that places actions and events in the context of constructed meaning. In other words, as they explain, framing may be used to simplify or recast the happenings of the world with the intention of mobilizing potential supporters for a social movement. Thus, “collective action frames” are constructed interpretations of problems, solutions, and the motivations of people who mobilize and take action.

Benford and Snow (2000) outline three main tasks associated with collective action framing: (a) diagnostic framing; (b) prognostic framing; and (c) motivational
framing. They describe diagnostic framing as defining problems facing a group, such as injustice and its source. Benford and Snow define prognostic framing as the proposed solution to a problem (often limited to how framing is constructed). Finally, they explain motivational framing as a “call-to-arms” or launch of mobility to action.

Of particular importance to framers, Benford and Snow (2000) assert, is how the frame resonates with its target audience; thus, credibility is at the heart of the resonant factor, where higher resonance with the frame will lead to a more effective mobilizing potential. They acknowledge the impact of context on the framing process, as well as the influence of framing on creating context. They point out how the framing of political opportunities is a central component of collective action. They assert that SMOs or leaders frame political space in terms of opportunity versus constraints, sometimes creating a virtual space for collective action. Similarly, framing embellishes identities and ideology, positioning them in the midst of a range of collaborative and conflictive groups or contexts. Framing is a vital ingredient in the educational strategy selection of Iranian religious minority groups.

**Contentious Politics**

Several case studies illustrate the failure of employing only one model to adequately explain social movements.\(^5\) A number of social movement scholars have shifted focus from one theoretical perspective to a more holistic explanatory model

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\(^5\) For example, Meijer (2005) discusses Islamic social movements in the context of a combination of theories, explaining that one theory alone does not take fully into consideration other characteristics associated with the movements in Egypt. Khawaja (1993) argues that the Palestinian movement, embedded in an extremely repressive setting, is insufficiently addressed by classic theories, which generally suggest a negative relationship between repression and collective action. Similarly, Loveman (1998) compares the rise of social human rights movements in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina, at a time when political opportunity was very low, and the prospects of collective action entailed high risk.
(Cohen, 1985; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996; Tilly, 2004). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) develop an integrative model by focusing on the causal mechanisms and processes of various types of contention, such as social movements, ethnic movements, and revolutions. They call this the contentious politics approach (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001).

Drawing on the tools developed by different approaches over the years (resource mobilization, political processes and structures, framing, and repertoires of contention), McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) move past the older social movement agenda characterized by general approaches discussed above, asserting that these analyses were static. Instead, they look to similar causal mechanisms that span various forms of contention and result in different consequences in diverse historical settings, emerging from dynamic processes of interaction. By looking at the causal mechanisms and processes, the authors contend that observers can learn more from considering all forms of connection by comparing their dynamic, rather than looking at specialized forms in isolation. While contentious politics may be interpreted in a variety of ways, the authors narrow their focus, stating: “The contentious politics that concerns us is episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of claims and others, is recognized by those others as bearing on their interests, and brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 5).

McAdam et al. (2001) criticize the narrow focus and increasing divisions that have come out of the general study of social movements because these scholars fail to look at related topics despite striking similarities in dynamics. For this reason, the authors’ main objective is to look for similar causal mechanisms and processes that occur
in a broad spectrum of struggles. To this end, the authors develop analytical lenses and tools to examine a series of cases.

The first set of lenses identified by McAdam et al. (2001) is the distinction between “contained” and “transgressive” contention. Contained contention involves pre-established actors and institutions practicing claim-making through established means. Those involved are considered constituted political actors using conventional means of claim-making. According to McAdam et al. (2001), transgressive contention involves claim-making by a newly self-identified political actor or when one party employs innovative collective action that may be unprecedented or forbidden within the regime. McAdam et al. (2001) proceed to describe three key features of the study of contentious politics: (a) mechanisms, (b) processes, and (c) episodes. By looking at parallels in various forms of contentious politics, the authors assert, they search for explanatory mechanisms that drive contention in different directions. They define the terms as follows (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 24):

1. **Mechanisms**—a delimited class of events which alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations

2. **Processes**—regular sequences of such mechanisms that process similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements

3. **Episodes**—segments of continuous streams of contention including collective claim-making that bears on other parties’ interests
According to the authors, mechanisms are noticeable when their elements interact, connecting them with one another. Because mechanisms seldom occur in a vacuum, but are rather linked with other mechanisms, the authors point to processes, which are “recurring causal chains, sequences, and combinations of mechanisms” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 27). The authors summarize: “we employ mechanisms and processes as our workhorses of explanation, and episodes as our workhorses of description” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 30). I have adopted this as the analytical framework and discuss its application to this study in the methods section (Chapter 3) and more specifically to educational strategy selection (Chapter 6).

McAdam et al. (2001) suggest focusing on social interaction and therefore look for two features in all contention: (a) recurring mechanisms and processes and (b) principles of variation. They propose a dynamic model that looks at mobilization structures, political processes, frames, and different forms of transgressive action as relational to one another with interactive actors. In this dissertation, the proposed features of group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations emerge from social interactions and illustrate principles of variation.

Tilly and Tarrow (2007) explain that contention involves the actuation of a claim bearing on someone else’s interests. Thus, three components arise in any contentious exchange: subjects, objects, and claims. Collective action plays out as the coordinated

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6 The three elements addressed by McAdam et al. (2001) include environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms. Environmental mechanisms refer to exogenous influences on conditions affecting social life, such as resource accessibility. Cognitive mechanisms consist of changes in individual and collective perceptions—e.g., when a group of people become aware of the risks in taking collective action, but do not opt out because of emotional ties to those involved. Relational mechanisms have to do with changes in the connections in networks of people and groups—e.g., brokerage between previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates relations between two actors and sites.
efforts of some on behalf of “shared interests or programs” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 5). The importance of politics in contention, as briefly dealt with earlier by McAdam et al. (2001), is supported by three overarching issues: (a) people in control of government have advantages over people who are not in control of government; (b) governments always set the rules of contention (i.e., what is allowed, tolerated, or forbidden); and (c) governments control coercive apparatuses and institutions (e.g., armies, police, prisons). These three issues come together to form the basis for contentious politics.

Claim-making and collective action around claims takes on different forms and manifests itself through what the authors call different “contentious performances.” Contentious performances are “relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actors” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 11). Contentious performances aggregate into contentious repertoires, representing an array of performances used by political actors in making claims and taking collective action.

Tilly and Tarrow (2007) offer three general reasons why the mechanism-process approach helps us understand mobilization. First, reducing the process of mobilization to its mechanisms and analyzing what particular mechanisms contribute toward the success or failure of mobilization gives us a more precise picture of specific mobilization efforts. Second, by comparing similar mechanisms across different types of contention (e.g., social movement versus civil war), the identification of key mechanisms in the transition from one type of contention to another is more evident. Finally, by examining the coexistence of two or more mechanisms, the environmental factors can be studied in order to determine what circumstances contribute to larger and less noticeable processes.
Building on Tilly’s earlier works, *Durable Inequality* (1998a), and *Regimes and Repertoires* (2006b), Tilly and Tarrow (2007) continue to argue that regimes matter in determining types of contention, and subsequently types of performances that political actors will choose in making claims. The authors employ two categories to label different regimes across the world: democracy and capacity, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4.

According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), political opportunity structures are affected by regimes based on the fragmentation or concentration of its power, the extent of a regime’s openness to new actors, availability of allies and supporters for challengers, as well as the extent to which the regime represses, tolerates, or facilitates collective claim-making. The primary vehicle by which a regime controls the political opportunity structure is through institutions. They describe how states control institutional operations by prescribing some institutions (e.g., requiring membership in a political party), tolerating others (e.g., allowing different religious groups to congregate insofar as it is done in private space), and forbidding still others (e.g., banning private militias). Tilly and Tarrow emphatically state that in any type of regime, limits on acceptable forms of claim-making are always set by the state. However, the authors claim that social movements are more likely to arise in the political opportunity structure of democracies—because they are either facilitated or tolerated—whereas in undemocratic settings, they will usually either die out or morph into other forms of contention.

The premise of the contentious politics approach is that social contention, by its very nature, is interactive, involving different political actors. Political actors emerge, the authors explain, when a recognizable set of people make collective claims and identify
themselves as a group of claimants. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) suggest that an important mechanism in solidifying political actors as a collective entity is through certification by a recognized external authority that supports their existence and claims. Such certification is more effective if international visibility and heft is associated with those certifying, especially if they signal readiness to support the actors’ claims. An antithetical response, decertification, would have a similar, but reverse, effect, opening the way for repression. As Tilly and Tarrow argue, a regime will counter such claims (e.g., to rights) by purposefully not recognizing the group as identifiable. This is especially relevant to the case of recognized vs. unrecognized religious minorities in Iran.

Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue that boundary formation most often happens outside of contention. However, they also state that those boundaries are amplified in the processes of contention. Identity becomes important here in infusing meaning into such boundaries, providing a shared understanding of “who are we?”, “what do we stand for?” and “what is our relationship to each other and to them?” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, pp. 81–82)

The authors also discuss how demobilization takes place, including the processes and mechanisms found in many different cases. By looking at demobilization, the authors want to know why groups which were making claims at one point stop doing so at a later point. To address several key inquiries, they first look at processes leading to the demobilization of prostitute protesters in Lyons who demanded workers’ rights. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) identified five general processes for their demobilization: (a) **competition** among different sources of support; (b) **defection** of leaders who left the trade after having gained experience and the skills needed for other work opportunities; (c)
disillusionment after bitter experience with collective action; (d) repression encountered by police who raided their protests; and (e) institutionalization into the state system when magistrates reframed their situation as exploited workers. These five processes are found in most cases of demobilization. Tilly and Tarrow argue that another reason for demobilization is disunity of purpose, vision, and adopted tactics. In particular, two routes are taken that end in demobilization:

- **Institutionalization**—the substitution of the routines of organized politics for the disorder of life in the streets, buttressed by mass organization and purposive incentives
- **Escalation**—the substitution of more extreme goals and robust tactics for more moderate ones, in order to maintain the interest of their supporters and attract new ones (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 101)

As the authors explain, the selection of either of these routes by different movement members leads to a polarization of those unsatisfied by routines (seeking escalation) and those avoiding risk and danger (seeking institutionalization). These processes are explained here to explain the cases of educational strategy selection by religious minorities in Chapter 6.

A key feature of social movements is social networks (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). The network of social movement bases often make social movement campaigns possible, In other words, groups that ally themselves with other groups are part of the diffusion and brokerage of different performances, increasing the sustainability of movements.

Institutions are also an important element in the formation of social movements. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), social movement bases can form within and
outside of institutions, but more importantly, movements also act within, against, and
outside of them. Movements can give rise to new institutions, but institutions can also co-
opt movements, leading to demobilization. Political opportunities for the emergence of
social movements are made available by political institutions; however, as Tilly and
Tarrow note, political institutions also repress and process movement claims.

They point to the importance of legalization as an integral element of
internationalization, which includes international agreements, the creation of international
agencies, and cooperation among different countries. According to Tilly and Tarrow
(2007) when threats or incentives arise to support particular interests transnational
calions and movements result. The topic of transnational activism will be discussed in
greater detail in the subsequent section.

Summary

In the thematic field of contention, a series of complementary theories have
emerged, including mobilization, political processes and opportunity structures, and
framing. In the 1990s, Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam, offered an integrative model and a
new perspective of movements. They recast the broader study of various forms of
contention and movements into the “contentious politics” approach (McAdam et al.,
2001; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996; Tarrow & Tilly, 2007).

This latter body of literature has become the theoretical and methodological basis
of this study. Within the context of “new” transnational connections in an
internationalized world, I turn to the literature on international relations theories of
globalization, internationalization, and transnationalism to complete what I consider the
three central theoretical foundations for the study of the contentious politics of education.
International Relations Theories and Contentious Politics

My discussion of international relations draws from literature on globalization, internationalization, and transnationalism, which I discuss briefly in order to provide background for the concept of new transnational activism, which looks at transnational contentious politics through the lens of international relations and social movement theories.

Globalization and Internationalization

While globalization has been framed and defined in different terms, Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton (1999) define it as the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life…” (Held et al., 1999, p. 2). Held et al. (1999) situate the prevailing scholarship on globalization within the categories of three schools of thought: hyperglobalists, skeptics, and transformationalists.

Hyperglobalist views are concisely summarized in Ohmae (1995), who asserts that, “traditional nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy” (p. 5). Hyperglobalist thought relegate nation-states to facilitators of a global exchange of goods, ideas, and culture subject to the demands of a world market. Skeptics, however, reject globalization as a myth. Beyond the increased intensity of internationalization, the economic integration of a world market is unfounded. Skeptics have argued that internationalization has not lessened the role of the nation-state in world affairs, but rather increased its importance. According to the skeptics, internationalization and the rise of the interdependence of states is the outcome of state design (Held et al., 1999).
Between the extreme positions of the hyperglobalists and skeptics stand what Held et al. (1999) call the “transformationalists.” Globalization for the transformationalists is a driving force in reconfiguring power relationships that bring about social, political and economic change. However, the outcome of globalization is as yet undetermined, subject to the happenings of historical processes (Hirst & Thompson, 1999). They claim that internationalization is taking place is an unprecedented way. Transformationalists emphasize the emergence of new centers of authority and power outside the nation-state, separating past internationalization from that of the present. They call the rise of nonstate authority a “new sovereignty regime,” whereby power is now also shared with multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international regularity agencies, among others within the global domain (Held et al., 1999).

Transnationalism and Transnational Contention

Concepts in the above general theories help us to consider the impact of globalization and internationalization on transnational activism, on the one hand, and interstate relations, on the other. Tarrow (2005) draws on multiple disciplines and theoretical paradigms to address what he calls “new” transnational activism. His outlook is akin to that of transformationalist scholars, as he adopts bits and pieces from the three international relations paradigms—realism, constructivism, and neoliberal institutionalism—to address the rise of transnational activism. Like the neorealists (Jervis, 1978, 1999; Levy, 1989), he concurs that states are still the key actors in

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7 For example, Goodman and Watts (1997, cited in Held et al., 1999) point to new sovereign powers such as the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and others that have entered the international scene.
international affairs. In harmony with neoliberal institutionalists (Keohane, 1989; Keohane & Martin, 1995), he believes that institutions are created by states to increase cooperation and maintain security. Finally, drawing heavily on constructivist arguments (Bob, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998), Tarrow (2005) also asserts that norms and identities influence state behaviors.

Tarrow (2005) defines internationalism as the “institutional and informal framework within which transnational activism—some of it aimed at globalization but much of it independent of that process—takes shape” (p. 19). Tarrow (2005) goes on to explain that “internationalism provides a framework within which transnational activists respond to threats and seize opportunities that empower their activism” (p. 19).

Other studies on internationalization have examined NGO and international organizations (Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnucco, 1997), and activist networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Including these in his discussion, Tarrow (2005) defines transnational contention as, “conflicts that link transnational activists to one another, to states, and to international institutions” (p. 25). In this context, nonstate and state actors can build coalitions, make claims, and engage in forms of contention that go beyond borders—a process which Tarrow asserts is not as well understood by scholars of globalization and internationalization.

While Tarrow (2005) suggests that states build international institutions to meet their particular interests, he also argues that international institutions create norms that are diffused into member states, sometimes creating new identities in relation to other states. As O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte, and Williams (2002) explain, international

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8 See Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink (1999) for a fuller discussion of this topic.
institutions represent a core around which NGOs, social movements, ethnic and religious groups, and trade and business groups gather. Upon this presumption, Tarrow hypothesizes that “the openness of the opportunity structure for non-state actors is a function of the institutionalization of interstate ties and of the degree to which they have produced multilateral interaction” (p. 27).

Tarrow (2005, p. 32) identifies the following six fundamental processes of transnational contention:

1. Global framing (international symbols to frame domestic issues)
2. Internalization (response to international pressure on domestic politics)
3. Diffusion
4. Scale shift
5. Externalization (projection of domestic claims onto international actors)
6. Transnational coalition formation

According to Tarrow (2005) two factors determine which processes are present: (a) the site of contention (domestic or international) and (b) the range of the issue (domestic or international). I will discuss each of these processes according to their relevance to the theme of this dissertation.

The first set of processes, global issue framing and internalization, occur at the domestic level and deal with domestic issues. Tarrow (2005) argues that while global framing draws more international attention and resonance with the transformed claim, it can isolate the local participants. The power of global framing is that, according to Tarrow (2005), it can “dignify and generalize claims that might otherwise remain narrow and parochial” (p. 76).
The second process of transnational contention is what Tarrow (2005) refers to as internalization (not to be confused with psychological references). Tarrow argues that internalization implies three inherent claims: the first is that international pressure on domestic politics foments reaction to their implementation by the government; second, governments react to pressure by protests from civil societies by addressing the international institutions and their citizens; finally, in the act of responding to both groups (i.e., international institutions and local citizens), they can act as mediators of international pressure and domestic claims.

The second set of processes in transnational contention includes diffusion and scaling. These concepts were discussed in some detail in the section about contentious politics (see McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). The internationalization of diffusion and scaling is important because it accounts for how something domestic becomes transnational, and how new communication technologies are used in these processes.

The final set of processes in transnational contention, as discussed by Tarrow (2005), includes externalization and coalition building. Externalization is the process whereby actors change their claims into universalistic terms that would appeal to international allies. Tarrow argues that the primary purpose for externalizing claims is to solicit the support of external allies, when redress from one’s own government is lacking or when one is unable to obtain it. Keck and Sikkink (1998), writing along these lines, state that “nonstate actors, faced with repression and blockage at home, seek out state and nonstate allies in the international arena, and in some cases are able to bring pressure to bear from above on their government to carry out domestic political change” (p. 154).
Risse and Sikkink (1998) called this the “boomerang” effect (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). I have reproduced the visual diagram of the boomerang model in Figure 3.

Figure 3. The boomerang model (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 13).

Tarrow (2005) describes externalization processes in phases, beginning with the relationship of externalization to domestic contexts, followed by the framing of contention, moving finally through various forms of collective action. For Tarrow (2005), the domestic context can vary from unresponsiveness to outright repression. Framing can range from simple frame extension to a more drastic frame transformation. Finally, collective action, as previously mentioned, can take on different forms, such as informational monitoring (when agencies and supranational organizations monitor human rights violations), institutional access (working within the framework of courts and international law), and direct action (using traditional instruments such as strikes and
novel employment of community protests which governments would have a hard time repressing without incurring public criticism; Tarrow, 2005).

As Tarrow (2005) explains, informational politics, like human rights advocacy, is often the only approach groups can adopt when faced with brutal persecution and high levels of repression. The rise of the “human rights regime” allows advocates to frame domestic oppositions in terms of human rights violations, garnering the support of human rights groups across borders. Finally, direct action appears to be more common in contexts where groups have little access or ability to utilize informational politics or institutional access, or where domestic direct action is the only means to actuate international pressures.

Tarrow (2005) suggests that transnational coalition building is part and parcel of transnational contention. Citing the work of Levi and Murphy (2006), Tarrow (2005) outlines five sets of criteria that must be met for increasing the probability of coalition formation and endurance: framing, trust, credible commitments, management of differences, and selective incentives. Tarrow (2005) describes the combination of four main mechanisms—diffusion, brokerage, mobilization, and certification (discussed above) as being essential for transnational activism to be effective in domestic politics.

Summary

In this section, I have discussed internationalization and globalization, and subsequently transnationalism. The concepts explained in this literature are relevant and important to this study not only because they frame the sites of contention for the claim makers, the receiver and target of claims, and all other subjected parties; they also help us to answer the following questions: How are those who make claims affected by these
larger contextual processes in international affairs? How do these processes affect the reactions of regimes to claims? What impact do nonstate and nonlocal actors involved in the contentious event have on the regimes and claim-makers?

While different perspectives have emerged in explaining the phenomenon of globalization, no one denies the presence of a heightened internationalization. Tarrow’s (2005) work, among that of others, suggests that this new era of internationalization has produced a new international opportunity structure with the presence of nonstate powers, including international institutions and nonstate actors. The proliferation of norms as an influence on state behavior is also relevant to the study of transnational activism and state responses to international pressure, as nonstate actors make claims across borders. In other words, how a state treats its own people—whether representing an open or repressive polity—may be influenced by nondomestic forces.
CHAPTER 3:

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation uses the method of historical narrative and the mechanism-process approach to study educational strategy selection. By presupposing that actions and decisions at a given point in time invariably affect subsequent actions and decisions, I adopted historical inquiry as the foundation of my study, as I believe it effectively explains how educational strategies are selected. To identify and analyze interactions and processes that shape educational strategies, I apply the case-study research design to specify objects, sites, subjects, and events involved. Finally, to provide a substantial body of empirical information to analyze, I draw on several data-collection techniques, including archival research, interviews, and the use of secondary analysis.

Research Question

The research question central to this dissertation was born out of an inquiry that goes beyond observations of education opportunity, which are limited only to looking at the behavior and effects of governments on repressed groups. In order to broaden the analysis, I set out to answer a two-part question:

*To what extent and how did the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities in Iran select different strategies to meet educational needs under the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes? To what extent and how does each group’s composition and characteristics, networks, and relation to both regimes affect their strategy selection?*

Methodological Design

In pursuing answers to these questions, this dissertation entails a chronological multicase study of three groups over two regime periods, covering 85 years of events and interactions. Furthermore, it is a study that uses an array of data sources and instruments,
including archival sources, interviews, and secondary analysis. The methods of analyzing collected data are historical inquiry and interpretation through the mechanism-process approach. Finally, I use theoretical concepts from network analysis to examine existing network ties.

**Sample Subjects and Sites**

Case subjects were selected from minority religious groups which are categorically similar, but which differ in their composition and characteristics, networks, and relations with regimes. Furthermore, religious communities have pre-existing organizational structures to oversee community affairs, making the task of following group strategies over a long period of time more manageable than strategies of temporary or event-based coalitions. I decided to include three cases because a comparative study would provide greater analytical leverage in explaining the influence of variations in group features bearing on educational strategy selection. Thus, I selected the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities in Iran as diverse, but manageable, subjects.¹

One of the central assumptions in this study is that regime-group interactions significantly shape group claims and actions. Thus, I choose to look at these three cases under two different regimes: the Pahlavi regime (1925–1979) and the Islamic Republic regime (1979–2009). Both regimes are characterized as high-capacity, authoritarian governments. However, each is distinguished by its ideological orientation, the former secular, the latter theocratic.

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¹ I did not include the Zoroastrian community because of small numbers, limited access to sources, and time constraints; i.e., there are only some 10,000 Zoroastrians in Iran, living in mid-size cities and rural areas (Sanasarian, 2000).
Sample Sources

In this study three sampling strategies were employed depending on the source: (a) archival, (b) interviews, and (c) secondary analysis. I used mixed purposeful sampling for the three source categories.\(^2\) Archival sources were the primary means of informing this study, including those available from governments, organizations, individuals, and the media. Furthermore, I conducted semi-structured and unstructured interviews with subjects living in Iran, Israel, the United States, Canada, and France. Finally, due to the scarcity of available and accessible information, secondary analysis sources became an important part of providing triangulation for other material and a means of providing information that was not accessed by the other two means.

Data Collection

Archival Sources

In dealing with a chronological case study spanning 85 years, archival information was the primary source of information for analysis. In the process of accessing governmental, organizational, individual, and media sources, and applying purposeful sampling, I created predetermined categories and subcategories for collection. Table A1\(^3\) shows the general categorization and labeling scheme applied to sampling archival sources, which are described in greater detail below.

I sampled electronic sources in the above four categories by inputting key words into Internet search engines and word processing scanning applications. Because there

\(^2\) According to Johnson and Christenson (2008), “mixed purposeful sampling is likely to be used when a researcher uses data triangulation—examining multiple data sources which might be selected according to different sampling methods” (p. 246).

\(^3\) See Appendix A for all Tables in this chapter.
were limited sources on the topic, I scanned for key words in every issue of those printed materials to which I had access. I used a hierarchical search technique, using primary key words, followed by secondary and tertiary key words input into search engines (details discussed below).

Purposeful and snowball sampling of printed sources was used by reading a wide range of secondary literature, identifying primary cited sources, and then seeking out those primary sources. Subsequently, I would search those primary sources for additional relevant information. Some sources were searched systematically and thoroughly, while others were accessed through general broad-based sampling using key word queries, employing an Internet search engine to locate additional sources. I was able to organize all material to provide sufficient information for triangulation and validation.

**Archival instruments.** In collecting the data, I used various technical instruments and skills, including translation, search engines, and research assistance. I used Persian and English sources for this study, drawing also on the work of a research assistant to expedite the reading of the Persian texts and identify relevant material. In looking for information sources and material, I developed a basic, flexible technique by applying hierarchical levels to key word sets in Internet search engines and word processing search features. I used a similar system for reading printed material.

Three general levels were used in search queries. *Level one* key words included case subjects and objects. *Level two* included primary themes of the study. *Level three* addressed specific issues, events, individuals and institutions, and other miscellaneous particulars arising from level two queries (varied and not systematic). These were then used in vertical and horizontal combination (e.g., Iranian Jews + education + Islamic
Table A2 is a sample tabulation of the type of hierarchy of key word sets used to look for material directly related to this study. Tables A3 (Governmental Sources), A4 (Organizational and Individual Sources), and A5 (Media Sources) represent archival sources used in parts of this study. In addition to the four categories of archival sources mentioned earlier, the archival source tables specify the number of documents, types and location of sources, how they were accessed, and dates, when applicable.

**Rationale.** The sources selected for this study were chosen because, in addition to being useful in providing answers to the research questions, they were the most accessible to the researcher. They not only represent the kinds of sources that are generally used in studies of Iranian religious minorities, but in some cases include a wider range. Some sources which do not appear in the archival source tables in the Appendices, are found in the reference list, because they were not systematically retrieved, but rather resulted from unintentional referral or search. Other archival sources not included in these tables (or this study in general) are the result of limitations of the researcher (see section on limitations at the end of this chapter).

**Interview Sources**

All three religious minority groups constitute vulnerable populations in Iran. It is not surprising that accessing information from members of any of the three groups was difficult, particularly because these groups have had to cope with restricted or risk-laden conditions by being circumspect in sharing information. Addressing the accessibility and availability of researching religious minorities in Iran, Eliz Sanasarian (2000), among the foremost experts in Iranian religious minority studies, asserts, “The scholarly literature on non-Muslim minorities is highly uneven, complex, and thinly researched” (p. 34).
Knowing from preliminary research that access to human information sources would be challenging, and that information is sometimes distorted and generally guarded from out-group members, I set out to identify community leaders, organizers, and prominent members to be “key informants” for the study about community strategy selection. Key informants include individuals who were able to obtain “descriptive information that might be too difficult and time consuming to uncover through more structured data gathering techniques” (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 105). I initially employed purposeful stratified sampling by soliciting interviews from community religious leaders, organization representatives, and experts on each community, both inside and outside Iran. I defined the categories as follows:

1. **Community religious leaders**—rabbis (Jewish), clergy and pastors (Christian), Assembly members (i.e., NSA and LSA members, or equivalent for Baha’is)

2. **Organization representatives**—nongovernmental group organizations, community advocates participating in secular organizations, and committee members responsible for educational services and strategies

3. **Experts**—included academics and scholars who research one or more of Iran’s religious minority groups, nongovernmental and government agents who specialize in a particular group(s), lay members in the community who show significant knowledge about the group (i.e., journalists, rogue scholars, etc.)

I presumed that, without insider trust networks, I would not be able to effectively interview community leaders and members of groups inside Iran, and made contacts with individuals in Iran through contacts in the United States. Snowball sampling was also used in the interview process. In the course of my interviews with different group
members (Jews, Christians, and Baha’is), I was referred to several members of the Iranian group communities who had experiences that were directly related to education in Iran. Through snowball sampling I was also able to access other community members who had experience with educational strategies used in Iran, including community run school administrators, teachers, students, and parents. Gender, age, and socioeconomic status were not included in sample design; only characteristics associated with roles in the community (i.e., community leaders, organization representatives, and prominent members) and educational experience in Iran was used in identifying subjects.

My initial target sample size was 10 community and organization leaders for each group, and three experts for each community; a total of 39 subject samples—given circumstantial restrictions I found this to be a sufficient number to provide essential information. With the goal of purposeful sampling of interview participants, I sent 19 independent requests for interviews with Jewish sources, 17 independent requests for interviews with Iranian Christian sources, and 14 requests for Baha’i sources (see Table A6). Contact information was obtained through Internet community websites, referrals by experts and other community leaders. These requests were sent by invitation letter (electronic) or in telephone calls. The acceptance rates were low. This was not surprising, given the high levels of tension in the social and political climate in Iran, and because of the sensitive nature of the topic and the understandable caution exercised by members of religious minority groups in general. In an attempt to offset the low response rates, I asked to be referred to others of similar rank; subsequently many pointed to the same source or directed me to an academic expert.
I was informed by several contacts that conducting research in Iran would not produce substantial results because of the “closed” environment. I was also warned that I should exercise caution because of the topic, as well as my own affiliation with an unrecognized religious minority group (i.e., Baha’i). However, after careful consideration, I decided—because of the dearth of existing information about Iranian religious minorities and educational issues—that it was necessary for me to travel to Iran to conduct anonymous, unstructured interviews. In Iran, I conducted interviews based solely on snowball sampling which began outside Iran through referrals, or while I was in Iran. I used extreme caution in interviewing members of Iranian religious minorities, not only because they are vulnerable, but also because of the sensitive nature of the dissertation topic.

Initially, I had set out to conduct five unstructured interviews with Iran-based informants involved in education of religious minorities for each group (i.e., students, teachers, administrators, etc.). However, my access to the minority school personnel I contacted—who will remain unidentified—was categorically denied. This clearly meant that approaching minority-run schools in the context of the current political climate in Iran was safe for neither the interviewee nor the interviewer. I was able to interview 28 Baha’is in Iran because of the insider sources I had already established prior to arrival in the country, but primarily because of the additional time that resulted when I was unable to access Jewish and Christian interviewees. I was able to interview two Christians and three Jews living in Iran. Most of those whom I interviewed wished to remain anonymous. Tables A6 and A7 reflect the sampling numbers by purposeful sampling and snowball sampling (based on an extensive interview database that was created to keep
track of interviews by group, organization affiliation, position/role, location, type of communication, and dates).

**Interview instruments.** An interview guide was prepared and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Teachers College, Columbia University, to be used in interviews with community and organization leaders, prominent community members, and topic experts (Table A8 shows the interview guide). The guide was nominally adjusted depending on the individual’s role and group affiliation, and translated into Persian. The interview guide included questions that solicited descriptive and explanatory answers related to their group and educational strategies. The guide included questions related to each group’s educational opportunities and challenges in Iran (past and current), as well as the group’s characteristics and composition, networks, and regime relations bearing on educational opportunities and strategies. I remained flexible and adjusted the interview guide according to each participant’s receptivity and expertise with the topic. I also left time for the participants to share information they felt would inform the study. This was particularly the case with those who did not know much about educational issues in the community, but were knowledgeable about other matters bearing on education, such as regime-group relations and community characteristics and composition.

I also employed unstructured interviews for follow-up session with interviewees, as well as all Iran-based participants. The usefulness of unstructured interviews was apparent when participants shared information about issues which did not appear in any other primary or secondary source, or about which I had no previous knowledge. I incorporated several themes in unstructured interviews, particularly questions related to
motives, fears, considerations in strategy selection, as well as experiences of opportunity and challenges related to educational pursuits. In addition, at some point during the unstructured part of the interview, I asked about other individuals whom I could contact. I also included written communication as part of the unstructured interview process, usually in the form of two or three questions soliciting answers about a particular subject, source, or fact. These were equally important, especially when retrieved from a key informant.

Interviews were conducted in person and using communication devices, in both English and Persian. In most interviews outside Iran, I used a voice recorder and took written notes. In Iran, I took only encrypted notes, and would then write out and email expanded notes to myself (still using cryptic language). I kept a ongoing database, into which all interviews were logged by participant descriptor when available (i.e., gender, age, initials to remind me who it was), date, position/occupation, organization/notes, date of interview, modality (i.e., written correspondence, personal communication, or telecommunication), and location.

Interviewees reside in various cities around the world, including Canada, France, Iran, Israel, and the United States. I spent 2008–2010 in Los Angeles, California as my main location of field research, because most members of Iranian religious minorities living outside Iran live in Southern California—particularly Jews, Armenian-Iranian Christians, and Baha’is. I traveled to Iran in December 2009 to conduct interviews. The political climate in Iran during this period was unstable as a result of the post-election
protests and riots of 2009. However, I was able to travel and conduct interviews in Tehran, Shiraz, Babol, and Sari during my stay.

**Consent and Confidentiality**

Given the vulnerability of group members and the sensitive nature of the study topic, I extended anonymity rights to all those whom I interviewed (unstructured and semi-structured). Most interviewees chose to remain anonymous. I followed IRB regulations for semi-structured interviews. I obtained oral consent and verbally conveyed stipulations of confidentiality with interview participants to reduce potential risk to participants in the study. The consent form included the purpose of the study, the researcher’s background (personal and academic information, and contact information), and confidentiality particulars. All participants were specifically informed that they could stop the interview at anytime, and did not have to answer any questions about which they felt uncomfortable.

**Secondary Analysis and Sources**

Secondary analysis and literature was an important part of this study, as it provided important background information on settings, regimes, and subjects. The information regarding religious minorities in Iran is scattered, fragmented, and sometimes unreliable (Sanasarian, 2000). One contribution which this dissertation makes to the study of religious minority groups lies in the efforts to synthesize and critically analyze the existing primary and secondary information in this field. I used several academic secondary analyses, cited throughout, to complete a comprehensive narrative of otherwise

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4 Two days before my arrival there had been mass protests in Tehran, and on the day of my departure there was an escalation of violence in Tehran.
fragmented streams and episodes describing educational experiences of religious minority groups. The use of primary sources and secondary analysis also reinforces triangulation of validity of data (see validity issues in section below). I attempted to access as many secondary analyses of Iranian religious minority community issues related to education. Much of the secondary source material gathered for all three groups repeats information and often cites other similar sources. This was useful in identifying the limits and strengths of secondary literature.

**Data Analysis Methods**

**Theoretical Propositions**

I used preconfigured theoretical propositions to categorize collected data. The study follows a historical timeline with distinct actors in question. Thus, I arranged the information along these two dimensions. The two major categories/themes are *regimes* and *religious minorities*, in order to optimally organize the data for a chronological multicase study, using the mechanism-process approach. Three other preconfigured codes were also assigned to religious minorities, intrinsically related to the research question: (a) *group composition and characteristics*; (b) *group networks*; and (c) *group-regime relations*. Finally, the category *education* was used to identify information directly related to educational opportunities, challenges, and strategies in modern Iran. Figure 4 illustrates the basic organization of data by category. The categories and labels were used

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5 With regard to case studies, Yin (2009) writes: “The first and most preferred strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to your case study. The original objectives and design of the case study presumably were based on such propositions, which in turn reflected a set of research questions, reviews of the literature, and new hypotheses or propositions. The propositions would have shaped your data collection plan and therefore would have given priorities to the relevant analytical strategies” (p. 130).
to organize and manage collected data from archival sources, interviews, and secondary
analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regimes</th>
<th>Religious Minorities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pahlavi (P)</td>
<td>Epoch 1 (1925–1941) (P1)</td>
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<td>Epoch 2 (1941–1979) (P2)</td>
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<td>Epoch 4 (2004–2009) (I4)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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Figure 4. Preconfigured proposition for categorizing data.

Interviews Analysis

After collecting recordings or notes from interviews, I scanned the content and
used the preconfigured thematic codes (see Figure 4) to label interview content. After
listening to the recorded interviews, information was included which was either missing
or incomplete in my corresponding interviews notes. When information was shared that
was outside the bounds of the categories, I would measure its perceived importance by
how it would contribute to the study and labelled it “miscellaneous (short description).”
Not all content derived from interviews was of equal length or quality. However, because
of this labeling scheme (dividing up interviews by religious minority group), I was able
to access interview content easily when looking at other data for the given group and time
period.

Four distinct categories emerged in the data collected in interviews:
1. *Historical*—events (episodes, interactions, etc.)

2. *Descriptive*—community characteristics, statistics

3. *Relational*—relations with the government and other religious minorities; networks within and outside the community

4. *Referential*—additional potential people to interview, and additional sources

Most interviews were used in the process of constructing historical events for each period, but also to inform particulars about how characteristics, networks, and regime relations affected educational and other social strategies. In many cases information was supplemented by archival and secondary sources, but also used to supplement archival sources that were incomplete. Interviews added a rich texture to the study, particularly for the Islamic Republic period, during which so little has been written about Iranian religious minorities.

It would be appropriate to mention here that I used secondary interviews in my study, but treated them as archival sources. I used a similar process of labeling those interviews using my theoretical propositions. Of particular value were the Center for Iranian Jewish Oral History and the Foundation for Iranian Studies Oral History Program. Short interviews available in documentary films contributed additional empirical evidence for the study.

**Historical Analysis**

**Historical inquiry.** Using preconfigured codes listed in Figure 4, I set out to find a substantial body of primary sources to outline the historical development of educational processes which could then be broken down into bound streams and episodes (see mechanism-process approach below). I employed historical inquiry and interpretation as
my initial means of analyzing and organizing this information. Historical inquiry is not just telling a story. Rather, it is the critical analysis of sources from various periods in the past, interpreting events and interactions, arranging them in logical sequence, with the goal of explaining what, how, and why a phenomenon in question occurred in the past. The categorized material was then systematically organized so as to be readily accessible when I moved through a chronological sequencing of events relating to educational development in Iran, for the religious minority groups specifically. Part of the process of analysis was to determine the validity and quality of the collected sources. In most cases, I was able to triangulate the data with other primary or secondary sources. However, in others cases, the information gathered was all that was available to me, and I had to use discretion in relying on those sources. In general, depending on the type of source, I used various preanalytical methods in drawing out useful information to create a historical narrative, against which I could apply the mechanism-process approach.

**Document and media analysis.** Concepts from document analysis were identified by themes in the texts. Those (particularly media) which contained the religious minority titles (i.e., coded as any derivation of Jew, Christian, Armenian, Assyrian, Chaldean, and Baha’i) were classified using a filing system. For print media (Ettelaat, Iran Times and Kayhan), I examined all issues for these primary codes. For raw archive material, such as letters, reports, and pictures, I collected information using the same classification scheme as in Figure 4, noted the content that related to the study, and filed it under the appropriate category. I was able to effectively examine how group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations affected strategy selection by using historical inquiry and interpretation of events and interactions within
this designated framework. I did not engage in a quantitative analysis of the documents nor do an in-depth discourse analysis of the text. The purpose of the document analysis was to construct a holistic and balanced historical narrative which could be further analyzed through the mechanism-process approach. It should be noted that in Chapter 5, I discuss the particular features of group characteristics and composition, networks, and regime-group relations, including definitions of concepts.

**Mechanism-Process Analysis**

This study set out to explain how a group meets its educational needs. While I discussed the theoretical background of the mechanism-process approach at length in the literature review, it is important to consider how it applies directly to this dissertation. I employed the mechanism-process approach in Chapter 6 in order to identify specific streams and episodes of interaction that significantly influenced educational strategies and their outcome. In the process of historical analysis using various sources, I specifically looked for streams and episodes of contention and actuation. As Tilly and Tarrow (2007) describe, “episodes are bounded sequences of continuous interaction, usually produced by an investigator’s chopping up longer streams of contention into segments for purposes of systematic observation, comparison, and explanation” (p. 36). I also use the terms *streams of actuation* and *episodes of actuation* to denote regime-group interactions characterized by facilitation and tolerance. Although more unwieldy than contentious interactions, streams and episodes of actuation highlight important periods of strategy development for the case subjects when conditions and government education policies are more favorable than contentious. Based on available data for each period (i.e., Pahlavi and Islamic Republic), streams and episodes related to education
opportunities and challenges become the units of analysis in studying educational strategy selection. I identified episodes of contention and actuation for the three religious minority groups. Often, several smaller events or micro-episodes were identified and analyzed within episodes. Once episodes were identified and described, I proceeded to apply the eight steps in the mechanism-process approach as outlined by Tilly and Tarrow (2007, p. 207, summarized in Table A9).

The purpose of analyzing my historical interpretation through the mechanism-process approach was to explain a) how strategies were actually selected, developed, and deployed, and b) how such strategies affected the subsequent selection of other strategies in meeting educational needs. In Chapter 2 (Literature Review), I defined essential terms such as mechanisms, processes, and episodes. Due to variation in the extent of information available and accessible for each time period and across the different groups, including general differences in group features, multiple scales of observation were used to identify processes. To identify mechanisms and processes over time, I borrowed the categories developed by Tilly and Tarrow (2007), and interpreted strategies in those terms (see Table A10 for a listing and definitions of mechanisms and processes used to explain strategy selection during analysis in Chapter 6). I also include specially created content-specific processes when analyzing the episodes, and describe these in greater detail in Chapter 6. While processes were identified and reassembled to explain the selection and development of strategies, I also interjected an interpretation of how each group’s composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations influenced the shaping of those processes.
Concepts of Network Analysis

In Chapter 5, concerning the religious minority groups’ composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations, I used concepts (not mechanics) of network analysis to visualize the domestic and international network ties of each group. Instead of using specifically designed surveys or computation of archival data—input into a network analysis software program, as typically used for network analyses—I made a simplified and holistic estimate of network ties and their values, based on a range of qualitative and quantitative sources available to this author.

Five nodes were classified for inclusion in the network mapping. For each group, I looked at following prominent actors:

1. Local community organizations and members
2. Transnational community organizations and members
3. Nongovernmental organizations (nongroup)
4. Governments and their agencies
5. International and supranational organizations (nongovernmental and governmental institutions)

I initially identified node ties with the subject group by labeling archival sources, interviews, and secondary literature that mentioned such connections with a code for network tie (i.e., NT). Nodes or actors were identified by geographical location. Since technical network analysis methods are beyond the scope of this dissertation, I only use approximated measures to determine the values of network ties. The sources I use to determine network nodes, tie strength, tie relation, and tie type, include government and organization documents and sources, organizational source material, news media sources,
in-depth interviews with organizational leaders (15 participants inside and outside Iran), and other archival and secondary sources (see Tables A2, A3, and A4 for the list of sources used). Four features are included in my conceptual network mapping exercise: network nodes (i.e., actors); types of ties between nodes; relational content of ties; and strength of ties between nodes.

I narrowed the focus on three other basic features as part of my conceptual network analysis:

1. *Types of relational ties between nodes*—direct, indirect, independent

2. *Relational content of ties*—information, resources, advocacy

3. *Strength of ties*—between nodes

Three types of relational ties are identified in my approximation. *Direct ties* indicate direct exchange or interaction between an Iranian group community and another node (whether in or outside Iran). An *indirect tie* indicates that one of the three interactions (informal, advocacy, or resources) exists, but through an additional party (i.e., broker) working as a conduit of exchange. The term *independent ties* indicates existing network ties between different entities (particularly governments), representing state-state relations or organization-organization cooperation. Drawing on international relations theory, I argue that these relations have an indirect impact on minority groups who are associated with communities in those particular countries.

Examined here are those ties involving the exchange (unidirectional or bidirectional) of information, advocacy, or resources.⁶ *Information* refers to that which can be utilized for reports and assessments, not information in the sense of resources used

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⁶ There may be other dynamic interactions present, but for the sake of brevity and this heuristic exercise, I have retained focus on only these three features.
toward community development (e.g., curriculum or school models). I use the term *resources* to refer to the categories of Edwards and McCarthy (2004; see literature review), including material, moral, socio-organizational, human, and cultural. *Advocacy* refers to any form of initiative that denotes explicit protest or support of particular regime policies and practices, or group actions; some forms of advocacy include mutual agreements, petitions, letters of appeal, voiced concern, motions made in multilateral supranational organizations, and sanctions. In the network maps in Chapter 5, icons at the end of the connecting lines identify content ties (information, resources, and advocacy).

To estimate the measure of tie strength, I use the descriptive values of weak ($s = 1$), moderate ($s = 2$), strong ($s = 3$). It is especially important to emphasize that network strength was estimated by accounting for recorded frequency of interaction, level of actions (i.e., prominence), and longevity of the relationship. Strength is not computed scientifically, but is attributed to emerging trends that surface from review of primary and secondary sources. In the network maps in Chapter 5, strength is represented by the thickness of the lines connecting nodes.

**Validity Issues**

Several research methodologists have suggested that to reduce threats to the validity of a given study, triangulation of data collection ought to be incorporated into the study (Creswell, 2007; Maxwell, 1996; Yin, 2009). In this study I used archival sources of various types (media journals, letters and memoirs, organization documents and publications, government documents and publications), semistructured and unstructured interviews, and secondary analysis to provide adequate triangulation.
Nevertheless, some consideration of potential threats to validity is warranted due to general research bias, interview participant bias, and source bias. My background and affiliation with an Iranian religious minority group, could be considered a potential threat to the study. Growing up in a community that framed the situation facing the Baha’is in grave terms created a preconception of the situation facing religious minorities. This was offset in a number of ways. By adopting the idea that all regimes engage in repression, toleration, and facilitation, I moved out of the fallacious dichotomous approach to government behavior (i.e., repressive or nonrepressive). More importantly, in using Baha’i sources or interviews, I exercised extreme discretion by triangulating data from non-Baha’i sources (i.e., governmental and nongovernmental, and more specifically from academic expert analyses). Conducting interviews with vulnerable religious minorities also poses some challenges. Validity of information gathered from these interview participants could have also been compromised when participants were fearful of having information used against them or others. Here again, I relied on triangulation to confirm information, using other interview sources, archival sources, and secondary analysis. Additionally, key informants were extremely helpful in compensating for the low number of interviews. Finally, there are sources on Iranian religious minorities (whether primary or secondary), and some are clearly biased. Thus, lack of information may also have given rise to nuances that were not accounted for in this study. However, I am confident that through the use of multiple sources, major threats to validity were overcome.

**Limitations**

The limitations to this study can be categorized as those related to language, access, safety, and current climate in Iran. I used Persian and English to conduct the
study, but was unable to use sources in Hebrew, French, Armenian, and Syriac. As mentioned earlier, conducting research on religious minorities in Iran is an extremely difficult task because of the sensitivity of the situation and the reticence of these groups since the Islamic Revolution. The caution and insularity of Iranian religious minority communities has only been amplified by current political and social restrictions during the presidency of President Ahmadinejad (2004–2009), the increase in religious minority harassment and slander in media, and the post-election protests and government crackdown since 2009. Thus, compromised trust and restricted conditions by the government inhibited freer access to more sources. The need for constant vigilance and concerns for safety were other limitations. I did not want to put my interviewees or myself at risk, particularly those participants who live or have connections in Iran. Similarly, I was advised by group informants that Christians and Jews are extremely insular in Iran, and even those who have recently left are reluctant to share information with outsiders. Notwithstanding these limitations, by using a wide range and differing types of sources, I was able to collect sufficient information to undertake this essentially unstudied research.
CHAPTER 4:
CASE SETTING AND OBJECTS—IRAN AND ITS REGIMES

On Regimes

An overview of regimes is central to the study of contentious politics, and deals with the inherently dynamic relationship between groups in a sovereign territory and the government managing its state institutions. I use the term regime to denote the organized group in control of the government. Regimes most often determine the political direction (form of government) and practice (capacity) of a state through its control of the government and its agencies.

The regime is a key unit of analysis for several important reasons: First because those people who control the government (i.e., power holders and regimes) experience greater levels of access to and control over information, resources, and coercive means, as compared to other groups (Tilly, 2006b). The form and capacity of regimes significantly bears on how the government distributes advantages in the form of policies and practices (Tilly, 2008). Second, because the orientation of regimes occupying power has a significant impact on the strategies they adopt and the methods they employ in governing the state.

According to Tilly (2006b), the forms of governments range from nondemocratic to democratic. He defines democracy as the “extent to which persons subject to the government’s authority have broad, equal rights to influence governmental affairs and to

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I define the parameters of the state with reference to those collective institutions operated by the government of a sovereign territory, such as the legislative, judicial, and executive bodies responsible for managing public affairs. However, I also use the term state to describe public institutions within a sovereign territory that are controlled by the government, such as schools, trade unions, select religious institutions, and the media.
receive protection from arbitrary governmental action” (Tilly, 2006b, p. 21). However, the type of government must be placed in the context of a government’s capacity to exercise the regime’s will. Tilly (2006b) defines governmental capacity as the: “degree to which governmental actions affect distributions of populations, activities, and resources within the government’s jurisdiction, relative to some standard of quality and efficiency” (Tilly, 2006b, p. 21). Capacity increases the chances of a government to engage in democratic processes, such as including wider participation in government decisions, more equitable distribution of resources, and greater tolerance of groups and actions. Conversely, capacity can also empower a government to control decision-making and engage in arbitrary rule, unevenly distribute resources, and repress targeted groups and actions.

I use the implications of Tilly’s (2006b) regime type-capacity model to highlight governments strategies in dealing with their population. However, I add a third, nuanced category: ideological orientation. By ideological orientation, I mean those ideas and beliefs which direct the course of a regime’s agenda and governance strategy. I suggest that how a state defines itself has a significant bearing on the form of government and how it chooses to exercise its capacity (while not bearing on capacity).

In this chapter I use these classifications to assess changes in the Pahlavi dynasty and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and subsequently how they bear on their educational policies and performances. Educational institutions will almost always become a space in which the form, capacity, and ideological orientation of a regime are manifested. Moreover, I argue that a regime will determine the extent to which it will prescribe, tolerate, and deny educational participants, policies, curricula, and practices based on the
above three defining features of a regime. To this end, I retain emphasis on the educational landscape during these periods, each regime’s educational system, and the general characteristics of their ideological orientation toward education.

**The Pahlavi Dynasty (1925 to 1979)**

**Reza Shah and Nation Building (1926 to 1941)**

Decades of government corruption, economic concessions to the British and Russians, frequent revolts and coups, and fragmented state institutions made Iran vulnerable to internal conflict and turmoil. In 1925, Reza Khan, a military colonel claimed the throne for himself. At the top of Reza Shah’s agenda was the drive to modernize and secularize Iran through industrialization, allying with landlord aristocrats, and creating new bureaucratic and educational institutions. European models, including modern universities, superfluous dress codes and standardized Persian lexicon, characterized much of his reforms (Abrahamian, 1982; Axworthy, 2008).

Despite the centuries-old presence of religious authorities within the government, the Shah set out to secularize Iran in judicial and legal spheres, such as a French-modeled civil code adopted by the Majles in 1928 and the Italian-modeled penal code (Abrahamian, 1982). The role of the *ulama* was further reduced when secular officials replaced them as official judges and document notaries, and the *shariah* (Islamic law) was only narrowly applied to personal matters and family law. Apart from military advances, the two most noticeable reforms during the time of the Shah were seen in industrialization and education (Abrahamian, 1982).

The Pahlavi regime has been criticized for its lack of effort to offer real educational reform to the largest segment of the Iranian population—rural inhabitants
(Cleveland, 2004). However, other than the limited public schooling instituted during the period of the constitutional government at the beginning of the century, the only schools that really functioned outside of *madrasas* (Islamic schools) were those run by religious minorities and foreigners. As for higher education, there were a few specialized professional and vocational colleges, but nothing comparable to a multi-departmental modern university.

Reza Shah and the Majles mandated compulsory education and increased the number of trained administrators. While limited in scope and execution, it nonetheless had a significant impact. But these efforts yielded only negligible results in rural areas. For example, during this time, the rural majority of Iran—made up of villages, isolated towns, and nomadic tribes—was in no position to facilitate or sustain schools (Matthee, 1992). Moreover, the *ulama* that had obviously benefited from madrasas or old religious schools steadfastly opposed participation in the new schools (Menashri, 1992). At the direction of the Shah, the first modern multi-departmental institution of higher education, Tehran University, was established in 1934. The university was founded to supply Iran with the experts it needed to support the modernization process, and aimed at lessening dependence on foreign expertise. The university benefited mostly people of privilege and those living in urban areas.

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2 For example, between 1921 and 1941, expenditure on education increased 12-fold (Messkoub, 2006; see Table B1), and the number of students in public elementary and secondary schools increased from 44,819 in 1922–1923 to 314,173 in 1940–1941 (Menashri, 1992, p. 121).

3 The number of participants doubled within five years creating a cadre of new intellectuals, as illustrated by the enrolment of 1,043 students in 1934–1935, a figure which increased to 2,113 in 1939–40 (Menashri, 1992).
With the counsel of education specialists, Reza Shah began a process of systemizing and standardizing schools throughout Iran (Sadiq, 1931). This involved innovation in curricula, structures, and procedures. Systemization involved repressive practices as well, including bans on ethnic clothing, minority languages, and dissemination of a somewhat mythical version of Persian identity (Kashani-Sabet, 1999; Matthee, 1993; Rostam-Kolayi, 2008). While ethnic and religious minority schools were not closed initially, any school that was perceived to be inconsistent with the regime’s agenda of nationalization and secularization was eventually shut down or suspended until changes were made (Banani, 1961; Sadiq, 1931). In 1936, all foreign elementary schools were nationalized, and by 1939, all high schools as well (Irvine, 2008; Menashri, 1992; Zirinksy, 1993a).

The policies driving the expansion of education in Iran can be understood in terms of Reza Shah’s overall objectives for the state. Reza Shah, who was practically illiterate himself, saw education as a useful tool from a purely utilitarian perspective (Matthee, 1993). For him, education was important, in so far as it helped the state to execute policies and furthered the state’s agenda to socialize the greater population, to centralize government through trained bureaucrats, and to bring about progress in the industrialization of the country (Cleveland, 2004). Not unlike other educational systems of the time, (such as in Turkey and Egypt), a key component of the new schooling system was engendering loyalty and service to the nation (see Kashani-Sabet, 1999, for more on use of education for nationalist agenda of the Pahlavi dynasty). Menashri (1992) explains that for Reza Shah, education was the primary and ideal apparatus to bring cohesion to an
otherwise fragmented country, by blurring ethnic identities and supplanting religious loyalties with a homogenous Iranian national identity.

Three educational advances are particularly noteworthy during the 15 years of the reign of Reza Shah: (a) mandatory “modern” mass schooling with a systematized and strong nationalist curriculum; (b) a state-sponsored study-abroad program; and (c) the establishment of a multi-departmental modern university. However deficient and incomplete, these three aspects of education laid the foundation for Iran’s education system and Iran’s first secularized intellectual class (Matthee, 1993; Menashri, 1992).

While Iran was never officially colonized, British and Russian occupation and implicit control was pervasive. When Reza Shah tried to break from this dependency by aligning with Germany, Britain and the Soviet Union persuaded him both to abdicate and escape the country in 1941 (Cleveland, 2004). His son, Muhammad Reza, was placed on the throne. It is interesting to point out that deeply negative impressions about the British and the Russians in Iran led to some receptivity to the French and American presence, including missionary and foreign schools. Several observers of the first half of the reign of the Pahlavi suggest that the interests of the people, of internal power brokers, and even of parliament were suppressed or ignored in favor of consolidated, centralized power (Abrahamian, 1982; Arjomand, 1988; Cleveland, 2004).

Muhammad Reza Shah and an Era of Rapid Reform (1941 to 1978)

The first 12 years of Muhammad Reza’s reign were characterized by overbearing power and political struggles, ranging from internal party controversies to debates about the invasive foreign policies of other countries (Arjomand, 1988). Notwithstanding the new Shah’s curtailment of political freedoms and suppressed contests for power to
maintain control, social and cultural freedoms were tolerated and even facilitated during this time—as long as they did not threaten the Shah’s vision of a consolidated Iran firmly under his rule.

Economic and social reforms were the hallmarks of Muhammad Reza’s push for solidarity. Muhammad Reza’s agenda for self promotion was pervasive. He tightened his control on political power through coercion and systemic hegemony, as he set out to make Iran a leading world power. However, he turned to social reform to enhance the country’s productivity and solidarity.

In 1963, Muhammad Shah launched what he called “The White Revolution,” implying a nonviolent social reformation. The White Revolution was initially premised on six points, and expanded to 19 articles over the course of 15 years (Arjomand, 1988). Important and understated efforts made through the White Revolution included educational policy. Four of the articles of the White Revolution related, directly or indirectly, to education (Abrahamian, 1982; Pahlavi, 1963).

In the sixth of the original series of articles outlining the agenda of the White Revolution, a literacy corps was established to meet the educational needs of those in rural areas. Upon graduation from high school, young men were required to serve in the military for two years, with the option of spending that time in rural villages engaging in educational activities, either teaching primary school or conducting adult classes (Sabahi, 2001).4 Article 12 (1967) dealt with reform of the curriculum, and Article 15 (1975) instituted compulsory and free education from primary school to high school, and

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4 A corps of approximately 200,000 participants enlisted, reaching 2.2 million children and another million adults. As a note of interest, the first UNESCO World Congress on the Eradication of Illiteracy was hosted in Tehran in 1965, at which the Shah pledged US$700,000 to UNESCO for the purpose of eradicating illiteracy (Sabahi, 2001).
included one free meal to those who were without means (up to age 14). Article 11 (1967) set out to address infrastructure needs, under the auspice of modernization of urban and rural areas, including building schools and libraries (Abrahamian, 2008).

Some have suggested that the White Revolution was overly ambitious and actually contributed to the downfall of the Shah (Abrahamian, 1982; Sabahi, 2001). Others are more cautious, but assert that the Shah’s agenda marginalized landowners, *bazaaris* (merchants), and the *ulama*, and failed to garner the support of the masses to which it ostensibly catered (Arjomand, 1988). In the final analysis, despite some achievements in various areas of infrastructure development and educational expansion, the radical reform campaign fizzled and was additionally stained by the Shah’s increasing totalitarianism and uncompromising drive to modernize Iran along Western lines.

Muhammad Reza recognized education as the primary means to progress. He envisioned expanding education as the means not only to modernization, but also to engendering support of the general public and to establishing solidarity in his kingdom. Education, in the view of Muhammad Reza, was a holistic apparatus for ideological assimilation and skill-building.

While there were varying degrees of tolerance toward ethnic and religious groups, and little to none for political groups, most minorities were included in all of the government’s plans. For the Pahlavis, the primacy of an Iranian identity was essential, and any other identity was inconsequential, as long as it did not interfere with loyalty to the state. Not surprisingly, those who had access to education services and educational opportunities welcomed them. Those who could not began voicing their growing dissatisfaction. Religious minority groups who had been attending their own schools also
took advantage of the burgeoning educational system during the time of Muhammad Reza Shah: some integrated into them, while others continued to run isolated community schools (Sanasarian, 2000).

Many have been critical of the educational policies of Muhammad Reza Shah (Arjomand, 1988; Cleveland, 2004; Menashri, 1992). To address the continued educational challenges that were still unmet, new initiatives were put in place. By 1975, the Majles not only ratified the Shah’s proposed Article 15 for free education, but even expanded it to include a wider age range and to include free vocational high school (Menashri, 1992).

Although the numbers of those affected by the new laws may have been nominal, and specific to a largely male, urban population, they still remain significant. To reject the pioneering efforts and strides made, however inadequate, would be underestimating the educational system that was developed from the virtually nonexistent infrastructure that was in place, and the impact it had on its later development (Menashri, 1992).\(^5\) However, the gross disparity between rural and urban populations became a bone of serious contention,\(^6\) and presented a grave problem that would be pivotal for protagonists of the Islamic Revolution and a platform for the Islamic Republic’s social justice campaign (Keddie, 1999; Messkoub, 2006; Sabahi, 2001). In 1978–1979, as a result of

\(^5\) For example, in 1941–1942, only 286,598 children were enrolled in elementary schools, but by 1977–1978, a total of 5,200,000 children were enrolled (Menashri, 1992, p. 186); similarly in 1941–1942, only 315,355 children were enrolled in elementary and secondary school, compared to 7,701,000 in 1977–1978 (Menashri, 1992, p. 191).

\(^6\) For example, by the mid-1960s, literacy rates for women were at 17 percent (half of that of men), and only 15 percent of the rural population was literate, compared to 50 percent literacy among urban dwellers. By the mid-1970s, as a result of efforts made by the Literacy Corps, some improvement was seen, with 31 percent literacy among male rural dwellers and 7 percent among female rural dwellers. (Messkoub, 2006, p. 234).
years of repressive rule, failed reforms, and demands of more government services, dissident groups—often bearing little resemblance other than opposition to the regime—ignited a revolution that toppled the dynasty (Abrahamian, 2008).

**Summary of the Pahlavis**

Returning to Tilly’s (2006b) outline of regime types, I place the two epochs during the Pahlavi regime at different points in the spectrum of characteristics. When Reza Shah first came to power, he was occupied with building government capacity at the expense of fostering a democracy. His ideology was focused on modernization and secularization through industrialization and nationalism. After establishing relative stability countrywide, Reza Shah was able to make bolder moves toward solidarity and independence from traditional foreign occupants. As Figure 5 shows, democracy ranged in the low zone, but capacity increased over time, ranging in the mid-high zone.

*Figure 5.* Regime type under Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–1941).

The first 12-year period of Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule saw two strands of movement on the regime type grid: one was of low capacity in the monarch, but mid-
mid-high capacity for Parliament; overall, there was a mid-level democracy. Between 1953 and 1963, the reinvigorated Pahlavi regime increased its capacity to maintain power and security, but this had the effect of blocking political development and restricting democracy. Once Muhammad Reza Shah felt that stability was reestablished, he launched the White Revolution reform campaign. While political rivals were still being repressed, other groups, such a religious minorities, women, and young people benefitted tremendously through the social reforms of the White Revolution. The regime’s capacity increased exponentially, as did its distribution of resources and opportunities for some groups that had been marginalized. Those that did not have access or who were excluded engaged in resistance and, in turn, instigated a fierce backlash against the Shah beginning in the 1970s. Figure 6 illustrates the waxing and waning of capacity and democracy during the Muhammad Reza epoch on Tilly’s (2006b) regime-type grid. Both eras of the Pahlavi dynasty were characterized by an ideological orientation toward modernization, which often took the form of industrialization and Westernization of institutions and policies.

The Islamic Republic of Iran (1979 to the Present)

Gestation of a Revolution: “Burn the Shah, End the Pahlavis”

The Shah was out of touch with the masses and perhaps overconfident in his abilities to quell rebellion. The tenacious resolve of protesters remained undeterred by his fierce backlash. In 1979, after fleeing the country, the Revolution had toppled the short-lived dynasty. Broadcast over Tehran Radio, the victory of the Revolution was made clear, “This is the voice of Iran, the voice of true Iran, the voice of the Islamic Revolution” (as cited in Abrahamian, 2008, p. 162).
Birth of an Islamic Nation

In February of 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran. Without wasting any time, he affirmed the end of the monarchy, replaced the position of Prime Minister with a member from a party in support of the Revolution, and declared himself Guardian of the Islamic Jurist (valeyat-e faqih)—ultimately securing his place as Supreme Leader. Over the course of the past three decades, four epochs within the regime may be observed. These four eras are distinguished primarily by their ideological orientation, as well as by their capacity and form of government.

First Epoch: Khomeini and the Establishment of the Islamic Republic (ca. 1979 to 1989)

With the deposing of the Shah and his Parliament, Khomeini’s para-state, made up of the Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Committees (komitehs), and the Revolutionary Guard Corps (sepah-e pasdar) filled the vacuum of power. Dealing with the diverse body of people who had deposed the Shah, Khomeini set out to secure an
Islamic regime by cutting down rivals and threats, while preserving state institutions and infrastructure. Khomeini’s new regime may have stripped the old Iran of its flesh, but it did not dispose of the skeleton—its infrastructure—which proved important for a new Iran.

In 1979, the establishment of an Islamic Republic would be based on a novel constitution drafted by a newly elected Assembly of Experts (majles-e khebregan), made up predominantly of individuals aligned with Khomeini (Abrahamian, 2008). For Khomeini, the new Iranian state required thorough ideological reformation. On a platform of religiosity, ethnic unity, and social justice, Khomeini spearheaded the radical transformation of Iranian society. In 1980, Khomeini launched the Cultural Revolution (engelab-e farhangi).

The Cultural Revolution set out to infuse the state and country with Khomeini’s brand of Shi’i ideological orientation in three steps: purification, (re)production, and preservation. Those in positions of influence and prominence—and who were aligned with the regime—were favored and replaced those whom regime leaders considered incompatible with the Republic’s agenda. While recognized religious minorities—Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians—were institutionalized within the Islamic political system, their role in the government seemed cosmetic and nominal at best (Sanasarian, 2000). Educational institutions in particular were completely revamped to accommodate and preserve the Islamic Republic’s ideological orientation and agenda. In addition to changes in the system, the state now instituted significant censorship, publication bans, control of media outlets, literature, dress, school curricula, product exports and imports, and began rewriting laws (Habibi, 1989). The drive of the state to establish hegemony
was unyielding. Khomeini used every conceivable means to achieve this goal. In very much the same way that the Shah had employed violent measures to suffocate the voices of perceived opposition, with an effective high-capacity government at his disposal, Khomeini was able to consolidate power by expanding the state on the one hand, and engaging in fierce repressive tactics on the other.

In addition to legitimated violence, education was crucial for disseminating and infusing Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic nation. If coercion was the primary means of purging the secular Iranian state and transforming it into an Islamic hegemony, then education was the apparatus used to sustain its shift through socialization and stabilization. The Khomeini regime believed that education was the key not only to eliminating further protest and dissent, but to raising up a dominant Islamic state.

Three major initiatives shaped the immediate reformation of the Iranian educational system. The first was a complete overhaul of the curriculum, including the rewriting of school textbooks. The second was the institutionalization of a countrywide literacy campaign. The third was the closure and restructuring of universities throughout Iran during the beginning years of the Cultural Revolution, in an effort to purge, purify, and create the new system of higher education of the Islamic Republic. Other significant reforms included gender-separated schools and classes, new regulations for religious minority schools, the firing and expulsion of nonaligned educators and students at all levels of education in Iran, and new standards of behavior and conduct (Habibi, 1989; Mehran, 1989, 1992; Paivandi, 2008).

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7 For theocratic and legal basis of violence see ideas associated with mufsid fil-ard (corruptors on earth) in Esposito (2003), Milani (2000), and Khalkhali (2001).
Compulsory schooling was reinforced by the new regime, yet schools and the curricula used underwent thorough changes. In fact, just nine days after the victory of the Revolution, in February 1979, Khomeini called for the production of new textbooks. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic, one of the most obvious actions by the regime was the rewriting of school textbooks, completed between 1980–1981 (Mehran, 1989; Paivandi, 2008). Golnar Mehran’s (1989) evaluation and critical review of elementary and secondary social studies textbooks concludes that the government’s drive for creating a homogenous and unchallenged Islamic identity is prominent throughout all new and revised textbooks after the Revolution. Not only were religious classes organized to reflect the regime’s view of Islam and other religions, but all subjects were subjected to Islamization.

Critical and supportive scholastic work on post-Revolution Iranian curricula accept that the government intentionally and purposefully uses educational space and curricula (textbooks, lesson plans, instruction of behavior) as a means to socialize children, youth, and young adults with the regime’s ideological foundation for an Islamic Republic (Matini, 1989; Mehran, 1989, 1992, 2007; Paivandi, 2008; Sanasarian, 2000). Additionally, there are high levels of intolerance for diversity and other narratives that deemed to be incongruent with the regime’s ideological agenda.

Khomeini centered considerable attention on Iran’s 63.5 percent illiterates (Sadri, 1999). In December 1979, Khomeini launched a campaign, known as the Literacy Movement of Iran (nehzat-e savad amuzi-ye iran) having various objectives. It was established to help Iran’s masses of illiterate people, comprising primarily regime supporters, but it provided the optimal apparatus to create widespread ideological
hegemony in Iran (Menashri, 1992). By one account the program was indeed effective in reducing country-wide illiteracy, as illustrated by literacy rate of 84 percent for adults and 97.6 percent for children and youth in 2006 (UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, 2008).

For the new Islamic regime, the greatest source of resistance within the education system was rooted in universities. Khomeini repeatedly condemned the existing universities in Iran for being the nest of Iran’s continued problems. Under the banner of the Cultural Revolution, the government targeted professors, students, university subjects, and curricula. All three of these sources of agitation which were perceived as contributing to a deficiency in the university system were framed as religio-political issues (see Khomeini, 1980, trans. in Algar, 1981, pp. 295–298). In the following year, all universities (other than medical schools) were shut down. Upon reopening over the course of three years, universities throughout the country experienced the purge to which Khomeini referred, particularly in the form of fired professors and administrators, expelled students, as well as curricula and structural reform. Moreover, universities were set up to filter out those not aligned with the state agenda, as well as perceived dissenters (Sakurai, 2004). Quotas were put in place to ensure favoritism toward ideologically congruent students and faculty (Sakurai, 2004). Finally, a ban was placed on certain targeted groups, and restrictions and difficult procedures were imposed on other minority and politically affiliated groups (Habibi, 1989).8 Successive conservative regime leaders and institutions continued the legacy begun by Khomeini in the decades that followed.

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8 Libraries were purged of books that were deemed un- or anti-Islamic. For example, one account reports that five tons of books of a major university were auctioned for “pulping” in 1985–1986 (Matini, 1989).
Second Epoch: The Search for Consolidation and Stabilization (ca. 1989 to 1997)

In 1989, the charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution and the new Republic died. Even 30 years after the establishment of the state Khomeini seems still to have had the most noticeable impact on the shaping of the Islamic Republic. However, the succession of leadership on all levels would face the serious challenge of reconciling the innovative state with a burgeoning international world system. In 1989, Seyed Ali Khamenei, succeeded as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In turn, Rafsanjani, the Majles speaker, was elected President. Both relied on a tight network within various sectors of Iranian society, consisting of religious and middle class business leaders, intellectuals, and various organizations (Takeyh, 2009).

In the midst of internal government conflict in the area of economic reform, there were signs of selective liberalization, and also some noticeable social improvements in the social sector (Islamic Republic of Iran, Management and Planning Organization, n.d.). The government’s capacity to implement social policy dramatically increased, with social services and institutions expanding in both structure and allocated expenditure. Educational expenditure also increased to expand services (see Table B2). In a sense, the legacy of the education system set up by Khomeini continued on into the epoch of reconstruction after the 1988 Iran-Iraq War, yet it required changes and modifications to deal with new demands and challenges. Since the Revolution, the country’s educational system showed quantitative improvements on several fronts, including in gender parity, increased enrolments and graduations, increased access for people in rural areas, and the building of new schools and universities (Sadri, 1999; Islamic Republic of Iran,

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9 See Appendix B for all tables in this chapter.
Statistical Centre of Iran, various years between 1989–1998; UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, various dates; World Bank, 2008; and see Table B3). Notwithstanding these advances in education, a number of new challenges faced administrators and government agencies responsible for the education system during this second epoch, including overcrowded classrooms and teacher shortages, lack of vocational and skill building education components, and issues related to reorganization of the structure of schools (Sadri, 1999; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005b). The second set of challenges related specifically to higher education, such as limited enrolment space as a result of high application rates (see Table B4),\(^\text{10}\) the poor quality of the education offered, inadequate job preparation, and problems in filtering admissions and censorship (Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007; Torbat, 2002). The filtering and screening of faculty and students along political grounds, curtailment of academic freedom, and admission quotas significantly altered Iran’s intellectual community (Sakurai, 2004; Torbat, 2002). Several researchers and educational experts both within and outside Iran have noted the deteriorating quality of education in Iran as a result of restrictive government policies instituted primarily by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.\(^\text{11}\) The problems cause mass discontent with traditional conservative governance.

\(^{10}\) In 1991–1992, only a few years after Khamenei and Rafsanjani took over the reins of the regime, only 10 percent of candidates (831,152) were accepted. A decade later, the rate of admission in proportion to applicants remained relatively unchanged (10.7 percent, or 1,593,489) (Sakurai, 2004).

\(^{11}\) For further reading on the topic of educational equity in higher education, admissions, policies, educational quality, and the paucity of resources see Bazargan (1999); Farasatkhah, Ghazi, & Bazargan (2008); Habibi (1989); Hamdhaidari (2008); Mossayeb and Shirazi (2006); Sakurai (2004); Tavakol (2007); and Torbat (2002).
The Third Epoch: From Revolution to Reform (ca. 1997 to 2005)

Disillusioned with conservative rule, Seyed Mohammad Khatami, an unlikely presidential candidate, stepped in to meet existing and new social needs and demands as the leader of a coalition-based reform movement (Clawson, Eisenstadt, Kanovsky, & Menashri, 1998). Rejecting unbridled autocracy characterized by arbitrary rule, Khatami called for a democratic movement that promoted freedom of expression, encouraged the active participation of women and youth in social affairs, insisted upon civil equity among Muslims and non-Muslims, condemned brutality and coercion, sought to build cordial international relations with Islamic countries as well as with the West, and advanced sustainable development in Iran (Ansari, 2006; Khatami, 1997).

In the midst of conflicting policies, challenged reforms, and ideological debates among government leaders, demands for educational opportunity continued to increase. Khatami (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b), an intellectual trained in both Islamic and Western philosophy, saw education as a key component in building civic capacity and an Islamic democracy. However, even a brief look will reveal that the reformists’ ideology had little effect on real educational reform, and that while quantitative and policy improvements were made in some areas, qualitative and practical improvements remained deficient (Mehran, 2003; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005a; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007).

Within the context of Islam, Khatami (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2004) espoused a progressive outlook toward the education of school children and youth. In several of his public addresses, as well as in his writing, he describes the ideal education system as one designed to meet the needs of youth, characterized by flexibility, tolerance, openness to questions, and the training of critical and inquisitive minds. Despite improvements seen
in increased enrollment in higher education, participation of females, and graduation rates (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, 1997–2005), the reformists were faced with several pressing and seemingly insurmountable problems. Amuzegar (2004) and Salehi-Isfahani (2005b), among others, describe the effects of the mismatch between the education being offered in Iran and the country’s occupational needs, suggesting that vast resources were being wasted and that higher education had not changed to meet the practical needs of the marketplace (Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005b; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007). The capacity strain on public higher education and the financial inaccessibility of private universities to the poor delivered a blow to Iran’s educational community. Several scholars have pointed to the resulting low quality of the educational system, shortages, exclusion of capable students, and inadequate evaluations, as evidenced by faculty, graduates, teaching topics, and rate of return for society, among other factors (Bazargan, 2002; Farasatkhah et al., 2008; Hamdhaidari et al., 2008; Sakurai, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani, 2005a; Tavakol, 2007).

Regime members acknowledged in public the increase of emigration and the perceived brain drain,12 In subsequent years, even the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the conservative arm of the regime, passed several resolutions to this end over the course of the third epoch (see Table B5 for selected resolutions).

Ultimately, however, as promising as Khatami’s vision for a freer and open educational system seemed, it was never realized. Mehran’s (2003) assessment of reformist movement ideas and their impact on the education system shows that none of

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12 See addresses by Khatami mentioned in IRNA (2001a, 28 February) and Rafsanjani in IRNA (2001b, 28 February).
the post-reformist elements are reflected in the educational goals and values of schools. Mehran correctly observes that the reason for this is that conservative organs of the government control schools. Those who had hoped for and sought change and reform once again became disillusioned with the government.

**The Fourth Epoch: The Resurgence of Conservatism (2005 to 2009)**

The 2005 presidential elections resulted in the surprise victory by a new conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While the reformists were playing out their agenda, a series of young revolutionaries who had a decade earlier engaged in the Iran-Iraq War, had joined the Revolutionary Guard, and taken advantage of privileges. The new conservatives in reality carried on the Khomeini legacy, while the traditional conservatives began to soften in many ways (Takeyh, 2009).

New conservatives disengaged from Iran’s political continuum, entering an idealized continuation of where Khomeini had left off. Although a slight increase in legal rights and loosened restrictions characterized the previous eight years prior to the new conservative regime, human rights violations escalated considerably during this period, including repressive measures against minority groups, political revivals, educational repression of students and faculty, and the brutal treatment of prison detainees (Ehsani, 2006).

Understandably, the education sector did not escape the extended influence of the new conservative administration. However, the new conservative regime approached education with strategies which were increasingly restrictive and which had the effect of

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13 The rise in violence, censorship, and other repressive acts during Khatami’s era was primarily spearheaded by the new conservatives—acts including the closure of newspapers, violent attacks against progressive clerics, and heightened persecution of religious minorities.
further degrading quality in schools and universities (Farasatkhah et al., 2008). A number of issues stand out when looking at education during this epoch, including university faculty purges, curtailed academic freedom and development, a curriculum infused with flagrant intolerance and inflammatory content toward minority groups, and misuse of statistical information to overlook serious structural problems (Haghighatjoo, 2009; Elmi, 2009; Paivandi, 2008).

Some reports indicate improvements resulting from years of development in education, such as steadily rising enrolment rates, increased literacy, increased graduation rates, gender parity, a rise in the number of advanced and professional degrees granted, and expansion and further development of educational facilities (World Bank, 2008; Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, *Iranian Census, 1986–2006*). Nevertheless, problems such as classroom overcrowding, mistreatment of minorities in schools, degraded quality of education, lack of access to universities, credentialism, and inadequate training at higher education levels persisted (Paivandi, 2008; Salehi-Isfahani, 2009a; Salehi-Isfahani & Egel, 2007; Shavarini, 2006). Curricula remained biased against minorities. As Paivandi (2008) asserts, “Discrimination and intolerance are neither accidental nor sporadic. They are consistent and systematic throughout the textbook at the core of the curriculum in Iranian schools” (p. 4).

Youth who seek higher education upon graduating are faced with new challenges outside curricular and instructional prejudices—namely access and equity issues, as well as problems with quality accountability. During this period, the Supreme Council of the
Cultural Revolution executed a series of policies\textsuperscript{14} that would purge those perceived as ideologically incompatible with the regime agenda, and placed in their stead like-minded supporters (Haghhighatjoo, 2009; Rasoulpour, 2007; Sanati, 2006).\textsuperscript{15}

**Summary of the Islamic Republic of Iran**

As Abrahamian (2008) recollects, most observers, journalists, and politicians, would have bet against the sustainability of a theocratic state run by a cadre of clerical radicals. Yet, 30 years later, after several economic, political, and social upheavals, the Republic remains. Dependence on social welfare has permeated popular life, especially among the poor and rural populations, and has enabled the power structure to remain in place. The regime increased its governing capacity with the strengthening and centralization of its state institutions. The clerical elite, holding ultimate power, effectively dominated nongovernmental agencies, institutions, and resources—even if it had a detrimental effect on economic development. Although the Constitution of the Islamic Republic contains an element of selective democracy, power, in reality, is wielded at the discretion of one leading figure and several like-minded senior clerics (Carothers, 2002). Thus, as shown by others, the Islamic Republic is not a dictatorship, but rather an autocracy made up of a fragmented elite (Kamrava & Hassan-Yari, 2004; Keshavarzian, 2005).

\textsuperscript{14} See a list of the Resolutions passed by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (Islamic Republic of Iran, Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, n.d.).

\textsuperscript{15} In October 2008, 109 Iranian university professors wrote an open letter to Ahmadinejad (Gozaar, 2008) decrying the state policies being implemented in universities. The letter focused on three central issues: (a) weakening of the structural and planning foundations of scientific development; (b) complete transformation of both the culture and functions of the university; and (c) the decrease in participation of faculty and students.
The Islamic Republic has a novel and sophisticated governmental structure with both elected and appointed officials, both subject to approval by others. Yet, upon closer examination, the structure is ultimately set up to secure and perpetuate the systemic power of a few who share a similar orientation. Considering this nuanced governmental form, Figure 7 shows a modified version of Tilly’s (2006b) governmental capacity grid reflecting the shifts made by the elected executive branch (e.g., President, Cabinet, and Majles) and the ecclesiastical branch (e.g., the Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts, and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution).

Figure 7. Regime space under Islamic Republic (1979–2009).

Conclusion

The study of any group and its efforts to make claims, mobilize, and take collective action in the public arena will implicitly or explicitly interact with regimes in one way or another. The study of the form, capacity, and ideological orientation of a
government provides the context in which groups in a given territory select strategies which either respond to, or cause a response from, the government. In the case of two distinct Iranian governments over time, one a secular monarchy and the other a theocratic republic, I have examined the shifts, however slight, in form, capacity, and ideological orientation. Moreover, I have focused on the educational landscape during selected epochs in order to lay the foundation for the following chapters which deal directly with three minority groups during each period. Part of the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze to what extent and how regime-group relations have a bearing on the educational strategy selected by each of the case studies.

In the final analysis, regimes matter. Whether in dictatorships, democracies, or autocracies, regimes play a critical role in the interaction of people’s and group’s interests. The Iranian state, under the Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic, made decisions that were intended to secure its own longevity and prescribe that which would mold the country into what it envisioned would serve its interests. Thus, the question before us is: how did groups manage to meet their needs despite these fluxes in these regime situations? How did groups—which the regime facilitated, tolerated, or repressed—respond under these various governments? In Chapter 5, I will examine the three groups and their group composition, their networks, and their relations with each of these governments in both periods.
CHAPTER 5:

CASE SUBJECTS—THE JEWISH, CHRISTIAN, AND Baha’i COMMUNITIES

**Analysis of Variables and Bounds**

This study sets out to explain the impact that group composition, networks, and regime-group relations have on the educational strategy selection of various religious minority groups. For purposes of clarity, it is imperative to define the limits of each assembled variable. These do not necessarily constitute an exhaustive categorization, but rather explain how, and the extent to which, these factors bear on the strategy selection process for each group. Following general definitions, I will look at the relevant data associated with each case subject.

**Group Composition and Characteristics**

A combination of four features makes up the category *composition and characteristics*: demography, socioeconomic status, organizational structure, and ideological orientation. Some of these features require more attention and definition than others, and various points even overlap. While each feature may be employed more broadly, I have narrowed aspects that directly relate to the analysis of strategy selection.

Demographic information, as generally used, refers to characteristics of a population. Categories in demography include biological and geographical data such as population count, population distribution, age, gender, birth, death, and migration rates, among other descriptive features. Some additional categories include languages spoken, religious affiliation, ethno-cultural grouping, and political affiliation. For my study, I use demography, where information is available, to identify population counts, distribution, and migration patterns for each minority group. Historically, this information has been
difficult to identify in Iran for religious minorities. Therefore, I will rely on a series of sources to triangulate data that vary.

Socioeconomic status sometimes correlates with demographical features. However, unlike the counting of demographic data, socioeconomic status of population members is measured in relation to other population members. It focuses strictly on economic and sociological combinations measuring an individual’s or family’s income, education, and occupation (and, more recently, the acquisition of wealth). These three measures are ranked relative to the economic and social status of other individuals in the population being considered, and can often be broken down into three sub-categories: high, middle, and low status (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2009). Social status is associated with any or all three variables, and thus reflects cultural norms and an individual’s perceived status in the larger community of the population being studied. Socioeconomic status is an important consideration for this study, because it provides insight into educational strategy selection based on economic means, previous educational backgrounds, and occupational experiences and careers sought by the different groups.

While demography and socioeconomic status help inform us about the individual characteristics of the group members, looking at organizational structure provides information on the functioning and social dynamics of each community. I use organizational structure to define (a) a group’s administrative body, which includes its leadership and membership structure; (b) how a group conducts its affairs; and (c) the local, regional, and international organizational branches. The inclusion of organizational structure in a study on organized religious groups provides useful data on how a group
mobilizes, how collective resources are organized and used, how issues are framed, and how regime-group relations are formed and augmented by an organization’s institutions, leaders, and members.

The last feature included in the category of group composition and characteristics is ideological orientation. By ideological orientation, I refer to a group’s official stance on specific issues, based on their religious canon and teachings. As is the case for any given group, changes and modifications are made, by re-interpretation or reformation, to address contemporary problems. The ideological orientation of each religious group in this study is determined by three sources: (a) doctrine and canon, (b) religious leadership, and (c) individual interpretation. While an individual’s religious experience has both implicit and explicit aspects, I focus primarily on the explicit. By explicit, I refer to what the community subscribes to in belief (theological issues such as monotheism, source of authority, etc.), what is generally practiced by the majority (rituals, ceremonies, laws), and what is perceived as essential to being considered part of the group (affiliation criteria and identification based on the latter two indicators.

By looking at orientation, the observer will obtain a richer and contextualized understanding of what is important to a group and its members, and thus influences choices to sacrifice one thing for another, or willingness to lose one thing with the prospect of gaining something perceived as having equal or greater value. Ideological orientation bears significantly on the effectiveness of framing situations and actions. For example, whether an individual sees obedience to religious authority as being of primal importance in an individual’s accepted affiliation will have a significant impact on that person’s choice either to stay within the religion and follow instructions, not to engage in
the community but to retain some semblance of affiliation with the religion, or to leave
the community and religion altogether. The point of assessing the role of ideological
orientation is to examine the extent to which beliefs can alter choices; or, in this case, the
selection of plausible educational strategies. However, I address ideological orientation
throughout the various descriptive features, and more directly when looking at particular
episodes in the chapter on educational strategy selection; in this way, the abstraction of
ideology is given more tangible expression through analysis of interactions.

**Networks**

While I do not adopt the network analysis methodology (see Chapter 3), I look to
concepts in network analysis to evaluate how the religious minority groups draw on
domestic and international networks to meet their educational needs. Suffice it to say that
a network is a set of actors or nodes connected by a specific type of relation, where actors
or nodes are either individuals, collective actors, or organizations (Diani, 2002). Like
organizational structures, networks may influence resource the mobilization, framing, and
opportunity structures of a group (Tarrow, 2005).

Domestically, analyzing community and organizational networks provides a
closer look at how a group (comprised of leaders and members) interacts with other
groups in meeting their needs. Internationally, the examination of networks is important,
because it informs any discussion on transnational movements and the efficacy of
supranational influences on regime decisions. To this end, I look at how each minority
group in Iran networks with its transnational communities (diasporas and otherwise), with
other national governments and their agencies, non-Iranian nongovernmental agencies,
and other international organizations.
**Regime-Group Relations**

A group’s relation to the regime can be defined in a number of ways. In my analysis, I am concerned with four key factors which constitute regime-group relations: (a) official recognition of the rights of the group by the state regime; (b) representation of the group in state institutions; (c) the extent to which a regime facilitates, tolerates, or represses a group’s claims, and actions; and (d) the extent to which a group accepts, tolerates, resists, or rejects regime policies and claims.

Regimes implicitly and explicitly recognize various sub-groups within the population. Some sub-groups are identified as ethnic, linguistic, religious, or political. A regime’s public recognition comes in the form of legal documentation, such as constitutions, census data, or public edicts and addresses. Sometimes implicit recognition of the groups is made through tolerance of a group’s activities without endorsing or acknowledging the existence of the group. Likewise, a regime may not recognize a group for a variety of reasons, including neglect and lack of awareness; at other times, a regime may purposefully deny recognition of a group, with the result that its members are not accorded certain civil rights offered to the country’s other citizens; in other cases, a regime may claim plausible denial of any ill-treatment of that group.

The importance of looking at the representation of the group in state institutions has a number of advantages in gauging regime-group relations. First, and most obvious, is that inclusion of a group in the state structure implies immediate recognition and legitimacy of that group as part of the body politic. Second, it provides an outlet for voicing claims by the group to the regime, to seek further rights to particular state
services or group liberties. Third, representation also means institutionalization of the group, which comes with both group privileges as well as limitations.

Representation is only one way that a group might be facilitated, tolerated, or repressed by the regime. Any given regime engages in these three behaviors toward every group. The government’s treatment of groups could be considered part of the opportunity structure provided for a group to make claims and mobilize toward collective action. By looking at government policies and practices as related to the case subjects, general patterns emerge to indicate what actions and groups are proscribed, tolerated, or prohibited.

In turn, looking at a group’s actions and the extent to which a group accepts, tolerates, resists, or rejects regime policies and claims, indicates the group’s relational approach to a regime. For the purpose of this study, I look at the extent to which a group selects educational strategies, based on how a group sees its current relation to the regime, how it perceives itself as being treated by the state, what opportunity structures exist under each regime, and how situations might be framed to benefit the group.

Generally, the claims and actions of each case subject can be characterized as accepting, tolerating, resisting, or rejecting. Accepting would mean conforming to regime policies and practices, maintaining the status quo, and participating in the government’s facilitation processes. Tolerating actions refer to situations where a group consciously bears the brunt of unfavorable policies and actions, and takes no significant action to openly counter the regime’s decision. Resisting would entail a range of actions including disengagement, isolation, and contained actions, in response to regime policies and practices. Finally, rejecting involves the wholesale refusal of a government claim or
action, leading to initiatives that may be condemned by the government, the formation of alliances with nongovernmental and international organizations in pressuring the government, and leaving the country.

**Group Composition and Characteristics of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is**

As previously outlined, a combination of four features constitutes the category composition and characteristics: demography, socioeconomic status, organizational structure, and ideological orientation. These features as they relate to the three subject groups will be presented where information is available, and the three groups will be treated in a comparative analysis.

**Demography**

The population count of the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities has significantly shifted over time. Different challenges and opportunities propelled emigration or caused stagnation, while other periods facilitated opportunities for growth. Obtaining accurate data on these groups has been challenging, as it has been much overlooked, leading to re-use of common but uncritically reviewed citations. To this end, I have triangulated sources to ascertain the population counts within each minority group, and made it a point to highlight estimates that may be vague, suspect, or which diverge from other sources.

**Jewish Population in Iran.** The Jewish community was reported to be about 100,000 in number in 1935. The population increased to 120,000 in 1948 according to one source (Jewish Agency in Tehran, as cited in Shiloah & Netzer, 2006) but declined to 90,000–100,000 according to another (Rahimiyan, 2008a, 2008b), and even lower by the Iranian Census which estimated 65,232. By 1966, according to the Iranian Census there
were 60,683 Jews living in Iran. Numbers grew in the 1950s, despite emigration to Israel by Jews in the lower socioeconomic segment of the community.¹ In 1979, there were reportedly 65,000–70,000 (Aryeh Dulzin, as cited in Anderson, 1979; Yegar, 1993) Jews in Iran, most of whom lived in Tehran.² Later sources place the figure higher at 80,000 (Rahimiyani, 2008a, 2008b; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006). After the revolution, an exodus of Jews from Iran resulted in a population decline over the next decade to 26,354 (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, *Iranian Census*, 1986). According to the Islamic Republic’s census data, there were 12,737 Jews in 1996 and 9,252 in 2006; other sources for this period show close to 11,000 (World Jewish Congress, 2009). See Figure 8 for population trends for Iranian Jewry in the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods, and see Table C1 for estimation by various sources.³

**Christian population in Iran.** Iranians of Armenian descent account for the largest proportion of the Christians in Iran.⁴ In 1956, an estimated 190,000 Armenians lived in Iran (Abrahamian, 1982). Firoozi (1974) placed the count of Armenians at 108,421 for 1966, out of the total estimated 149,427 Christians (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, *Iranian Census*, 1966). The number of Armenian Christians in Iran grew to somewhere between 270,000 (Amurian & Kasheff, 1987) and 300,000

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¹ There was a reverse migration from Israel back to Iran by many; reports record up to 5,000 returned only five years after leaving Iran (Rahimiyani, 2008b). This reverse trend may be explained by possible difficulties of adjustment in a foreign territory, lack of actual opportunity, or unfavorable conditions, resulting in a return to a familiar setting, family, and community life.

² This correlates more closely with the Iranian census data, which found 62,258 for 1976.

³ See Appendix C for this chapter’s Tables.

⁴ Most Armenian Christians belong to the Apostolic Church, an ancient, autocephalous branch of Eastern Christianity. A very small minority of Armenians are also Catholic or Protestant.
Figure 8. Population of Iranian Jewry in the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods. Sources: American Jewish Yearbook (1950, 1962); Anderson (1979); Higgins (1984); Hourcade (1996); Iranian Census (various years); Rahimiyan (2008); Shiloah and Nezter (2006); World Jewish Congress (2009); Yegar (1993).

(Minority at Risk Report, 2009b) for 1977, which significantly exceeded the total count of Christians by the Iranian Census for the same period (168,593 for 1976). By several accounts, there were varying estimates, ranging from 130,000 (Pakizegi, 1992), 200,000, and 300,000 Armenians in the 1980s (Sanasarian, 2000). After the revolution, however, the number has fallen significantly. Some approximations for the number of Armenian Iranian Christians place the population count at 112,000 (Marshall, 2000) to 150,000 (Sanasarian, 1995) for the 1990s. Many policy and government reports still place the number of Armenians higher than expected, at around 250,000 to 300,000 for the last decade (Minority at Risk Report, 2009b; United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2009). According to one source, there are only about 100,000 Armenians in Iran as of 2006 (Armenia Diaspora, 2009), which correlates relatively well
with the Iranian Census data, which estimates a total of 108,415 Christians for 2006 (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, 2006).

Other major Christian sects include the Assyrian and Chaldeans who were collectively estimated to number roughly between 10,000 (Macuch & Ishaya, 1987) in 1950–1951 and 20,000 for 1956 (Abrahamian, 1982). Macuch and Ishaya (1987) estimate that in 1971 the Assyrian population grew to slightly under 20,000. For the 1970s, Sanasarian (2000) estimated 30,000. For the 1980s, the numbers begin to vary significantly, ranging from 27,500 to 58,000 (Macuch and Ishaya, 1987; Pakizegi, 1992). Other numbers indicated a more conservative trajectory of population growth: Marshall (2000) estimated 23,000 Assyrians and 13,000 other Catholics for the 1990s, and Archbishop Youhannan Issayi (as cited in Sanasarian, 2000) put the count at 16,000 to 18,000. The Vatican reports around 17,000 Catholics (comprising Roman Catholics, Armenian, as well as Chaldean sects) in Iran as of 2009 (Thavis, 2009).

Protestant Christians are estimated to number between 5,000 and 15,000 in the population (Sanasarian, 2000); however the number remains uncertain because of the large number of converts that remain uncounted for safety reasons—because they are not a recognized religious minority. Additionally, the rise in Muslim converts to Christianity is undercounted according to some sources, because they would be considered apostates. Some inside sources estimate that between 50,000 to 120,000 Christians hide their religious affiliation in public (Issa Dibaj, cited in Esfandiari, 2004; Iranian Christians International, n.d.; Open Doors USA, 2009). While the Armenian presence in Iran has declined over the years since the revolution, conversion to Christianity has increased; the number however is difficult to ascertain. Figure 9 includes the averages of these figures,
and includes Iranian Census reports during the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic Period for all Christian groups (Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, *Census Data*, 1966–2006).

### Figure 9. Iranian Christian population averages by decade.

**Baha’i population in Iran.** During the Pahlavi era, statistics gathered in the earlier epochs were both unreliable and unsystematic, and did not include the Baha’is as a recognized minority. After the Revolution, the Baha’is again went unrecognized as a legitimate minority group in Iran. In 1915, Wilson (1915/1970) approximated the Baha’i population to be 100,000–200,000. There were a reported 192,000 Baha’is living in Iran.
in 1956 (Abrahamian, 1982), while Berges (1954) offers a ranged figure of 100,000–
200,000 for the same decade. For 1975, Barrett (1982) estimated 295,000 Baha’is, similar
to most other estimates of 300,000 by other early sources. Baha’i sources outside Iran
initially reported 300,000 to 400,000 members, but the estimates were reduced by Baha’i
institutions to 300,000 based on non-Baha’i external sources. This latter figure is the
most cited by academics, government organizations, and other accounts. Ahang Rabbani
(personal communication, November 5, 2009) provided the author with a conservative
calculation for this period. Based on the records of the National Spiritual Assembly of the
Baha’is of Iran, some 75,000 Baha’i adults lived in Iran in 1977. Based on this figure,
Rabbani calculated a total of 172,500 Baha’is for the period (including children and
youth). After the Revolution, there was a significant emigration of Baha’is, and counting
the remaining community membership was next to impossible because of their
unrecognized and banned status. The commonly cited figure of 300,000–350,000 has
remained in circulation for the last 30 years, and is used by both Baha’i and non-Baha’i
sources. While this number appears to be an overestimation, underestimating the number
has its deficiencies as well, particularly because the number of Iranian Baha’is continues
to increase through conversion and birth.

Geographic Spread of the Three Minority Groups

The geographic spread of Jews, Christians and Baha’is also changed over time,
but by most accounts, all three groups, like the general population, gravitated toward

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5 See Smith, 1984 for an overview of statistical information on Baha’is in th19th- and early
th20th-century Iran.

6 Using the United Nations Statistical and Demographic database, Ahang Rabbani (personal
communication, November 5, 2009) used the factor of 1.3 children/youth for every adult. The following
formula was employed: \((1+1.3) * 75,000 = 2.3 * 75,000 = 172,500\).
urban areas whenever possible when there were no opportunities locally. Figure 10 shows the general geographic distribution of the three religious minorities (ca. 1979–2009). A major influence on emigration outside the country for the various groups was domestic pressure and restrictions on mobility and freedom, as well as the lack of opportunity—whether as a result of discrimination or general disparity. For example, a large number of Iranian Jews left Iran for Israel in the 1950s, in search of opportunities unavailable to them in their home country. The pervasive the Islamic Republic and public sentiment after the 1979 Revolution in Iran played a role in motivating members of minority groups to leave Iran. This was especially critical for groups which perceived that their survival was threatened. A further motive for leaving the country after the 1979 Revolution was the war with Iraq, followed by a deteriorating economy. Other significant attractions for emigration were the perceived opportunities outside Iran, such as education, social freedom, economic, and political opportunity.7

Notwithstanding the varying and sometimes unreliable estimates of the numbers of the three religious minorities, it is important to note that the ebb and flow of growth and decline, whether influenced by an internal (domestic) or external (international) impetus has had a direct effect on other elements of the groups’ composition. Population count, clustering, and dispersion have a bearing on socioeconomic opportunities, the integrity of group organizational structures, and how group members frame and reframe ideological orientation. I argue that population count also affects the resources available to a group, including material, human, organizational, moral, and cultural resources. Similarly, the size and location of a group partially determine the accessibility and

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7 See Hakimzadeh (2006) for a detailed analysis of international migration of Iranians by date and country.
availability of strategies and opportunities; thus, a small or a large group will have particular advantages that the other does not. Small groups may not be as noticeable and thus be tolerated, while larger and more visible groups may face harsher scrutiny. Conversely, larger groups have a wider pool to draw from in mobilizing resources for community affairs, while a smaller community generally has fewer. Actions can also be framed in a similar context.

Figure 10. Religious minorities in Iran (ca. 1979–2009)

Migration is particularly important in considering network ties and collective resources. Diaspora communities’ relationship with their home population can aid or impair a group’s ability to strategize and act collectively. Prior to the Pahlavi era, religious minority groups were fairly scattered throughout Iran. However, as in other
segments of the population, many migrated to the cities where the government spent most of its development resources. In other words, greater opportunities for employment and education were perceived in such cities as Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, and other urban areas, especially for members of minorities.

All three groups moved to bigger cities over the decades, particularly Jews and Baha’is. However, Baha’is remained in many smaller localities because of their commitment to engage in local propagation of their religion and in order to sustain local communities. Christians also moved to urban areas like Tehran, but most maintained their communities in Isfahan, Urmieh, Tabriz, and Ahvaz. In 1946–1947 large numbers of Armenians moved to Soviet Armenia, following an open call to them from the Catholics of Soviet Armenia to help repopulate the homeland after the devastation and population decline of World War II (Amurian & Kasheff, 1987). The move to central cities changed other characteristics of the groups, notably the educational and professional opportunities that facilitated the Jewish and Baha’i communities’ social and economic mobility during the Pahlavi era.

While some Christians emigrated because of persecution during the time of Reza Pahlavi, significant migration occurred only after the Revolution. With the exodus of Christians and Jews, the communities in smaller areas suffered from isolation. Similarly, the Jewish population experienced large emigration to Israel beginning in the late 1940s and in the 1960s; however, 5,000 of the 57,1118 Iranian Jews who moved during this period returned to Iran (Rahimiyani, 2008b). According to Haftvan (2006), half of the entire population of Armenians left Iran in the years immediately following the Islamic

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Revolution, moving primarily to the United States and Europe. The Minority Assessment Report (2009b) indicates that Christians had been leaving the country at a rate of 15,000 to 20,000 per year since 2001. Jewish émigrés during the 1970s and 1980s consisted primarily of those with financial means, opportunities outside the country, or ties abroad (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, November 2, 2009). The primary destinations for Jewish émigrés were the United States (35,000), Israel (20,000)\(^9\) and Western Europe (5,000; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).\(^{10}\) Many Baha’is also fled the country during and after the revolution because of heightened persecution of community members, leaders, and institutions. Most Baha’is who emigrated moved to the United States, Canada, Australasia, and Western Europe, although a smaller number went to countries in the Middle East, southern Asia, Africa, and South America. The precise number of Iranian Baha’i emigrants is unknown. However, based on records and estimates of Baha’i immigrants to the other countries, it seems that the number is relatively small, indicating that only some 20,000–50,000 have left since the early 1900s up to the present.\(^{11}\) Many individuals and families who did not or could not leave the country moved to the hubs of their respective communities, but others remained in place out of a sense of service, duty, or because it was impractical for them to do otherwise.


\(^{10}\) The move to Europe was mainly to England, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland (Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).

\(^{11}\) Based on figures of the United States Baha’i National Center (2009), 1,413 Iranian Baha’is arrived in the United States between 1901 and 1977, and 19,195 between 1978 and 2009. Baha’is emigrated to other places, including Canada, Australia, India, and various countries in Europe, but also to countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America. In 1978, when there were only 50 to 60 Baha’is in all of Australia, the arrival of 538 Iranian Baha’is in 1986 brought the number to approximately 2,500 in 1988 (Hassel, 2000). According to Moojan Momen’s (1991) calculations, 60 percent of the European Baha’i community consisted of Iranian Baha’is by the 1970s.
The loss of so many people had a noticeable impact on the vitality and organization of all three groups.

**Socioeconomic Status of the Three Minority Groups**

There has been little serious study of the socioeconomic status of the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities in Iran, and for good reason. The data traditionally available in such assessments is generally unreliable, missing, or inaccessible. When discussing socioeconomic status of individuals or the average status of a group, four indicators are usually measured: family income, education, occupation, and wealth. While exact figures for each of these indices are unavailable, there have been generalizations made by insiders and outsiders based on observation of related indicators.

**The Jewish community.** Prior to the Pahlavi era, many urban Iranian Jews lived in distinct areas of a city (called *mahalleh*) having high concentrations of community members. In these special districts, shops, hospitals, schools, houses, synagogues, and other venues were run and used by Jews (Sarshar, 2002). Before the secularization efforts of Reza Shah, Jews had faced gross discrimination, and were prohibited from buying products from some Muslim-owned shops, baths, and public spaces; moreover, Muslims were often discouraged from buying products from Jews because of their *najes* or “impure” status. The *mahalleh* were not ghettos, nor were they mandatory, but they served the practical functions of everyday life (Sarshar, 2002). Before the Pahlavi era, Jewish children were not permitted in government or Muslim schools, but did not actually require this service, as Jewish-run schools and other religious minority schools proved to be higher in quality. Certain jobs or industries were off limits to Jews as well, such as banking or government posts. As a result, many became entrepreneurs and
performed other services needed in their own community. One informant\textsuperscript{12} relates that, because of the generally hostile attitude toward the Jewish community over the centuries, many members of the Jewish community sought professions that were mobile and less subject to long term disadvantage—such as goldsmithing, peddling, trading, etc. Socioeconomic status was tied directly to one’s religious affiliation and place of dwelling. While some Jews were able to successfully run businesses, or even work outside the Jewish community, the vast majority did not do so with ease.

The advent of Reza Shah’s rule of Iran ushered in new economic and educational opportunities for Iranian Jews. Due to Reza Shah’s nationalistic agenda, the primary identity of the citizen was secular rather than religious. Jews, like most religious minorities, were able to retain both national and religious identities, while benefiting from privileges that were usually reserved for Muslims. For example, Jews were allowed to serve in the military and higher posts in the government, able to buy land, open shops more freely outside the Jewish Quarters (mahalle-ye yuhudiyan), go to public schools and build new ones, and benefit from the new higher education sector that was being developed (Rahimiyan, 2008b). Despite the fluctuating strain of worsening Israel-Iran relations on Iranian Jews, most individuals were able to integrate into the burgeoning national Iranian identity that was characteristic of the political ideology of the Shah. Despite these gains, the majority of Iranian Jews were still relatively poor by the time Reza Shah abdicated the throne (Rahimiyan, 2008a).

Some refer to the period of Muhammad Reza Shah as the “Golden Age for Iranian Jews,” because of the significant improvement in the economic status of Jews during that

\textsuperscript{12} Sam Kermanian, personal communication, June 2, 2009.
period (Menashri, 2002; Rahimiyan, 2008a). Occupationally, those who rose in socioeconomic status were entrepreneurs, international dealers and importers, academics, industrialists, insurance brokers, developers, and real estate investors.\textsuperscript{13} (Loeb, 1996; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).\textsuperscript{14} According to Faryar Nikbakht (2002), one reason Jews were able to rise economically and socially was because they had been attending the French Alliance Israel Universelle school (established in 1898) for several decades prior to the Pahlavi era. Equipped with both English and French, they were the ideal candidates to supervise, manage, or work as intermediaries between the foreign technical industrialists brought by the Shah from abroad to help modernize Iran and its workers. These opportunities facilitated the movement of a segment of Iranian Jews, particularly those in urban areas, into the middle and higher class. The rising status of the Iranian Jewry was even more noticeable because of the migration of lower class Iranian Jews to Israel—seeking opportunities unavailable or inaccessible to them in Iran—as early as the late 1940s. By 1968, according to Haddad (1984), Iranian Jews were the wealthiest community of Jews in Asia and Africa.

The secular environment encouraged by the Pahlavi regime also had a bearing on Jewish status. Despite still being considered najes (impure) by Islamic standards, the focus on national identity facilitated the integration of Iranian Jews into the larger community. Nearly 68 percent of all Jews in Iran lived in Tehran by the 1970s. Some 10 percent became extremely wealthy, 80 percent were roughly middle class, and another 10

\textsuperscript{13} Prior to 1925, Jews were generally not permitted to own land (Loeb, 1996).

\textsuperscript{14} According to various sources, some of the significant careers industries included banking, jewelry, insurance, textiles, plastics, paper, pharmaceuticals, aluminum production, liquor distillery and distribution, shipping, imports, industrial machinery, clothing and retail, automobiles, medicine, engineering, and tile manufacturing (Rahimiyan, 2008b; Shiloah & Netzer, 2006).
percent counted among the poor (usually in rural areas, but also in poor areas of the city (Nezter, 1981, as cited in Rahimiyan, 2008a). Although most of the original mahalleh still exist today in some form, most Iranian Jews were integrated and dispersed in the general population by the mid-1960s (Sarshar, 2002).

As mentioned earlier, the impetus for the social mobility of the Iranian Jewish community was due in part to open opportunity structures under the Pahlavis Shahs, and educational training decades earlier in various Jewish and other religious minority-run schools,15 particularly the Alliance Israelite Universelle.16 Jewish children also attended schools run by American and European Christian missionaries as well as Baha’is during the late 19th and early 20th century (Nikbakht, 2002). During both regimes of the Pahlavis,17 Jewish children were able to attend government schools as well. The importance of the Alliance schools in developing the Jewish Iranian community—contributing to both the educational opportunities as well as status—cannot be overestimated. Their role as a hub promoting culture, networking, and training a new generation of “modern” youth prepared thousands of Jewish young men for service in the professions and set the stage for rapid development during the Pahlavi era (Nikbakht, 2002). The schools reflected the French ideological orientation toward liberalization, modern education, and extended into the cultural arena. The reputation of the schools attracted non-Jewish children (Muslims, Armenians, Assyrians, and Baha’is) who

15 In addition to the Alliance schools established in the late 19th and early 20th century throughout Iran, other schools included the famed Ettefagh and Shamash Schools (Nikbakht, 1999).

16 The Alliance schools first opened in Tehran in 1898, and then in other Jewish communities; Hamadan (1900), Isfahan (1901), Shiraz (1903), Sanandaj (1903), Nahavand (1904), Kermanshah (1904), Bijar (1906), Borujerd (1913), Yazd (1926), and Kashan (1929).

17 According the American Jewish Yearbook (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1950), 1500 students were enrolled at religious minority schools and another 4500 were attending government schools. However, 8000 Jewish children (less than half) did not attend any school.
eventually made up 10 percent of the enrollment and included the children of some prominent government officials (Nikbakht, 2002). Before the Alliance (Ettehad) and other Jewish schools, literacy in the Jewish community was limited to Persian-Hebrew (reading Hebrew with Persian letters), while attendance in these schools eventually resulted in literacy in Persian as well as other European languages for many thousands (Nikbakht, 2002).

By 1968, there were 13 Alliance schools with 5,158 pupils (Schwarzfuchs & Malino, 2006), while other figures place the count for this period at 15 schools with 6,500 students (Netzer, 1985). Other locally based and foreign Iranian Jewish schools were opened throughout Iran as well, such as the Koresh School of Rast (1922), the Koresh School of Tehran (1931), Otzar Hatorah (ca. 1947–1979; 31 schools), ORT (vocational and technical training schools), the Ettefaugh School in Tehran (1947), Abrisami, Ruhi Sad, and Saybani in Shiraz. By 1961, a reported 13,200 Jewish children attended the 37 various Jewish schools in Iran, and another 2,000–3,000 attended non-Jewish schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1962). By 1973, the number had dropped to some 10,647 students enrolled in Jewish-run schools, 45

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18 It is important to note that institutions like the Alliance school assisted the vitality and cohesion of the Iranian Jewish community whose membership was increasingly attracted and converted to either Christianity or the Baha’i Faith.

19 In 1926, Persian language instruction was mandated by the government (Netzer, 1985).

20 The Otzar Hatorah school was established by an American Orthodox educational movement, and stressed Hebrew and ritual knowledge, and observance of the Sabbath and kashrut (dietary law). The Otzar Hatorah was central to the revitalization of the Shirazi Jewry, particularly in providing a thorough educational model (Loeb, 1981). According to the *American Jewish Yearbook* (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1950), there were 3,800 students registered in Otzar Hatorah schools.

21 By 1961, a reported 13,200 children attended the 37 various Jewish schools in Iran, and another 2,000–3,000 attended non-Jewish schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1962). In 1966, 14,000 children attended the 37 Jewish schools and another 2,000–3,000 Jewish children attended other schools (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1966).
percent of whom were Jewish children (American Jewish Committee Archives, *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1975). The decrease in attendance in Jewish schools from 14,000 to a little over 10,000 can be explained by the proliferation of government-run schools accessible to Jews and others during the period of Muhammad Reza Shah, as well as to migration outside Iran.22

Scholarships were usually extended to Jewish children who could not afford to attend Jewish-run schools, and additional clothing, hot lunches, and health services were made available to poor students. Funding for these schools came from wealthy donors in Iraq, France, and England, as well as from organizations and synagogue congregations. By the 1970s, organizations and committees were the primary financial managers of these institutions (including the Sanduk Melli or the Jewish National Treasury Committee; American Jewish Committee Archives, 1975). In other words, schools and learning institutions constituted the primary means of distribution of “wealth” through material, social, and cultural capital—the channels for social mobility. In turn, many Jewish graduates entered the new universities throughout the country, and, after graduating, some joined the various faculties. The significant boost in economic status also helped the newly schooled generation of Jews to change the lives of their families for generations to come.

The Christian community. The different Christian communities in Iran benefited from similar processes of socioeconomic status mobility experienced by many

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22 It is important to note that with the modern school system, traditional schools and old learning models became less popular. Even the Jewish religious schools saw a significant decline in attendance. As Loeb (1981) describes: “The curriculum consisted of a prayer book, readings from the Torah, particularly the prophetic portions read on Sabbath in the synagogue, and for the astute, Mishna. By age nine or ten, most boys had completed their education, and began working as apprentices to their fathers or other close kinsman” (p. 315).
Iranian Jews, but with significant differences. The foreign Christian missionary and Armenian schools served as an important first step in equipping students with the skills and knowledge to meet the demands of the modernization and industrialization agenda during the Pahlavi regimes. Traditionally made up of artisans, many were able, during the first half of the 20th century, to adjust to the modernizing efforts of the new government. According to Bournoutian (1994), because of transnational ties and language advantages (French and English in schools), Armenian Iranians thrived as both fine and performing artists, tailors, cobblers, photographers, managers of cafes and restaurants, but also as traders, auto-mechanics, truckers, technicians, and business owners. Others who attended Christian schools experienced similar advantages. Only a very small number rose to the upper class, with the majority remaining in the low and new middle class (Bournoutian, 1994; Burke, 1993). Christians experienced moderate upward mobility during the Pahlavi era, as compared with the tour-de-force carried out by the Jews and Baha’is of the same period. The long tradition of guilds among Armenians and Assyrians assisted in facilitating opportunities as Iran was modernizing (Yaghoubian, 1993).

While reliable figures are difficult to obtain, we have good evidence that during the years 1925–1979 there were some 48 Armenian schools (several small, one-class, as well as more established multi-grade schools; Bournoutian, 1994; Sanasarian, 2000). Some scholars have suggested that the initial rise of modern schooling among Apostolic Armenians was spurred by the rivalry between Presbyterian and Catholic missions which

23 By the 1970s, only 0.1 percent had succeeded in penetrating the upper class (Pahlavi family, military officers, senior civil servants, and high end entrepreneurs); some 23 percent were among the middle class (occupying both traditional and new roles), and the vast majority of the population at large (77 percent) were part of the lower class (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 140). This is why the leap made by the small Jewish population to middle and upper class positions was so noticeable; as was the case with the Baha’is during this period (Abrahamian, 2008; Keddie, 1981; Naficy, 1981; Sanasarian, 2000).
were perceived as a threat because they attempted to convert others (Rostam-Kolayi, 2008; Zirinsky, 1993a; discussed in Chapter 6). By the time Reza Shah came into power, there were already 13 Presbyterian schools in Tehran, Hamadan, Rasht, Tabriz, and Urmia (Zirinsky, 1993a). The French Lazarist Catholic missionaries established one of the first nonreligious oriented schools in 1938, which attracted students from various faiths (Shahvar, 2009). Around 1975, the Chaldean Church had a school “Sarq,” which had 370 students and 15 teachers, and a national school “Susan” with over 750 students and 14 teachers (Macuch and Ishaya, 1987).

Initially, the missionary school curriculum emphasized practical and technical education, but later this expanded to include foundations for business, industrial work, training in the trades, business, engineering, and medicine (Zirinksy, 1993a, 1993b). Some Christian schools enjoyed a prestigious reputation, such as the Alborz College of Tehran, as well as the Nurbakhsh girl’s school, and attracted students from all religious communities and prominent government officials (Armajani, 1985; Doolittle, 1983; Zirinsky, 2009). While there are no accurate figures for the total number of students that attended the schools—much less for their ethno-religious composition—the closest estimate based on trajectory and representation indicate some 10,000–15,000 students.24

**The Baha’i community.** Like the Jewish community, the more nascent Baha’i community in Iran benefited from its own schools during the late 19th and early 20th century, and was primed for the opportunities available to them during the Pahlavi Era. Unlike the many Jews who lived in the *mahalleh* or the Christians who were concentrated

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24 This figure may appear insignificant unless compared with the total of some 55,000 students attending Iranian government and private schools when Reza Shah came into power. By 1935, however there were an estimated 170,077 students, spurred by the government’s education initiatives (Matthee, 1993).
in specific regions of Iran (such as New Julfa), Baha’is were the most dispersed of the three groups, and represented membership from an array of social-economic classes. This was in part due to the speedy growth of the religion which had attracted converts from the time of its earliest beginnings in the 1840s (Smith, 1987). However, because of the persecution and stigma associated with the Baha’is, they were often isolated and their mobility restricted. Public government schools were rare during this period in Iran, and Islamic schools were inaccessible, if not dangerous, for Baha’i children to attend (Banani, 1961). However, from the outset, education was a religious injunction in the Baha’i Faith, set by its founder and his successors, and by 1899, the first modern school was established. By 1938, there were 50 Baha’i schools open to children of all religions throughout Iran (Shahvar, 2009). While no exact figure is given, approximately 10,000 to 25,000 children attended these schools during the years that they were in operation. Some estimate that about 10 percent of all school children attended Baha’i-run schools (Baha’i International Community, 2005a). Baha’is and many non-Baha’is attended these schools, making it difficult to provide reliable figures for number of Baha’i pupils.

The schools increased one after another in large and small cities throughout Iran, and were further supported by members of the American Baha’i community, who played a significant role in developing the structure and philosophy of the schools (Shahvar, 2009). The schools strictly adhered to the curricular requirements of the new Pahlavi Ministry of Education, and refrained from including Baha’i education (Banani, 1961). With the Pahlavi focus on modernity, the Baha’is were able to implement their own modern principles, pioneering in a variety of fields, despite being stigmatized as an
aberrant group by large segments of the general society. The schools were highly regarded by many non-Baha’is, and even government officials and prominent families of Muslims sent their children there.

With the more liberal policies toward religious minorities that characterized the later Pahlavi period, Baha’is continued to seek education from modern schools which had been established decades earlier, and began to pursue higher education in Iran’s new universities. Some even joined the growing number of students abroad (particularly in the United States and Western Europe). As several scholars have indicated, the education and progressive orientation of Baha’is, coupled with open opportunities, led to the social mobility of many of its community members during the period of Muhammad Reza Shah, much as it had for the Jews (Keddie, 1981; Naficy, 1981; Shahvar, 2009). Even though the Baha’is were a nonrecognized religious minority, their growing affluence and prominence in positions of influence and in education was noticeable to many (Abrahamian, 2008). This fact would later be used against the Baha’is during the time of the Islamic Republic, when opponents of the Baha’is accused them of collaborating with the Shah, with the imperialist interests of the United States and Great Britain, and with Zionism. Baha’is who were members of the new middle and upper classes of modern Iran included businessmen and entrepreneurs, doctors and nurses, engineers and architects, international traders, academics, government sector employees, as well as managers and supervisors. As with other minority groups, they occupied their share of the traditional

25 It is significant that, even though other religious minorities received harsh and inequitable treatment at the hands of the authorities because of their “impure” status, they were still protected officially by their designation as ahl al-kitab, (People of the Book). However, Baha’is were considered murtadd (unprotected) and mahdud al-damm (whose blood could be shed), maslub al-huquq (without rights), and whose property was mubah (belonging to no one), and thus subject to manhub al-mal (plundering). In other words, they occupied the lowest run of the ladder of Iranian society.
middle class (teachers, artisans, and the merchants known as *bazaari*) and lower class, engaged in common trades (e.g., peddling, tailoring, etc.).

The rise of a segment of their population to the upper and middle class strengthened their community organization, structures and property, and services offered. This, in turn, boosted their status within society as modernists, progressives, and socially mobile members of society. Baha’is, however, remained out of favor and were often the target of more radical and conservative factions of the Muslim community, the Baha’is nonetheless experienced significant and unprecedented social mobility during the Pahlavi period, particularly economically and educationally. According to one 1973 report (Baha’i World Centre, 1968–1973, Vol. 15, p. 248), illiteracy had been eradicated among Baha’i women under the age of 40. Literacy for boys was equally advanced, similar to that of those who attended the Jewish, Christian, and foreign schools. Baha’is were accepted into many government posts at all levels, including the civil service, the military (as noncombatants), and even high appointed positions (Banani, 1961; Keddie, 1981; Milani, 2008).

**Status of Minority Groups Under the Islamic Republic of Iran**

With the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), conditions, opportunities, and status immediately changed for religious minority groups. Several key factors led to the rapid reorganization of the socioeconomic structure of the Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. Over the 30-year span of the Islamic Republic (1979–2009), virtually all members of the upper class belonging to

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26 There was a surge of violence against Baha’is throughout Iran during the 1950s, including attacks on and beatings of individuals, the destruction of some of their most holy sites, and other violent measures (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006).
any of the three groups left the country, because of the threat to their well-being and safety. It is extremely difficult to assess with any accuracy the real socioeconomic status of religious minorities in the Islamic Republic, and thus a general overview of their economic, educational, and occupational conditions will have to suffice.

The victory and aftermath of the Islamic Revolution aroused uncertainty in many members of the Jewish population, prompting the largest emigration of Iranian Jews—particularly from the upper and middle class—during these three decades. Nonetheless, recognized religious minority groups were included in the new Iranian constitution, and given representation in Parliament. The rights and privileges prescribed to these groups were insignificant, but *dhimma* (protected) status was extended to them. As with the general population, Jews and Christians in rural areas who were part of the lower class probably benefited from the literacy campaigns of the Islamic Republic, resulting in a 99 percent literacy rate in the new generation. However, because Christians and Jews were considered second-class citizens—not being Muslims—they did not benefit equally from the social services extended to Muslim supporters of the Revolution. With the exodus of many of their leaders and prominent, educated community members, the cultural and social aspects of both Jewish and Christian communities suffered.

Jewish and Christians schools were reorganized to reflect the agenda of the Islamic Republic and gain regime approval. Name changes to schools and buildings, reformation of the curriculum, and restructuring of the administrative and teaching staff of minority-run schools were at the top of the agenda, and had an inevitable affect on the...
educational quality being offered to Christian and Jewish students. The heavy-handed
dogmatic curriculum and overt domination of Shi’i ideology had a detrimental impact on
minority populations, often leading to higher rates of emigration, by means of which
parents sought better conditions, especially educational opportunity, for their children
(Mossayeb & Shirazi, 2006).

The Islamic Republic never recognized the Baha’is as a legitimate religious
minority. Moreover, the Minister of Education, Mohammad Ali Raja’i, an open opponent
of the Baha’is, called for the immediate expulsion of all Baha’i children from schools and
universities, and demanded the firing of any Baha’i who worked for the education system
(Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006). Ultimately, Baha’is were allowed to
enroll in primary, elementary, and secondary schools, but still faced sporadic harassment
and on occasion expulsion or suspension when identified as Baha’is. A ban was placed
on self-identified Baha’is seeking access to higher education, even if they were able to
successfully pass the university entrance exam. Those who slipped through the filtering
process were expelled once identified. To date, there is no record of any Baha’i graduate
from a public university since the Cultural Revolution. This was a blow to the Iranian
Baha’i community. Many of those with means among the middle and upper class left the
country during the first few years, when there was unabated violence by the regime
against Baha’i families, institutions, businesses, and social service organizations.
However, as with the other religious minority groups, some prominent Baha’is members
deliberately remained to tend to the needs of the remaining community. In 1987,
desperate to meet the educational needs of its young members, Baha’is started a distance-
learning university, the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education (BIHE), made up of
volunteer instructors and professors—a university which is not only unaccredited in Iran, but which also undergoes raids and closure from time to time (discussed in Chapter 6). Thus, while no real number is given for the educational status of Baha’is under the Islamic Republic, it is safe to say that many seek education as they did during the Pahlavi era. Children attend government-run schools when possible, and, as of this writing, only a few thousand now participate in the Baha’i university. According to an administrator of the Institute (personal communication, October 21 and 28, 2009), some 500 are admitted each year, with the most recent enrolment for the academic year 2010 totaling about 3,000.\(^{28}\)

Consultation with several sources from different groups both inside and outside Iran reveals that there is a generally conviction that the economic and educational status of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is has deteriorated significantly during the Islamic Republic. Public statements by members of Iran’s Jewish community claim that they enjoy equal rights under the Islamic Republic, but such comments have received much criticism by other community members, who suggest that they do not correspond to the geopolitical and social realities and pressures of life in Iran (Cohen, 2009; Melamed, 2009; “MP: Iran only country,” 2010; Tugend, 2009). However, it is possible that those who have made such statements are lower class and rural residents who benefit from a wider range of social services under the Islamic Republic than were made available during the Pahlavi era. It is important to note that most of the modernization and industrialization developments during the Pahlavi era benefited urban areas and the elite

\(^{28}\) The enrollment number has increased over the years since its inception: 250 in 1987, 600 in 1996, 900 in 1998, 1200 in 2003, 2500 in 2008, 3000 in 2009 (Baha’i International Community, 2005a; BIHE management, personal interview, October 21, 2009).
in other regions. While Jews and Christians are allowed by the Islamic Republic to work for the government, they are barred from certain positions (in both public and private sectors). Baha’is are banned from employment at any level of the government, and even private businesses are discouraged from hiring Baha’is. The private sector, however, has been the arena where Baha’is have been able to maneuver and secure livelihoods, and in a few cases thrive in Iran like members of other religious minorities, although not on an equal footing with their Shi’i Muslim countryman.

Whereas in the time of the Pahlavis, nationalism was the primary agenda, during the Islamic Republic, Islamization of society is at the heart of the Islamic Republic. Thus, religious identity has become political. The idea of equality based on national identity was replaced by religious status. According to Shi’i doctrine, while the “People of the Book” are given protective status, they are not equal to Muslims. For example, all non-Muslims are considered to be ritually impure. Some Muslim leaders, such as Ayatollah Montazeri (2008), have adopted a more liberal orientation toward religious minorities. Nonetheless, he has repeatedly voiced in public his conviction that religious minorities in Iran are entitled to equal rights as Iranian citizens (while not denying their status according to Islamic teachings; Fani-Yazdi, 2008; Sanasarian, 2000).

Organizational Structure

The organization of religious groups is too broad a topic to discuss in detail here. Therefore, I have narrowed my discussion to its functionality in communal and public life. Under this heading, three structural elements will be addressed in brief: (a) administrative body; (b) operation of affairs; and (c) organizational international branches. While this categorization of organizational structure is limited, it will suffice
for the analysis of the mobilization and collective action undertaken by minority communities, the extent to which a group can gather and employ resources, and the role of community leaders in framing situations as opportunities or challenges. For the sake of brevity, I will also refrain from elaborating on the historical development of these institutions.

Organization of the Jewish Community. As of 1938, the Hebra (the governing assembly of the Jewish community), was registered as the Tehran Jewish Committee (TJC), and this body operates to the present day as the main administrative arm of the Jewish community, under the supervision of the government (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). Appointed subcommittees under the Tehran Jewish Committee look to the provision of a variety of community services and activities. Jewish religious authority is vested in three sources: the Chief Rabbi, the elected Jewish representative to Majles, and the Board of Directors of the Central Tehran Jewish Committee (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). The Chief Rabbi oversees the spiritual affairs of the community, and those elements that relate to Jewish law; the Majles representative is the official spokesman for the community regarding policies, statements, and proclamations about the Iranian Jewish community. Finally, while each locality has its own elected committee, the Board of Directors of the Tehran Jewish Committee oversees the social

29 Some of the subcommittees deal with cultural affairs, youth affairs, conflict resolution, and poor relief

30 The qualification of a rabbi (khakham) is his training in the Torah and Talmud, and other significant canon and texts. Such training begins in the yeshiva (Jewish religious school). Additional advanced learning in the Talmud, Rishonim and Acharonim (early and late medieval commentaries), as well as in Jewish law, is also a prerequisite for someone wishing to be recognized as a rabbi.
affairs of the community, including health care, education, social services, publications, \(^{31}\) event organization, facilities, and property management. \(^{32}\) The Iranian Jewish community in Iran is centralized through its administrative arm, but regional communities maintain religious autonomy through their local synagogues. Funds to support facilities and services in various regions, including the posts of rabbis and other religious functionaries, come from collections gathered from the local community. Sometimes, affluent members of the community, and even individuals outside the country made large donations, but this has become more infrequent over the last 20 years.

Since the early 1900s, Jews were offered the opportunity to have representation in Parliament, but the influence of the successive individuals who held this post was negligible, and was largely confined to their own community (Loeb, 1996). As a result of being institutionalized during the Pahlavi era, and even after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the Jewish community has, by and large, been able to establish and maintain many of its facilities, organizations, and public services. In 2007, there were 100 synagogues throughout the country, 26 of which were located in Tehran (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). As a result of the emigration of large numbers of Iranian Jews and the acquisition of Jewish schools by the state, \(^{33}\) there are only five special Jewish schools remaining today (Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009). From the end of the Pahlavi

\(^{31}\) In addition to a collection of books made available for sale, and those in libraries, there were two major Jewish periodicals: *Tamouz*, which functioned until 1989, and *Ofegh-BINA*, run by the Tehran Jewish Committee since 1999; these were responsible for publishing works on Jewish culture and education, as well as providing a social and news source.

\(^{32}\) According to the Tehran Jewish Committee (2009), there are many synagogues, special Jewish schools, cultural complexes, youth and student centers and organizations, such as the Iranian Jewish Students’ Organization, women’s centers, nursing homes, a hospital, libraries, computer and music training centers, assembly halls, and Jewish slaughter houses throughout the country.

\(^{33}\) According to Haroun Yashayaei (2003), chairman of the Tehran Jewish Committee, one reason for the take-over of Jewish parochial schools by the state was overpopulation in state-run schools.
era to the present, Tehran remains the main hub for the community; according to several sources, there is a noticeable disconnect between the Jews of Tehran and Shiraz.34

Today, most Iranian Jews live outside of Iran, the largest concentration being in the United States, Israel, and Western Europe. Confirmed by several sources, the connection between the community in Iran and its diaspora was very strong shortly after the Revolution, but has weakened continually since that time.35 While individuals and some relief organizations provide donations to the Jewish hospital, nursing home, synagogues, and schools, the efforts are uncoordinated. There exists no transnational organization unifying Iranian Jews with those outside the country; rather, Jewish organizations and leaders inside and outside of Iran function separately. Immediately following the Revolution, the spiritual leader of the Jewish community, after the execution of several prominent community members after the Revolution, Jewish leaders made it clear that the Jewish community in Iran would be loyal to the Islamic Republic of Iran and would disavow any association with Zionism and the State of Israel (Menashri, 2002).

**Organization of the Christian community.** Unlike the Jews and Baha’is, there is no one coherent way to describe the organizational structure of Christians because of the multiplicity of their denominations in Iran. The three major denominations in Iran are the Armenian Apostolic and Catholic Church, the Assyrian Church of the East, and the

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34 The divide between Tehran and Shiraz has been described as a schism in Jewish identification, with those in Tehran leaning toward a more secular orientation, and those in Shiraz being associated with a greater attachment to religious observance (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, 2 November 2009). The fact that there has been significant relocation by Jews of Shiraz to Israel, has led leaders of Tehran’s Jewish community to express the view that such emigration can harm the relationship between the regime and the Jewish community (Bahgat, 2005).

35 Personal communication: Faryar Nikbakht (16 May 2009), Sam Kermanian (2 June 2009), and Nahid Pirnazar (21 October 2009).
Chaldean Catholic Church. Other Christian denominations, consisting of Armenians and Assyrians, as well as converts, include Protestants, such as Presbyterians (Evangelical Church of Iran), Pentecostals (Assyrian Pentecostal Church, Assemblies of God or Jama’iate Rabbani), and Anglicans (Cheney, 2009; Diocese of Iran, n.d.; Macuch & Ishaya, 1985; World Council of Churches, 2009). The denominations are highly fragmented, and observations indicate that there have been tense relationships over the centuries between and among particular groups (Sanasarian, 2000).

Hierarchical structures vary among the denominations, but generally follow a similar overarching model. For instance, the Catholic churches (such as the Assyrian, Chaldean, and Armenian churches in Iran) have priests or bishops who can be elevated to the higher rank of archbishop. Parishes exist in various localities under the auspices of a diocese or archdiocese (sometimes referred to as eparchy or archeparchy). The Chaldean Catholics adhere to the authority of the Vatican in Rome, while it is only since 1994 that the Assyrian Church of the East has begun to reconcile with the Church in Rome and their Chaldean counterpart (Vatican, 2001). The Assyrian Church of the East has three major churches and 15 missions in Iran, guided by their international spiritual leader, Mar Dinkha IV, the Assyrian Catholic Patriarch. The Armenian Apostolic Church follows a similar hierarchical model, and pays its allegiance to the Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia, the spiritual leader of the Church.36 There are three diocese of the Apostolic Church in Iran, one each in Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz.37 The Apostolic leadership ranks

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36 There are two Catholicos with equal powers, each of which respects the other’s jurisdiction; the Armenians in Iran fall under the leadership of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia (Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, n.d.).

37 According to one source there are 12 churches in New Julfa, 10 in Tehran, 2 in Tabriz, 1 in Urmieh, and another in Azerbaijan (Armeniapedia, n.d.).
follow a line of hierarchy beginning with the clergy or laity and ending ultimately with the catholicos. While there was some growth of organizational leadership for both groups during the Pahlavi era, there has been a consistent decline in the number of bishops, priests, clergy, and parishes throughout Iran for both denominations since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.\(^{38}\)

Although all of these mainstream Christian churches are officially under the leadership of supranational organizations, they have tended to the affairs of their community with little guidance with regard to policies and practices outside of religious practice. The two government-recognized Christian denominations are the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Assyrian Church (including the Chaldeans); this recognition was extended during the Pahlavi regimes and the Islamic Republic. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Armenians receive two seats (a representative from north and south) and Assyrians receive one seat.\(^{39}\) Protestant denominations are not recognized as legitimate branches within the country, and are tolerated as part of the total collective of Iran’s Christians.

The organization of the evangelical churches is more difficult to define because of their nonrecognized status and diverse affiliations with Western churches in the United States and Europe. Their spiritual leadership is based on a hierarchical model. One important development among Protestant (particularly evangelical) converts is private worship in homes. Because conversion from Islam to Christianity is considered an act of

\(^{38}\) For example, in 1980, there were 41 priests (diocesan and religious) associated with Iranian Catholic churches (Chaldean and Armenian), as compared to only 11 in 2004 (Cheney, 2009).

\(^{39}\) The number of deputy representatives to the Majles was based on the estimate of one deputy for every 150,000 members of the community, counted every ten years (Sanasarian, 2000).
apostasy, many meet privately in what some adherents call “home-worship.” Unlike the Apostolic and Assyro-Chaldean\textsuperscript{40} churches, which remain insular, these other groups engage in active proselytizing among Muslims and other religious minorities.

Several of the Christian denominations created committees and appointed delegates to run various organizations, publications, and other services provided to the community. Funding for running these activities came primarily from members of the congregation. However, missionary schools established in the 19th and early 20th centuries received both material and human resources from groups outside the country. In the case of protestant groups, external resources were the primary means of running schools, hospitals and clinics, and other services under the supervision of the missions.\textsuperscript{41} Nominal aid was also extended to the Armenian and Assyrian schools by their respective heads outside Iran at various points during the Pahlavi dynasty.

**Organization of the Baha’i community.** In contrast to Judaism and Christianity, there is no clergy in the Baha’i Faith. There are, however, two branches of leadership: elected administrative bodies and appointed individuals. The local administrative body of the Baha’is is called the Local Spiritual Assembly (LSA), a council comprised of nine democratically elected individuals from the total population of a given city or locality. These nine individuals elect officers from among their own number for a one-year term of service. In Baha’i elections at all levels, the nine individuals serve on a voluntary basis. Such service is considered a sacred duty, does not require formal training, and is

\textsuperscript{40} This is an arbitrary term used to refer to both Assyrians and Chaldeans, but does not denote a new subgroup or their union.

\textsuperscript{41} This includes the famed Alborz School, Nurbakhsh School, Sage College, Community High School, and others.
not accompanied by ordination or other ritual. The individuals who are elected have no special rank or station, are not privy to arcane knowledge, nor do they have individual power over other members of the community (Effendi, 1973). There is no institutional concept of a “professional” religious leader in the Baha’i community. In Iran, the above structure existed until the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which formally banned all Baha’i organizations, national and local, in 1983.

The elected Assemblies are responsible for the guidance of the religious and social affairs and development of their respective communities, and appoint committees to meet special needs at the national, regional, and local level within their jurisdiction. Members of each National Spiritual Assembly (NSA) of the Baha’is elect the international governing institution of the Baha’i community, called the Universal House of Justice. This body was first established in 1963, and is elected every five years. The prophet founder of the Baha’i Faith (1817–1892) indicated that the individual members of the international body also held no special rank or station, but that the collective decisions were binding on every Baha’i (Baha’u’llah, 1873/1992). The issue of binding authority is important when considering the impact of framing situations in Iran. The Baha’i Faith functions within an umbrella organizational structure. Both appointed and elected positions are generally unpaid, except for those roles which require significant dedication of time, such as the elected executive officers of some Local or National Assemblies where there are large concentrations of Baha’is.

Staffing of the administrative bodies varies from country to country. As elsewhere, the Iranian NSA and some 400 LSAs appointed committees to provide services to the community. As elsewhere in the world, the funds of the community came
from voluntary donations from individual community members only,\(^42\) and are managed by local and national elected treasurers (officers of the Local or National Assembly). During the time of the Pahlavi Shahs, the National and Local Spiritual Assemblies in Iran appointed directors for special service institutions established by the community, such as hospitals or schools.

During the Pahlavi era, the Iranian Baha’i community was considered one of the most developed in the Baha’i world. In 1934, it formed its first NSA.\(^43\) Soon after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, many of the members of the Baha’i administration, including two iterations of the NSA, as well as many LSA members were arrested, often tortured, and killed. In 1983, the Prosecutor General Seyyed Hossein Mussavi-Tabrizi pronounced a ban on any formal or informal organization and administrative activity of the Baha’is in Iran (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006).\(^44\) The Baha’is immediately responded by dismantling the National and all Local Spiritual Assemblies, showing no sign of rejection toward the government. To retain some semblance of organization, the Universal House of Justice appointed an ad hoc committee, called the Yaran (Friends), to oversee the basic affairs of the Iranian Baha’i community, and local working groups called Khademin (Servants). In 2008, with the

\(^{42}\) On principle, Baha’is do not accept funds from any individual who is not a registered member of the community, or form non-Baha’i organizations.

\(^{43}\) By 1946, there were 694 Local Spiritual Assemblies throughout the country. In 1963, there were 521 Local Spiritual Assemblies and 1,271 localities where Baha’is resided (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391). During the same period there were some 150 national committees functioning under the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391). By the mid-1960s, in Tehran alone, 3,000 Baha’is served on various administrative bodies and approximately the same number worked with the education of youth and children (Baha’i World Centre, 1979–1983, Vol. 18, pp. 380–391).

\(^{44}\) Prosecutor General of the Islamic Republic, Seyyed Hossein Mussavi-Tabrizi, in the published Tehran daily, Kayhan (September 21, 1983) stated that the Baha’i religious and spiritual administration was banned and considered a crime.
arrest and imprisonment of the seven members of the Yaran and threat to their life, the Baha’is voluntarily dissolved the committee, after it was declared illegal. Several Baha’i sources in Iran have reported that Baha’i activities since then have been minimal, reduced to children’s classes, prayer meetings in homes, the only Baha’i organization still in operation being the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education (anonymous Baha’i in Iran, personal communication, 13 December 2009).

**Networks of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is**

To assess the social and organizational networks of the Jews, Christians, and Baha’is in Iran with other actors, I will draw on concepts found in network analysis studies. In the Methods section, I discussed how technical concepts of network analysis were adjusted in order to conceptualize network relations of religious minority groups. The network diagrams which follow are of my own design, and are used to identify ties and interaction among groups, regimes, and transnational actors. The networks include consideration of nodes (i.e., actors), geographic level, type of ties (direct, indirect, or independent), strength, and content (resources, advocacy, and information). The reader may refer to Chapter 3 for more detailed discussion of technical information.

**Network Ties of the Jewish Community**

Over the centuries, as a result of compounding factors, the network configuration of the community changed, but ultimately created strong local and regional ties, and moderate domestic ties between localities. By the early 20th century, Jewish communities in Europe extended their ties to the Iranian Jewish community, notably from the Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU) organization and the British Jewish Council. During the Pahlavi era, the Iranian Jewish communities benefited significantly from the AIU’s
services, including education and social welfare, and in turn created the opportunity to form and strengthen ties to Western Europe. The Iraqi Jewish community, one of the largest in the Middle East, experienced its own exodus because of the threat of genocide to Jewry, many of whom left for Israel and Iran.

By the 1930s, there was a strong Iraqi Jewish presence in Iran that would ultimately become integrated by the nationalization campaign of Reza Shah. The tie between Iraqi-Iranian Jews and those in Iraq remained strong during the early years of the Pahlavi dynasty, particularly in facilitating guidance and resources from wealthy individuals of Iraqi descent as well as leadership of the Iraqi Jewish Council (Nikbakht, 1999; personal communication, 2 November 2009). Despite degraded status and treatment of Jews in the past, Jews during the Pahlavi era were accorded representation in Parliament, official recognition, and, toward the second epoch, experienced near equal rights with other citizens, including access to high-ranking government positions. As mentioned earlier, with the formation of Israel, there were many in the Iranian Jewish community who supported Zionist efforts, including the eminent Jewish leader Habib Elghanian (Milani, 2008). Some, however, opposed Zionist efforts, and sought an exclusive Iranian Jewish identity. By the 1960s, ties to the American, British, and Israeli Jewish communities were strong (see Figure 10). In contrast, the tie between the communities in Tehran and Shirazi was weak, because of tensions over issues of religious observance, with Tehran Jews leaning toward the more secular, nationalist agenda, while the Jews of Shiraz were more sympathetic to overt religious identity and conservative values.
The modernization and nationalization that took place in Iran permeated the Jewish community, strengthening ties of community members with the regime, and simultaneously strengthening ties with Western Jewish communities, particularly the American Jewish community. Like other religious minorities during this period, the relative flexibility afforded the Jewish community during the Pahlavi era facilitated the sharing of resources, education, and services with other religious minorities—for example, Jews attended both Christian and Baha’i schools and vice versa. There was no supranational body that bound the communities together, and even though there was a leader for all Jews in Iran, the local communities shared only moderate ties from region to region, depending primarily on local leadership. As illustrated in the diagram, the Iranian Jewish community was able to draw from a wide range of resources to meet various needs. Most of its ties were direct and unilateral. Existing independent ties provided a more open opportunity structure for Jews during the Pahlavi era.

With the advent of the Islamic Republic, the national Jewish community was still allowed its seat in Parliament, conditioned upon its representative disassociating with any Zionist sentiments, and completely breaking ties with Western and Israeli Jewish communities. This isolated the Iranian Jewish leadership and its community from others around the world. Those who attempted to retain ties with the West and Israel were repressed through various means, including execution, arrest, torture, property and wealth confiscation and destruction, and exile, among other harsh treatment.
Over the three decades of the Islamic Republic, sources outside Iran identify three different group-ties with the Iranian Jewish community.\textsuperscript{45} The first are those who left Iran, but retain national pride and sympathy for those who remain, and thus extend support to Iranian Jews, usually in the form of monetary donations (moderate ties remain). The second group consists of those who left Iran, reject the validity of the regime, and urge others to leave the country as well; of this group there are those who do and do not extend aid to Iranian Jews (weak and moderate ties remain). The third group, mostly younger Iranian Jews outside Iran, has weak or no ties with the Jewish community in Iran, choosing, instead to integrate into the general Jewish population. However, among all three groups, a move toward cautious advocacy has emerged particular since the late 1990s. Some have collaborated with NGOs, non-Iranian state agencies, and even formed their own coalitions to assist in ameliorating the depressed condition of Iranian Jews. This has taken the form of news articles, reports, statements, and even aid to assist Iranian Jews who experience hardship and persecution. On rare occasions, Jewish organizations, primarily in the United States and England, extend significant support to the Iranian Jewish community when situations of grave danger arise. The best example is the case of the arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz who were accused of espionage and put on trial for treason in 1999.

The Jewish community in Iran claims no tie whatsoever to this latter movement of advocacy, and often state their absolute contentment under the Islamic Republic of Iran, stressing their strong ties with the government (“MP: Iran only country,” 2010; see

\textsuperscript{45} Personal communications: anonymous Iranian-American Jewish leader (June 8, 2009); David Shofet (March 23, 2009); Faryar Nikbakht (May 16, 2009); Karmel Melamed (March 3, 2009); Sam Kermanian (June 2, 2009).
Ties between Iranian Jewish communities inside and outside Iran are mostly fragmented or invisible to the general public. There is no substantial collaboration between the Iranian Jewish communities in Western Europe, the United States, and Israel. Some Iranian and non-Iranian Jewish individuals and organizations have voiced concern for the situation facing Iran’s Jews today, and some even offer services to Jews who wish to leave Iran. But no advocacy campaign or highly organized connection exists today between the Iranian Jewish communities inside the country and those outside. While the network diagram in Figure 11 illustrates the high level of independent connections (and activity) among various non-Iranian nodes, it also reflects the Iranian Jewish community’s relative isolation from them under current conditions. In other words, there is an increase in advocacy on behalf of the Iranian Jewish community, but the community within Iran disassociates itself from it. This isolationist behavior constitutes the primary survival strategy of the Jewish community in Iran, which has ultimately made it even more dependent on its relationship with the current regime. It is also the residual effect of the regime’s own political isolation from countries with which the Iranian Jewish community used to have ties.

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46 It is important to note that many those who leave Iran convey their dissatisfaction with the situation in Iran, relating the lack of opportunity, harsh treatment, denial of access to certain services, and the generalized fear associated with living openly in Iran as a Jew.

47 There are individuals with whom I spoke who have taken the initiative to highlight the difficulties and discrimination against Jews in Iran; however, even they concur that there is no real organized and coherent campaign. As Kermanian (personal interview, June 2, 2009) suggests, “we do not engage in confrontation unless it is a matter of life or death.”
Figure 11. Jewish networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 12. Jewish networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009)
Network Ties of the Christian Community

Much like the Jewish communities of the early 20th century, the Christians benefited significantly from exchanges with missionary services and interaction with foreigners. By the 1930s, many Armenians, Assyrians, Protestant converts, and other denominations had made connections with transnational communities, and received foreign aid from them during the industrialization initiatives of Reza Shah. There was some cross-religious exchange through institutions and services provided by Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. Two groups in particular developed strong ties with Christians in Iran during the Pahlavi era: the American Presbyterians and the British Anglican Church. While their connection to the leadership in Iran was almost nonexistent, these organizations were a source of funding and advocacy for schooling efforts.

Ethno-religious Christian leadership and organizations became more separatist (from other denominations) during this period. Not only was interdenominational collaboration absent, but rivalry was frequent between and among the different groups. While the Assyrians and Chaldeans follow almost identical doctrinal foundations, cultural and religio-political tensions over past centuries divided them. The Armenians were among the most vocal protesters against missionary activity by Western Europeans who actively recruited from their congregation. The Pahlavi regime only recognized the Apostolic Armenian Church and the Assyrian Church of the East, allotting two Parliamentary seats to the former and one to the latter. However, Armenian ties to the regime were weak and even strained during the first half of the Pahlavi era, due, in part, to the ethnic and national concerns which were incompatible with Reza Shah’s monolithic Persian identity campaign. Armenian-Iranians strengthened ties with their
transnational community, drawing on their expertise particularly in the running of schools and cultural programs. The Protestant churches were never officially recognized by the government, and thus never had direct ties, other than through the governments in the countries from which they originated.

The guilds were another strong tie connecting Assyrians and Armenians with fellow community members. Significant material, organizational, and human resources were brought in from Europe and America to found schools and health clinics, as well as other organizations that served the Christian community. The Armenian Apostolic Church received social, organizational, and moral support through the coordinated efforts of the Catholicos of Cilicia. But other than some human resources from Armenia, material resources came mostly from the local community. The same was true for the Assyrian Church of the East as well as the Chaldeans. Supranational ties to organizations such as the World Council of Churches and the Middle East Council of Churches were fairly strong, and although valuable as a means of visible unity and eucharistic fellowship, did not confer anything on the local community other than recognition and awareness.

While missionaries and foreign control of facilities were prohibited during the regime of Reza Shah, the move toward amicable relations with the West in the time of Muhammad Reza Shah (1960s and 1970s) offered opportunities of domestic and transnational social mobility among all Christian groups. Although network ties were weak among Christian denominations, there were moderate to strong ties between each group and its own superior organization and community outside the country. Figure 13
illustrates the Christian Network during the Pahlavi period, and how most ties were direct, moderately strong, and few.

The ties between the various Western affiliated denominational groups were strengthened in one respect and weakened in another under the Islamic Republic. The non-Iranian denominations in countries like the United States jeopardized their local Iranian counter-parts by associating them with imperial powers. This led many Protestants to leave the country after the Revolution. However, even after the Revolution, there was a noticeable rise in activity among evangelical Christians in Iran, including proselytizing and conversion of Muslims and other religious minorities. This strained existing weak ties between missionaries and the government, and ultimately led to a rise in persecution in the 1990s targeting leaders in the Protestant Christian community. The persecution of Christians in Iran strengthened their ties with both Iranian and non-Iranian counterparts in the United States, Britain, and other countries and groups of the World Evangelical Alliance (World Evangelical Alliance, n.d.). This also led to the rise of NGO ties and advocacy on behalf of Protestant Christians in Iran. Resources were also extended to the community in Iran by transnational community members and organizations, such as Iranian Christian International affiliates (mostly in the United States), Elam Ministries (centered in England with international reach), and the Open Doors USA/UK campaign. Ties with the government of the Islamic Republic were very weak and officially did not exist. Recognized and institutionally represented Christians, on the other hand, avoided any association with Western institutions and organizations, and followed their typical practice of insular communal activity.
By the middle of the 1990s, the Assyrian Church, led by Catholicos Patriarch Mar Dinkha IV—based in Chicago since the early 1980s—moved the Assyrian Church toward reconciliation with the Chaldeans and the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, ties of collaboration between the Catholic groups strengthened during this period—although this was not necessarily the result of the situation in Iran, and is thus not reflected in the network diagram in Figure 14. Nonetheless, independent support was given by communities outside Iran for the situation facing Iranian Catholics, as evidenced by the most recent statement of the Pope to the Iranian Ambassador to the Vatican (Thavis, 2009).

For the most part, the ties between denominations remain nonexistent to weak, only sharing knowledge to keep some semblance of solidarity when addressing issues related to Parliament (Sanasarian, 2000). Moreover, some sources have indicated that even discord between leaders of some of the different communities continues today.\(^4\) It is important to note that although resources are forthcoming from superior institutions outside Iran, as is the case for the Protestants, the actual amount of aid remains undetermined by this author. Community affairs seem to be primarily managed by national and local leadership.

Since the mid-1980s, there has been a proliferation of human rights organizations and nongovernmental groups that either work with the nonrecognized Christian groups in Iran, or address the general situation facing different denominational Christians in Iran. While activity seems to have increased, there would appear to be more information than resources or advocacy in the relational content of the networks of the Iranian Christian

\(^{48}\) Personal communication: Sanasarian (April 14, 2009).
community. As illustrated in Figure 14, indirect ties increased while direct ties have decreased. As a result of having to downplay ties with outside organizations and countries—thus weakening them—in order to maintain good standing with the government, the Christian groups represented in the Majles (Armenians and Assyrians), have become more isolated, more dependent on the current regime, and strengthened their ties to it.

**Network Ties of the Baha’i Community**

During the Pahlavi period, the Iranian Baha’i community shared very strong ties with the Baha’i World Centre (BWC), the administrative center of all Baha’i communities and headed by the Universal House of Justice (est. 1963).49 There were strong ties, as well, with the American and Canadian national and local Baha’i communities. Since universal identity is given precedence over national loyalty in the Baha’i Faith, the Iranian Baha’i diasporas (marginal at the outset of the Pahlavi era) did not see themselves as being religiously separated from their non-Iranian counterparts. Nonetheless, family ties played a role in independently supporting individuals and communities in Iran.

As illustrated in Figure 15, the relationship between the Iranian Baha’i community and the international Baha’i community was initially not very strong, because it was linked through the BWC. However, with the encouragement of Baha’i leaders (i.e., Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi), small numbers of Iranian Baha’is left their homes and

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49 The Baha’i World Centre is a title referring to several institutions and structures that constitute the focal point of administrative and spiritual life of Baha’is around the world. After the founder of the Baha’i Faith (Baha’u’llah) was exiled and died in what was then part of the Ottoman Empire, the successive leaders of the Baha’i community (his son Abdu’l-Baha and then great-grandson Shoghi Effendi) remained and established a center in Haifa, which developed over decades. In 1963, the institution of the Universal House of Justice was elected, and has since led the world-wide Baha’i community.
Figure 13. Christian networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 14. Christian networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009).
committed themselves to assisting the development of Baha’i communities in Africa, South America, Asia and other parts of the world. The United States, Canadian, and United Kingdom Baha’i communities were able to assist the Iranian community in developing modern schools and other institution of service (e.g., hospitals) under the central leadership of the BWC and other Baha’i institutions. However, the relationship between Iranian Baha’is and their Western counterparts was collaborative and characterized by equality in status. The ties between different Baha’i communities were not only strengthened over time but also systematized.

The persecution of the Baha’is throughout the 19th and early 20th century was generally met with fortitude and advocacy from within Iran, or by other National Spiritual Assemblies from different countries, and of course the BWC. By the mid-1950s, when persecution began to intensify, the BWC drew on its highly developed network of national and regional organizations to marshal assistance for the Iranian Baha’is, directing them to appeal to their respective governments and supranational ties (Baha’i International Community, 1956). This and other similar campaigns, was considered effective, and led to the establishment by the Universal House of Justice of the Baha’i International Community (BIC) as the official representative of the worldwide Baha’i community (For example, see Baha’i International Community, 1956).

The network between local Baha’i communities under the leadership of the NSA of Iran was fully developed by the early 1960s, and represented a unified structure with clear channels of leadership, organization, and operation. Many of the prominent and affluent members of the Baha’i community contributed their expertise and material

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50 For the sake of clarify and focus, I have refrained from representing the direct ties between national Baha’i communities (although they existed).
resources to the development of the Baha’i community not only in Iran, but internationally, supporting the development of the BWC and service projects around the world. While there was no official tie between the Baha’i community of Iran and the government, members of the Baha’i community served as individuals in nonpolitical government positions, including influential offices (Milani, 2008), and continued, when called upon, to appeal to the government during times of intense persecution of the Baha’i community. The network between religious minorities is hard to measure, but there was noticeable interaction in the form of shared services, such as schools, clinics and hospitals. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Iranian Baha’i institutions and community had benefited from collaboration with other developed Baha’i communities around the world. However, the Iranian NSA focused primarily on ministering to the affairs of its own burgeoning community. The BIC and other communities worked as the main vehicle of advocacy, with the BWC providing cultural, moral, and sometimes material resources. The United States Baha’i community was a partner in providing material and human resources during this period. As Figure 15 illustrates, the Baha’i network consisted of a large number of indirect ties that worked in favor of the Iranian Baha’i community, with several key direct ties. Additional indirect ties to governments and organizations would become a designed strategy of the Baha’i community in marshaling various kinds of resources, in information collection and distribution, and in advocacy.

After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the network configuration within the Baha’i community changed in several respects. With the dismantling of the NSA and all LSAs throughout Iran in June of 1983, the closure, confiscation, and destruction of Baha’i buildings, centers, and services, as well as the killing and exodus of
many of its leaders and prominent community members, the community was left with no formal organization-to-organization tie. Thus the node illustrating the Iranian Baha’i community in Figure 16 represents the Baha’i community and not any form of official leadership. With only the Yaran, an ad hoc committee appointed by the Universal House of Justice to meet the basic needs of the community, the Baha’is had to deal with administrative matters privately through that informal body. As a result of the developed network system outside of Iran, national Baha’i communities around the world, under the guidance of the Baha’i World Centre, collaborated to support the Baha’is in Iran by a variety of means, including resources to sustain the community, assistance to leave Iran (for those in extreme danger), as well as social, organizational and moral support. Since the onset of the Revolution, the BIC has continued to be in the forefront of advocacy on behalf of a highly restricted and often repressed Iranian Baha’i community (Ghanea, 2002). The BIC guided national communities and their external affairs offices to work with their national governments and other agencies in pressing for the rights of the Baha’is in Iran. The Iranian Baha’i diaspora maintained strong ties with their families, often sending material resources to sustain daily living, and even sponsoring them if they chose to leave as refugees. With the exodus and dispersion during and after the Revolution, the Iranian Baha’i diaspora developed and strengthened the indirect ties between the Iranian Baha’i community and their destination communities. Ironically, as a result of a crippled internal administrative structure, the Iranian Baha’i community (and the Baha’i community as a whole) strengthened its network ties, drawing on them more readily and systematically.
Another significant shift in the network configuration was the rise of NGOs and government agencies dedicated to human rights and freedoms, and the indirect ties with them which served the Iranian Baha’i community. These relationships offered not only moral support and advocacy, and the opportunity to share information about the situation of the Baha’is, but subsequently provided the impetus for minor opportunity structure changes in Iran (see Figure 16). It is as yet unclear what the precise connection of the BWC or the BIC is with the national community in Iran since the arrest and dissolution of the *Yaran* in May 2008. It is interesting to note that the number of human rights organizations inside and outside Iran have increased over the decades, and now play a prominent role in advocating the case of Baha’is and other religious minorities in Iran. Because of the banned, nonrecognized status of Baha’is since the Revolution, no tie exists between the Baha’i community in Iran and the government of the Islamic Republic. Similarly, because of the “untouchable” status of Baha’is, no other religious minority organization is at liberty to associate with Baha’is publicly—as this may put them at risk of reprisal. During this period, although ties became stronger (albeit more indirect) across the Baha’i transnational network and Iran, and ties with NGOs and other governments increased in frequency and prominence, this has not altered the relationship with the regime itself. It is evident that relying on networks has been and continues to be a central feature of mobilization and coordination of the Iranian Baha’i community and those abroad.
Figure 15. Baha’i networks in the Pahlavi period (ca. 1925–1979).
Figure 16. Baha’i networks in the Islamic Republic period (ca. 1979–2009)

The diagram illustrates the relationships and interactions between various entities within the Baha’i community and other organizations during the Islamic Republic period. The nodes represent different groups and levels, and the lines indicate the nature and strength of their connections.

Key terms and definitions:
- **Nodes (Shapes)**:
  - Circle: Group institutions and community
  - Square: Government and its agencies
  - Diamond: Other group communities
  - Octagon: Multilateral gov. organizations

- **Level (Color)**:
  - Gray: Domestic (in Iran)
  - Black: International level (other countries)
  - White: Trans/Supra-National Level

- **Type (Line Links)**:
  - Solid: Direct Tie
  - Dashed: Indirect Tie
  - Dotted: Independent Tie

- **Strength (Thickness)**:
  - Heavy: Strong Tie
  - Standard: Moderate Tie
  - Light: Weak Tie

- **Content (Line Ends)**:
  - Arrow: Resources
  - Square: Advocacy
  - Circle: Information

**Prominent Nodes**:
1. Iranian Baha’i community (a) (b)
2. Iran-based NGOs
3. Islamic Republic government
4. European (select) governments
5. European Baha’i communities (a) (b)
6. United Nations
7. Asian/Mid East (select) governments
8. Asian/Mid East Baha’i communities (a) (b)
9. Australian and New Zealand governments
10. Aus. and New Zealand Baha’i communities (a) (b)
11. South American Iranian communities (a) (b)
12. South American (select) governments
13. African Baha’i community (a) (b)
14. African (select) governments
15. BWC (Haifa) directing the Baha’i International Community representing all Baha’i communities
16. U.S. & Canadian Baha’i communities (a) (b)
17. American and Canadian governments
18. American and Canadian NGOs
19. European NGOs
20. Intl. NGOs

**Notes**:
(a) Includes National and Local Assemblies, authoritative committees, organizations and organization leadership
(b) Includes local community members
(c) Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian, non-Iranian communities’ services, institutions, and individuals
Regime-Group Relations of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is

As they relate to the study of educational strategy selection, I have narrowed my discussion of regime-group relations to four particular factors which I believe clarify their interactions: (a) official recognition of rights of the group by the government; (b) representation of the group in government institutions; (c) the extent to which a regime facilitates, tolerates, and represses groups, claims, and actions; and (d) the extent to which a group accepts, resists, or rejects regime policies and actions.

Recognition

In the Electoral Law of 1909 of the Iranian Constitution, formal recognition by the government was extended to certain ethnic and religious minority groups, including the Armenian Christians, the Assyrian Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians—long considered by Muslims as “People of the Book” (Iranian Constitution, Electoral Law of 1909, Article 7:1). Baha’is were excluded from this recognition, but individual members may have been accorded the theoretical equal rights extended to all citizens (Iranian Constitution of 1906, Article 8). With the advent of Reza Shah’s rule, the constitution was reaffirmed, with only minor alterations until the 1963 Referendum spurred by the White Revolution launched by Mohammad Reza Shah. The most significant changes made to the Iranian constitution since its original draft came with the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution of 1979 explicitly delimits the recognition of religious minorities to Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Armenian and Assyrian Christian Iranians, who “within the limit of the law, are free to perform their

51 The “Book” refers to the Koran, and within it the provision to extend protective status to religious minorities included Jews and Christians, and later Zoroastrians. Protective (dhimma) status meant that they could not be killed or forced to convert, while still being regarded as infidels and impure.
religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.” Article 26 further secures their right to form societies and organizations within the bounds of the law. Drafters of constitutional articles addressing religious minorities included recognized leaders of religious minorities. The Chaldeans, although demanding separate representation, were not given a seat, and were identified with the Assyrians. Other nonethnic Christian denominations were not given a voice at all. Despite being the largest non-Muslim religious minority, Baha’is were once again not recognized. In various public proclamations, policy papers, and other official arenas, Baha’is are often referred to as a “misguided and wayward sect,” or as a “political movement” (Higgins, 1984); and there was clear evidence in various court edicts, press statements, and private policy papers, that the government identified the Baha’is as a group (see Appendix E for copies of official documents).

Considering recognition status is important in any discussion regarding minority groups because it brings with it certain advantages and disadvantages. For example, official recognition may entitle a group to certain rights, while simultaneously limiting others. Moreover, by recognizing a separate group, there is an implicit admission of “otherness” that separates one group from the majority. Higgins (1984) suggests that nonrecognition under certain circumstances could be considered an advantage, particularly when religious identity is not a concern. Nonetheless, Tilly and Tarrow (2007), using the example of the Baha’is, point out that a regime may refrain from recognizing a group to decertify their legitimacy to claim any rights and to reinforce regime policies.
Representation

As an extension of recognition of religious minority communities, representation followed. During both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic periods, the recognized religious minority groups were accorded representation in Parliament with one seat in parliament. During the Islamic Republic, one seat each was accorded to the Zoroastrians, the Jews, and the Assyrian Christians (including Chaldeans). Two seats were offered to the Armenian Christians (one for the north and another for the south of the country). All these groups expressed loyalty to the Islamic Republic and to Ayatollah Khomeini, rejecting ties to any countries considered by the regime to be enemy states.

By various accounts, during both the Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic era, the role and influence of the representatives in the Majles was nominal. By having a representative in a formal institution of the state, recognized minority groups had an arena to voice concerns and make claims in the manner of contained contention. However, unrecognized groups had no proper channel in which to file complaints for group affairs, and often association with an unrecognized status would simply be dismissed. Despite representation, some have argued that religious minority Parliamentary deputies are easily influenced by the government, lamenting it as a necessity to survive the climate of heightened scrutiny (Pirnazar, personal communication, 21 October, 2009).

Providing representation in the government is a form of institutionalizing a group. This carries significant bearing on mobilization, claim-making, and collective action. As Tilly and Tarrow (2007) suggest, institutionalization can lead to demobilization of

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52 This was not the case for Muslim minorities or many ethnic minorities in Iran.
movement activity and alter the way a group presents claims to the state. In this way, noninstitutionalization may lead to bolder claims, or what McAdam et al. (2001) call transgressive contention (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). Conversely, representation is another strong form of domestic certification, where the authority is ready to recognize and listen to the recognized group. In order to explore these two concepts of institutionalization and certification, among other related features regime-group relations, I turn to regime and group interactions.

**Regime Facilitation, Tolerance, and Repression of Groups**

Recognition and representation, however useful as categories, inadequately capture the nuances of contentious politics and dynamics at various levels of analysis. On the one hand, they can be considered constructive qualifiers. Interactions, on the other hand, are dynamic observable quantifiers of the relationship. The work of scholars of contentious politics (McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2005; Tilly, 2006b; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) and of some scholars of international relations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999) indicate that the following five interactive elements bear on a regime’s treatment of groups and their actions, particularly when considering the configuration of how a regime prescribes, tolerates, and forbids actions: (a) a regime’s acceptance level of a particular group and action; (b) a regime’s governmental form, capacity, and ideology; (c) the influence and impact of other power holders, parallel domestic authorities,53 social and economic elites, and pressure from the masses; (d) the

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53 Parallel authorities are those individuals, institutions, and organizations that share power in a country. In Iran, parallel authorities are the Islamic scholars and religious leaders, who can issue farman (orders) which become binding injunctions on Shi’i Muslims. Although alienated during the Pahlavi era, Shi’i leaders have always played a significant and influential role as parallel authorities (Arjomand, 1984, 1988).
influence and impact of international pressure, standards, relations; (e) responses of targeted groups. Thus, a regime’s actions toward a group are not decided in a vacuum. Rather, the decisions of the regime have a reciprocal impact on the other factors discussed.

Figure 17. Interactive elements bearing on a regime’s approach toward groups.

Figure 17 illustrates one way the above-mentioned five factors interact in producing policies and practices that affect a group. By categorizing regime actions within the bounds of facilitation, tolerance, and repression, I identified repeated sets of performances that each regime used in addressing Jews, Christians, and Baha’is, in order to contextualize regime-group relations through interaction.

The categorized actions, or as Tilly (2006b) calls them, performances, are presented Tables C2, C3, and C4 for the period of Pahlavi rule and Tables C5, C6, and C7 for the period of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although these tables do not include actions by parallel authorities or mobs, they do include recurring actions associated with
government agents at the local, regional, or national level. Finally, in describing the actions of Iranian regimes toward these three minorities, it is important to bear in mind that at different junctures in time, various levels of facilitation, tolerance, and repression were present.

**Regime Performance in the Pahlavi Era**

**Jews.** With the secularization of the Pahlavi rulers, the Jewish community experienced a series of shifts in regime policies. As Rahimiyan (2008b) illustrates, despite Muslim stigmatization of Jews, with equal rights officially extended by the government, Jewish Iranians were being assimilated into a broader Iranian identity, and thus integrated into society. As Table C2 shows, allowing Jews to attend government schools, hold government jobs, and open shops outside the Jewish quarter are only a few examples of the facilitation process during the Reza Shah period. In turn, most members of the Jewish community did not see a contradiction between religious and national identity, and took advantage of the secular-nationalist facilitation of the regime. Despite noticeable local and regional anti-Semitism among segments of the population, and sporadic vilification by state-media, tolerance at the national level toward Jews was unaffected. Like other religious and ethnic minorities, Jews faced uncompromising policies requiring stricter alignment with the Shah’s nationalization campaign, including impositions on community run schools. It was during the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–1978) that Jews saw the greatest level of facilitation, similar to that of other religious minorities. Iranian Jews were allowed to register their own organizations on a
level that was unprecedented (Menashri, 2002; Rahimiyan, 2008a). The Jewish community also rise in socioeconomic status during this period was facilitated primarily by a degree of tolerance during the second Pahlavi epoch.

**Christians.** During the rule of Reza Shah, ethnic Christians, like the Armenians and Assyrians, experienced turbulence when the regime made efforts to assimilate them into the general Iranian population, as with other ethnic minorities. Although they enjoyed the same rights as those of the Jews and Zoroastrians, Armenians and Assyrians found the language and cultural policies of the Shah highly restrictive (see Table C3). For Reza Shah, the Armenians in particular, as well as some other ethno-linguistic groups, represented a barrier—even a threat—to the smooth implementation of the nationalist campaign that would present Iran as a monolithic entity. While the religious element of recognized groups did not pose problems for the regime, the ethnic features were more problematic. Missionaries, who experienced the brunt of intolerance by Reza Shah, were singled out more because of their foreign influence than their religious affiliation.

After the abdication of Reza Shah and the rise in American and British influence, tolerance significantly increased, and facilitation of Christians into the system likewise improved. Like many Jewish organizations, the various Christian sects saw an expansion of their institutions, membership, and services—developing their community as in no other time in Iranian history because of the tolerance accorded to them in the second epoch. In general, all rights were reinstated to Christian groups by the time of Muhammad Reza Shah, particularly in the 1950s.

**Baha’is.** Unlike the Jews and Christians, whose rights were restored with the affirmation of the Iranian constitution, Baha’is remained unrecognized and
unrepresented. Yet, with the focus being placed on nationalism and modernity, religious identity was relegated to the sidelines and remained a concern only for the Shi’i religious establishment and some of its ardent supporters. Thus, despite their formally unrecognized status, Iranian Baha’is were able to enjoy those rights and liberties extended to all Iranian nationals. Community members were tolerated in many sectors, and thus were able to individually access or benefit from the facilitation process of the regime. However, as with Jews and Christians, the unique features of the Baha’i community caused them to encounter the same restrictions that were placed on all those who were perceived to be a roadblock on the path of the nationalization campaign. The most significant barrier faced by the Baha’is came from the strong influence wielded by parallel authorities on and inside the government. The fact that Baha’is were not recognized or represented made their situation doubly unpredictable. As illustrated in Table C4, despite enjoying unprecedented social and economic mobility during this period, Baha’is still faced arbitrary persecution at the hands of religious leaders, and as a result of collaboration between government and parallel authorities (Choubine, 2008). Yet, as with the Jewish community, many Baha’is took advantage of social freedom during the Muhammad Reza Shah period, and, in spite of sporadic outbreaks of repression, made significant strides in developing their organizations and community.

What is noticeable about the actions used by the Pahlavi regime in addressing all three groups is the similarity in repertoires of facilitation and tolerance. The actions affecting Christians and Jews were most alike—no doubt the result of their similar recognized status. The greatest obstacles originated in challenges to assimilation into the regime’s nationalization and solidarity process. From the data examined, tolerance
appears to have been prominent when the regime was focused on other agenda issues. Facilitation for all three groups was offered with a view to bringing about integration and assimilation into a modern nation-state as envisioned by the Shahs. Parallel authorities played a highly significant role in the treatment of minority groups by the regime. Regime tolerance noticeably increased when the influence of the parallel Islamic establishment was held in check by the legitimate authorities.

**Regime Performances in the Islamic Republic Era**

**Jews.** During the first epoch of the Islamic Republic, many Iranian Jews did not know what to expect, given the years of harassment and rising anti-Israel tide that came with the Revolution. With the execution of several Jewish community leaders, a shockwave traveled through the Jewish community. Despite the fomenting calumny and anti-Zionist attacks by new government leaders and agents, Jews and Christians were guaranteed protective status in the Koran. As a result, in the drafting of the new Constitution, official recognition and representation was extended to these groups. Although faced with harsh treatment, including arbitrary arrest, property and asset seizure, and police harassment shortly after the Revolution, Khomeini’s regime began a process of institutionalization of the Jewish community. Over time, those who remained were continually being assimilated into the system. With decreased direct assault over consecutive epochs, the quarter percent of Jews that remained in Iran operated within the infrastructure of the regime. The government successfully divorced the Iranian Jewish community from its sister communities in Israel and America (“MP: Iran only country,” 2010; Tehran Jewish Committee, 2009).
Notwithstanding facilitation and tolerance, the Jewish community experienced sporadic incidents of repression with varying levels of severity, such as the arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz, charged with espionage for Israel. Similarly, there have been several reports by individuals who have revealed that, the constant social and economic pressures make it necessary for Jews in Iran to be cautious and secretive. Government-run schools (curriculum and instruction) only reinforce negative stereotypes and stigmatization of Jews in society (Farahani, 2005). Not surprisingly, the traditional Shi’i belief that non-Muslims are najes, or ritually impure, has been legalized and is taught in schools. Thus, Jews are not able to engage in certain professions or jobs that involve food preparation or contact with liquids. Nonetheless, by various accounts, the daily private practice of Judaism is, for the most part, tolerated, but they remain the most marginalized and compromised of the formally recognized religious minority groups in Iran.

**Christians.** Ethnic Christians during the Islamic Republic saw the least agitation and repression in the first epoch of the regime, but foreign Christians and Protestants experienced a harsh backlash for a number of reasons, namely, association with Western countries. Again, the primary goal of the regime was the institutionalization of its recognized minority groups, and the elimination or marginalization of its unrecognized groups. For example, the Anglican Church was deemed dysfunctional and all missionary activities of Anglicans and Presbyterians from abroad came to a halt. Likewise leaders of various nonethnic Christian groups were pressured by government agencies to stop their activities, to refrain from including any non-Christians, and have sometimes been threatened, arrested, and tortured if they proselytized and converted Muslims. This was
most noticeable when several Christian pastors and new converts were arrested, and some executed throughout Iran.

Like Jews, Christians are considered *najes* by the regime. However, they are likewise given rights to practice their religion, and given privileges exclusive to their religious rituals and customs. Although some Christian schools and facilities (e.g., hospitals, nurseries, gardens) were confiscated by the government, Armenians and Assyrians were allowed to maintain their own schools, on condition that they follow government guidelines. Apart from the Protestant and Catholic groups which are not recognized by the regime, Armenians and Assyrians generally experience high levels of tolerance within the confines of prescribed government ordinances. It is important to note that treatment by civilians and lower level government agents is another story, and experiences vary considerably throughout Iran.

**Baha’is.** Baha’is under the Islamic Republic have experienced the highest level of regime repression among religious minorities in Iran. Unlike the Jews or Christians, the Baha’is are not only not represented in any governmental institution and not recognized as a religious minority, but are labeled as heretics, infidels, and apostates. Throughout the 30 years of the Islamic Republic, the regime has always given Baha’is opportunities to integrate and assimilate into society, namely by recanting their faith and disavowing affiliation with anything having to do with the Baha’i Faith. The first epoch was characterized by high levels of regime violence, physical assault, and infrastructure destruction. Subsequent administrations, demarked by epochs, shifted strategies to deal with the ideologically incongruent group, including giving them permission to leave the country freely, denying them the right to higher education and government jobs,
continued harassment, and blocked social and economic development. On the other hand, the various iterations of the regime also incorporated strategies of tolerance and relative neglect, with some agents not viewing the Baha’is as a threat, and allowing them to leave forms blank where religious affiliation was usually required.

The actions of the regime of the Islamic Republic in addressing religious minorities employ the same differentiating factor which was applied during the previous regime: recognized status. Jews and Christians are accepted as legitimate communities, with restricted actions, whereas Baha’is are an unacceptable group, variously described as a “political movement,” “a misguided sect,” and without the rights extended to other minorities. The Islamic Republic facilitated recognized religious minorities through institutionalization and assimilation into the broader Khomeini brand of Shi’ism and the revised Constitution. This was an effort to incorporate a doctrinal pluralism constituted originally in the Koran. The government of Iran has been highly repressive, but also draws on actions that facilitate and tolerate different groups in order to maintain control and to steer the country along a path aligned with the ideology of the regime’s founders.

**Group Acceptance, Tolerance, Resistance, and Rejection of Regime**

In examining the relationship of the three minorities toward regimes, actions again become the key unit of analysis. There are four basic categories within which I place general group claims and actions: (a) acceptance\(^\text{55}\) of government policies and practices; (b) tolerance\(^\text{56}\) of unfavorable policies and practices; (c) resistance\(^\text{57}\) to policies

\(^{55}\) The group accepts policies of the regime, integrates into the system, and even assimilates according to the ideological agenda of the state.

\(^{56}\) The group members tolerate policies by integrating into the system, going along with obligatory laws and policies, while privately disagreeing or contradicting the regime’s exhortations and agenda. In other words, the action and policy of the regime is unfavorable to the group members, but no active
and practices through mostly contained and mild transgressive contention; (d) rejection\textsuperscript{58} of policies and practices by turning to options outside the polity or by engaging in transgressive contention.

In order to understand broader strategies (both short- and long-term), I place group claims, actions, and reactions within this framework. To this end, Table C8 represents some of the general but salient actions of groups in relation to regimes over time. The sorts of actions concerning this study are those that recur, because they point to coalescing strategies to meet needs, including educational ones. The listing and order does not identify the frequency, the magnitude, or prominence of each action as a strategy. However, these features were considered in including them in this Table. The purpose of Table C8 is to provide a manageable, general description of the range of actions carried out by religious minority groups in relation to regime actions and responses.

Even from this cursory overview, it is evident that all groups performed actions that could fall under virtually any of the four categories (i.e. accept, tolerate, resist, and reject), just as a regime will engage in various levels of repression and facilitation.

Beyond this study is the thorough measurement of the extent and frequency with which resistance or counterclaim is made to oppose it. Members or group may also retreat into isolation—an action bordering on resistance.

\textsuperscript{57} The group or a collection of its members make a counterclaim or take action contrary to regime policy or action. This can range from writing letters, signing petitions, participating in street demonstrations, and boycotting, to initiating parallel projects and innovations. In other words, resistance includes primarily contained performances, but may also entail transgressive performances.

\textsuperscript{58} The group or collection of its members rejects outright the policy and action by open acts contrary to state policy or action. This may occur through a series of performances having varying degrees of seriousness, including leaving the country, seeking aid from international bodies to bring pressure on the regime to change, as well as engaging in transgressive actions, such as disrupting daily life through sit-ins, boycotts, graffiti, rioting, and even seeking to overthrow the government.
these actions were performed by each group. However, in Chapter 6, a closer examination will be made of those actions which have coalesced into educational strategies.

As reflected in Table C8, those groups that are institutionalized and recognized seem to be more accepting and tolerant than those that are not. Similarly, those groups that are institutionalized and recognized do not take as many transgressive actions as do the unrecognized groups, even when resisting. From an organizational viewpoint, the Jewish leadership during the Pahlavi era leaned primarily toward accepting-tolerant actions, and only slightly shifted toward a tolerant-accepting mode after the revolution. Their case is very similar to that of the recognized ethnic Christian groups. Resistance only took place through proper legally sanctioned channels, such as letters, addresses to government bodies, and sometimes statements to the media. The nonrecognized Christian denominations, specifically the evangelical groups, began by being accepting-tolerant during the Pahlavi era, but drew closer to tolerating-resisting actions after the Revolution, particularly during the third and fourth epochs. Similarly, the Baha’is who were not recognized or represented, were tolerant-accepting during the Pahlavi era, with intermittent episodes of resistance. However, after the Revolution and the radical shift in the new regime’s treatment behavior toward the community, the Baha’i community initiated resistant-tolerant actions, and even rejecting actions, drawing on a network of support outside of Iran.

Outright rejection of the regime by recognized groups did not occur, except that large numbers of all three groups left Iran after the Revolution. Despite official recognition by the government, the largest percentage of those who chose to leave were
members of the Jewish, Armenian, and Assyrian communities. This strategy should not be overlooked. Exodus by the majority of the members of these communities has had a significant impact on subsequent actions selected by group leaders and remaining members.

The secular nature of the Pahlavi dynasty provided more opportunities for religious minorities to integrate into society and the public sector than did the religiously charged epochs of the Islamic Republic. The nature of regime-group dynamics and contentious interaction is political, and when religious identity was transformed into a political category after the Revolution, it became more difficult to maintain community integrity and development. International pressure and intervention has had an important impact on the regime’s actions toward groups, even if minimal. While some argue that this argument is hard to prove (Afshari, 2008), there are several cases regarding religious minorities in Iran that illustrate the notion of the “boomerang” effect, as described by Keck and Sikkink (1998). Networks and group composition, as well as group standing, also had a bearing on the kinds of strategies that were available and adopted. Moreover, some actions engendered or facilitated other subsequent actions, while limiting the accessibility of others.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the particular dimensions of three group features which I argue will have an impact on the selection of education strategies: composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations. Ultimately, the Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities during both the Pahlavi era and the epochs of the Islamic Republic shifted in various directions based on the dynamic interplay between the
features, as well as differing in scale. In other words, neither groups nor actions exist or
develop in a vacuum. The impact of the government and its regime is omnipresent in
influencing and even shaping the composition and characteristics of groups, how they
form and develop networks, and, ultimately, altering the status and interaction found in
regime-group relations. The same applies to the impact of groups on regimes. Thus, the
features become significant factors in determining a trend of actions which coalesce into
strategies to meet certain needs. This idea will be tested further in Chapter 6, in which I
incorporate a mechanism-process approach, in order to examine specific episodes of
contention and actuation for each group over the two periods. I argue that these three
factors bear on strategy selection, and point toward some of the actions that are more
often adopted by and available to various groups. Building on this, the following chapter
will also illustrate how, and to what extent, these factors influenced the selection of
educational strategies.
CHAPTER 6: EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY SELECTION

Analyzing Education Opportunities and Strategy Selection

Mechanisms and Processes in Streams and Episodes

I now turn to specific episodes of interaction to highlight mechanisms and processes that form groups’ educational strategies. Contentious politics literature emphasizes the role of political opportunity structure, framing, and resources in shaping processes by looking at contentious interactions. I suggest that including an agent-centric approach focusing on the role of a group’s composition and characteristics, networks, and relations with the regime further explains the nuances and selection of particular strategies and their deployment. The relational aspects of political opportunity, framing processes, and resource mobilization inherently comprise considerations of composition/characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations. The features of the three groups dynamically interact as the driving force, within the broader interplay of opportunity structures, framing, and resources. Each set affects the other, as illustrated in Figure 18. In the context of education, I have created a model to illustrate this dynamic, which I call the educational opportunity dynamic. This holistic consideration will provide more coherent explanations for why certain mechanisms and processes, and thus educational strategies, are selected and employed in meeting educational goals.
Figure 18. Educational opportunity dynamic model.

As Tilly and Tarrow (2007) explain, “The distinction between mechanisms and processes … depends on our level of observation…Whether a causal cluster counts as a mechanism or a process depends on our scale of observation” (p. 214). In my analysis, I identify what level of observation is being made at each logical juncture. I look to available data to determine which observation scale of the mechanisms and processes is available and best informs my study. Generally, I undertake mid-scale observations for processes. However, in some cases, I highlight observations of small-scale processes by illustrating micro-scale mechanisms. Conversely, in some areas where information is wanting, I draw on large-scale processes to determine strategies, and extrapolate mid-scale mechanisms. I single out processes and mechanisms that significantly contribute to strategy formation, and analyze how group composition, networks, and state-group relations affect the selection of those strategies.
The unit of analysis is the stream or episode of contention. Episodes of contention and actuation are replete with interactions (i.e., performances) that highlight mechanisms and processes. By looking at bounded interactions among subject groups, regimes, and other important actors, explaining similarities and divergences between group strategies becomes manageable, and in many cases shows why groups adopt certain strategies at a later period. Sometimes in-group interactions determine strategy selection more than interactions with the regime.

**Jews Under the Pahlavi Monarchy**

A discussion of the Iranian Jewish community and their educational strategy selection must begin by addressing Jewish education initiatives in the decades leading up to the Pahlavi era. Most, if not all, subsequent educational strategies were shaped significantly by the events and interactions during the pioneering decades associated with the development of modern, Jewish-run schools and school initiatives in the community. The introduction of modern, Jewish-run schools significantly influenced major developments in the community’s composition and characteristics, networks, and relations with the government. This, in turn, led to the adoption of specific strategies affecting their educational opportunities and pursuits in the decades to follow. I examine mostly large-scale but also mid-scale processes in order to identify the formation and selection of Iranian Jewish educational strategies. To this end, I focus primarily on three specific initiatives: the formation and development of Alliance Israelite Universelle schools (representing nationwide foreign-based initiatives), the Ozar Hatorah (representing a hybrid initiative), and the Ettefaugh School (representing local-based initiatives).
During the Qajar period, Jewish education was primarily religious in orientation, taking the form of *maktabs*, which were attended only by boys. Advanced education entailed becoming an apprentice in some vocation. In 1889, the Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU), a French-based organization, established the first modern, Jewish-run school in Iran, with others following suit in subsequent years. Jews in Iran witnessed the socioeconomic advances made by the Jewish community in Baghdad (Iraq) and associated it with the positive impact of AIU schools there. Jewish leaders in Tehran wrote a letter to the head of the AIU in France and asked for assistance in starting the modern school. In turn, the organization’s founder worked out an arrangement with Nasr al-Din Shah (1831–1896) for schools to be established in Iran (Netzer, 1985). The opportunity structure was opened by the end of the 19th century, giving the Jewish community the possibility to start schools. Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1853–1907) had been drawing on European experts to help modernize various aspects of the state, and so the importation of a French schooling model was welcomed (Nikbakht, 2002). The schools were established through a process of *new coordination* (produced by a combination of brokerage and diffusion). The Alliance representatives consulted with local leaders and prominent community members before proceeding with plans to establish schools. Although AIU representatives collaborated in mobilizing moral and financial resources for the schools, local leaders were excluded from the structural and curriculum decision-making process (Cohen, 1986). Thus, only a quasi-coalition was formed, which excluded Iranian Jewish leaders from becoming wholly involved in the education process. Like Christian missionary schools, all administrators of Alliance schools were non-Iranian,
until after the first cadre of graduates received formal education in France (Eshaghian, 1998; Malino, 2005).

Beyond its primary purpose of increasing social and economic mobility, I argue that the drive of the Iranian Jewish community to start and participate in modern schools was sustained by a combination of several other motives: first, the AIU presence provided protection and relief for Iranian Jews who faced fierce persecution and disparity in Muslim-dominated countries (Cohen, 1986). As part of the recruitment and relief strategy targeting the poorer population, clothing and food were provided for school children (Cohen, 1986). Second, Iranian Jews initially welcomed the initiative of European Jews who sought to offer Middle Eastern Jews secular knowledge and skills, as well as liberal mores, so as to facilitate their integration into non-Jewish society more easily (AIU, n.d.; Nikbakht, 2002). Third, Jewish-run schools provided an alternative to religious minority-run schools (which sometimes led to conversion or weakened ties with the community), or to government-run and Muslim schools which were inaccessible at the time (Netzer, 1985). Thus, group characteristics, particularly ideological orientation and the desire to advance their socioeconomic status was a primary driving force.

Leaders and members of the Iranian Jewish community never pursued modern schooling prior to seeing the Iraqi Jewish community thrive, nor did they consider it a religious obligation. It was the AIU organization that introduced the Iranian Jewish community to a new culture of education, brokered and diffused through its French representatives and eventually its Iranian Jewish graduates. Community leaders framed educational pursuit as a means of increasing social mobility and economic opportunities, but also to protect the Jewish community from conversion (Nikbakht, 2002). Through
new network ties among Iranian, Iraqi, and European Jews the initiatives came to fruition. However, the culture shock presented by the pervasive Eurocentric and secularist orientation of the schools, with little and sometimes no emphasis on Jewish education, posed a challenge for Iranian Jewish community leaders, parents, and community members (Cohen, 1986). Thus, a boundary shift and activation was in the making—one that marked secular versus religious Jewish identity, and national versus transnational aspects of the religious community. This boundary shift would become an impetus for creating locally based Iranian Jewish schools, and decades later for soliciting help from Orthodox Jewish organizations in the United States and Israel to reassert Jewish religious identity. However, their relationship remained cooperative (see AIU correspondence and reports, cited in Cohen, 1986).

From this embryonic cooperative relationship the Iranian and French Jewish communities were able to mobilize resources in forming the first set of schools in areas like Tehran, Isfahan, Hamadan, and Shiraz. Many of the Jewish maktab schools were intentionally dissolved so that students and previous Jewish religious scholars (khakham) could be incorporated into the modern schools (Cohen, 1986). Administrators and teachers were brought in from France, and schools were built with funds collected from the local congregation and contributions from AIU for the initiative. It is also important to note that among the various initiatives within the Jewish community, many individuals sent their children to other minority schools run by Christian missionaries and Baha’is (Arasteh, 1962; Rostam-Kolayi, 2008). As mentioned earlier, one of the supporting reasons for starting Jewish-run schools was to provide an alternative to these other
schools. Thus, the ideological orientation of communal preservation factored into decisions to pursue education.

Several mechanisms were employed to carry forward the processes involved in importing the French modeled modern schools and their operation, including brokerage, diffusion, boundary activation and formation, certification, and emulation. These mechanisms combined and configured common processes that are usually present in the start-up of a school, including: mobilization, collective action, selective coalition formation, and new coordination. In addition, in the case of the Iranian Jewish community, five other processes were present, namely scale-shift, identity shift, assimilation, institutionalization, and framing.

The contribution of the organizational structure of AIU to the development of Iranian Jewish educational strategies should not be underestimated. It was their long-practiced systematic procedures for forming and operating schools that allowed for their relatively rapid diffusion and expansion throughout Iran. The general cooperation of Iranian Jewish community members with AIU representatives signaled the readiness for and the subsequent acceleration of coordination and collective action. Perhaps more than the Baha’i- and Christian-run schools, AIU schools emulated a foreign school model with very little adaptation to local culture and practices. This was a continued point of contention and struggle between the French and Iranian Jewish participants in the development and management of schools. The recognition of Jews in the Iranian Constitution started a process of institutionalization of the Iranian Jewish community into the government (see Chapter 5). The institutionalization of the Jewish community allowed organization leaders to provide education services to its community, and to
include in-group particulars in the educational institutions, with protection from local and regional government—implicitly highlighting the role of the regime in facilitating the processes of starting and running the Jewish-run schools. These processes continued into the Pahlavi era. In fact, adjusting to the practice of assimilation became a hallmark of Jewish-run school for decades to come and into the period of the Islamic Republic.

**Streams and Episodes**

Reza Shah’s launch of a modernization agenda, in addition to amicable state relations with the French, provided an open opportunity structure for Jewish-run schools. By the time the Shah came to power, eleven AIU schools¹ and three locally based Iranian Jewish-run schools were established in the country (American Jewish Committee Archives, 1930). In the context of Iranian Jewish educational strategy development, there are three major streams of contention and actuation for this period that I refer to as: (a) internal contention, (b) regime implementation of new policies, and (c) external configurations.

**Internal contention.** Three major challenges emerged with the introduction of AIU schools, issues related to: culture and language adaptation, religiosity and religious education, and ethnic disunity. These issues led to general contention within the community, and had a significant bearing on the selection process of subsequent strategies. Local schools arose partly in response to the AIU and other religious minority schools (Cohen, 1986; Nikbakht, 2002).

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¹ AIU schools were established in Tehran (1898), Hamadan (1900), Isfahan (1901), Shiraz (1903), Sanandaj (1903), Kermanshah (1904), Bijar (1906), Nehavand (1906), Tuyserkan (1906), Kashan (1911), and Golpaygan (1914). Some of these schools closed down shortly after opening, and in some cities like Tehran, more than one school was opened.
AIU was not only modeled after French schools, but the curriculum, structure, and content of subjects of most schools were almost entirely French-oriented (even celebrations revolving around events and prominent individuals associated with European Jewry). The language of instruction was solely French, with Persian and Hebrew sometimes used as an elective second language (Netzer, 1985). The provision of free clothing, hygiene, behavior and edict instruction, helped the general conditions for participants and bolstered the reputation of Iranian Jews in the general community, for which the community members were grateful. Thus, assimilation was framed as a necessity to improve living conditions (Cohen, 1986; AIU, n.d.).

However, many parents and leaders voiced concern for the lack of sensitivity and appreciation for the Iranian Jewish heritage. The primary challenges posed by French instruction in the first decades of the schools can be identified by limited learning retention, degraded or mediocre language acquisition, and illiteracy in Persian and Hebrew (to which only a few hours were devoted in a week). Hebrew was relegated to religious instruction, and Persian was completely absent at first. This led to a series of confrontations between community leaders and members and the French AIU representatives. For example, in communities like Shiraz, Sanandaj, and Isfahan where the community spoke a Judeo-Persian dialect, the frustration reached such heights that parents withdrew their children because they were frustrated with the inadequate levels of learning (Cohen, 1986). Local Iranian Jewish community members were calling for more language and religious education. In some regions, there were adaptations, but in others there were none. AIU schools that adjusted—by increasing hours of instruction in Persian

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2 Alliance students were forbidden to speak Persian even in the schoolyard.
and taking cultural issues into consideration—were able to retain the support of the local community; in other areas, where no changes were made, learning was weak and degraded, attendance decreased, and some schools even closed (Cohen, 1986). However, many felt that the compromises did not outweigh the advantages that came with AIU modern schools (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, 2 November 2009).

Lack of cultural consideration of the local community on the part of AIU representatives led to additional concerns about the lack of religious orientation in schools. This fueled existing contention. AIU schools were primarily secular, despite the supposed inclusion of Hebrew and Bible study (Schwarzfuchs and Malino, 2006). School administrators committed only marginal hours (if any) to the study of the Torah and Jewish subjects (Malino, 2005; Cohen, 1986). In the absence of religious schools, parents and community leaders voiced concern about the lack of attention given to religious studies. Several prominent AIU administrators and teachers did not see the usefulness of teaching Hebrew to Iranian Jews, and saw a greater need for their social and cultural education to integrate into non-Jewish society (Cohen, 1986). I argue that this led to boundary activation. Iranian Jews became acutely aware of their distinct Iranian Jewish heritage, as compared to the secular brand of Judaism practiced by some AIU representatives. The linguistic, cultural, and religious issues were among the motives for establishing locally based Iranian Jewish schools such the Koresh Schools in Rasht and Tehran.

Replete in Alliance reports and representative letters are sentiments that may be characterized as culturally prejudiced, with overtones bordering on racism. Even a cursory perusal of 23 different letters and reports reveals that many Alliance
representatives attached derogatory labels to Iranian Jews. This, however, was more prevalent in some areas than in others, like Kermansah, Hamadan, Yazd, and Tehran (see statements cited in Cohen, 1986). In those areas where the attitude was blatantly prejudiced, tensions usually led to school closure or change in administration (see Table D1 for examples of responses to Alliance establishment). Figure D1 illustrates the general sequence and outcomes of strategies adopted as a result of the interaction between AIU administrators and Iranian Jewish community members.

By and large, the AIU schools were welcomed, and are remembered in most contemporary Iranian Jewish histories as having given an important impetus for the socioeconomic advancement and improvement of living conditions during the Pahlavi era (Eshaghian, 1998, 2007; Netzer, 1985; Nikbakht, 2002; Sam Kermanian, personal communication, 17 February 2009; Schwarzfuchs and Malino, 2006). Since it was difficult for AIU to mobilize enough teachers to settle in Iran, the administration sent talented and willing graduates to France to receive education and return as staff—a process I call external accreditation (Malino, 2005). It was not enough to undertake local training, but the external validation that training in France provided supported the assimilation goals of the AIU.

**Government education expansion and policy implementation.** As they did on other religious minority schools, three important government policies during the Reza Shah period had a profound impact on Jewish-run schools. These included the 1928 curricular requirements, the 1932 and 1936 government restrictions on foreign school enrolments and eventual takeover by the government, and the 1939 takeover and closure.

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3 Tables and Figures for this chapter are found in Appendix D.
of all non-Iranian elementary and secondary schools. The first policy perhaps had the most serious effect on the Jewish schools. The latter two had almost no effect on the schools themselves, but significantly changed the educational landscape in Iran and thus the educational strategies of Iranian Jews.

The 1928 policy required Iranian Jewish-run schools, as well as all other nonstate schools, to incorporate fundamental changes, including the use of Persian as the language of instruction, the addition of several other courses on Iranian history, geography, and the study of Islam (thus de-emphasizing Western history; Sadiq, 1931). Most AIU schools made the transition to the new policies slowly, but showed little or no open resistance (not making even appeals to the government). The Iranian Jewish community had learned the strategy of assimilation, and applied it selectively. This included secretly teaching preferred subjects and language of instruction, but disguising with false class schedules on bulletin boards in case administrators visited (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, 17 February 2010). Thus, the AIU and other Iranian Jewish schools employed the strategy of selective assimilation, which entails the adoption of select elements of the broader system to benefit the group and avoid a negative reaction.

In 1932 and 1936, when the government first issued orders forbidding foreign schools from enrolling Iranian students and then taking over all non-Iranian primary schools, AIU schools were not included. This is especially peculiar, since the schools were under the French AIU, while other foreign missionary schools were taken over (such as those run by the Anglicans and Presbyterians). In my investigation, I find several likely explanations: first, the schools were co-registered or fully registered to the local Iranian Jewish community, which might have protected them from foreign status.
Second, because of the good relations between the AIU and Iranian Jewish community and the government, the schools were framed as a local initiative and catered to Iranian students who studied according to government standards. Furthermore, as Soli Shahvar (personal communication, 24 February 2010) suggests, “France was never seen as a threat in the Iranian psyche, and were definitely not seen with the same eyes as Britain, Russia/Soviet Union or the USA.” Not only did the state-group relations provide favorable conditions for the Jewish-run schools, but the secular orientation of the AIU schools could have warded off concerns about any emphasis on religious and cultural loyalties. Finally, the Iranian educational system was based on the French lycée model, thus making the AIU schools look compatible.

Similarly, in 1939, when all foreign schools were taken over, the Jewish-run schools once again escaped co-optation by the government. This required them to further draw on the strategy of selective assimilation of the Iranian curriculum at all levels of education. This is further supported by the fact that other local Iranian Jewish schools were also not taken over during the 1939 reconfiguration of Ministry of Education policies. These contention-free episodes with the government illustrate the openness of the political opportunity structure for the Jewish community in Iran, and their ability to use framing and organizational network ties to keep schools afloat (Cohen, 1986; Netzer 1985). Despite the sustainability of Jewish-run schools, the expansion, increasing quality, and receptivity of government-run schools attracted many Iranian Jews. In additional to other significant factors, this led to reconfiguration of strategies and innovations during the second epoch of the Pahlavi period.
**External configuration and innovation.** With the abdication of the Shah in 1941, the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah maintained an open political opportunity structure for Iranian Jewish schools and offered them educational opportunities. After decades of experience with modern schooling, the Iranian Jewish community had gradually adopted an education-oriented outlook, considered as part and parcel of the path toward social mobility and economic prosperity, which created a significant change in their composition and characteristics. This was an idea that was framed and emulated throughout the Iranian Jewish communities in Iran. With the coalescing of an educated class, Iranian Jews were being hired by the government and foreign companies. In other words, the composition and characteristics of the community had changed from an insular, isolated and generally uneducated group, to that of an outward looking, integrative, and educated community. A new generation of educated parents continued to send their children to modern schools. As one source relates, educational strategies may have changed in detail, but it was dominated by a drive toward professions which would allow Iranian Jews to relocate quickly and avoid the risk or danger of damage to shops and property (Sam Kermanian, personal communication, 2 June, 2009).

With the diffusion of Zionism by Western-educated Iranian Jews and the eventual formation of Israel, Iranian Jewish community leaders began to establish network ties with British, American, and Israeli Jewish communities and organizations (Rahimiyian, 2008a). One noticeable shift in educational strategy was associated with the reasserted Jewish identity. With only partial success in persuading AIU schools to increase religious education, Iranian Jews connected with foreign Jewish leaders who showed an interest in
the religiosity and circumstances facing Mizrahi Jews\textsuperscript{4}—either through personal contact or through correspondence (Ozar Hatorah, n.d.). This new connection enabled some Iranian Jewish leaders to solicit help in focusing on the religious education of Iranian Jews. It is important to note that the Iranian Jewish community never made moves that would fall out of alignment with the Pahlavi regime—it maintained good standing even during sporadic outbreaks of anti-Semitism.

The most prominent manifestation of international brokerage and diffusion of new educational efforts took place in 1947, with the establishment of the first Ozar Hatorah School in Iran. The Ozar Hatorah was an organization established by a partnership of Isaac Shalam (a Syrian Jew who had immigrated to the United State), Joseph Shamah and Ezra Teubal (in Jerusalem) in 1945, to provide education to Mizrahi Jews. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), a relief and welfare organization, had sent Rabbi Isaac Lew to Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East to evaluate the conditions of the Jewish communities (Ozar Hatorah, n.d.; Kadosh, 2007). During his travels in Iran, he reported witnessing weak religiosity and poor social conditions among the Iranian Jewish community, and brokered a connection between local Iranian Jews, the JDC, and the Ozar Hatorah network to establish and diffuse religion and secular schools in Iran (Kadosh 2007; Ozar Hatorah, n.d.; Ozar Hatorah, 2007). These schools not only provided rich education in Judaic subjects, but also included secular subjects, and free meals and clothing for Iranian Jewish children. The international network of the Iranian Jewish community grew from having principal ties with Iraqi and French Jews, to including American, Israeli, Russian, and British Jews as well. Within the first 30 years

\textsuperscript{4} Mizrahi: from the east; that is, Jews descended from Jewish communities of the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus.
after establishing its first school, there were a total of 41 schools and programs for Iranian Jewish boys and girls throughout Iran5 (not at the same time; American Jewish Yearbook, 1976; Ozar Hatorah, n.d.; “Ozar Hatorah,” 2007). These schools were smaller as compared to other mid-scale and larger public and community-run schools with enrolments in the hundreds. By the 1950s, having learned from the mistake of alienating local Jews, Alliance representatives connected with the new Ozar Hatorah schools to handle the Jewish subjects and Hebrew language instruction in their schools (Netzer 1985; Nikbakht, 2002). The strong Jewish leadership, which had been educated in secular, French-language, Jewish-run schools, was now steering the Iranian Jewish community toward a middle ground. I argue that it was as a result of resources through networks that this integration of secular and Jewish studies was possible.

After the creation of Israel in 1948, The Joint Distribution Committee mobilized a campaign to populate Israel, by supporting the immigration of European as well as Mizrahi Jews (Kadosh, 2007). This opened opportunities for lower-class Jews to find opportunities outside Iran. The increased attention of foreign Jewish communities towards Middle Eastern Jewry expanded a pool of resources that had not been accessible until this period. The amicable relations between Israel and Iran bore on state-group relations; and transnational community networks ties were strengthened. Two tracks of educational strategies moved forward from 1950 to 1979. The first track included the continued creation and maintenance of Jewish-run schools, which included substantial religious education as a component. The second involved the rapid rate of integration of

5 The count of 41 is cited in several places, and seems reasonable, considering that the organization had a presence in 31 localities throughout Iran (Ozar Hatorah, n.d.).
Jewish children into government schools, as a result of the open opportunity structure for Iranians who supported the modernization of the state.

In 1947, with the aid of an affluent and prominent Iraqi-Iranian Jewish donor, Meyer Abdu’llah, local congregation community funds, and support from other community members in Baghdad, the Iraqi Jewish Committee founded the Ettefaugh School in Tehran (Daghighian, 1998). This local school was not only structured after modern schools, but it included a strong Persian program, in addition to religious activities adequate to satisfy the community (Darshi, 1997). The network tie between the Iraqi-Iranian Jewish community and the Iraqi Jewish community in Baghdad was retained through family and organizational connections, and was the means through which the educational initiative was founded. The student body was primarily made up of Iranian-Iraqi Jews living in Tehran, although by the 1970s, 20 percent of the 2,000 students consisted of Muslims, Baha’is, Christians, and Zoroastrians (Nikbakht and Hojat-Panah, 1999).

Social assimilation was a central strategy of the broader Iranian Jewish community. Thus, the school’s structure and policies shifted according to prospective changes in group-regime and international relations. For example, when tensions arose between the Anglo-American interests and Prime Minister Mossadeq’s administration in the 1950s, the school administrators made a bold shift to the Iranian curriculum (abandoning the British model), cautious of backlash from the government (Nikbakht and Hojat-Panah, 1999; Beroukhim, 1997). Emphasizing association with different network affiliates to keep good favor with the regime would become a strategy employed even

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6 According to Moshi Dellal, there were about 6,000 Iranian-Iraqi Jews by the middle of the 1970s, with the majority living in Tehran (cited in Dallalfar, 2002).
later during the regime of the Islamic Republic. The change in the curriculum caused some setbacks internally, but with the appointment of Beroukhim as principle and his recruitment of teachers from the well-reputed Albourz College, the school got back on track (Beroukhim, 1997; Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, 2 November 2009). Funding for subsequent management of the school was provided almost entirely by the congregation, and the principals of the school were under the supervision of the Iraqi-Iranian Jewish Committee.

While schools such as the AIU, Ettefaugh and others existed until the Revolution in 1979—and into the Islamic Republic—by the 1950s, the number of Jewish schools and the enrollment declined. First, the increasing number of government-run schools facilitated religious minority children, as they did Muslims and others, emphasizing an Iranian identity. Second, many Jews had left smaller cities for urban areas like Tehran and Shiraz, where there was greater opportunity, rendering schools in other areas unsustainable. For example, organizations in cities such as Kashan, Borujerd, Sanandaj, Urumieh, and Yazd disintegrated, and so did many of their Jewish schools (Yashayaei, 2003). Figure D2 illustrates the rise and decline of Jewish-run schools over the course of the Pahlavi era.

The predominant Iranian Jewish education strategies during the last two decades of the Pahlavi era focused on integration into the expanded public school system and migration to seek educational opportunity wherever available. Government schools were not only multiplying in those cities where the majority of Jews were living, but the quality of government schools was also increasing. Iranian Jews were accepted in schools, and despite random and sporadic harassment by some students and teachers, the
period was characterized by high levels of tolerance and facilitation. Additionally, with a pervasive and successful nationalization process, Iranian Jews saw themselves as having two noncontradictory identities: one Iranian, the other Jewish (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, 2 November 2009). By emphasizing their secular Iranian identity in the public sphere, they were able to enjoy greater access to educational, economic, and social mobility than if they emphasized their Jewish identity (anonymous Jewish leader, personal communication, 23 March 2009; Farahani, 2005). Thus, the characteristic of Jews shifted and was less polarized than in earlier periods. In like manner, higher education was also sought to build on the community’s acculturated Western-style education. For decades Iranian Jews participated in both the AIU and government study abroad programs, returning home to build up the community’s educated class.

**Summary.** Over the course of several decades of modern schooling, the composition and characteristics of the Iranian Jewish community changed. The growing number and strength of international ties also influenced the types of strategies available to the community. Finally, not only the institutionalization of Jews as a recognized group, but also their good standing with the government throughout both epochs facilitated various shifts, and allowed for growth, development, and integration. Additionally, there was an increase in network ties, and consequently in resources and framing processes available to Iranian Jewish community leaders and educators. I explain this by the open flow within the educational opportunity dynamic during the Pahlavi period for Iranian Jews.
Christians under the Pahlavi Monarchs

In examining the case of Christian communities in Iran during the Pahlavi era, I observe two levels of processes. Where possible I analyze mid-scale processes to identify strategies and explanations for their selection, but also consider large-scale educational processes when information is sparse. An analysis of how modern schooling was initially introduced, developed, and accessed by the Christian communities in Iran\(^7\) will provide an understanding of those processes which shaped educational strategy selection during the Pahlavi period.

The case of the Iranian Christian communities is unique because modern schooling was originally initiated by foreign missionaries and not by the local communities; it was Christian missionaries who first introduced the idea of modern schooling to Iran. Moreover, because there are multiple denominations among the local and foreign missionary Christian groups, there are often parallel and overlapping processes at play. During the first epoch of the Pahlavi era, the educational strategies of these local Christian communities were tied to the missionaries’ initiatives, and thus the discussion of strategy selection involves looking at the initiatives of both missionaries and the local community. I focus analysis on the Presbyterian and Anglican education missionary work and Apostolic Armenian Christian initiatives in the context of Iranian Christian strategies in education.

The first semblance of modern schooling in Iran was introduced by American Presbyterians in 1837, followed by the French Lazarists in 1839 (Hadidi, 2001) and the

\(^7\) To clarify, I use the term Iranian Christians to signify all locally based Christians living in Iran, including the Iranian-Armenians, Iranian-Assyrians, Iranian-Chaldeans, as well as subsequent Iranian converts.
Anglican Church Missionary Society in 1876 (Richards, 1933). In addition to foreign education initiatives, the Iranian-Armenian Apostolic prelacy established schools beginning in 1843 (Amurian and Kasheff, 1987), followed by Assyrians and Chaldeans some time later. The foundations of most of these schools lasted into the Pahlavi era, and some continued into the Islamic Republic period.

The Presbyterian and Anglican missions set out to revitalize the Christian communities in Iran, proselytizing and converting other Christian sects and non-Christians, and providing health and education services to local Christians, Muslims, and other Iranian minorities. The missionary schools attracted local Christians, primarily because of the additional services accompanying the schools (free food, cleaning, and skill building in crafts). Iranian ethnic Christian communities, particularly the Armenians, established schools in response to missionary efforts (Berberian, 2000). Apostolic Church leaders and community members were concerned that the missionary-run schools would diminish Armenian cultural and religious identity, and lead to increased conversion to Protestantism and Anglicanism (Board of Foreign Missions, 1936). After much debate, the Apostolic Armenian community established special schools for Armenian girls, by framing them as a means of educating Armenian women in their roles as wives, mothers, and the first teachers of the future generation of community members (Berberian, 2009). I suggest that considering the firm reaction to missionaries, as well as later contention with

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8 There is no record for when the Assyrian and Chaldean schools were established, but it is likely that they were begun in the late 19th century.

9 For first-hand accounts of missionary goals and activity see Smith and Dwight (1834), Perkins (1843), Rice (1916), Wood (1922), Cash (1929), Howard (1931), Richards (1933), and Doolittle (1983). Also see United Presbyterian Church in the United States, Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, Secretaries’ files: Iran Mission 1944–1973 Record Group 161, Iran Mission 1881–1968 Record Group 91, located in the Presbyterian Historical Society: The Archives of the Presbyterian Church (USA).
the regimes, Armenian Church leaders positioned education in all respects within the context of its potential to preserve cultural and religious values first, and secondarily to provide secular knowledge and skills.

Missionary schools received resources primarily from the countries in which their missions were based, but also from tuition and local fundraisers. In addition to the services provided by missionaries, Armenians received resources through network ties to Armenia (specifically the Apostolic Church and community organizations), as well as from the local Armenian-Iranian congregation. The American and British schools recruited teachers from their own countries, and often employed locals to assist in language instruction and translation. After several cohorts of Iranian student graduated, missionary school-administrators trained local Christian converts to teach classes as well (Allen, 1918; Arasteh, 1962). Armenian-Iranian schools drew from administrators and teachers trained in Armenia to establish the first schools, and subsequently trained Armenian-Iranians to teach as well (Howard, 1931; Richards, 1933). A strong coalition formed among members of the local and transnational Apostolic Church over time, as the focus on cultural preservation intensified. While the Armenian community had practiced isolation for centuries, new boundaries were forming, separating them even from other Christian denominations. Missionary schools did not collaborate with local leaders of the Christian community, but rather made direct ties with prominent community members and government officials to establish schools (Richards, 1933). This was due, in part, to resistance by local ethnic Christian leaders (Board of Foreign Missions, 1936). While drawing on human and material resources from transnational networks, the local Armenian religious leadership and its appointed committees managed their own
Armenian-Iranian schooling initiatives. New schools were emulated and spread by missionaries (Zirinsky, 1993b), but also through educators directed by Apostolic Church community organizers for Armenian-Iranians schools (Berberian, 2000).

Unlike the Baha’i and Jewish education initiatives, coalitions were not formed between ethnic Christian Church leaders and Western co-religionists. However, the presence of Anglican and Presbyterians in Iran, and their conversion efforts, galvanized existing identity boundaries for Armenians and Assyrians. Sectarian division prevailed. This led to coalition formation within each ethnic community and their transnational networks. Thus, I suggest that community characteristics and composition played perhaps the most significant role in educative initiatives started by Christians in Iran. It is important to note that while there was a clear divide between missionaries and ethnic leaders, local Christian communities still participated in missionary schools.

At various junctures, processes played out differently in the education initiatives of missionaries and local Christian groups. Armenian-Iranian community leaders and members co-opted a new role as authorized providers of educational services for their community, appointing education committees to act on their behalf. Missionaries believed they were acting in the interest of Iranians, particularly Christian communities, by providing moral and secular schooling in order to revitalize their communities.¹⁰ Network ties existed between all groups, despite existing competition among them. In the early days of missionary schools, most pupils were Armenian and Assyrians, and thus these communities drew from the resources being channeled to British and American

¹⁰ In 1895, Anglicans and Presbyterians entered into a mutual understanding which delineated activities in northern Iran to be administered by American missionaries, with the work in the south to remain under the auspice of the British (Zirinsky, 1993b).
missions from their respective home communities. In response, Armenian Christian leaders developed new types of coalitions with their transnational community members in establishing schools and educational opportunity for community members, thus strengthening ties that were underdeveloped before the rivalry between the two Christian groups (i.e., missionaries and local community leadership). In other words, missionaries and local Christian leadership tended to compete for Christian students. It is important to mention that Apostolic Armenian-run schools recruited only Armenian students. This was an intrinsic element of their *isolationist* strategy which developed in reaction to the conversion efforts of missionaries.

Other processes continued to shape education strategies. Ethno-religious community leaders signaled to in-group community members the need for action to meet educational demands, and thus called for coordinated and collective action, as well as polarization between alien Christian denominations and culturally religious tradition. Missionaries framed schooling as a moral and social service, with added benefits. Local ethnic Christian community leaders framed the need for schooling in similar terms, but with the overriding goal of preserving cultural and religious integrity. In the process of schooling, identities either became polarized and reaffirmed (i.e., Apostolic Armenians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans) or shifted through conversion, with Armenians, Assyrians, and Iranians changing sectarian affiliation. Globalization processes were present through the importation of foreign education models into Iran. Missionaries mobilized resources from host countries (government and religious-affiliated organizations), which included the recruitment of administrators and teachers, collection of funds for associated costs, and external certification by Western states. Armenians drew resources from transnational
networks but also from their local congregations (Papazian, 1987). These multiple processes shaped and shifted for decades throughout the Pahlavi era.

During the first epoch of the Pahlavi era, Christians in Iran had access to four different portals to modern schooling: missionary-run schools, locally based ethnic Christian schools, government schools, and non-Christian religious minority-run schools. Missionary schools as well as local Armenian schools successively increased enrollments during the initial years of Reza Shah’s rule (Zirinsky, 1993b). Initially Reza Shah welcomed Western missionary schools, which seemed to be equipping young Iranians with modern skills and orientation, moving them away from the traditional maktab-style education which had been prevalent in past centuries. In fact, many government officials and societal elite sent their children to Christian-run schools (Zirinsky, 1993a; Rostam-Kolayi, 2008).

The education initiatives were generally framed by local community and missionary leaders in four ways: (a) modern schooling would improve the moral conduct and religiosity of children; (b) modern schooling would provide practical skills to children that could be used in work and society (enhancing quality of life); (c) modern schooling was in alignment with the regime’s agenda and would provide the know-how and mores required to increase socioeconomic status in Iran; and, in the case of ethno-religious Christian-run schools, (d) modern schooling would provide a space for community children to acquire a solid cultural foundation and keep children safe from proselytizing foreign Christian sects (Berberian, 2000; Hoare, 1937; Richard, 1933; Zirinsky, 1993a). Table D2 shows some of the main locations of the various schools available to all Christians in Iran during the Pahlavi era. Calculations for the number of
schools are inconsistent in primary sources, with the result that total counts sometimes do not distinguish between a one-room classroom and a full-fledged modern school.

While forbidden from directly teaching the Bible to Muslim students as a means of conversion, missionaries framed the use of the Bible as a means of moral education and other classes as a means of training a skilled generation (Doolittle, 1983). Venues for schools expanded to accommodate merging one-room schools, necessitated by increased student enrolment and new trained teachers and administrators (Richards, 1933). Unlike the AIU schools, the Presbyterians and Anglicans set out to teach classes in the language of the students, adopting a cultural adaptation approach to schooling (Arasteh, 1962; Richards, 1933). However, because of lack of capacity, educators would often resort to using English as the main language of instruction (Rostam-Kolayi, 2008).

**Streams and Episodes**

In observing educational efforts, I analyze three mid-scale streams during the regime of Reza Shah, and one large-scale stream during the second epoch of the Pahlavi era. The regime’s education policies during the first epoch had a detrimental impact on the cultural dimensions of Christian educational opportunities. Likewise, the regime’s nationalization campaign eventually inhibited foreign missionary education efforts, especially because of their ties to Western powers. Nonetheless, the initial contentious interaction that shaped educational strategies for Christians in Iran was born out of the competition between Apostolic Armenian, as well as Assyrian and Chaldean leadership, and the missionary efforts from America and Europe. Thus, the first stream of contention involved inter-denominational strife. Both ethnic and missionary Christians would experience a confrontation with the aggressive educational campaign of the Pahlavi
regime. While encountering the same imposed government policies, missionary and ethnic Christian schools dealt with regime contention in different ways. At times, there is an overlap of contentious interactions among missionaries, ethnic Christians, and the regime. The segregation of these streams can be partly explained by several processes, including the reinforced activation of ethnic and identity boundaries, the lack of coalition formation between ethnic and missionary Christian education efforts, and competition between the two.

The first stream that shaped Christian educational strategies in Iran goes back to the contentious interaction between Armenian-Iranian leadership and missionary Christians. The perennial tension that existed between the Apostolic Christian community and missionaries in Iran has been noted in several sources (Bartlett, 1894; Berberian, 2000, 2009; Bournoutian, 1994). It is important to mention two features of this contention: first, the competition for students was focused primarily on the cultural and ideological orientation of schools; second, the rivalry was instigated by the Apostolic Church (Arasteh, 1962; Berberian, 2009). In Yazd, Tehran, and Isfahan, Armenian Church leaders appealed to the government and local Shi’i clerics, in personal communications, to put a stop to Western missionary activity targeting the local community (Arasteh, 1962; Board of Foreign Missions, 1936). Armenian-Iranian community leaders simultaneously solicited aid from the Apostolic Church in Armenia to start modern schools in Iran. The appeals to the government were only partially effective, as the government responded only by passing restrictive regulations on proselytizing and teaching non-Christian children (Board of Foreign Missions, 1936). Apostolic Armenian schools fostered community development and vitality in those regions where schools
were established (Berberian, 2009; Howard, 1931; Richards, 1933). While the contentions between the groups did limit missionary activity among Muslims, the rivalry between the groups led the Apostolic Church to becoming innovative and education-oriented. The boundary activation, coalition efforts within and outside the country among Armenians, and diffusion of anti-missionary rhetoric likely boosted mobilization efforts to increase enrolments and expansion. To reiterate, the use of frames to emphasize cultural preservation and boundary activation was a key educational strategy. Although information is scant on particulars in the general contention, the drive to preserve culture only became more intense with the passage of time, and subsequently affected how strategies that were chosen played out when confronted with new contention with the regime.

**Government intervention.** In 1927 and 1928, the Ministry of Education issued a circular to all nonstate modern schools outlining the new policies set by the Ministry of Education (Rostam-Kolayi, 2008; Sadiq, 1931). The new education policies were aligned with other educational campaign efforts of the Pahlavi regime (see Chapter 4). The new regulations stipulated that foreign schools were to use official syllabi produced by the Ministry of Education for all classes up to the 4th grade—including the implementation of a nationalized government textbook—that Persian be used as the language of instruction, and that Iranian geography and history be included along with other subjects based on the French lycée system, a program in Arabic and Persian literature at the upper grade levels, and a standardized matriculation exam at the end of secondary education (Matthee, 1993; Menashri, 1992; Sadiq, 1931). Moreover, Christian schools were required to teach the history of Islam and Islamic law, and were forbidden to teach Christian subjects to
Muslim students. State holidays were also to be observed, which meant restructuring the academic year calendar (Doolittle, 1983).

There were three general responses to the government policies: wholesale acceptance; acceptance and appeal to modify aspects of the policies; failure to comply (by resistance or lack of capacity). Depending on the reaction to government policies, several strategies remained available. The government had restricted the opportunity structure and triggered new boundaries in group-regime relations which had a directly bearing on group mobilization and collective action. Among schools which accepted the regulations, there were some which implemented the reforms, but made sufficient changes enough to appease Ministry of Education inspectors. Others attempted to genuinely align schooling procedures with those standards to avoid closure (Doolittle, 1983; Richards, 1933). Anglican and some Armenian schools adopted this strategy. Presbyterians adopted the strategy of selective adaptation, adopting the policies while simultaneously appealing to officials on the local and national level to make modifications. Many of the ethnic Christian schools (run by local community leaders or by missionaries) closed down, either in resistance to the new policies, or because they lacked the capacity to comply with the new requirements, or because the government offered incentives for pupils to leave those schools and attend state-run schools (Gillespie, 1928; Howard, 1931; McComb, 1928; Richards, 1933).

Anglican—and presumably some Armenian-run schools in the southern half of Iran—adopted the policies, but many were reluctant to implement the regulations. They adjusted to the situation by adding the required courses, omitting those that were banned, and finding ways to supplement subjects and content which were already included in the
core curriculum of the schools—such as moral and cultural education (Richards, 1933). This latter strategy was particularly evident in Isfahan and Yazd in the Anglican-run schools (Richard, 1933). I identify three processes in the acceptance response, including integration, selective assimilation, and institutionalization.

The Presbyterian schools adapted to the policies after reluctantly accepting the regulations and making appeals. For example, in the course of their communication with the Prime Minister, Samuel Jordan and Arthur Boyce, educational administrators in Tehran, were able to negotiate with the government and broker a deal whereby Christian-run schools did not have to teach subjects related to Islam, and were allowed to continue using the Bible for moral instruction if they sold the schools in northwestern Iran which were targeting ethnic groups (Zirinsky, 1993a). The head of the Nurbakhsh School and Sage College in Tehran, Jane Doolittle (1983) relates that while the school went through some structural and curricular changes, the administrators and teachers were able to sustain the objective of moral education. Adaptation moved beyond mere acceptance, and progressed to additional processes, including contention (letters of appeal), re-framing objectives of missionary education from religious motivation to secular service—in other words, a boundary shift—and coordinated and collective action in securing particular rights for select schools. The composition and networks of American- and British-run school administrators gave the missionaries an advantage that was beyond the reach of the isolated Armenian and Assyrian communities.

In areas such as Tehran and Uremia, some Armenian, Assyrian, and other smaller missionary schools outside of the large cities resisted the policies, and continued to use their own preferred language of instruction and subject matters (i.e., particularly religious
The resistance was shaped by processes including coordinated action, boundary activation, framing, escalation, polarization, and collective action. In Tabriz, Azerbaijan, and Uremia, the failure to change policies was likely the result of insufficient human resources to teach in Persian, since the language of instruction was solely Armenian (Arasteh, 1962). Certain other circumstances resulted in compliance failure, including demobilization, downward scale-shift, and broader institutionalization (i.e., subject to following imposed standards to keep other special rights). In both cases of resistance and default noncompliance, it is likely that the previous strategy of framing Armenian schools as a means of cultural preservation would have influenced decisions to resist or close schools, if the alternative would compromise the fundamental integrity of Armenian Christian culture and ideology. (Berberian, 2000; Grettie Holliday, 1917, cited in Zirinsky, 1993b; Howard, 1933).

**Government control.** The association of missionary schools with imperial powers was a significant impetus for contention that arose between the regime and Christian-run schools. Most Christian-run schools, whether local or missionary, complied with government regulations as a strategy to remain open, but pushed to retain unique features, such as bible study and closure on the Sunday Sabbath (Doolittle, 1983; Zirinsky, 1993a). However, in 1932, the government issued new regulations forbidding foreign-run primary schools from enrolling Iranian students (Richards, 1933, Zirinsky, 1993b). Furthermore, remaining schools had to change foreign names to reflect Iranian ones. Although local ethnic Christian groups made great efforts to avoid confrontation with their Muslim counterparts, the missionary efforts of European and American
Christians stirred the hostility of local Muslim clergy and inhabitants in various regions, particularly in the southern half of Iran (Richards, 1933). In several incidents prior to these government policies, schools were attacked or even temporarily shut down because of the rising opposition (Ferrin, 1929, cited in Rostam-Kolayi, 2008; Gillespie, 1928; McComb, 1928). In order to maintain ownership and management of their other schools after the 1932 edict, I argue that missionaries conceded by relinquishing control of primary schools that consisted of Muslim majority students, and in some cases acquiesced to forced closure (Richards, 1933; Zirinsky, 1993a). This reflects how past escalation of school attacks and closures influenced the choice of less confrontational or perhaps more tactful strategies in addressing the changes demanded by the government’s education policies. To reiterate, the goal of the missionary schools was to provide Iranians with moral and religious education, and to increase the influence of Christian values on students; ethnic schools taught religious values but education was tied to the primary objective of cultural (ethnic) preservation.

This second episode also represents the predominant view among Pahlavi officials, that missionary schools were a block to progress and a reminder of old empire relations with the West. The Court Minister Taymurtash condemned missionary activity as “undesirable religious propaganda” and conveyed to Charles Hart, the U.S. Diplomatic Chief of Mission to Iran, that Iran, “We must get rid of missionaries.” (Charles Hart, 1931 cited in Zirinksy, 1993b, p 349). The Iranian government set out to expand its influence through education to lessen foreign schooling (Arasteh, 1962). There were generally two responses on the part of the Christian community: first, schools would be closed with no follow-up action. Students who had attended these schools enrolled in
government run schools, other religious minority schools, or none at all—adopting the strategy of integration. Second, although missionary-run schools demobilized, private classes were coordinated in some areas that included religious and secular subjects—a parallel schooling effort that focused primarily on moral education (Doolittle, 1983; Fisher, 1940). The new policy affected all Christian schools, with the significant exception of those that were co-run by Iranians administrators. For example, in Shiraz, the Anglican girls’ school remained open because the principle was considered an Iranian national (Richards, 1933). Several upper-grade schools (three for boys and four for girls) and a pair of colleges remained open under the leadership of the Presbyterian mission (Board of Foreign Missionaries, 1939). The Anglican schools in the southern part of Iran also complied, and closed schools in Isfahan, Kerman, and Yazd (Howard, 1931; Richards, 1933). While some of these schools tried, through the use of diplomatic ties, to remain open despite the policy, the government succeeded in persuading the Armenian and Assyrian Christians in particular to send children to government schools, dealing a significant blow to Christian-run schools (Richards, 1933; Zirinsky, 1993b).

**Government domination.** In 1936, marking the third episode, the government aggressively pushed to take over non-Iranian schools. By the mid-1930s, the regime had committed significant resources to its education campaign (Menashri, 1992; see Chapter 4). In due course, missionary and foreign schools were again pressured to change the curriculum substantially, by significantly lessening secondary language instruction, forcing the inclusion of Islamic subjects, and omitting Christian-oriented content altogether. The government began taking over missionary and ethnic Christian schools between 1936 and 1940, by forcing them to sell them the schools (Zirinsky, 1993b).
From one perspective, the regime was facilitating a process of demobilization of Christian education efforts in order to merge diverse populations into the systematized government Iranian national schools. For example, many teachers who taught at those missionary schools which were being shut down, went on to teach at government schools; similarly students from these schools enrolled in government schools (Arasteh, 1962).

The Armenian Christian community took the brunt of the nationalized education initiatives. By order of the Shah, all non-Iranian primary and many secondary schools were shut down, including nearly all Armenian schools in Azerbaijan and Tabriz (Amurian and Kasheff, 1987). The isolationist drive of the Armenian-Iranian Christian community—an ideological and cultural characteristic that was noticeably activated when missionary schools began their work in the community—polarized them from the Shah’s monolithic image of the Iranian citizen. Another factor that weakened the efforts of the missionary educators was the partial withdrawal of U.S. State Department certification of their efforts, believing that missionaries were “persistently remaining in a place where they are emphatically not wanted” (1932, cited in Zirinsky 1993b, p. 350).

In 1939, the government ordered all existing schools to come under the control and management of the state. By 1941, despite many appeals, nearly all Christian foreign and ethnic schools were taken over by the Ministry of Education (Board of Foreign Missions, 1940; Dodds, 1940). Many of the missionary faculty members were replaced by Iranian administrators and teachers (Doolittle, 1983; Irvine, 2008; Zirinsky, 1993a). Students were channeled into government run schools, and few attended the Jewish Alliance Universelle Israelite schools that had remained opened. The vacuum left by the closure of ethnic Christian schools was partially filled by religious classes held at
churches. However, this situation changed during the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah, when ethnic Christian-run schools and foreign (non–missionary oriented) schools reopened (Irvine, 2008). Figure D3 represents the sequential outcome of interaction involving Christian school choices in response to government policies from 1928–1939.

**Muhammad Reza and a stream of actuation.** There are some identifiable large-scale educational processes during the reign of Muhammad Reza with regard to Armenian-Iranian schools. During his regime, the heavy-handed restrictions on foreign schools were lifted. Beginning in 1943, many Armenian schools that had been closed were now reopened or reorganized into larger schools, sponsored by individuals or the community (Sanasarian, 1995). Most of these were under the leadership of the local and regional Apostolic Armenian prelacies, who appointed education boards of directors. However, missionary schools lost their momentum and identity (Doolittle, 1983; Irvine, 2008). By the early 1950s, it was the government-run schools which provided modern schooling for most minority groups (Arasteh, 1962; Menashri, 1992). Many missionary educational institutions, such as Alborz College, Nurbakhsh, and Iranzamin, transferred ownership to either the government or private parties, retaining the high standard and prestigious reputation that they had obtained during the missionary years (Armajani, 1985; Doolittle, 1983; Irvine, 2006; Zirinsky, 2009). In the 1960s, the Anglican and Presbyterian missionary organizations handed over leadership of the Christian community to the modest-numbered Iranian evangelical community (Arasteh, 1962). Thus several prominent processes may be identified, including integration, upward scale shift of Armenian schools through expansion, collective action and coalition re-formation to run schools, boundary re-activation, and institutionalization. All schools complied with
standardized regulations of the Ministry of Education. Armenian schools that were established continued to multiply, and included emphasis on Armenian language, history, and culture (Amurian and Kasheff, 1987).

Despite the absence of foreign missionary activity during the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah, the government tolerated local Christian educational pursuits. Armenian and other ethnic Christian schools were allowed to reopen, on condition that Persian would be the principal language of instruction, with Armenian and Syriac to be used for religious studies and secondary language education (8–10 hours a week; Amurian & Kasheff, 1987). During the 1960s and 1970s, Armenians began experiencing facilitation by the government in the form of approval to expand schools, churches, and libraries, access to government and military positions, permission to create and maintain cultural centers and organizations, and tolerance of increasing the hours allotted to Armenian language in classes (Bournoutian, 1994).

This process of educational expansion within the limits of the community reinforced the distinct boundary of Armenian-Iranian identity, while allowing for integration into the public sector as Iranian citizens. According to Bournoutian (1994), nearly four dozen schools and libraries were established during the entire period of Pahlavi rule. Many others selected the strategy of integration, particularly those in urban areas. By the end of the Pahlavi era, nearly all Armenian children attended Armenian schools (Amurian and Kasheff, 1987). Like the Jewish and Baha’i communities, the education opportunity structure for participating in state-run schools was open—primarily as a result of improved regime-group relations. Networks with transnational community members in Armenia and the United States continued to provide resources
and the facilitated the cohesion of group characteristics and composition. Framing culture and religion as inseparable helped to sustain the isolationist orientation. While contention was a process that formed missionary educational strategies in the first epoch of the Pahlavi era, it was not noticeable during the rule of Muhammad Reza Shah, because bids to open and expand schools were tolerated by the government.

Summary. In reviewing the range of Christian communities’ educational strategies during the Pahlavi era, I explain several prominent strategies, particularly unique ones such as isolation among ethnic groups and competition between denominations. As discussed above, contextual factors such as group composition and characteristic of different Christian groups (i.e., denominations), their networks, and finally their dynamically changing relation with the regime influenced the ways in which strategies were implemented but also, more importantly, which strategies were available to them.

Baha’is under the Pahlavi Monarchy

I observe two scales of processes for Iranian Baha’is during the Pahlavi era. For the epoch of Reza Shah, I draw on small-scale processes and mechanisms, and highlight micro-scale interactions for support. For the epoch of Muhammad Reza, I look at mid-scale processes and mechanisms to reflect the general increase in educational opportunities for the Baha’i community and their subsequent strategies. To set the stage, it is important to consider how educational opportunities and strategies developed prior to the Pahlavi period. A brief look at the educational developmental processes during this period highlights subsequent choices made by the Iranian Baha’i community.
Social conditions were extremely harsh for Baha’is during the Qajar period until 1895–1900 (Tavakoli-Targhi, 2008). As a result, most Baha’i communities initiated small classes in homes and small local centers, using private tutors where possible. For general studies, they sent their children to larger cities. The first modern Baha’i school was established 1898–1899 in Tehran, ushering in a wave of other modern Baha’i-run schools throughout Iran (Sabet, 1997). There were three reasons for this pursuit of modern schools, which included secular and religious education: the education of children was a religious obligation (Abdu’l-Baha trans. in Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, 1976); the education of girls in particular was of primary importance to Baha’is (Abdu’l-Baha trans. Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, 1986); and other schools were unavailable or inaccessible, potentially dangerous, or had limited capacity during this period.

By the end of the 19th century, despite continued hostility toward Baha’is by some Shi’i clergy and adherents, the regime under Muzaffar al-Din Shah provided the political opportunity structure for Baha’is which enabled them to register individual Baha’is in schools, but did not extend the privilege to the community as a recognized group (Shahvar, 2009). Abdu’l-Baha, the community’s leader at the time, laid out the basic mandate for starting modern schools, and framed the need for secular and religious education as a binding imperative (trans. Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, 1976). In addition to resources mobilized by Baha’i communities in Iran, Abdu’l-Baha solicited the support of members of the American Baha’i community in
contributing to these education efforts.\textsuperscript{11} American travelers also partnered with Iranian Baha’i educators in developing modern standards and curriculum. Local Baha’i communities and individual Baha’is extended support (including teacher salaries, materials, and venues) when families were unable to cover associated costs. Over time, Baha’i maktab khaneh (small, private religious class) and smaller schools were ready to scale up into full-fledged modern schools.

Several identifiable mechanisms went into the process of mobilizing and collectively acting to meet educational needs, including: framing, brokerage, diffusion, boundary shift, and certification. Abdu’ll-Baha rallied the Baha’i community in adopting the ideological importance of education, by framing it as a religious duty and as a contribution toward their social well-being. The modern school model was diffused throughout the Iranian Baha’i community by educators from America and other Iranian Baha’i scholars, who had previous experience, and who were able to network with other educators (in and out of Iran) (Armstrong-Ingram, 1986; Clock 1919, 1920; Hakim, 1919; Moody, 1921). Initially, it was Abdu’ll-Baha, from his home in Haifa, who brokered the connection between American Baha’is and Iranian Baha’is, and shifted the boundary of their identity from being simply an Iranian Baha’i community to being part of a transnational religious community. Subsequently, American travelers and educators joined Iranian Baha’i leaders and organizers in diffusing the methods and practices for

\textsuperscript{11} One notable example is the formation of the Persian American Educational Society, collaboratively formed in the United States by American Baha’is and Iranian Baha’is residing in the United States. Their activities and reports served as a portal to the general American Baha’i community (see Star of the West, Vols. 1-6). This relationship is highlighted in correspondence between Iranians and Americans in Iran and those in the United States; see Oral Platt Papers (Box 1) Ahmad Sorab Papers (Box 2, 4, 6); Hannan-Knobloch Family Papers, Box (19, 20, 22, 30) located in the United States Baha’i National Archives.
modern schools to places that had no standing initiative. Notably, Christian missionaries had introduced modern schooling decades earlier, so the idea was not entirely new (Perkins, 1843). The combination of brokerage and diffusion facilitated the process of coordinating plans to start schools. Baha’i organizational leaders marshaled material and human resources from local congregations and American Baha’i donors in establishing schools, buying equipment, training teachers, and providing supplies. Abdu’l-Baha certified the efforts of the Baha’i community in establishing modern schools (trans. Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, 1976), which received positive endorsement by some American and European government agencies (Shahvar, 2009).

In an effort to meet the educational demands of Iranian Baha’is, these various mechanisms combined to form a number of different processes, including (a) mobilization, (b) collective action, (c) coalition formation, (d) new coordination, (e) scale-shift, and (f) globalization. These processes revolved around establishing schools, but later included advocacy for and defense of rights for Baha’is in Iran. The transnational network established between the Iranian and American Baha’i community under the centralized leadership of Abdu’l-Baha was nascent, but provided a significant means for educational initiatives, which also established a nexus around which strengthening the ties between the two communities was made possible. Abdu’l-Baha gave ideological instructions by framing modern education and establishment of schools as an unequivocal necessity and priority for spiritual and social advancement. He also endorsed the idea of selectively adopting models from other countries where great progress had already been made (Abdu’l-Baha, 1875/1990). The members of the community, accustomed to novelty and encouraged to investigate new ideas, contributed
enthusiastically to the new schools. As resources were gradually collected from local congregations, individual donors, and American contributors, the schools grew from private religious classes to modern schools open to the public (Shahvar, 2009). These processes would dictate the general mode of operation for educational initiatives and strategy selection in the subsequent first epoch of the Pahlavi era, and even in later periods.

The rise of Reza Shah initially signaled the prospect of more favorable conditions for Baha’is, especially since many of the Shah’s new goals resonated in form with the progressive elements of the Baha’i Faith (Effendi, 1929/1974). However, the Shah did not extend recognition to Baha’is, and thus the old tactic of registering schools in individual names continued (Shahvar, 2009). Prior to Reza Shah, there were 26 to 34 Baha’i schools. During the Pahlavi era the number rose to 47–50 (Shahvar, 2009, pp. 147–174). The schools not only scaled up from maktaba to full-fledged modern schools, but the educational campaign escalated through the increased participation of Baha’is and non-Baha’is in the schools, and through recruitment efforts which were generally supported by the general move in society toward modern schooling (Banani, 1961).

Not all Baha’i-run schools were of the same size and quality, nor did they function under the same regulations, or have the same level of resources. Divergence was significantly affected by the composition and characteristics of the local communities (Momen, 2008). Schools were held in houses, sections of existing buildings, small halls, multi-room buildings, and even on large campuses. By and large, the majority of schools met government standards, and many exceeded them, including subjects and services that would only be seen years later in other modern state-run schools (Banani, 1961).
Conditional on capacity, the curriculum also varied among schools. Another important feature of Baha’i-run schools was their enrollment of non-Baha’i children (Baha’i International Community, 2005a). Baha’i community members took extreme precautions, including tolerating slander and sporadic harassment, to avoid the risk of having schools closed down (Sabet, 1997; Clock, 1916). By 1928 most Baha’i-run schools emphasized their secular characteristics while maintaining moral education as a component of the school (Shahvar, 2009). Baha’i-run schools adopted the secular education as the public image of the school. This was due in part of a process I call selective assimilation, that is, an attempt to assimilate some elements of the majority in society, to benefit the group or program in some way while maintaining distinction. In cases where schools were attacked or temporarily shut down, a recurrent tactic was employed: letters of appeal were sent to local, regional, and central government agencies (Baha’i Publishing Trust, Baha’i News, No. 75, 90, and 95, 1934–1935; Baha’i Publishing Committee, The Baha’i World, Vols. 2–5, 1928–1936). This became standard practice by Baha’is, developed over many years of persecution in Iran, and one which continued to be emulated as network ties with its transnational Baha’i communities increased (see US NSA 16 July 1926 letter to the Shah on behalf of Iranian Baha’is in Baha’i Publishing Committee, The Baha’i World, Vol. 2, 1928).

Streams and Episodes

**In the wake of Reza Shah’s state formation enterprise.** On the intermediate level, three events characterize episodic encounters. The first took place in 1928, when the Ministry of Education issued a series of new policies affecting all nongovernment

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12 See Momen (2008), Sabet (1997), and Shahvar (2009) for curricular subjects.
schools (Sadiq, 1931). The second was in 1932, when all foreign primary schools were forbidden to enroll Iranian students (Menashri, 1992). Finally, in 1934, the government ordered all Baha’i-run schools to be shut down for failing to comply with a specific edict of the Shah (Moayyad, 1991). These episodes reflect the government’s efforts to facilitate schools and communities into the state system, tolerate nominal diversity, and repress practices and features that were deemed to be not aligned with the regime’s agenda. The era of Muhammad Reza reflects a stream of actuation through large-scale processes.

In 1928, some of the regulations directly affecting Baha’i-run schools included mandatory requirements to use Persian as the language of instruction, teach classes on Islam, Iranian geography, and history, and omit minority-religious subjects. This first encounter was passed with relatively no contention, because most Baha’i-run schools were either already using Persian as the language of instruction or it was used in conjunction with English. Baha’i schools met the demands found in the regulations without the necessity for resistance. Moreover, the composition and networks of the Baha’i community provided the human, organizational, and material resources required to follow through with the particulars associated with the new regulations (Shahvar, 2009).

The second episode occurred in 1932, when the government forbade non-Iranian primary schools to enroll Iranian students (Rostam-Kolayi, 2008). Since nearly all Baha’i-run schools were either owned or operated by Iranian nationals, or at the least co-directed by Iranians, this latter policy did not have a noticeable effect. Baha’is had registered these schools under the names of local Iranian Baha’is, precisely because the community itself was not recognized (Shahvar, 2009). From one perspective, not being
institutionalized as a community benefited the Baha’i-run schools in this situation, in contrast to those run by Christian missionaries, foreigners, and ethnic minorities in Iran.

The third episode, which I will discuss in greater detail, took place in 1934, and led to the ultimate closure of all Baha’i-run schools in the country. Until this time, there had been several attempts by local and provincial government agents to take over Baha’i schools, but given the legal structure, there had been no substantial grounds to do so (Moayyad, 1991). The primary objective of the government was to expand its own education system, and lessen the influence of foreign and non-Iranian schools (Matthee, 1992).

However, in the winter of 1934 the Minister of Education, Ali-Asghar Hikmat, on behalf of the Shah, delivered orders to close two eminent Tarbiyat Schools in Tehran and many others (Moayyad, 1991; see NSA Iran, 1936, for list of closed schools). The charge was based on the schools’ violation of the Ministry of Education regulation requiring schools to remain open throughout the year except for government approved holidays. Two days before the order, Baha’i school administrators cancelled classes in observation of a Baha’i holy day—something they had been doing for decades. Additional instructions followed, requiring the closure of other Baha’i schools that had cancelled classes that day (NSA Iran, 1936).

While the severity of the response was shocking to many, there were several Baha’i leaders and organizers who had already expected some form of reaction. According to the British Ambassador in Tehran, H.M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Baha’is had been rebuked a year earlier for closing on the occasion of a Baha’i holy day (Shahvar, 2009). A few months later in the summer of 1934, the Minister of Education allegedly
threatened the Board of Directors, indicating that Reza Shah had given an order to shut down the school if it should close when other schools remained open (see Moayyad, 1991, pp. 330–331 for statement). Christians and Jews were permitted to cancel school on their religious holidays, as well as on the Sabbath (Saturday for Jews and Sunday for Christians; Cohen, 1986; Rostam-Kolayi, 2008), but since Baha’is were not a recognized religious minority, they were not afforded minority status rights. Two years earlier, the fact that they were not institutionalized as a recognized religious minority, had helped the Baha’is to avoid the cooptation of primary schools. However, in this episode, it worked against them, as they were held to standards applied to general public schools. The threat issued by the government could be considered a heavy-handed attempt to force the integration of Baha’is schools into the national system, since they were not an institutionalized religious group. From another perspective, the threat was an act of repression, raising the risk level that the group would mobilize and act collectively to run their schools. In either case, it was a contentious claim.

The Ministry of Education had given two explicit warnings to Baha’i school organizers prior to the closure. Ali-Akbar Furutan, the principle of the Tarbiyat School, appealed to the newly formed National Spiritual Assembly of Iran (Shahriyari, 2006). The NSA sent a cable to Shoghi Effendi, the international leader of the Baha’i community (who had succeeded Abdu’l-Bahá ) for guidance. In preparation for a delayed response, the NSA decided that all Baha’i-run schools would remain open on the holy day if Shoghi Effendi’s instructions did not arrive in time (Shahvar, 2009). This was a difficult decision, particularly because the observance of Baha’i holy days is obligatory, requiring suspension of all work including school (Baha’u’llah, 1992; Shoghi Effendi,
1976). However, the possibility of not shutting down the schools, thereby technically compromising the ideological integrity of the community (i.e., Baha’i religious law), may, I suggest, have been seen by the National Spiritual Assembly as a viable strategy to keep the schools operating. Shortly before the coming holy day, a clear and direct response arrived from the Baha’i World Center to keep the schools closed on the holy day (Shoghi Effendi, 1936, trans. in Shahriyari, 2006).

It was a bold claim and a strategic move to publicly identify the distinct Baha’i affiliation of those schools (Iranian NSA, 1936). In other words, it was a process of boundary activation, or the increase in salience of an “us-them” relationship. By calling for the closure of Iranian Baha’i schools on the holy day, Shoghi Effendi was inherently making a bid for a share in equal minority recognition for Baha’is (see Effendi 1935/1970, p. 52). In compliance with these instructions, the Tarbiyat schools, along with most Baha’i-run schools throughout the country, suspended classes in observance of the holy day (Moayyad, 1991; Shahvar, 2009). The same mechanism of diffusion was now implemented to suspend the schools on Baha’i holy days. The organizational structure of the Baha’i community, consisting of a hierarchical model, made possible the systematic and uniform implementation of uncompromising policies in Baha’i-run schools throughout the country. After another warning from Hikmat, Furutan responded by emphasizing the importance of suspending school and work on Baha’i holy days, the outright ownership and operation of the schools by Baha’is, and the uncompromising nature of the decision (see Shariyari, 2006, p. 32 for the official response). In retrospect, the mechanisms involved in suspending schools on the holy day, despite the warnings, resulted in a counter-strategy of contention. Thus, the framing of the ideological
importance of Baha’i law over even the Baha’i imperative of education is paramount in considering the future strategies adopted by Baha’i community leaders and members as a whole for decades to follow, including during the regime of the Islamic Republic.

In turn, after the orders to close down the Tarbiyat schools for boys and for girls in Tehran, almost all Baha’i schools were shut down within the course of the year (Ali Asghar Hikmat, 1934, trans. in Moayyad, 1991; NSA Iran, 1936; see Figure D4 for facsimile of official notification). Some schools faced harsher treatment, while a few schools even encountered sympathy on the part of police officers who were obliged to follow orders (Shahvar, 2009).

There were very few schools that either reopened after the closure, or were never shut down. Some schools in the rural areas were left untouched, or, when closed, reopened. As Shahvar (2009) suggests that, unlike the larger cities, there were fewer, or no, schools in smaller towns and villages (like Sisan and Arabkhayl). This may have prompted the government to tolerate, or more precisely, to ignore the Baha’i schools in smaller centers, despite the Shah’s disapproval of inconsistencies and disobedience. Some schools remained open temporarily for several months after the incident, because they did not cancel classes on the holy day. Since the NSA had decided to keep schools open on the holy day, unless otherwise instructed by Shoghi Effendi, it is quite possible that the change in plans was not received in time to be implemented in these areas. This speculation is supported by subsequent episodes in which the mandate to suspend classes on holy days was observed by those same schools—leading to their eventual closure by local officials (Shahvar, 2009). Finally, in some smaller areas, such as Bihnamir, the schools were presented as a maktab-khaneh (religious school), and thus were able to
remain open. Initiating a “parallel school,” or an unofficial school not registered with the government, and framed as a religious school, would become a prominent strategy for years to come (Iran NSA, 1936).

Following the closure of schools, Baha’i leaders and education administrators made great efforts to appeal local, regional, and central government agencies to allow schools to reopen and operate again with recognized status (Iran NSA, 1936; Momen, 2008). Even Americans in Iran solicited support from the US government, other organizations, and the American Baha’i community (Baha’i Publishing Trust, Baha’i News, 1935, No. 90, 1935, No. 93). Many Baha’i families, and some non-Baha’is who had sent their children to Baha’i-run schools, delayed registering them in other schools out of concern for the dangers associated with sending their children to non-Baha’i schools and the possible impact of the schools on the children (Baha’i Publishing Trust, Baha’i News, 1935, No. 90).

To change the restricted educational opportunity structure, Baha’is again returned to the strategy of written appeals and engaging in transnational campaigning. Such letters of appeal were sent on the local, national, and international level to various government officials and political elites (Baha’i Publishing Committee, The Baha’i World, Vol. 6–7, 1934–1938). After a decade, the government had become accustomed to the performance of appeals, and had reacted to some of them by rectifying transgressions or preventing a negative situation (Baha’i Publishing Committee, The Baha’i World, Vol. 6, 1938). But this time was different. Knowing the strategy of the Baha’is, the Shah ordered telegraph posts to refuse Baha’is permission to send cables, and government officials at various levels were instructed not to accept appeals and letters from Baha’is (Shahvar, 2009).
Additionally, due to growing protests from Baha’is abroad and foreign diplomats in Iran, Baqir Kazimi, the government’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued a circular to all Iranian diplomats around the world to provide a counter argument to Baha’i advocacy against the government closure of schools by non-Iranian Baha’is to their respective governments (trans. in Shahvar, 2009; pp. 112–113; also see Baha’i Publishing Committee, *The Baha’i World*, Vol. 6, for details on appeals). In this way, the strategy of contained contention by Baha’is was thwarted. A little over a year later, conditions relaxed somewhat for Bahá’ís, but most schools did not reopen (Shoghi Effendi, as cited in Baha’i Publishing Trust, *Baha’i News*, No. 93, 1935). The political opportunity structure radically changed, and the inter-workings of networking and group composition affected the Baha’i decisions to go in one direction knowing the potential outcome.

There are three distinct follow-up strategies that Baha’is adopted after closure of the schools. First, students and teachers integrated into state-run schools or religious minority schools. Second, students who had enrolled in schools, but who had faced harassment left and continued to study privately, or stopped altogether (Iran NSA, 1936). Third, after the closure of schools, the Baha’i community started new, unofficial parallel schools, sometimes framing them as small, informal religious schools, which began to flourish throughout Iran with the coordination of the NSA and LSAs (Shahvar, 2009). In other words, three processes emerged, often overlapping: integrated study, isolated study, parallel study. As processes, they can be identified as integration, defection, and innovation. Figure D5 shows the developmental adaptation of strategies.

The downward scale shift, manifested as decentralized classroom schools, was a practice to which the Baha’is were accustomed during the Qajar period, when conditions
were even more unfavorable. The Baha’is readily adapted to the situation by unofficially facilitating many of the same schools in parallel format, in private homes and smaller centers under the leadership of the Local Spiritual Assemblies and the management of volunteer educators who had worked at the Baha’i-run schools. For example, according to an account by Abu’l-Qasim Faizi, upon entering Najafabad, where schools had been recently shutdown, “Within two weeks [after the closure], twenty schools and akhlaq [religious] classes were set up in the homes of the Baha’is, and began operating like a very efficient factory.” (trans. in Shahvar, 2009, p. 135). I argue that there were four reasons for this result: first, individual and collective community belief in education as an uncompromising imperative, by which they felt compelled to seek educational opportunity even in the face of known risks; the mechanisms of framing, mobilization, and new coordination were primarily the driving force for this, supported by the deployment of developed resources despite an unfavorable opportunity structure. Second, a systemic network of organizations (Local Spiritual Assemblies) coordinated by the National Spiritual Assembly under the leadership and guidance of a central authority (i.e., Shoghi Effendi in Haifa). The community’s leadership employed framing as a means of marshalling local and transnational resources, while American and Iranian Baha’i educators brokered the adapted parallel models in different sites and diffused methodologies. Third, a body of trained administrators and teachers, a developed curriculum, and a community ready to volunteer in order to continue parallel schooling. This was the result of effective mobilization, new coordination, collective action, and the increase of globalized connections within the transnational and national Baha’i community. Fourth, a large number of community members were experienced with old
modes of mobilizing and collectively acting under restrictive conditions, supported by the mobilization of cultural, spiritual, and organizational resources, and the ability to frame the situation as an opportunity and a challenge, as opposed to a failed outcome.

Unquestionably, the geographic spread and population size of the Baha’i community aided in mobilizing resources to run the schools, and later maintain the parallel schools. The networks between the American and Iranian Baha’i communities were strengthened through the collaboration on education initiatives and the advocacy work done on behalf of the Iranian Baha’is by the American National Spiritual Assembly and other American Baha’i organizations and adherents; transnational ties also played a significant role in their resource mobilization. Had the Baha’is been recognized as a religious minority, perhaps special privileges similar to those extended to the Jewish and Christian schools would have allowed Baha’i schools to cancel classes on holy days, while meeting other regulations of the Ministry. The adaptive strategy of scaling down to parallel smaller schools run as religious classes, as well as integrating into the general secular public school system illustrates the impact of the ideological importance placed on modern education—despite the perceived risks associated with attending such schools.

**Muhammad Reza Shah and a stream of actuation.** Over the decades from 1928 to 1941, the impact of schooling on the Baha’i community’s characteristics was profound (see Chapter 5). A new generation of educated and education-oriented Baha’is helped to establish a different view of the Baha’is in the eyes of the general public, which now saw them as being modern, educated and progressive (Abrahamian, 2008; Banani, 1962; Keddie, 1981). The government may have exercised repressive measures to limit the development of the religious aspects of the community, but it continued to
facilitate their involvement in various arenas of the public sector as Iranian citizens (Sanasarian, 2000). In the years following the abdication of Reza Shah, the Baha’is integrated further into the state educational institutions, shifting certain aspects of identity boundaries and integrating themselves into the broader Iranian identity that was formed, while simultaneously engaging in their own private religious classes (Baha’i Publishing Trust, *The Baha’i World*, Vols. 8–17, 1954–1979). In other words, the opportunity structure allowed for a selective pluralist identity, so long as that identity was subordinated to the national one (Kashani-Sabet, 1999).

There is no detailed account of the educational facilitation process of the Baha’is during the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–1979), but there are important markers in the stream of educational actuation. While the educational initiatives of both Shahs had limited results (see Chapter 4) and benefited only a small segment of the population, the general change in the educational opportunities coupled with the orientation of community positively affected many Baha’is. In terms of large-scale processes shaping educational strategies of the Baha’is, these included:

1. *Integration*—participation in government run primary, elementary, and secondary schools; enrolment of large numbers of students in institutions of higher education and permitting them to study abroad;
2. *Framing*—the pursuit of education further emphasized by Baha’i leadership as religious imperative, service, worth tolerating hardship and harassment;
3. *Mobilization and renewed coordination*—continued increase in religious and moral education classes in homes and Baha’i centers; youth organizations and conferences throughout the country to supplement secular education;
4. **Tolerance**—sustained low-level harassment by teachers, other students, and clerics, but pursued educational opportunities;

5. **Contention**—use of an array of mechanisms to seek redress for discrimination and occasionally severe harassment in public schools, through LSAs and NSAs, including assistance from transnational communities.

**Summary.** Of the mechanisms and processes which were evident during the entire Pahlavi era, several prominent educational strategies become identifiable, all of which were shaped by the holistic dynamic of factors found in the education opportunity model. While Baha’is were not institutionalized, individual community members registered schools in their own name while mobilizing community research, collectively acting to meet educational needs. Contained contention, particularly international and international appeals, was a hallmark strategy in pushing for educational rights. When contention became transgressive, the government shutdown Baha’i run schools, but continued to facilitate them into the state system as students and teachers. Baha’is also responded by relying on old strategies of parallel education, and diffused a hybrid version of secular and religious schooling.

**Comparative Review of Religious Minorities in the Pahlavi Period**

For the entire Pahlavi period, similar processes were at play in the development, selection, and deployment of educational strategies for all three groups. Sometimes educational strategies were formed and selected independent of government policies, but never without consideration of the consequences. However, other strategies were specifically designed and adopted because of existing government policies and practices affecting the religious minority groups. The processes and educational strategies chosen
often differed based on the combination of their group features. Examining strategies through the lens of mechanisms and processes allows us to explain how similar and different strategies emerged. In this section I focus on the most prominent educational strategies employed during the Pahlavi era, and compare the similarities and variations for the groups.

It is important to note that there were definite periods during which policies of the regime were imposed on all three religious minorities, affecting their respective educational opportunities and developments. These coincided primarily with the development and implementation of state educational policies. Figure 19 illustrates a brief timeline when major impositions took place and where opportunities noticeably opened.

Figure 19. Prominent government education policies affecting religious minority educational opportunities during the Pahlavi period.

As a result of various factors, including group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations, sometimes all three groups shared the same types of strategies, partially shared strategies, or relied on group-specific and unique strategies. Below, I compare how the various levels of shared and unique strategies were manifested in diverse forms.
Shared Strategies

Model importation: Assimilation and adaptation. All three groups initiated modern schooling education by importing at least some aspect—if not identical replicas—of models from outside Iran. The Iranian Jewish community’s connection with the French Alliance Israelite Universelle Foundation (AIU) resulted in the importation and emulation of French-model schools for the purpose of assimilation into a secularized Western-oriented system. Later, however, the Jewish community’s desire for more religiosity and culturally relevant education led to the coordinated collaboration with the Ozar Hatorah, among other international Jewish organizations, in mobilizing and providing religious education. Unlike the AIU representatives’ emphasis on assimilation, the Christian missionaries made concerted efforts to adapt modern schools to include both missionary objectives and local cultural sensibilities. It was Christian missionaries who introduced Iran to modern schooling in the first place, as brokers, and through independent organizational mobilization and collective action. Ethnic Christians, in reaction to the missionaries, imported models from Armenia and the Caucasus region. This was a response that emerged from processes of competition and contention. Somewhere between the Jewish collaboration and the adaptive Christian missionary education initiatives, Baha’is were mandated by their religious leadership to start modern schools integrating the arts, sciences, and religious education. Their international religious leader also brokered the connection between Iranian and American Baha’i educators to import models similar to those used in the United States.

Innovation. Innovation of schools, their startup and customization, was the result of several factors. For the Jewish community, innovation took place when local Jews
were dissatisfied with the AIU emphasis on French and European culture and secularization. For Christian ethnic groups, the innovation of community based schools—as opposed to missionary schools—resulted because ethnic Christian leaders saw missionary conversion efforts as a threat, and desired cultural preservation. This was spurred by processes of boundary activation and polarization in the community along sectarian and national ties. Baha’is created a hybrid of the Western model and Iranian Baha’i moral education in their schools, but their real innovation lay in the establishment of parallel classes when general schools were shut down.

**Selective assimilation.** When restrictive and demanding regulations were imposed on all three groups, selective assimilation was employed to avoid government repression on the one hand, and to solicit government facilitation on the other. AIU and other Jewish-run schools readily changed aspects of school structure and curriculum to meet state regulations. They were able to assimilate those aspects of schooling that cosmetically satisfied the regime’s requirements; however, because the state schools were based on similar French models, the structure needed little reorganization. Most Christian missionary schools aligned themselves with regime regulations to avoid restrictions by the government, and the threat of having the schools closed down. They did this by reducing foreign language instruction and removing significant elements of religious education. Furthermore, they relied on externalization, support from their host government representatives in the country to negotiate with the regime. Schools that failed to comply were closed, including many of the ethnic schools which did not have the capacity to meet government demands or resisted by remaining unchanged. Baha’is also modified their school models to meet government regulations at every turn because
they were a nonrecognized minority and had to comply with the state’s requirements. Similar to Christians, they maintained elements that they felt were critical to their objectives by adopting the bare minimum requirements.

**Expansion.** All three groups were able to expand their schools through the use of increased resources, more open opportunity structures, and more complex network ties with their transnational communities and other organizations. The AIU representatives diffused school models and later used graduates of AIU schools as future staff. The Ozar Hatorah organization sent more instructors, as well as trained others inside Iran, to increase the number of schools and programs. Similarly, Christian missionary schools emulated American and European school models, recruited students from all religious minorities and Muslims, drawing on local teachers and administrators who had graduated and become educated. Armenians also benefited from networks with their own transnational community to increase ethnic schools. Although missionary schools ceased to operate by the end of the Reza Shah period, there was a noticeable increase in Armenian schools during the Muhammad Reza Shah period, because they were given the opportunity to create isolated schools. Like the Jews and Christians who faced relative education facilitation in the early Reza Shah period, Baha’is scaled up schools throughout Iran, and emulated other Baha’i run schools in bigger cities.

**Institutionalization.** The Jewish and Christian communities were recognized and represented in the governments of both Pahlavi regimes. This provided their educational initiatives with special features and exclusive rights. Baha’i schools were not recognized, and thus Baha’i run schools had to be registered with the state in the name of individuals, rather than the community. By institutionalizing—or in the case of Bahá’ís, semi-
institutionalizing by registering with the government—all three groups were protecting schools from perceived and actual threats from severe government repression and more noticeably parallel authority repression and attacks. While institutionalization benefited Jews throughout the entire Pahlavi era, it had a detrimental effect on some missionary and ethnic Christian schools which either tried to sustain distinctive features or could not comply with government policies. Baha’is benefited from not being formally institutionalized when foreign groups during the Reza Shah period faced regulations targeting non-Iranian schools for closure. However, the fact that they were not recognized with special features worked against them when their uncompromising religious standard conflicted with state regulations imposed on all Iranian-based schools.

**Contention.** While contention is a process, it overlapped and constituted a special type of educational strategy, characterized by *appeals* and *negotiation* with the government, internal community and denominational *strife*, and international *advocacy*. Contention between local Iranian Jewish community members and AIU representatives shaped specific features of some schools. Contention with the government remained minimal for the Jewish community under the Pahlavi government, as they relied on assimilation and integration as main strategies. Christian missionaries and ethnic minorities faced sectarian contention, polarized by cultural and ideological divides. Boundary activation was initiated by local ethnic Christian leaders, not by missionaries who attempted to adapt to cultural mores of Christians in Iran. The government saw missionaries as symbols of old imperial presence in Iran, but nonetheless engaged in contentious interaction through appeals and negotiations through missionary host government representatives in Iran. Although ethnic Christians faced clashes with the
government on grounds of national identity, there was no real record of attempts to use contentious modalities in the area of education, other than passive resistance to changes occurring during the first part of the Pahlavi era.

**Competition.** There was noticeable and active competition between missionaries and locally-based Christians for students and staff. This was sparked by the Armenian community religious leaders, and sustained through contentious interaction. While the Jewish and Baha’i schools did not engage in competition with the same intensity that existed among the various sects which divided the Christian community, they implicitly responded to the existing minority schools that opened to their population. All three competed passively with the emerging government-run schools which recruited minority teachers and administrators, as well as students to build their capacity.

**Partially Shared Strategies**

**Integration.** By and large, while the establishment of their own schools was the primary means of accessing education, members of the Jewish community sought to integrate into the larger Iranian society, and when educational opportunity dynamics facilitated such integration, many participated in the government-run schools and universities. The disintegration of some Jewish schools towards the end of the Pahlavi era was primarily the result of this preference for integration strategy over isolation. Bahá’ís, like Jews, also benefited from open opportunities to integrate into the public system. While they maintained parallel religious schools after the initial closure of all Bahá’i-run schools during the reign of Reza Shah, community leaders and members relied on integration as the primary educational strategy during the second epoch of the Pahlavi era. Because they actively pursued educational opportunities and integration, both Jews
and Baha’is saw significant social mobility during the Pahlavi era. Some ethnic Christians also integrated into the public education system once government-run schools fostered integration, and as a result of diminished missionary schools after their closure at the end of the Reza Shah era. However, because they emphasized and framed cultural preservation as a primary goal, only a marginal number of Christians actively chose integration even when opportunities were open to them. As will be discussed below, Christians leaned toward the strategy of isolation.

**Paralleling.** Parallel schooling, or running educational programs and initiatives outside the system of government monitored education, became important to Christians and Baha’is, particularly when their schools were shut down. Parallel schools were organized by respective community leaders and organizations, drawing on existing curriculum and human resources developed over the previous decades. Such parallel schools were facilitated in religious centers and privately owned property and venues. The Jewish community did not rely on parallel schooling, but did initiate Ozar Hatorah programs to supplement secular education, including the addition of religious classes to AIU schools run by Ozar Hatorah.

**Adaptation.** Baha’i and Christian foreigners brokered the diffusion of Western models of modern schooling which were then adapted in consideration of local religious and linguistic customs. The AIU schools did not engage in adaptation until extreme pressure from the local community over decades, since the French emphasized assimilation over adaptation. French AIU adaptation included partnering with Ozar Hatorah to offer supplementary religious classes and Hebrew language classes, but also incorporated the features required by the state-regulated curriculum for education.
**Toleration.** Jews and Baha’is who registered in public schools in pursuit of integration tolerated the minor harassment they experienced in those schools. Baha'i community leaders and members appealed against harsher treatment, while continuing to avail themselves of the education opportunities offered in non-Baha'i schools. In case of violations, they made continued use of international networks to pressure the government when human rights were at stake. The Jewish community did not necessarily engage in appeals, but did look to other schooling opportunities when harsher treatment was perceived as detrimental.

**Group-Specific Strategies**

**External accreditation.** Alliance Israelite Universelle schools sent graduates to France for higher education and training to become teachers and administrators. Unlike the Christians and Baha’is who trained staff locally, Jewish AIU representatives felt that proper training to meet assimilation and qualitative objectives would best be served by sending them to France, thus gaining legitimization through external accreditation. Many Jewish community members accepted this course of action, in the hope of successfully increasing socioeconomic status in Iran. This assimilationist external accreditation strategy lessened when local schools were established, but reliance on external certification remained an important process in their educational strategy deployment.

**Isolation.** Armenian schools catered strictly to the Armenian population to preserve culture and religious characteristics of the community. They relied on networks to diffuse methods and models that were customized to meet the agenda of insular communal life; thus, schooling was framed as a necessity for maintaining distinction. Boundary activation became the principal means of sustaining this isolationist strategy.
Throughout the Pahlavi era, one which was preferred during both repressive and facilitative periods of the regime.

**Religious Minorities in Comparative Context of Group Features**

Although the religious minorities pushed to provide educational opportunities through modern schooling prior to the Pahlavi dynasty, their educational strategies would subsequently influence those pursued during this period. Importing models from abroad, adapting or attempting to assimilate students into the new models was at the heart of the strategy. Government opportunity structures were gradually opening for minorities during the secular rule of Reza Shah, and were highly tolerated and facilitated during the regime of his son.

**Composition and characteristics.** The composition and characteristics of groups, in particular their orientation, gave an indication of their initial goals, but also reflected the standards and attitudes concerning the strategies considered acceptable and accessible. For example, ethnic Christians benefited from secular aspects of modern schools, but leaders framed their importance in terms of cultural and religious preservation. Jewish Iranians were initially attracted to schools because of the promise they presented in improving socioeconomic conditions, as well as better relations with the non-Jewish majority. Baha’is pursued secular education, in addition to religious studies, based on canonical instruction and because education was framed as both a religious obligation and a social service.

Educational attainment changed the very characteristics of these communities. Ethnic Christians exercised more isolation and enhanced cohesion through communal schooling. Iranian Jews not only improved socioeconomic status, but were also devoted
to education, with high numbers of university graduates, academics, and professionals by the end of the Pahlavi era. Baha’is emerged from their formerly ostracized and stigmatized status to being counted among Iran’s growing middle and upper class. The pre-existing religious structures and institutions among all groups invariably facilitated the process of mobilization and collective action to meet educational needs.

Generally, the characteristic of the groups in other social areas permeated educational strategies as well. Jews continued to use assimilation and adaptation as a means of coping with restrictive conditions. Christian ethnic communities used isolation as a means of preservation, and Baha’is remained uncompromising in areas of religious principle and framed struggles and losses in terms of service and sacrifice.

**Networks.** Networks played a vital role as well. In fact, without strong network ties, I argue that groups could not have expanded educational initiatives. Jews and Baha’is benefited significantly from non-Iranian transnational ties with their religious affiliates in other countries. Coalitions formed between leaders of local Iranian communities with their colleagues and affiliate organizations abroad tapped into an array of resources which would otherwise not have been accessible to them. Christian communities in Iran, while divided along denominational ties, and thus not making full use of their potential network ties across sectarian lines, relied on transnational ethnic ties. Assyrians and Chaldeans in general did not use such ties, as they were weak to begin with. Armenians drew on transnational ethnic ties, but primarily used networks built into their hierarchical religious structure. Similarly, Baha’is used their hierarchical structure, but their centralized leadership and subsequent institutions were not based on common ethnicity.
Diffusion of methods and strategies from one country to another through these network ties led to success in implementing strategies. Cultural diversity was noticeably divisive in the case of Christians and Jews. However, where adaptation ensued, coalitions were more effective in ensuring school success. Additionally, the indirect ties that affected religious minorities in Iran gave a significant impetus for protecting the rights of some groups and providing further services. For example, Iranian Jews were able to expand networks beyond the AIU organization to other more religiously-oriented institutions and initiatives such as the Jewish Distribution Committee, Ozar Hatorah, and Zionist organizations. Likewise, Iranian Baha’is were able to draw on connections with sister communities in America and Britain, coordinated through the Baha’i International Community (BIC), and their cordial relations with their respective governments in pressing for the rights of the Baha’is in Iran.

**Regime-group relations.** While it may be intuitive to conclude that institutionalization through recognition and representation were advantageous to Christians and Jews, partial institutionalization worked against Baha’is. It is important to note that, in some cases, institutionalization caused groups to compromise educational goals. Using parallel schools outside of the institutionalization processes helped all three communities to supplement secular schooling with religious education. The relationship of each particular regime with other states also affected group-state relations. Missionary schools were partially closed down because of their association with Western powers, from which the Pahlavi government was trying to distance itself. Ultimately, educational opportunities were available during the regime of Muhammad Reza. However, this openness contributed to the waning of Jewish-run schools, and decreased the drive of the
Baha’is to pursue community-run schools. Students in both these groups increasingly integrated into the government system. Armenian Christians, on the other hand, took advantage of the tolerance afforded by the regime, and multiplied the number of schools, maintaining their isolation.

**Jewish Community in the Islamic Republic Period**

The close association of the Shah with Israel and the United States, which had afforded the Iranian Jewish community an open opportunity structure, as well as networks with ample resources, became a liability as revolutionary rhetoric heated up at the end of the 1970s. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the very foundations of the Iranian Jewish community was transformed in the course of a few short years.

Observing processes for the Jewish community during the Islamic Republic period is difficult, primarily because of the rapid decline of its population (from 70,000–80,000 in 1978, to 40,000 in 1984, to 10,000 in 2006; Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian Census, 2006; Rahimiyan, 2008a; Yegar, 1993). Notwithstanding the small sample and limited population of Iranian Jews seeking educational opportunities in Iran during the latter epochs of the Islamic Republic, I have been able to identify fragmented mid-level processes, as well as several micro-level processes involving individual cases. Most of my interview participants inside and outside Iran agree that some of these particular cases are representative of common experiences of many Iranian Jews. Both the schools and the Jewish students faced significant challenges as a result of the government’s education policies in public schools, as well as structural and curricular reform. I again argue that past strategies—changes in group composition, characteristics, networks, and regime-
group relations—shape successive ones. Finally, to understand the educational strategies of the Iranian Jewish community during the Islamic Republic era, it is imperative to consider other social and economic processes which overlap with them.

**Streams and Episodes**

**The Iranian Jewish exodus.** Many Iranian Jews left the country during the upheavals of 1978 and 1979, many of whom planned to return after the political situation stabilized. However, after the regime executed Habib Elqanayan (an affluent and prominent member of the Jewish community) and several other members of the community, the rate of emigration accelerated (Sarshar, 2009; Yegar, 1993; see Chapter 5). In April 1980, the community’s spiritual leader, Chief Rabbi Yedidiya Shofet, left for Europe and advised other community members to flee (Sanasarian, 2000). Most of those who left in these first years were among the most affluent and educated—among the community’s leaders (*Economist*, 17 February 1979; *Economist*, 14 June 1980; O’Driscoll, 1988). While Jewish enrolment in community-run schools had declined in the 1960s (with increased immigration into urban areas and to Israel in particular, as well as enrolment in government-run schools), this latest wave of emigration severely affected Jewish schools.

Although most observers have described this rise in emigration as an outcome, I argue that it constitutes the *exit* strategy. By *exit* I mean the conscious and deliberate decision to leave the country with the intention of pursuing opportunities in the destination country (e.g., education, employment, social freedom, refuge); this also includes motives based on perceived unfavorable conditions limiting one’s opportunities. Iranian Jews had used exit as a strategy during less tumultuous times, but it is likely that
the exodus beginning in 1978 was initially motivated by fear (i.e., threats to safety and survival, risk of losing wealth, etc.; O’Driscoll, 1988). Indeed, alarming signs of danger facing Iranian Jews included Islamist revolutionaries’ antagonism toward the Shah’s regime, as well as the virulent anti-Israel and anti-Zionist discourse.

Between 1978 and 1979, travel was relatively unrestricted, but leaving the country required resources and networks for travel and relocation. Many of the educated first wave of emigrants coordinated with friends and family to relocate, and brought much of their wealth with them, while leaving some behind in Iran (Economist, 17 February 1979; anonymous Jewish leader, personal Interviews, 23 March 2009). Some Iranian Jewish parents sent their children ahead. Some 1,200 children were sent to Israeli boarding schools, and another 3,000 to Jewish schools in France and Switzerland (Economist, 17 February 1979, p. 75). Thus, those who may have wanted to leave but had insufficient funds were unable to pursue this strategy. The socioeconomic status of most middle class Iranian Jews gave them mobility, while networks in the United States and Israel made exit an optimal strategy. Likewise, the rise in persecution was not framed as something one should endure or bear for a greater purpose, making flight a logical choice.

Between 1980 and 1988 travel was hindered by the government, particularly for Iranian Jews and other targeted groups. Many Iranian Jews were forbidden to leave the country and often harassed through coercion (Anderson, 7 May 1979; Economist, 7 February 1987; O’Driscoll, 1988). Exiting was an even more costly strategy, because of the ban on travel that carried severe consequences if one was caught trying to leave Iran.
American, European, and Israeli Jews extended help to those who wished to leave, the latter through the Jewish Agency for Israel, (Aryeh Dulzin cited in Anderson, 13 May 1979; Jewish Agency, 2009)—the Israeli government remained generally silent about Jews in the Islamic Republic. Likewise, the U.S.-based Hebrew Immigration Assistance Society (HIAS) also aided over 6,000 Iranian Jews to leave Iran between 1979 and 1988 (HIAS, 2009; O’Driscoll, 1988). The high concentration of Iranian Jewish immigrants in Southern California, led to the formation by a coalition of diaspora community leaders of the Iranian-American Jewish Federation (IAJF), to help settle Iranian Jewish immigrants find homes, jobs, and education, and assist other community members wishing to leave Iran (Iranian-American Jewish Federation, 2009; anonymous member on IAJF Board of Directors, personal communication, 8 June 2009). The IAJF (n.d.) collaborated with the American Joint Distribution community and the HIAS in providing aid to Iranian Jewish refugees. Thus, old and new networks, as well as their coordinated and mobilized resources, played a significant part in executing this exit strategy.

In the 1990s, Iranian Jewish emigration declined significantly. But reliable statistical data, reaffirmed by several Iranian Jewish informants, indicates that exit continues to be a strategy in the context of a looming threat (Iranian Statistical Centre, Iranian Census, 2006; anonymous Jewish leader, 23 March 2009; see Stahl, 26 December 2007; Voice of America, 25 December 2007 for examples) and for the primary purpose of educational opportunity (Faryar Nikbakht, personal communication, 2

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13 Two open land routes taken by Iranian Jews who sought refuge went through Turkey and Pakistan. In 1988, for about US$6,900 (five million rials) an individual could be smuggled through mountain passes or suspended beneath livestock; for about US$1,200–US$1,650 an individual could be taken to Pakistan by a local Baluch tribesmen accustomed to less guarded routes (O’Driscoll, 1988).
November 2009; Sam Kermanian, personal communication, 2 June 2009). One Iranian Jewish family therapist, who immigrated to the United States in 2001, stated that the principal limitation facing the Iranian Jewish community is not persecution, but rather the lack of educational and other opportunity, acknowledging that as her own reason for leaving Iran (Shirin Taleh, as cited in Greenberger, 2006).

Several processes combined to make exit a strategy as well as an outcome: polarization, framing, mobilization, coordination, collective action, coalition formation, and internationalization. While the Iranian Jewish community had shared close ties with the Pahlavi government, the Islamic Republic’s anti-Israeli stance, and initial persecution of many Jews, created a rift that polarized many Iranian Jews and hardliner Islamists, increasing ideological distance between them. Leaving was framed as a logical strategy by community leaders. The interaction and planned coordination of the different organizations mentioned above in support of Iranian Jews fleeing the country internationalized the exit strategy.

The Islamic Republic’s emphasis on religious identity stimulated a boundary activation across various groups, which resulted in many Iranian Jews shifting, favoring similarity with the international Jewish community over the Islamic Republic’s vision of the Iranian citizen. This did not negate their association with an Iranian identity, but a new distinction was being made (Fariyar Nikbakht, personal communication, 15 May 2009; Karmel Melamed, personal communication, 3 March, 2009; Nahid Pirnazar, personal communication, 21 October, 2009; Orly Rahimiyan, 30 September, 2009; Sam Kermanian, personal communication, 2 June 2009). By breaking from the remaining community that had aligned its support with the new regime and denounced other
network ties to Israel and the United States, the immigrant Iranian Jewish community defected from educational efforts to sustain Jewish schools.

**School Reform and Reorganization**

While details about processes of educational strategy for those who remained are scant, existing information provides enough analytical leverage and includes episodes related to adjustments and reactions to government-imposed policies regarding not only Jewish-run schools, but also the educational opportunity structure for Iranian Jews attending government-run schools. Despite the guarantee of representation and recognition in the redrafted Constitution (Articles 13 and 28) members of the Jewish community faced various levels of repression. Some members of the Iranian Jewish community, particularly the community’s representative to Parliament and the leaders of the Tehran Jewish Council, have suggested that Iranian Jews enjoy equal, if not more, rights and freedoms than they had during the Pahlavi period (Harrison, 22 September 2006; Islamic Republic News Agency, 16 January 2010; Tehran Council of Jews, 2009; Yashayaei, 2003). Others suggest that Jews enjoy limited freedom and that vigilance and tolerance of sporadic harassment is imperative (anonymous Jew in Iran, personal communication, 5 April 2009; Farahani, 2005; Karmel Melamed, personal communication, 3 March, 2009; Orly Rahimiyan, 30 September, 2009). At the local level, tolerance by government agents, school administrators and teachers, and the public varied (Sanasarian, 2000). In other words, the situation is complex, reflecting various degrees of regime facilitation, toleration, and repression. In turn, local Iranian Jews employ tolerance to cope with repressive policies and engage in assimilation to access opportunities.
**Higher education.** As part of the Cultural Revolution’s purging process targeting higher education and positions of influence, most Iranian Jewish university instructors were fired, often accused of being Zionists or having Zionist ties (Economist, 14 June 1980; Keyhan, 27 August 1979; Yegar, 1993).\(^{14}\) The screening process put in place for admitting university students during the first decade of the Islamic Republic was particularly biased against Jews, Bahá’ís, and political dissidents (Torbat, 2002). During the application process, government agents conducted background checks, and those affiliated with unfavorable groups and ideologies would be screened out or monitored closely (Habibi, 1989; Torbat, 2002). Until 2004, all applicants had to indicate their religious affiliation. These additional barriers made accessing university even more challenging for Iranian Jews. According to one account, a Jewish professional, now working in Shiraz, had completed his undergraduate degree with exceptional academic performance. Upon applying to graduate school, he was declined admission, despite having ranked higher than many others who were admitted (anonymous in Iran, personal communication, 10 February 2010). He attributes the inequitable screening to having been targeted as a Jew. Networks are not useful in accessing higher education, and there are few collaborative efforts to meet educational needs in the public sector. After the Revolution, the Jewish community officially severed its ties with transnational communities. Many who do not leave the country, and are not admitted into public universities, enroll in private universities. In general, some Jews practice selective assimilation by dissimulating in public, and continue to practice Jewish communal life in

\(^{14}\) According to Hojjat al-Islam Abbas Mahfuzi (Montazeri’s representative at Tehran University), by 1983, only 6,000 members of the 1978 academic staff were still teaching in universities (cited in Menashri, 1992, p. 319).
private (anonymous in Iran, personal communications, 5 December and 4 April; Farahani, 2005).

**Jewish-run schools and adaptation.** Jewish-run schools and education opportunities changed drastically during the Islamic Republic. Immediately before the Revolution, there were about 20 Jewish-run schools. According to Haroun Yashayaei (2003), chair of the Tehran Jewish Committee, the number of schools dwindled to four after the establishment of the Islamic Republic and the imposition of new policies. In the first several years after the Revolution, most Jewish-run schools were temporarily shutdown, and required to meet new government regulations affecting school structure and curriculum. Many others were permanently closed or taken over by the government due to the shortfall of students and teachers caused by the Iranian Jewish exodus. The Jewish community complied without resistance. Most structural and curricular changes were implemented between 1981 and 1984 (Sanasarian, 2000). Ministry of Education regulations required that schools incorporate the new state curriculum, classes be segregated by gender and dress codes applied; that schools not be located on the same grounds as synagogues; that Persian be the sole language of instruction (including during religious classes); and that Islam become mandatory as a subject, in addition to Jewish studies (Sanasarian, 2000). The government issued special textbooks to be used as the religious curriculum for Jewish subjects (Mehran, 2007; Paivandi, 2009).

In most schools, government-vetted Muslim principals were appointed to replace Jews. Similarly, Muslim instructors have replaced many Jewish teachers (Yashayaei, 2003). From 2000 to the present, the Ettefaugh School (which remained open) has been run entirely by Muslim administrators and teachers, with the exception of the religious
instructor (Darshi, 1998; interview with School Principle of Ettefaugh in Farahani, 2005), not only because of government-imposed policy, but because emigration had brought about a shortage of teaching staff certified by the regime. The Islamic regime required Jewish schools to remain open on their Sabbath and on Jewish holy days, despite canonical law prescribing suspension of work and school on those days. Compliance by the Jewish community with this particular regulation is a significant shift away from previous characteristics of the community during the Pahlavi era.

According to the Tehran Jewish Council (2009), out of the 3,000 Jewish students attending schools in Iran, half are enrolled in Jewish schools, while the other half participates in state-run schools. Jewish schools are funded by the various existing Jewish institutions in Iran (Yashayaei, 2003). Additional resources and funding also come from the Ministry of Religion (which oversees all religious schools) and the Ministry of Education (Yegar, 1993). I was informed that generally very few resources come to the Iranian Jewish community from the Iranian Jewish diaspora (anonymous AJIF board member, 8 June 2009; Sam Kermanian, personal communication, 2 June 2009). The Iranian Jewish community thus runs the schools on internal resources, and does not use networks, because their networks with the international community have all but disappeared, and they have become isolated.

In response to the flurry of reorienting policies, the Tehran Jewish Council agreed to all terms outlined in the regulations, avoiding any other confrontation with the regime. The old strategy of assimilation used during various periods since the Qajar period was once again invoked. The exodus caused a major shift in the composition and characteristics of the Iranian Jewish community, which in turn influenced the strategies
that were acceptable and accessible to community leaders. With a significantly smaller pool of resources, abruptly severed network ties, and a constricted opportunity structure under the Islamic Republic, conceding to government policies was the primary coping mechanism. Unlike the Pahlavi era, when community members were disinclined to compromise Jewish laws, such as observation of holy days and Sabbath (Cohen, 1986), the recomposed community under the Islamic Republic evidently saw it as a means of survival (Fariyar Nikbakht, personal communication, 16 May, 2009). According to some of my interviewees, most Iranian Jews living outside Iran sympathize with the compromise of leaving schools open on holy days. “It’s not that we want to keep schools open,” one source in Iran informed me, “it’s that we have no choice in the matter if we want to keep our schools” (anonymous Jew in Iran, personal communication, 5 December 2009).

Several processes led to the circumstances and conditions facing Jewish-run schools, as well as their continued maintenance. Previous strategies and a reconfiguration of opportunity structure, resources, and networks available to Iranian Jewish community members influenced the formation and selection of strategies. Demobilization had the most noticeable impact on the schools. When Iranian Jews left Iran—among them teachers, administrators, community leaders, and students—schools were left with inadequate human, organizational, and material resources. Ultimately, most of these schools closed, leading to the downward scale shift of remaining Jewish schools. Consequently, the community complied with the new regulations in order to preserve the remaining schools.
The Iranian Jewish community mobilized and coordinated new efforts around a re-envisioned objective: preservation. Despite having an elected representative in the Majles, very little resistance was voiced (Sanasarian, 2000). The Iranian Jewish community became more dependent on the regime than ever before; thus, concessions were an intrinsic element in maintaining good relations with the regime and operating Jewish schools. Beyond institutionalization, an identity shift took place within the country whereby Iranian Jews reasserted their Iranian identity first, affirmed primary loyalties to the regime, and conceived their Jewish allegiance within that context.

Community leaders framed compromise as a necessity to preserve the community rather than considering it a deterioration of its integrity. Due to centuries of persecution, practices of dissimulation, cosmetic conversion, and suspension of certain Jewish laws was a common strategy of survival (Fariyar Nikbakht, personal communication, 2 November, 2009; Harrison, 2006; Nahid Pirnazar, personal communication, 21 October 2009; Orly Rahimiyan, personal communication, 30 September, 2009; Sharq, 1998).

The Tehran Jewish Committee also agreed to accept Muslim principals, not only because they were pressured to do so, but because community leaders thought that the Muslim principal could secure greater benefits for the schools through networks with other Muslim officials (Maron Yashayai, cited in Haftvan, 2006). Thus internal networks became more important in the absence of external networks in mobilizing resources and engaging in contained contention. The reconfiguration and ideological reorientation of the renewed Jewish leadership, aligning itself with the Islamic regime, constituted a new group of actors who mobilized and collectively acted on behalf of the remaining Iranian Jewish community. These processes illustrate the dynamic between the Islamic Republic
regime and the Iranian Jewish community. Despite the lower quality of community schools as compared to public schools (Yashayaei, 2003), Jewish students were attracted because they experienced less pressure and peer harassment at Jewish schools; (anonymous high school girl who left public school to attend Ettefaugh, in Farahani, 2005; anonymous Jew in Iran, personal communication, 5 April 2009). Thus Jewish schools helped maintain a semblance of community cohesion.

**State-run schools.** Iranian Jews also accessed educational opportunities during the Islamic Republic period by attending public schools with mostly Muslim students, despite a perpetual sense of “otherness,” biased textbook content, derogatory rhetoric and treatment by teachers and other students, 15 and even when religion classes consisted solely of Islamic studies, with only historical reference to religious minorities (Mehran, 2007; Paivandi, 2008). Some students simply remain silent in order not to draw attention to themselves (anonymous in Iran, personal communication, 5 April 2009). Others tolerate slander and occasional harassment, but continue on with their studies. It should be noted that not all students and teachers alienate religious minorities, but it is evident that this remains a serious issue. Those attending public schools participated in Friday religious classes at synagogues, and thus paralleled their secular education.

Two local episodes illustrate well the nuanced environment facing Iranian Jewish school children and youth. In Shiraz, a Jewish professional who faced discrimination as a university student himself years ago, believes—based on his own hardship in university and graduate school in Iran—that there are currently limited opportunities for his

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15 According to an Iranian Jewish leader who immigrated to Israel after the Revolution, Jewish school children in Tehran were forced to wear yellow uniforms to make them easily identifiable and some Jewish students were forced to attend Muslim schools (Associated Press, 23 July 1982).
daughters. Thus, he plans on moving to America once his daughters enter high school, in the hope of providing them with greater educational opportunity and social freedom (10 February, 2010). In an interview conducted by Ramin Farahani (2005), an Iranian Jewish high school girl tells of her humiliation when her religious class teacher told the class not to touch her because it had been raining, and that touching a wet Jew would make them impure. She admits this was not the first time she had been vilified for being Jewish. The girl’s family allowed her to withdraw from the public school, and sent her to the Ettefaugh Jewish school instead, despite its lower quality. This girl also stated that her family was seriously considering leaving Iran for her sake. Some of my interviewees recalled occasions when teachers in public school religious classes ridiculed Jewish students, but stated that at other times they were not harassed (anonymous in Iran, personal communications, 13 August, 2008, 3 October 2008, 18–23 December 2009).

The processes described above illustrate the educational strategy of integration, including tolerance (of harassment), assimilation (of the mainstream cultural values or by practicing silence), and quasi-paralleling (supplementation of religious classes on Fridays). As mentioned before, there is little organized effort on part of the community to accommodate Jewish students who attend public schools.

**Summary.** Over the course of 30 years under the Islamic Republic, as a result of diminished resources in the wake of the exodus, Jewish educational strategies were reduced to attending the limited number of compromised Jewish schools, integrating into public schools, or exiting Iran for educational opportunity. Strategies of the past played a significant role in determining all three for a number of reasons: first, because more Jewish schools might have remained open and accessible to Jewish children and youth if
their number had not declined so drastically during and after the Revolution. Second, resources previously available through network ties had shrunk, the results of the mass exit limited choices to community leaders and members. Third, members compromised standards and accepted government policies with no noticeable contention, tolerating continued, albeit occasional, harassment and bigotry in public schools. Fourth, Iranian Jews who had themselves experienced hardship or perceived greater educational opportunities outside Iran left the country.

Iranian Christians in the Islamic Republic

By the time of the Revolution in 1979, there were at least 26 Armenian schools in Tehran alone with seven elementary and five secondary schools under a Board of Trustees appointed by the Apostolic Armenian Prelacy, as well as another 14 private Armenian schools in the city (Amurian & Kasheef, 1987). Unlike the increased integration of Baha’is and Jews into the state system during the Pahlavi era, most Armenian students attended their own community run schools, creating an insular community. The failure of the Assyrian and Chaldean schools to expand may be explained by their lack of resources and relatively stagnant population growth, leaving them with only two schools for each community. Evangelical protestant Christians had largely integrated into government-run schools, enrolled in the ethnic Christian schools, or attended other religious minority schools.

The government of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi had tolerated Armenian schools’ increasing use of Armenian language to teach history, literature, and religious subjects (Amurian and Kasheef, 1987). This provided abundant opportunities to develop a distinctive Armenian-Iranian identity and foster community cohesion. Historically, the
Armenian language has been part and parcel of the religious identity of Apostolic Armenian Christians (Atiya, 1968; Manukian, as cited in Iran Times, 15 April 1983). I believe that this is the fundamental reason why maintaining its use was a critical issue during the Reza Pahlavi era, when schools were faced with the choice of either switching to Persian or shutting down. With the rise of the Islamic Republic, language once again became a paramount issue escalating into contentious interaction between the regime of the Islamic Republic and Armenian Church leaders.

**Streams and Episodes**

Despite the paucity of available sources pertaining to educational opportunity for Christians during the Islamic Republic, I observe mid-scale processes which took place during the early years following the Revolution, and large-scale processes characterizing the last two decades. I focus primarily on the Armenian community, address generalities associated with the Assyrian and Chaldean communities.

As discussed in Chapter 5, in addition to the Armenians, there was a combined total of some 30,000 Assyrians, Chaldeans, and other Christian denominations at the outset of the Islamic Republic. After the Revolution, Armenian Christians emigrated in far fewer numbers than Jews but more than Baha’is, with nearly 50 percent leaving the country over the first two decades after the Revolution (see Chapter 5 for demographical statistics). Since they experienced much less difficulty than either the Baha’is or Jews in leaving the country, *exit* was a strategy more viable for that community. As mentioned earlier, some of the Christian communities in Iran had been associated with the imperial and foreign presence in Iran (Abrahamian, 1988). However, the isolationism practiced by ethnic Christians was initially perceived as a minimal threat to the new regime’s agenda.
for an Islamized nation (Sanasarian, 1995). This isolationist strategy was particularly
manifest in the Armenian community’s educational goals (*Iran Times*, 15 April 1983).
The relationship between the new regime and ethnic Christians was very likely smoothed
over because Armenian leaders publicly renounced association with Western powers on
the one hand, and paid allegiance to the Republic and its goals on the other (*Islamic

As Sanasarian (1995) explains, the first few of years following the establishment
of the Islamic Republic passed with little or no change to Christian communal life.
However, between 1981 and 1983, tension between the regime and the Christian
communities surfaced in several episodes of contention around educational issues. Two
interrelated episodes stand out: the first entails group responses to government-imposed
education regulations, which affected all recognized religious minority schools; the
second concerned language and testing issues in Apostolic Armenian schools, ending
with the closure of several schools.

**Reformation and reorientation.** With the establishment of the Islamic Republic,
the government institutionalized Armenian and Assyrian Christians in the renewed
Constitution by extending official recognition and giving them representation in
Parliament. Recognized minorities were given special rights, which included the privilege
of maintaining separate religious schools, permission to teach the language of their
respective communities, and engage in state-approved ceremonies and other special
functions (*Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian Constitution*, Article 13 and 26). At the same
time, beginning in 1981, many restrictions were imposed on minority schools, including
name changes, gender segregation, curriculum reform, replacement of principals and
teachers, new dress codes, and guidelines affecting religious and language instruction (Sanasarian, 2000).

All ethnic Christian schools were affected, but their reactions varied, due, in part, to group composition and characteristics, networks (both inside and outside Iran), and perceived relationship with the new regime. For example, while the Armenian representatives to the Majles lodged complaints regarding some of the education policies, Assyrians and Chaldeans ultimately acquiesced to government pressure, and gave up on appeals to maintain the number of hours dedicated to native-language instruction (Sanasarian, 2000). Moreover, as a result of a waning population, Assyrian schools were forced to take in Muslim students, while replacing principals and teachers with state-approved Muslim staff. Conversely, the Armenian political representatives and religious leaders in the northern half of Iran voice adamant objection in Parliament to unfavorable policies, via the media, and in direct one-on-one meetings with leading members of the Islamic Republic. Despite the imposed restrictions, Christian representatives and some other Christian religious leaders felt confident in protesting regime decisions without incurring a repressive response (Islamic Republic News Agency, 19 September 1983).

By and large, Christian communities offered little resistance to most regulations, such as segregating gender classes, dividing schools from churches, applying dress codes, or adopting the general curriculum of the Ministry of Education (Islamic Republic News Agency, 7 July 1982). Nevertheless, compliance did not mean that the transition was easy or advantageous to the community (anonymous Armenian-Iranian Christian in Iran, personal communication, 19 December 2009; Eliz Sanasarian, personal communication, 14 April, 2009). In 1983, the Ministry of Education ordered all religious minority schools
to be headed by Muslim administrators (Haftvan, 2006). In 2003, this requirement changed in a revised clause allowing religious minorities to run schools, as long as they professed allegiance to the Constitution (Haftvan, 2006). But since 2005, even with the slight relaxation of the requirement, out of a total 50 religious minority schools, only three in Tehran and two in Urmieh have principals who are Christian (Haftvan, 2006). According to George Vartan, the Armenian representative to the Majles, this has contributed to the deterioration of Armenian culture in the community (cited in Haftvan, 2006). Indeed, language, religious instruction, and the replacement of principals surfaced as central issues of contention between Armenian schools and the government.

Three responses followed restrictions and impositions: rejection; adaptation; and assimilation (see Figure D6). Some schools rejected unfavorable impositions framing them as transgressions of their constitutional rights. This latter group of schools continued using their own religious textbooks and Armenian language for instruction. This resistance was fueled by community characteristics of isolationism which were tolerated by the previous regime. Other schools either adapted by adjusting to minimum Ministry requirements, or assimilated by abandoning native language instruction altogether (Sanasarian, 1995; anonymous Armenian-Iranian Christian in Iran, personal communication, 19 December, 2009). The latter two strategies were approved and facilitated by the government (Islamic Republic News Agency, 6 July 1982). Weakness in networks and lack of resources contributed to these concessions. In 1982, however, the Ministry of Education sternly rebuked those schools which failed to implement the policy, explicitly ordering Armenian schools to a) conduct religious instruction in Persian, and to reduce the hours reserved for instruction in Armenian and related
subjects. Thus, Armenian history and culture should generally be “taken out of the curriculum…” (Iran Times, 15 April 1983, p. 17).

Within three years after the establishment of the Revolution, processes embedded in group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime relations shaped the immediate strategies of the various groups. Institutionalization of schools was mandatory. Thus, all religious schools were considered by the government as state schools with special privileges. Based on the acceptability of aggressive institutionalization, community leaders framed the situation differently and responses varied. For example, Assyrian and Chaldeans initially voiced reservation over the policies, but ultimately submitted to government pressure by assimilating because of concerns about other issues (such as the schools being completely closed down; Sanasarian, 2000). Assyrian and Chaldean schools had been forced to accept Muslim students because they had low enrollments in their schools. The educational strategy of community isolation led to demobilization because resources were inadequate to maintain school cohesion. By having to include Muslim students, replace principals and teachers, and include Islamic curriculum during religious studies, these latter schools also experienced a boundary shift, breaking down the insularity of the community. However, concessions served as a process of collection action to preserve a semblance of community schools, despite having to compromise fundamental features. Some Armenian schools adjusted, and adopted the bare minimum requirements, scaling down old self-determined curriculum in exchange for maintaining the steady mobilization of community and state resources, and keeping schools open.
Notwithstanding continuous compromise brought on by institutionalization, there were many Armenian schools, particularly in northern Iran that rejected some of the policies through contained contentious claims, using the Constitution as backing, appealing through political representative and religious leaders. These bold claims stem from the community’s composition and characteristic. The Apostolic Armenian community had the largest number of followers among the recognized religious minorities, perhaps justifying the need to show significant representation in the country. Secondly, by being institutionalized, channels for contained contention were appropriately followed—unlike Bahá’ís, whose access to such channels of communication was blocked. Armenian Apostolic church leaders also used their internal networks with Muslim clergy to broker support wherever possible (Iran Times, 6 July 1984). Such links between local religious leaders with local Muslim clergy and government agents had developed over decades to maintain the insular nature of the Armenian community (Amurian and Kasheff, 1987). While for decades prior to the Revolution, the Apostolic Church had sought to preserve their community by soliciting the help of government and Muslim parallel authorities to combat foreign missionaries (Berberian, 2000), they now used the same networks to ensure that they were not seen as a threat and safeguard the uniqueness of their community. Armenian leaders framed the preservation of Armenian language and use of their own religious textbooks as fundamental to their religiosity.

**Contested boundaries.** Representative leaders of the Armenian Apostolic community aggressively resisted the regime’s demands. This may have been motivated by their perceived relationship with the regime, the level at which they were affect by
new regulations, and ultimately what they believed to be at stake. The new government decrees became an issue around which the Armenian community mobilized (Sanasarian, 1995, 2000). Artak Manukian, primate of the Tehran Armenian Diocese, vehemently opposed the new religious curriculum as “interference in our [Armenian] religious teaching,” and argued that “these officials cannot and are not authorized to prepare a textbook for our faith and put it into use” (Iran Times, 15 April 1983, p. 17). The Armenian-Iranian leadership framed the imposition as a government strategy to “kill off the Armenian school system and use of the Armenian language” (Iran Times, 15 April 1983, p.17). Manukian appealed to the Deputy Minister of Education, Haddad Adel, explaining that Armenian language and religious instruction were inseparable (Iran Times, 15 April 1983). Not only did select community leaders reject the imposed policies, but Manukian made several other counter demands: (a) only Armenians should attend community schools; (b) religious feasts be observed in schools; and warned that (c) unless Armenian custom and culture prevailed in schools, the community would be destroyed (Iran Times, 15 April 1983)

The religious leaders and Majles representative may have been outspoken, but it was within the bounds of contained contention. However, the situation escalated into transgressive contention as each side raised the stakes. This is illustrated by one episode between Armenians and the Ministry of Education in 1982–1983, when the Minister of Education, Ali-Akbar Parvaresh, requested that school administrators submit final exam questions for religious studies in both Armenian and Persian (Iran Times, 2 September, 1983). Armenian educators assumed that Persian translation was requested for vetting
purposes, but on the day of the examination, Muslim government proctors distributed the Persian version of the test in Armenian schools.

Students responded by refusing to take the exam, and turned in blank tests (Iran Times, 8 June 2004); others were bewildered and incapable of completing the test (Iran Times, 2 September 1983). Manukian complained that “this issue is critical for us; why is the religious subject that is taught in Armenian—as is our right to do so—tested in Persian?” (Iran Times, 2 September 1983, p. 14). He argued that it was unreasonable to think that students who received instruction in one language could be expected to be tested on the same subject in another language. By inciting contention, the community and its leaders were making a bid for expansive rights to remain isolated from the government’s educational agenda.

While the government had tolerated the uncooperative behavior of Armenian school administrators and teachers in the past, this blatant disregard for repeated demands of the Ministry of Education provoked further intolerance, particularly in the face of the momentum for cultural hegemony fueled by the 1981 Cultural Revolution. The Speaker of the House, Hashemi Rafsanjani, lashed out at the audacity of Armenians in refusing to follow instructions (Iran Times, 22 June 1984). Students who had refused to take the examination were failed (Iran Times, 2 September 1983). In Tehran, the district school superintended followed orders to close down those schools in which students and teachers refused to comply (Iran Times, 6 July 1984). More than 12 schools were shut down, including some of the more prominent ones, such as Sahagian, Alik, Rostam, Nor Ani, and St. Mary’s (Iran Times, 6 July 1984). Manukian was meeting with Ayatollah Montazeri on the very day the schools faced closure (Iran Times, 6 July 1984). In
response to Montazeri’s statements of sympathy and support, Manukian responded in frustration, lamented the restrictions on classes, and dismissal of teachers and principals; he also expressed great anxiety that all Armenian schools would also be shutdown (Iran Times, 6 July 1984, p. 1).

After government retaliation for disobedience to Ministry orders, the Armenians retreated, and agreed that language instruction would be reduced to as little as two hours a week, and that the state-issued religious textbook would replace their own curriculum (Sanasarian, 1995). Unable to marshal the clout necessary to change government policy, the community complied in order to keep other schools open. This led to increased migration. Whereas during the Pahlavi era, little resistance was used upon closure of schools, and the community preserved its good standing with the government, in the current situation, the Christian community tested the opportunity structure to its limits and adjusted accordingly, without using international networks.

Sanasarian (2000) explains that in the southern part of Iran (Isfahan) and in peripheral areas (Rasht and Tabriz), Armenians did not face as much rigidity as those living in Tehran and explains that this may be attributed to the dynamics of local relations and networks between Muslim clergy and local Armenian Church leaders. For example, while Armenian language was taught in Tehran schools for only two hours, in Isfahan six to eight hours were allocated. I suggest that this difference may stem from the variation in the local communities’ relations and network ties with local authorities, as well as the characteristic of the groups, the Armenian community representative in the south being less vocal in general than those in the north (Sanasarian, 2000).
Several important processes went into shaping the educational strategy of Armenian-Iranian Christians, including contention, mobilization, collective action, self-representation, new coordination, escalation, polarization, boundary activation, scale-shift, isolation, and framing. By audaciously resisting unfavorable government policies through transgressive contention, and appealing rights in Parliament through contained contention, the community’s leadership was attempting to maintain isolated schools to meet community goals of insularity. Leaders in the north acted collectively to present the case for the uniqueness of the Armenian community, suggesting that language was integral to religious integrity. They framed resistance to imposed changes as a constitutional right when addressing government agents, and as a religious imperative when coordinating efforts within the community. They pressed forward with goals of a distinct Armenian school by refusing to take exams or lessening hours of instruction, through writing letters to high ranking clergy, and voicing protest in parliament.

Other significant processes were at work. Mobilization of efforts to reject some changes and accept others enabled leaders to push the line. However, community leaders engaged in transgressive contention, overstepping the limits of government tolerance, thus provoking an unexpectedly repressive and demobilizing response: the closure of over a dozen schools. The movement by religious and political community leaders to keep the desirable features that had existed under the previous regime coalesced in a renewed attribution of self-representation, in a display by a coalition of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (see Tilly and Tarrow, 2004). Institutionalization may have hampered continuation of transgressive contention and pursuit of original educational strategies (such as the pursuit of more language, cultural, and religious content) because
community leaders did not want to lose the rights and standing guaranteed to them by the Constitution. Conversely, institutionalization aided community leaders in voicing protest against restrictive policies through legal means.

As with the Jewish community, Iranian Christians downplayed their historic relationship with Western and Soviet powers, by emphasizing renewed ties and identity shift toward the Islamic Republic’s image of the Iranian citizen. Boundary and identity affirmation played a significant role in ensuring that the educational strategies of ethnic Christians would be carried out, by re-polarizing the community as distinct from other Christian communities, from transnational network ties, and from the new regime. Nearly all these processes were brokered through the Parliamentary representatives and the religious leaders. Some leaders were naturally more active than others, and enjoyed varying relations with local and national government, as well as with other Muslim authorities. Manukian’s public sentiments reverberated throughout the Tehran Armenian community, providing a vision and response to emulate: that commitment to the Armenian language was not simply a linguistic issue but a religious one, and its preservation imperative.

Adaptation and alignment. By the 1990s, the situation for recognized Christians relaxed. In 1995, the number of hours allowed for Armenian language use increased from four–five hours to six–eight in Tehran’s Armenian schools, as in other areas (Sanasarian, 2000). However, parents and teachers continued to complain that this was insufficient for their children to adequately learn the language (Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2008). The response was to tolerate and accept boundaries. Several Armenian-Iranians living outside Iran recall positively having attended the Armenian-run schools (anonymous
graduates of Alishan Armenian school, group forum postings, 20 June 2009–23 February 2010). The Islamic Republic’s amicable relationship with the newly formed independent Armenian state (est. 1992) has also provided a more open opportunity structure. According to George Vartan, the community’s representative to the Majles, in 2008 about 15,000 Iranians of Armenian descent were studying in Armenian universities (Trend News, 20 October 2009). Another factor that has made the opportunity structure for ethnic Christians less stressful than it was in the early years of the Republic, is the isolationist nature of those communities, with nearly all Armenian-Iranians attending community-run schools (Sanasarian, 2000). There continue to be large numbers of Iranian Armenians who leave the country to pursue higher education and economic opportunity, most of them settling in the United States (principally California), Armenia itself, and to a lesser extent Europe (Eliz Sanasarian, personal communication, 14 April 2009). Notwithstanding a generally tolerant situation, there have been individual reports of discriminatory experiences in university admissions process (anonymous in Iran, personal communications, 12 December, 2009; 10 February 2010).

In the last two decades, large-scale processes at work toward fulfilling educational strategies include mobilization, new coordination, collective action, isolation, integration, institutionalization, scale shift, and internationalization, strategies previously employed by the community. While official network ties to transnational communities in America and Europe weakened, families still maintain strong connections, and use these ties when members seek to leave the country (anonymous Armenian Iranian, personal communication, 4 November 2009). The strong ties between the Armenian-Iranian community and Armenia have reinforced efforts to keep a distinct insular cultural
community by affirming identity boundaries. Ethnic communities, such as the Armenians have been able to sustain their characteristics through the employment of cultural isolationism, and during the Islamic Republic period, their relations with the regime have remained more favorable than those of any other religious minority in Iran (United States Commission on Religious Freedom, 2008).

**Summary.** For the Christian communities under the Islamic Republic, contained contention was used to press for more privileges and rights within the bounds of the Constitution. When group contention became transgressive, the situation escalated, resulting in government repression—resonant with the response of the Pahlavi government toward Baha’is who engaged in transgressive contention. Recognized Christian groups adapted by aligning with government policies while attempting to maintain a relatively isolated community. Over the entire course of the Islamic Republic to date, Christians made compromises to educational features while continuing to pursue an isolationist strategy which reflects how community leaders framed educational goals. Network ties to Western powers and transnational communities in those countries were severed to maintain good relations with the regime. Noticeably, the positive state-state relations between Iran and Armenia allowed for sustained network ties with transnational communities there. It is interesting to note that like the Jewish community, exit was the initiative and perhaps most impactful strategy on the community features after the Revolution.

**Baha’is in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

Although Baha’is never attempted to reopen their own schools during the regime of Muhammad Reza, they had ample opportunity to integrate into government-run
schools and universities. This led to a noticeable rise in their socioeconomic status, and subsequently their relation with both the public and the government—despite never being officially recognized as a religious group in the country. During this period, the Baha’i community not only expanded in size and developed its organizational institutions, but also strengthened its ties with its transnational community. Despite sporadic episodes of repression by some radical Muslim organizations and some government agents, the last 20 years of the Pahlavi period were generally characterized by government toleration and facilitation.

With the 1979 Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Baha’is experienced a drastic change in their relation with the government, as well as the composition and characteristics of their community. Unlike the Christians and Jews, Baha’is were never institutionalized within the Islamic Republic. Many high-ranking regime leaders declared Baha’is to be incompatible with the Islamic Republic (Hojjat’ul-Islam Jannati, cited in Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006). In general, the regime restricted the opportunity structure for Baha’is by targeting various aspects of the community which affected their educational opportunity dynamics and thus their strategies (Iranian Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006). In 1983, Baha’i administrative and charitable organizations were officially outlawed by the Attorney-General, Seyyyed Hussein Musavi-Tabrizi (Keyhan, 21 September 1983).

In the atmosphere of the heightened anti-Baha’i rhetoric that was characteristic of some vocal Islamist revolutionaries, a number of Baha’is fled the country. Despite travel restrictions placed on Baha’is (like those imposed on Iranian Jews), especially between 1979 and 1984, 4,398 Baha’is immigrated to the United States alone (US NSA, 2009).
Others traveled to Canada (3,000 according to Douglas Martin, personal communication, 31 March 2010), Europe, Australia, India, and other locations where they had network or family connections or where national Baha’i communities were able to provide services. As for the Jewish community, the social conditions facing the Iranian Baha’i community during this time has had a serious impact which has changed the composition and characteristic, networks, and regime relations of the Baha’i community and their educational strategies and opportunities over the three decades under the Islamic Republic.

Streams and Episodes

I look at mid-scale and small-scale processes within two distinct streams for this period. The first stream, and its episodes, includes the general educational challenges and opportunities for Baha’i children attending primary and secondary level government schools during this period, in the context of the regime’s educational policies and practices, and some consequential educational strategies that emerged out of that evolving situation. The second stream entails the denial of access to Bahá’í students to higher education and their response by creating a parallel university, the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE). To this end, I have selected representative episodes that reflect general trends of educational strategy selection.

Schooling in the Islamic Republics: Challenges and opportunities. The newly appointed Minister of Education, Muhammad Ali Rafai, a former leading organizer of the Hojjatiyah (an anti-Baha’i organization) in Qazvin, issued an edict that called for the purge of Baha’is from the education system, and held Baha’i teachers responsible for repayment of their salaries to the government (Figure D7 shows a facsimile). Rafai
(1981) emphasized the regime’s uncompromising stance on Baha’is in public schools, stating that the Ministry of Education “will not tolerate followers of the Baha’i sect in its educational unit, so as not to defile and destroy the minds and thoughts of innocent students.”

Administrators and teachers identified as Baha’i were dismissed throughout Iran, including university instructors (Baha’i International Community, 2005). Regime repression peaked during the first epoch of the Islamic Republic; government agents dismissed Baha’is from schools and government jobs, along with other more severe treatment (Bordewich, 1987; Jamuri Eslami, 30 June 1980; Washington Post, 24 January 1980). The government used repression as a means to facilitate ideological congruence by purging incompatible elements out of its system or coercing assimilation of various groups to conform to the regime’s vision of the state (requiring Baha’is to recant; Associated Press, 30 July 1983; Bigelow, 1992; Kazemzadeh, 2000).

The Ministry of Education also targeted school children. In 1981, the Ministry of Education distributed an official form to Iranian schools, requiring students to identify their affiliation with the Baha’i religion, their family’s affiliations, the number of years they considered themselves Baha’is, and their willingness to recant their faith (Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Education, 1981; Figure D8 shows a facsimile). Prior to enrolling in the upcoming academic year, if students did not identify themselves with one of the recognized religious groups in Iran (Muslim, Jewish, Christian, or Zoroastrian), they faced general harassment and occasionally expulsion (Baha’i International Community, 1982). Furthermore, in that same year, the Ministry of Education formalized the prohibition against Baha’is in private and public universities, issuing several letters of
expulsion over subsequent years and prohibiting nonrecognized religious minorities from sending funds to students studying abroad (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006; *Kayhan*, 4 August 1981, p. 4).

Those who identified themselves as Baha’i faced serious consequences. Over the course of the first three years, Baha’i school children were sporadically subjected to coercion, abuse, and expulsion from schools. Expulsion and suspension from school was not systematic, and occurred erratically in different parts of Iran. However, the numbers remained high; approximately 25,000 Baha’i children were expelled by 1983 (*Southwest Newswire*, 10 February 1984). Baha’i religious classes were also targeted. In Shiraz, several young women (among them teenagers), who were volunteer Baha’i religious class teachers, were sentenced to death and hanged by official order from the local government agents on charges of Baha’i propaganda (Roohizadegan, 1994; *Washington Times*).

Several responses followed. Some Baha’is left Iran via carefully chosen routes, such as those used by Iranian Jews escaping the country. Some parents and community leaders made direct appeals to school principals, local administrators, and even complained to regional government offices; however, most complaints were ineffective (Baha’i International Community, 1982; Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006). Baha’is had abandoned parallel secular education decades earlier because government schools provided sufficient venue and generally open access to educational opportunities; thus it was an out-of-practice strategy. However, parallel religious studies classes and programs had successively improved (Baha’i World Centre, *The Baha’i World*, Vols. 14–17). Parallel schooling, unlike during the previous regime, posed the danger of government retaliation because of Baha’i activities were officially prohibited.
The Universal House of Justice and other Baha’i national and local leadership organizations framed the persecution of Baha’is in two ways. First, to non-Baha’i governmental and nongovernmental organizations they characterized the Islamic regime’s treatment of Baha’is as a transgression of fundamental human rights (see Ghanea, 2002; Baha’i International Community, 2005b); this is a process Tarrow (2005) calls externalization, whereby local claims are extended and transformed from indigenous rights to universal human rights. Simultaneously, they provided ample moral support by framing the fortitude and perseverance of those who were bearing persecution as a service to and sacrifice for the Baha’i community (Universal House of Justice, multiple letters dating 1983–1992). Both of these were frames used in past episodes during the Pahlavi era when government agents and parallel authorities (Islamic clergy and anti-Baha’i organizations) harassed and attacked Baha’is. Thus, the Iranian Baha’i community’s transnational network was activated to work toward changing educational opportunity structure, and thus coalesced into an educational strategy (i.e., advocacy for educational rights).

Virtually all Baha’is, children and parents included, identified themselves as Baha’is upon inquisition, even in the face of possible dire consequences. One reason for this response was because dissimulation (an act of dishonesty) has always been prohibited in the Baha’i Faith, and was reiterated by the Universe of Justice and other National Assemblies (Universal House Justice, 1985, 1985a; National Spiritual Assembly of the United States, 1985). This is reminiscent of the uncompromising stance taken decades earlier during the Pahlavi era, in suspending Baha’i-run schools on Baha’i holy days because the religious injunction required them to be closed. The Iranian Baha’i
community found itself with few options, especially because appealing to the government\textsuperscript{16}—which did not recognize them—proved to be useless, while it was not willing to make what it perceived as unacceptable concessions. Consequently, community leaders and members turned to the Baha’i World Centre for guidance.

Building on decades of experience, the Baha’i International Community was mandated by the Universal House of Justice to launch a comprehensive campaign using media outlets, government ties, and other organizational affiliations in shedding light on the situation facing the Iranian Baha’i community, and soliciting help in pressuring the Iranian government to alter its course of action—including education-related issues (Kazemzadeh, 2000; Baha’i International Community, 6 June 2006). The BIC worked closely with National Spiritual Assemblies and other non-Baha’i institutions and organizations from around the world, including United Nations agencies, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Federation of Human Rights (Sara Vader, personal communication, 7 December 2009). Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “boomerang effect” model succinctly illustrates how group transnational networks and international organizations are used in restrictive conditions. The interests of the Iranian Baha’is were pursued through the channels of the Baha’i International Community, to bring external pressure on the Islamic Republic, after the Baha’i community itself was unable to ameliorate the situation via internal means. According to several sources, advocacy seemed to lessen the regime’s tendency to use violent behavior, but spurred the regime to use more discreet repressive measures (Ghanea, 2002; Bigelow, 1992; Baha’i

\footnote{\textsuperscript{16} In addition to local and regional appeals, the Iranian NSA’s (1983) open letter called for the guarantee of particular rights for Baha’is, three of the 13 points directly related to educational opportunities of Baha’i children and youth.}
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Baha’i children were once again integrated in public schools with relatively little resistance, and only isolated instances of suspension and expulsion. The government’s tolerance reflects its shifted focus with the leadership of a new pragmatist at the helm of government during the second epoch, and the rise of the reform movement during the third epoch of the Islamic republic. The shift from violent performances was partially an effort to facilitate assimilation. This was made evident in a confidential document issued by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR) in February 1991, outlining the general government strategy on how to address Baha’is living in Iran (Golpaygani, Islamic Republic of Iran, SCCR, 1991; see Figures D9 and D10 for facsimile and translation). Education was one of the central strategies in dealing with “the Baha’i question.” On closer examination, the memorandum presents a mix of repression, tolerance, and facilitation. For example, the SCCR recommends that Baha’is be “enrolled in schools provided they have not identified themselves as Baha’is.” However the policy also suggests that even if they are implicitly identified, “preferably, they should be enrolled in schools which have a strong and imposing religious ideology.” Thus, forced assimilation is was the ultimate goal.

Notwithstanding the revised government posture, Baha’is continued to either integrate into the education system or exit the country. Because conditions for leaving became less stringent during the second and third epoch of this period (ca. 1989–2004), many Baha’is continued to leave Iran. The strain of restricted opportunities in Iran affected community morale and cohesion (Baha’i International Community, 2005b;
Sanasarian, 2000). In turn, community members took initiative and organized discreet classes on Baha’i studies in homes (anonymous BIHE and Baha’i religious class teachers in Iran, personal communication, 10–24 December 2009). Thus, paralleling became an additional strategy in addition to integration. The characteristics of the community had changed as a result of attrition among community leaders and the educated class; the use of parallel schooling was used to continue preserve community cohesion and identity. It is interesting to note that several Iran Baha’is both inside and outside the country informed me that although the heightened repression may have hampered facilitation of activity, it reinforced Baha’i identity. While seemingly counterintuitive, I argue that the effects of polarization (an “us-them” amplification) sparked by the regime emboldened boundaries and contributed to community cohesion.

While general social conditions for Baha’i individuals improved during the second and third epochs, as compared to the first, with the rise of the new conservatives in 2005, Baha’is again experienced difficulties in the schools. For example, in a survey of incidents involving insults, mistreatment, and even physical violence by school authorities against Baha’i students over a 30-day period (mid-January to mid-February) in 2007, nearly 150 cases were identified in 10 different cities (One Country, 2007). Other instances involving Baha’i students also reflect the general rise of intolerance, and the application of abrasive and clandestine methods to assimilate young Baha’is (see Baha’i International Community in US NSA, 2008, for summary report on attacks against Baha’i school children in Iran 2007–2008). I argue that the lack of favorable regime-group relations, and closed political opportunity structures, increased the importance of group networks and characteristics to compensate in forming educational strategies.
Looking back at the interactions concerning education between the Islamic Republic and the Baha’i community, several processes stand out: contention, coalition formation, collective action, escalation, framing, identity shift (or reaffirmation), internationalization, mobilization and demobilization, polarization, scale shift, and self-representation. The regime imposed high stakes claims on the educational (and other) interests of Baha’is, and as a result of failed cooperative attempts to appeal to the government, the Baha’i International Community and other national Baha’i communities collectively acted on behalf of Iranian Baha’is primarily through human rights advocacy to governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Information was diffused by Iranian Baha’i leaders to the BIC, which in turn diffused methods of advocacy to National Spiritual Assemblies around the world, who coordinated national and local campaigns in their respective countries. Baha’is who remained in Iran formed ad hoc coalitions to meet their needs, which included providing private religious classes for Baha’is, but also moral support and community cohesion by framing the fortitude of the community members as a service and sacrifice for “the Cause.”

Thus, the situation was escalating both within the regime and within the Baha’i community. The regime raised the cost of mobilization by threatening expulsion from school and banning students from higher education, in order to dissuade Baha’is from maintaining their loyalty to their community. In turn, Baha’is by and large rejected the threats, by disbanding their entire organizational structure after it was outlawed (maintaining contained contention), and while tolerating educational discrimination, sought representation and advocacy from transnational networks. This, in turn, not only polarized the two groups, but simulated boundary activation for Baha’i identity. The
nationwide demobilization of the Iranian Baha’i community’s organizational structure and infrastructure (i.e., centers, property, holy sites, and service facilities), as well as the emigration of large numbers of educated and affluent community members was a significant blow to the Baha’i community’s composition and characteristics.

The Universal House of Justice continued to reinforce the morale of Iranian Baha’is by framing their ability to withstand repression as heroism and a courageous fulfillment of their loyalty and service to their faith. Inside Iran, framing the restrictive and inequitable educational policies as part and parcel of a greater sacrifice was genuinely accepted by community members. This practice has been an effective strategy for many years. The increased interaction between national and international Baha’i institutions with other organizations constituted a new level of internationalization and in some ways a transnational social movement on behalf of the Iranian Baha’is. By extending frames that presented the plight of Baha’i as a universal violation of human rights, the Baha’i community was able to garner the support of human rights organizations and democratic governments.

The adaptive innovation of a parallel higher education institute. Although the Islamic regime tolerated the return of Baha’is into the public school system, it refused their participation in higher education. This was part of the regime’s broader Cultural Revolution launched by Khomeini, which set out to purge and purify universities from what the regime perceived as anti-Islamic elements. The Baha’is turned to innovation to counter the effects of the ban.

Three episodes within this stream illustrate higher educational strategy selection and deployment processes. The first episode (encapsulating events across time) highlights
the ongoing denial of entry into public universities by the Islamic Republic. The second
episode is one of actuation, whereby the Baha’i community mobilized and put into
motion the making of a parallel university. The third episode involves a government
 crackdown and raid on the university after it had been well established (representative of
 similar encounters between the regime and the parallel university).

**Denial.** Among the exclusionary policies which were initially imposed on
Baha’is, denial of higher education was a central regime strategy to repress the
community. To take the university entrance exam (*konkur*), students had to identify
themselves as belonging to one of the four recognized religions in the Islamic Republic.
Students who left the question blank, or wrote in Baha’i, were automatically disqualified.
In the February 1991 memorandum, the policy required that Baha’is “should be expelled
from universities, either in the admission process or during the course of their studies,
once it becomes known that they are Baha’is...” (Golpaygani, 1991). For the first two
decades, the only educational strategy to access universities was exiting the country; the
network ties of the Iranian Baha’is with their transnational communities and families who
had left earlier made this a possibility. This situation changed in 1987 with the
establishment of the Baha’i parallel institute for higher education, the Baha’i Institute for
Higher Education (BIHE).

**Innovative adaptation.** In 1987, a group of university professors, most of whom
were fired from their posts after the Revolution, came together to develop an institute for
higher learning, later entitled the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education (Baha’i Institute
for Higher Education, 2009). With an open ban on public Baha’i activity, the advanced
education classes were held discreetly in homes and shops privately owned by Baha’is,
and relied heavily on distance learning modalities. Initially, the goals were modest, offering classes on subjects reflecting the expertise of instructors and interest of students (Baha’i International Community, 2005b; Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006). Because degrees issued by BIHE were unofficial (i.e., not from an accredited university), participation in the programs was framed with reference to the Baha’i concept of advanced education as a service and religious imperative. Within several years, the number and diversity of classes grew to form quasi-departments divided according to disciplines and departments, such as civil engineering, business administration, computer software engineering, biology, sociology, and educational psychology. Despite being unaccredited and unrecognized by the state, the demand for entering the new university was exceptionally high (Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, n.d.; 250 enrolled in 1987 and 1200 in 2008). I argue that not being institutionalized, and thus having little to lose in terms of legal rights, provided the impetus to take the additional risk of establishing the Institute and enrolling in its courses. In other words, institutionalization of the Jewish and Christian education initiatives, while providing them with some opportunities, caused them to make certain fundamental concessions, with the risk of losing what they had already acquired. Baha’is on the other hand, were denied government institutionalization, which actually propelled Baha’is to create a space to meet their needs in the ways that suited them.

Through the ad hoc Baha’i national and local committees, information was disseminated throughout various Baha’i communities, including lists of prerequisites, admission testing dates and sites, and protocols for study, supervision, examinations, etc. Between 1987 and 1999, most of the classes were administered in Tehran, where students
would attend for a period of time, and then return to their homes to complete work (Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006; anonymous BIHE administrator in Iran, personal communication, 21 October 2009). When it became known that the postal service was interfering with the distribution and reception of materials, innovative means were devised whereby various appointed individuals would hand deliver curriculum and material packets.

As a result of community demands for access to the only means of higher education in the country, not only were more subjects and new fields included in BIHE, but also administrators reached out to trusted non-Baha’i associates working at public universities in Iran (Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006; anonymous Baha’is in Iran, personal communications, 10–24 December 2009). Over time, facilities were rented or purchased by the Baha’i community to host special classes that required laboratories and workstations, such as dentistry, chemistry, computer science, and architecture (Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006; Baha’i International Community, 2005a). However, BIHE continues to use primarily homes and private shops owned by local Baha’is as classrooms (anonymous BIHE administrator in Iran, personal communication, 12 December 2009). To help accommodate the large influx of enrollments, many BIHE graduates volunteer as teaching assistants and lecturers.

With the advent and proliferation of the Internet, BIHE experience significant transformation and expansion. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the maintenance of records, and most course work was transferred online (administered by Baha’is in Canada). While most members of the governing board for the Institute remained in Iran, it also had affiliate board members in Canada and the United States
(anonymous BIHE administrator in Iran, personal communication, 12 December 2009). Moving courses online also facilitated an increase in the number of instructors able to teach classes and widened the range and scope of new courses. BIHE administrators and other Baha’i leaders outside Iran solicited the aid of academics and professionals to join what is called the Affiliated Global Faculty (AGF; Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006). The number of Iran-based and international faculty grew from 273 members in 2006 (Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006) to approximately 350 in 2009 (anonymous BIHE administrator in Iran, personal communication, 12 December 2009). The transnational network of the Baha’is reached down to the individual level, with Baha’i volunteers in countries around the world joining the AGF.

Since the late 1990s, an increasing number of BIHE graduates have successfully been able to receive recognition by universities in the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, India and other parts of the world, and thus continue to graduate education (Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006). This was the result of highly coordinated and collaborative efforts between BIHE administrators, students, and transnational Baha’i community members in these countries (Baha’i International Community, 2005a). BIHE also sponsors scholarships for high performing graduates to receive graduate degrees abroad and then to return to join the Iran-based faculty of BIHE for a set number of years (anonymous BIHE administrator, personal communication, 13 December 2009).

Some salient processes that went into the strategy of innovation and adaptation of the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education include: actor constitution, coalition formation, mobilization, collective and coordinated action, framing, globalization and internationalization, and scale shift. Professors and professionals fired from previous
positions regrouped and constituted a new sub-group of educators within the Baha’i community, forming coalitions with the Baha’i ad hoc committees, as well as reaching out to other academics and organizations inside and outside Iran. This new coalition of Baha’i leaders and educators mobilized the community’s resources and drew on networks to create a parallel institute for higher education. Procedures for accessing the private university were diffused through letters between the Institute and the community through the brokerage of the ad hoc local committees. By engaging in high levels of organization, a team of administrators, instructors, staff, and students coordinated students and class schedules, and collectively acted to facilitate access to higher education. The mobilization efforts gradually evolved and expanded in both scope and range to include more students, instructors, courses, and diversity. The ability to use homes, shops, and rented facilitates was gained earlier from the community’s experience during both the Qajar and early Pahlavi dynasty. The high level of internal networks within the Iranian Baha’i community, following a quasi-hierarchical structure in tandem with decentralized committees created functional channels of communication, resource allocation, and strategy deployment.

The pursuit of education was again framed as an imperative, but also now as a service to the Baha’i Faith itself. This consequently boosted the morale not only of students but also of the Iranian Baha’i community at large. Drawing on international networks, and building a pool of hundreds of affiliated global faculty members from around the world through Internet communication illustrates of the increasingly successful processes of globalization. When, beginning in the mid-1990s several students were admitted into recognized universities abroad, procedures were diffused among peer
groups and BIHE administrators to other students. Non-Iranian universities who accepted
BIHE students into their graduate programs unofficially certified BIHE and their
educational enterprise. The collaboration of BIHE, other Baha’i organizations and
academics, and non-Baha’i institutions in arranging transferable credit from BIHE to
other universities also highlights the process of internationalization. Since 1987, the
parallel university experienced a significant upward scale shift, with an increase in almost
every feature, including faculty, courses, students, subjects and degrees. With all these
developments, it is not surprising that in 1998, the expansion of the school, however
tolerated it may been at various points, drew unfavorable attention on an unprecedented
scale.

The raids of 1998. By 1998, the Institute offered the Bachelor degree in ten
subject areas, each requiring 200 distinct courses each term in each of five departments
(Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006). Although in the initial years of the school,
the identities of professors were concealed from students, by mid-1990s, BIHE operated
even more openly and established several laboratories and testing facilities around
Tehran (Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006; Baha’i International Community,
2005a). The expansion attracted the attention of the government. In September and
October of 1998, government agents launched a surprising and sweeping raid of nearly
500 homes, rented venues, and shops associated with the university, confiscated over
US$100,000-worth of equipment and essential documents, and arrested 36 faculty
members and administers (anonymous BIHE administrative staff, personal
communication, 10 December 2009; Baha’i International Community, 2005a). While the
BIHE had experienced raids prior to this incident, they had been relatively mild and
seemingly uncoordinated (anonymous BIHE administrative staff member, personal communication, 10 December 2009). The faculty members who were arrested and interrogated were eventually released, and were undeterred by their jailors to sign pledges to stop their activities.

The Baha’i International Community responded with a surge of public statements addressed to various international and national, governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Moreover, other Baha’i national communities were encouraged to become involved, including the solicitation of non-Baha’i academics and organizations (see United States Baha’i Website, http://iran.bahai.us/support-bahai-students/, for outline of advocacy instructions). The Universal House of Justice and Iranian Baha’i leaders continued to encourage students and educationalist involved in the Institute to continue their work over the next several years (Baha’i International Community, 2005a; also see a letter written by the Universal House of Justice addressing Iranian Baha’i students, 9 September 2007). With the aid of the Iranian Baha’i community, through individual donations from within and outside of Iran, the Baha’is were able to recuperate from the substantial losses.

Despite the alarming raid, participation in BIHE did not lessen, but rather continued to grow during the following years (Baha’i International Community, 2005b). Several instructors interviewed expressed their surprise that, despite the government’s vigilance in keeping Baha’is out of public universities, the regime tolerated or neglected the existence of BIHE (however selective it may have been). Nonetheless, government tolerance or neglect of the Institute must also be considered in its ability to remain open. In the face of the ongoing harassment, I suggest that without this narrow window in the
opportunity structure, however restrictive it may be, no coordination, resources, or framing adequately explains the expansion of the Institute over the past 10 years.

As Figure D11 shows, contrary to what one might have expected, instead of showing a downward scale shift, the BIHE experienced an increase in its activity, resources (human, material, and cultural), and faculty (Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, 2006). Baha’is avoided confrontation inside Iran, and continued to operate the Institute quietly. The high flow of traffic occurring in the Iranian Baha’i network sustained most innovations and adaptations, including the increase of new forms of resources that were not present before (i.e., technological). As a general reaction to heightened repression in 2007–2008, particularly with the dissolution of the Yaran and increased raids of homes, the Institute scaled down its physical facilities (personal observation, 23 December 2009; anonymous BIHE chemistry instructor, personal communication, 23 December 2009).

Repressive facilitation. In 2003, however, the regime gave all appearances of opening a new opportunity structure for Iranian Baha’is to pursue public higher education. The requirement to identify religious affiliation was removed from the entrance examination forms (Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology, n.d.). In response to this seeming new opportunity, nearly 1,000 Baha’i high school graduates signed up and took the university entrance exam the following year (Baha’i International Community, 2005b). All students had to take a test on subjects related to one of the four recognized religions as part of the exam. Most Baha’i students chose to write about Islam, since it was taught in public schools and was thus most familiar to them. But upon receiving their entrance exam results, the Baha’i students were identified as Muslims
Several bold responses followed from among the 800 Baha’i students who passed the examination. The Iranian Baha’i community wrote a letter of appeal to President Khatami about the rights of Iranian Baha’is in the Islamic Republic (Baha’i Community of Iran, 15 November 2004). Part of the letter addressed what they called “the duplicity” of the government’s actions to sabotage Baha’i efforts to access higher education, and asked the government to provide the right of higher education to Baha’i youth who were Iranian citizens (Baha’i Community of Iran, 2004). There was no response.

The students who had applied actively tried to rectify the error on the forms, by writing to the Educational Measurement and Evaluation Organization, stating that they had been incorrectly identified. Officials responded by saying that because Baha’is are not recognized the information would not be changed (Baha’i International Community, 2005a; Affolter, 2007). Only 10 of the 800 who had passed the exam were acknowledged as having been admitted into university. All 10 rejected admission in protest and solidarity with their peers. From the perspective of the Baha’i community, this had clearly been a strategy on the part of the regime not only to demoralize Baha’i youth and encourage emigration, but also to keep human rights monitors at bay by showing that the regime had accommodated the Baha’is by giving them a chance to enroll—and then refusing to actually admit them to study (Baha’i International Community, 2005a). I suggest that the regime may have also used this strategy to encourage Baha’is to enter the state system by means of an implicit assimilation, avoiding the exercise of violent coercion.
In this situation, Baha’is continued to take the entrance exam and attempted to gain admission into public universities (Diane Ala’i, personal communication, 18 November 2009). However, time and again, Baha’is were identified as Muslims, and appeals to local and national offices ensued (Affolter, 2007). In some cases, a small fraction of Baha’i students are admitted (nearly 200), but at some point soon after they begin their studies, they are expelled (see Batebi, 2008, and Baha’i International Community, 3 October 2008 for examples).

Since 2006, several government documents have surfaced indicating the explicit pervasiveness of the policy to exclude Baha’i students (one of which refers directly to the February 1991 memorandum). For example, in 2006, in a letter directed to 81 Iranian universities, Asghar Zarei, the director general of the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology, issued instructions to expel all those who were identified as Baha’is (see Figure D12 for facsimile). Similarly, in November 2006 and March 2007, the government and university officials issued circulars to various branches of Payam-e-Noor University, Iranian’s largest public university (distance learning), requiring university administrators to block enrolment and continue expulsion of identified Baha’is (see Baha’i International Community, 27 August 2007 for facsimile and translation of documents). Students still attempt to attend public universities because employers and graduate schools around the world recognize Iranian university diplomas. In the clear expectation of expulsion, most Baha’i students simultaneously apply to the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education. Transnational community activism and advocacy on behalf of the Iranian Baha’i community continues. Without a means to access education, Baha’i youth continue to rely on the parallel university or study abroad as their primary
strategy for accessing higher education (anonymous Baha’is in Iran, personal communications, 10–24 December 2009). In retrospect, the community’s ideological commitment to refuse to deny or even neglect stating their religious identity has a direct bearing on their access to public universities. These latest documents show that even transnational advocacy has not necessarily improved the prospect of changing the government’s policy of denying higher education to the Baha’is of Iran, but, rather, has led them to devise more innovative means of marginalizing active and vocal members of the community.

Summary. Baha’is who were blocked from educational opportunities in the first several years of the Islamic regime turned to advocacy and exit as the primary strategies to advance pursuit of educational opportunities. For the entire period of the Islamic Republic, Baha’is drew on several prominent strategies. Most of these were strategies employed during the Pahlavi era, although they assumed different forms. Variation in the regime-group relations—shifts in repression, toleration, and facilitation—had an impact on those processes that differed from past experience. I argue that in the absence of ties with the government, which marginalized the community and blocked access to higher education, led to innovative adaptation and bolder initiatives than both the Jewish and Christian community who had been given limited educational rights. It was also their centralized and transnational organizational configuration that supported continued mobilization and collective action to meet educational needs, despite increased waves of repression.
Comparative Review of Religious Minorities Under the Islamic Republic

The radical transformation of the regime after the Islamic Revolution, recasting religious identity as a political identity within a theocratic state, entailed a series of reconfiguring relational dynamics, and ultimately group features, including characteristics and composition, networks, and regime-group relations. Not surprisingly, from the foregoing comparative examination of educational strategies during the Pahlavi era, some educational strategies were selected based on preference, others on those limited to a group because of the shifts in group features, and, finally, as a reaction to new government policies and practices. With a disparate and fragmented body of information to analyze, the mechanism-process approach made possible critical explanations of both similarities and differences in the educational strategies selected under the regime of the Islamic Republic. Similarly, a comparison shows more closely how group features bore on strategies, but, more interesting, how strategies shaped the very fabric of the features of the three communities.

As was done for the Pahlavi era, Figure 20 illustrates a relative timeline of major periods during which the government exercised heightened repression and closed educational opportunity structures, as well as periods when tolerance or neglect dominated regime behavior toward specific groups. Fluctuations in increased repression or imposition of specific educational policies reflect the regime’s efforts to meet state their own educational agenda and political goals.
Prominent government educational policies affecting religious minority educational opportunities during the Islamic Republic period.

As in earlier periods, the three groups sometimes shared the same types of strategies, partially shared strategies, or relied on group-specific and unique strategies. However, it is evident that during the Islamic Republic there was greater divergence of strategies; this can be explained by the drastic reconfiguration of group features. Below, I compare the development of prominent strategies by Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. It is especially important to note that past strategies re-emerged as the recurring course of actions chosen by groups, unless and until group features were changed, causing a rupture in regularly adopted educational strategies.

**Shared Strategies**

**Exit.** Perhaps the strategy which had the greatest impact on both subsequent strategies and features of all three religious minority groups in the first decade of the Islamic republic was that of exit. Initially, many of those with financial means, higher education, and political clout fled the country in the first few years during and after the Revolution. Since the Revolution, the majority of both Christian and Jewish communities have emigrated in pursuit of educational and other opportunities elsewhere. Baha’is left Iran (some continue to leave) with refugee status, using network ties in communities
throughout the world. While those who left were able to access education in the countries to which they immigrated, those who remained faced new challenges.

**Tolerant Integration.** Those who remained also integrated into the reformed educational system. Unlike the previous regime the Baha'i and Jewish community members who entered schools did so by tolerating general harassment and the discriminatory government curriculum. Nearly all Armenians remain isolated in Armenian Christian schools; those who do attend government public schools similarly tolerate minor harassment and discrimination. Assyrian and Chaldeans select integration in the form of conceding to government requirements to take in non-Christian students, in order to keep schools open. Those who do not tolerate these conditions usually receive harsher treatment and even expulsion. Baha’i’s appeal to school administrators occasionally, and Jews do sparingly as well; however, this is usually done without significant change in the situation. Tolerance on the part of Jews and Christians, without major appeal, is explained by the desire to maintain good relations with the state as a recognized religious community.

**Partially Shared Strategies**

**Selective Assimilation.** Both Jewish and Christian schools make concessions to government school regulations to keep schools open. This includes reduced language and religious instruction, use of government-issued religious textbooks, and forfeiting the Sabbath and recognition of some holy days by keeping schools open. Other concessions include gender-segregated schools, specific uniforms, and other compromises that do not reflect the goals of the religious community.
Institutionalization. Like under the previous regime, Jews and Christians are recognized by the government as legitimate religious communities, and are accorded a representative in the Parliament. Among the special rights of recognized religious minorities under the Islamic Republic is permission to run community schools with special features. Baha’is are not recognized or represented, and thus are forced to integrate into the state system, leave the country, or not participate in education at all.

Contention. In the first several years of the Islamic Republic, Armenian Christians were particularly vocal in resisting government policies which placed limitations on the isolationist goals and educational practices of the community. This was primarily carried out through contained contention, and was tolerated by the regime. However, when the community crossed the line, and engaged in transgressive contention, by protesting government-issued exams, the government closed schools, whereupon the community responded by backing off. Thus contention was reduced to contained contention. As a result of not being institutionalized, and being denied educational opportunities of various sorts during different periods, Baha’is engaged in contention through appeal and international advocacy on their behalf to the international community. It should be noted that the Jewish community did not engage in contention to meet educational needs, and fell back on assimilation and integration.

Group Specific Strategies

Assimilation. There are cases where members of the Jewish community assimilate into the general community, practicing dissimulation of religious affiliation in public, practicing their faith in private or in communal settings. This is done in hopes of avoiding harassment and discrimination in public.
**Isolation.** By the end of the Pahlavi period, Christians were extremely isolated in their schooling, and relied on continuing isolationism to meet the goals of cultural and religious preservation. While Muslim principals and many Muslim teachers manage most Armenian schools, the student body consists primarily, if not exclusively, of ethnic Armenians. Assyrian and Chaldean schools failed to maintain this desired isolation because of their small numbers; thus, their schools had to take in Muslim students. To this end, some members of these two groups attempt to attend Armenian schools.

**Paralleling.** Due to regime restrictions of cultural and religious education in community schools overseen by the government, Jewish and Christian community organizations maintain quasi-parallel religious classes for young people. These classes are held primarily in synagogues and churches, and are approved by the government. Similarly, the Baha’is hold private religious classes in homes and on private property, but because they are prohibited from conducting such classes publicly, they are constrained to be highly discreet. Perhaps the most noticeable case of paralleling as a strategy is the Baha’i community’s establishment and maintenance of a private parallel institute for higher education for nearly 3,000 Baha’i students, who are otherwise banned from public universities.

**Innovation.** Baha’i intellectuals and community members formed an ad hoc coalition to establish the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education. Through community resources and support, faculty members are able to mobilize and coordinate a series of classes, fields of study, and award degrees (not recognized by the state) to Baha’i students who are banned from higher education in Iran. They also draw on networks around the
world, under the leadership and guidance of the Baha’i World Centre, to provide a broad
global faculty of scholars to supervise classes by distance education.

**Religious Minorities in Comparative Context of Group Features**

As seen during the Pahlavi period, group features had a significant bearing on the
way in which mechanisms and processes combined to coalesce broad educational
strategies. The variations in features and shifts that took place suddenly or over a longer
period of time had a noticeable impact on other group features, and subsequently on the
types of strategy that were (a) available and (b) acceptable to groups. In retrospect, while
past strategies invariable influenced the selection of future ones, they were subject to the
types of ties, resources, opportunities, and frames that were available and in play as are
result of reconfigured group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group
relations.

**Composition and Characteristics**

The strategy of exit had perhaps the most significant impact on the Jewish and
Christian communities, and to a lesser but still significant degree on the Baha’i
community. With the vacuum of leaders, affluent and educated community members,
who fled the country, in pursuit of educational and other opportunities and protection
from perceived repression, those who remained faced new challenges with fewer
resources on which to draw. For example, the Assyrian and Chaldeans were unable to
mobilize resources required to protect schools from imposed integration. Most evident
were the concessions made by the Iranian Jewish community by keeping schools open on
the Sabbath, violating a fundamental tenet of Judaism, and by accepting compromises to
the curriculum and staffing of the schools. The Armenian Christian schools attempted to
show greater resistance initially, perhaps as a result of stronger leadership and larger numbers; however, after a repressive backlash on the part of the regime, they, too, made similar compromises. Baha’is, who were not only ostracized but whose organizations were banned from operation, reconfigured to form ad hoc committees to run community affairs and sought innovative means to adapt to the heightened repression of the regime. Their centralized leadership in Haifa helped to provide guidance in the pursuit of forming and selecting educational strategies. The characteristics of the Jewish community changed it grew smaller in number, consisting primarily of middle and lower class, and with leadership who outwardly aligned themselves with the regime, simultaneously denouncing association with previous transnational ties in Israel, the United States, and Western Europe. Armenian Christians also emphasized their support of the regime by disavowing association with Western and Russian powers.

**Networks**

Composition and characteristics did drastically change, but so did the configuration of transnational and local networks. Because the Jewish and Christian leadership cut official ties with Israel and the United States—the countries providing their greatest support and network ties—they effectively cut the flow of material, human, organizational, and moral resources that came from them. I argue that this severing of ties to keep good relations with the regime made their network tie to the Iranian government more important in meeting educational needs. In contrast, Baha’is, who were excluded and marginalized by the government, relied even more heavily on network ties with its transnational community, and these indirect ties were used to fuel the advocacy campaign which countered the discriminatory state educational policies and practices, and provided
support for other educational strategies. It is important that while human rights organizations, and several national and supranational government organizations have increased their discourse about human rights violations against all religious minorities in Iran, many Jewish and Christian community leaders, however difficult their situation may be, disassociate themselves from these groups and their claims, and realign themselves with the regime. I suggest that this is primarily the result of their consideration of relations and standing with the regime.

**Regime-Group Relations**

When the Islamic Republic was established, I argue that religious identities became political, and thus a matter directly related to the state. In the first years of after the revolution, particularly between 1980 and 1984, there was heightened pressure on political and religious minorities. The government used coercion and force to facilitate support and alignment of these disparate groups. The Jewish and Christian community schools were faced with the need to make major changes, as a result of the regime’s intolerance of particular standards. The Jewish and Christian communities had been institutionalized into the new state system through official recognition and representation in the Majles, giving them the right to run community schools, albeit with some restrictions. Although they were able to engage in moderate contained contention to meet needs, transgressing the bounds threatened loss of other rights. I contend that this led both the Jewish and Christian communities to adopt a highly tolerant attitude toward government-imposed policies, and thus resulted in many concessions and compromises to keep group schools open. The most repressed of the three groups, the Baha’is, who continue to face high levels of educational discrimination and are still banned from
higher education, had nothing to lose legally, since they were already excluded from the Constitution, were deemed a “misguided sect,” and were even targeted with sanctioned repression. The various levels of repression and neglect facing Baha’is by the Islamic regime led Baha’i community leaders and members to make innovative adaptations to meet educational needs. Thus, the fact that they were completely marginalized enabled the Baha’is to take greater risks than either Jews or Christians in meeting educational goals.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have identified educational strategies for each religious minority group, using historical narrative and the mechanism-process approach to explain how strategies were formed and selected by Jewish, Christian, and Baha’i communities in modern Iran. Through a cross-regime multi-case analysis, I have established that variations in group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime relations affect educational strategy formation and selection. While the literature on contentious politics looks at mechanism and process to explain phenomenon, I took these considerations a level further by looking at my proposed causal factors, which explain the nuances of the educational strategies that emerge.

Just as the deployment of strategies and their effect change a group’s composition and characteristics, networks, and regime relations, so the adopted strategies, in turn, affect the selection of subsequent strategies and change each group features. In other words, two cycles of interacting forces are simultaneously in motion, or what I call a bi-cycle effect, showing how the inter-relational dynamic of features and strategies serve as both conditional and causal forces in educational strategy formation and selection (see
Figure 21 for illustration). Several prominent findings emerge from this analysis, the highlights of which may be helpful in reviewing how these three features influenced strategy selection, and how strategies in turn affected the three group features.

Figure 21. Bi-cycle effect: Relational dynamics of features and strategies.

The bi-cycle effect is an essential consideration of how one group’s education strategies emerge, continue, change, and vary from those of other groups. Where features are similar, strategies are also similar, with nuanced differences. However, when major shifts occur, there is a noticeable change in strategies accessible and acceptable to the groups. Strategies also affect subsequent ones, because they reflect the new configuration of the group features at play. For example, when the exodus of Iranian Jews took place during and shortly after the Islamic Republic, the composition and characteristics of the community drastically changed, thus limiting the set of strategies available—even if undesirable—such as the concession to keep schools open on the Sabbath. Because the leadership had been affected by the decline in educators and the reduced number of
children attending schools, further compromises were made to keep schools open in order to preserve some semblance of community cohesion. This, in turn, became a common theme in subsequent strategies, such as acceptance of the heavily biased government-imposed curricula and the imposition of government-approved Muslim principals to run schools. This is only one example of how the bi-cycle effect model explains strategy selection better than other more simplified methods or descriptive analyses addressing the issues of religious minorities and education in Iran.

**Composition and Characteristics**

Groups relied heavily on pre-existing organizations to broker and diffuse educational strategies, which ranged from integration into public schools to innovation of community run schools. I argue that the characteristics of the groups, particularly ideological orientation, determined the attitudes of community leaders and members in identifying what the educational goals were and which features were important. For example, seeing the advances made in the socioeconomic status of Iraqi Jews, the Jewish community became interested in modern schooling. This became the primary motive and driving force for most Iranian Jewish educational strategies. Once status had been assured, religious identity and cultural preservation gained importance. Christian groups in Iran were divided in their purpose for establishing schools and in their educational strategies: missionaries wanted moral and social education, while ethnic groups sought community preservation and development. Baha’is pursued educational opportunities by founding their own modern schools and integrating into public ones because education was mandated as an imperative by the head of the community.
Using my propositions within the mechanism-processes analysis, I explain that ideological orientation and framing by leaders influenced what strategies were acceptable and desirable, and which were unfavorable. For example, a selective assimilation strategy adopted by the Jewish community had its limits when religious education was compromised during the Pahlavi era, but was nevertheless tolerated. The exodus of tens of thousands of Jews during and after the Revolution, through a strategy I define as *exit*, significantly demobilized schooling efforts of the Iranian Jewish community, while fundamental compromise with Jewish law led to changes in the characteristic of the community. Baha’is were unwilling to compromise religious principles, and strategies were chosen within those constraints.

At times ethnic and cultural divisions between transnational group members interfered with coalition formation and collective action, as in the case of Christian missionaries and Apostolic Christian leaders, or in the initial clash between French and Iranian Jews. These diversity issues ultimately influenced characteristics of the group, and, as I suggest, ultimately refined decisions made in meeting educational needs through boundary activation and polarization. When the Baha’i community faced severe setbacks after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, it continued to draw moral and organizational support from its central leadership in the Baha’i World Centre. Thus, I argue that the capacity of organizational structures, including transnational networks, determined the resources available to the three groups to employ educational strategies, and had a bearing on each group’s composition.
Networks

Networks, I contend, played a significant role in the types of strategies available to the religious minority groups for a number of reasons. For Baha’is and Jews, the increase in network ties during the Pahlavi era provided them with resources and influenced regime-group dynamics. Christians in Iran benefited from the missionaries’ introduction of modern schools, but ethnic Christian leaders in northern Iran in particular separated themselves along cultural and denomination divides. Apostolic Armenian-Iranians strengthened ties with transnational same-denomination/same-ethnicity networks outside Iran—remaining a purposefully insular group. Networks were extremely important for Baha’is, and became the primary means of pursuing educational strategies, through advocacy and innovation. Coalitions built within Iran among Baha’is were fostered by the leadership of the Baha’i World Centre, which orchestrated external network ties around the world to provide resources, most noticeably in the form of advocacy. Iranian Jews severed almost all external network ties during the Islamic Republic era, becoming an isolated community with reduced resources to execute educational strategies.

I argue that it is precisely the weakness or strength of network ties that supports the ongoing activities of religious minorities in repressive settings. If networks are lacking or weak, then regime-group relations become central in shaping educational strategies. On the contrary, when regime-group relations are weak or strained, networks become an important factor in determining educational strategies.
Regime-Group Relations

Although political opportunity structure offered openings and/or imposed restrictions on how strategies were executed, I explain that, this, in and of itself, did not ultimately determine the formation of strategies. Rather, it affected the type of strategies that were chosen. For example, while Jewish schools experienced high levels of tolerance during the Pahlavi era, they nonetheless experienced a decline because integration into the state system was being facilitated by the government. Conversely, Baha'is, who were excluded from recognition and representation, were able to create and run a parallel university despite a ban on attending public higher education.

Thus, I am convinced by the foregoing analysis that the manner in which a group responded to regime actions had significant bearing on strategies. The reason why Baha’is were successful in establishing the Institute for Higher Education during the Islamic Republic was because the group refused to acquiesce to government demands of recantation and denial of religious affiliation. When regime-group relations made it impossible—despite the use of international advocacy networks—to change unfavorable education policies, the government neglected to crack down harder on their efforts. Conversely, both Christian and Jewish schools made compromises to fundamental features of their schools to keep them open, but were included in public schools and universities.

Although it is clearly erroneous to conclude that institutionalization results in fewer opportunities, I argue that institutionalization has limits. Furthermore, I suggest that institutionalization can hamper some initiatives, and noninstitutionalization may lead
to greater risk-taking and innovation in meeting educational needs—at least in the cases of minority religious groups in Iran.

The particular cases discussed here serve as examples of how group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations influence educational strategy selection. By analyzing events as processes and mechanisms, I have carried out an analysis that shows when and how similarities and variations took place. I assert that analyzing how strategies are selected also explains why those strategies were selected and deployed. Thus, I maintain the argument that conditional and causal elements overlap, and that outcomes themselves are also conditions and causes for strategy selection is critical in understanding how religious minority groups in Iran select educational strategies under restrictive conditions.
CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSION

Background

According to Freedom House (2007), a non-partisan non-profit research organization, 23 percent of the world’s countries are not free and only 30 percent are partially free. In other words, the majority (52 percent) of the world’s countries still manifest some form of authoritarian practice and policy, from mild to extreme (Freedom House, 2008). Adopting conflict theories of education, I argued that general authoritarianism and regime repression is almost always manifested in educational curriculum and space. I maintain that this directly and indirectly bears on the educational goals of targeted segments of a state’s population.

One of the important reasons to study the role of political contention in education is the simple fact that people generally feel they have an implicit right to education per se. What happens when that perceived right is removed or distorted? Is the threat of losing other rights and privileges, or even of fierce repression, enough to stop mobilization, as some of the literature implies? Do groups accept, tolerate, resist, or reject imposed educational policies that affect the educational goals of minority groups? These questions reflect how desperately this area calls for closer analysis to broaden our understanding of how minorities function educationally in the majority of the world’s countries which are either partially or not free. This dissertation is an empirical, theoretical, and methodological contribution toward filling this gap.

The objective of this dissertation was straightforward: to explain how religious minorities in Iran meet educational needs under autocratic regimes, and to account for significant

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1 Freedom House uses a four part matrix covering four areas which they equate in the aggregate with freedom: (1) accountability and public voice; (2) civil liberties; (3) rule of law; and (4) anticorruption and transparency.
causal factors for the selection of particular strategies. However, without considerably more attention to the underlying reasons, it would have been easy to fall into the trap of producing yet another descriptive response without explanation. While the Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i communities may have selected similar and different educational strategies at various points, convergence and divergence in educational strategies have been not discussed elsewhere, and thus this dissertation is a pioneering contribution by addressing this important topic. Moreover, in this dissertation I essentially accomplished three things: (a) I accounted for, what I define as, educational strategies in the context of streams and episodes of contention and actuation using my propositional framework; (b) I explained how and why strategies selected by each group resulted from variations in the group’s composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations; and finally, (c) using my education opportunity dynamic framework, I demonstrated that identifying mechanisms and processes shows us not only how educational strategies were formed, but also why they were selected.

In the process of answering the research question, I developed theoretical and methodological tools which I believe contribute to the body of literature from which I drew theoretical and analytical considerations. For example, one of these developments is the propositional framework of group features as causal rather than conditional elements in influencing educational strategies. Another enhancement was the development of the educational opportunity dynamic to explain the relational dynamic of group features with each other, within the broader processes of framing, political opportunity structures, and resource mobilization.

**Highlighted Findings**

In looking at three different religious minority groups under two different regimes spanning 85 years, I was able to (a) identify educational strategies, (b) explain those strategies by looking at mechanisms and processes within segmented streams and episodes of educational contention and actuation, and (c) illustrate the extent to which
group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations bore on the formation, selection, deployment, and outcome of those strategies. Thus, by including the propositions of group features in my analysis using the educational opportunity dynamic, I provided a more specific understanding of essential initiatives and responses of the three groups in meeting their educational goals and needs. I highlight some of the key findings below using the categorization of the group features. Following the review of findings, I provide an overview of the educational strategies which I organize into coherent categories for each group and period, as shown in Table 1 below.

**Composition and Characteristics**

As I initially proposed, the demographics of the groups evidently determined the types and extent of internal resources available to each group to mobilize education efforts, and indicated the extent of the pool of resources to draw from. The initial strategies to seek out modern schooling significantly increased the socioeconomic status of the Jewish and Baha’i communities, and noticeably increased the status of Christians. By developing a new middle and upper class in society, not only did resources increase in quantity, but their quality improved. This finding illustrates what I refer to as the bi-cycle effect, in which group features not only affect strategies, but educational strategies significantly effect group compositions. Subsequently, I found that boundary shift in composition and characteristics also influenced the ideological orientation of groups. Ideological orientation shed light on underlying motives and goals for educational pursuits, and influenced how education and educational opportunities were framed, their importance to each group, and the risks worth taking to obtain them. I also discovered that boundary shift in ideological orientation also defined what strategies were desirable,
acceptable, or unacceptable, including the extent to which groups would tolerate regime impositions and demands before engaging in contained contention or escalating claims into transgressive contention. I found that one of the central instruments for educational strategy development and deployment was pre-existing preference structures, including the groups’ leadership and organizational structures. As I argued throughout the chapters on group features and educational strategies, organizational structure created the coalitions and basis for collective action needed to carry out educational strategies, but also determined how strategies were brokered and diffused, how they were framed, and the kinds of networks that existed for the community. I further argue that community unity mattered in the operation of educational initiatives and the formation of educational strategies: that is, sectarian divisions caused significant obstacles, and when cultural diversity overrode community commonality, the deployment of educational strategies was negatively affected.

**Networks**

My analysis shows that the three religious communities all relied, to one degree or another, on domestic and international networks in forming and selecting educational strategies. I argue that without international networks, community-based modern schooling initiatives would not have proliferated as they did. I suggest that organizational ties and common community characteristics determined how collaboration between domestic community groups and their transnational counterparts materialized. Groups which had hierarchical organizational structures, I contend, were able to benefit from centralized leadership to coordinate strategies on an international level, including mobilization of resources, framing of situations, and acting globally in the interest of
domestic group communities. I maintain that network ties with transnational communities not only made it possible to import educational models, but allowed for exchange of cultural capital, opportunities to study abroad, or use the exit strategy when opportunities were blocked in Iran. Similarly, through my analysis I found that networks were used to strengthen identities through boundary activation, and reinforce group loyalties in the process of seeking education opportunities. In some cases, sectarian agendas varied or often conflicted, which I argue weakened ties or eliminated them across denominations. When groups had strong ties with transnational communities, another consideration, indirect ties, became important. When groups had strong transnational community ties, and those transnational communities had moderate to strong ties with other governmental and nongovernmental organizations, I show how collective action, particularly for advocacy, was a significant factor in educational strategies in the face of educational repression. I argue that while networks increased during the Pahlavi era, they decreased for those groups that were institutionalized during the Islamic Republic because of the influence of state-state relations with those countries that hosted the groups’ transnational communities.

Regime-Group Relations

The study of regime-group relations confirmed ideas about political opportunity structure affecting the amount and kind of resources available for mobilization and collective action. I found that when the government was tolerant of group educational strategies, communities were more able to meet their goals, whether through innovation, integration, or isolation. During the second epoch of the Pahlavi era, I argue that facilitation and increased opportunities for religious minorities caused the Jewish and
Baha’i communities to integrate into the state educational system and, to some extent, led to a reduction of activation or prominent boundaries. This may seem counter intuitive, but as I explain, it was the result of the ideological orientation of the communities to distinguish between religious and national identity, and thus integrate into the national body of the country. Conversely, I found that Christian ethnic communities, took advantage of regime leniency and continued with their deliberately insular educational strategy. However, during both regimes, when repression increased, I illustrated using the concepts laid out in my educational opportunity dynamic that groups responded differently, based not only on their characteristics and networks, but also in consideration of their standing with the regime. Government recognition status gave certain special educational rights to religious minorities, but I contend that it also officially gave rise to a distinct and polarized us-and-them relationship. Moreover, I argue that not being legally recognized had its disadvantages when groups faced incongruence between special community features and regime demands. I found that having a recognized representative in Parliament—constituting institutionalization—gave the respective communities (Jewish and Christian) the opportunity to make contentious claims regarding educational rights. I argue that by institutionalizing, and thus partially aligning with the regime agenda, state-state international relations bore on regime-group relations as well. For example, in cases where the Islamic Republic severed relations with the United States, Britain, and Israel, so, too, did the Jewish and Christian communities break formal ties with their sister communities in those communities, leading, in turn, to demobilization of resources, defection, and fragmentation of transnational community ties. The Baha’is, on the other hand, being officially unrecognized—and therefore not institutionalized as a
community body—had the most restricted opportunity structure. I suggest that because they had no legal status or standing to lose, they were able to engage in more innovative and bold educational undertakings when no other alternatives were open to them.

Table 1

Prominent Educational Strategies by Group and Regime Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>Making claims to the government bearing on education access and quality that is either not provided or inhibited at some level</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>Changing culture and mores to fit with culture and mores of another; changing standards and characteristics of school, curriculum, or participants to fit another standard</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>Adjusting elements of schooling, instruction, subjects, schedules, regulations in consideration of particular actors or institutions</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contention</td>
<td>Any form of contained or transgressive behavior that signals claims that infringe on interests of another (government and nongovernment)</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit</td>
<td>Leaving a given territory in pursuit of opportunities that are blocked or degraded in quality in the host territory; leaving a given territory in pursuit of perceived greater opportunities</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Expansion of school curriculum, structure, infrastructure, population, and personnel; including establishment of other schools</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Accreditation</td>
<td>When an outside community authority sets standards that are required to be met to receive accreditation/validation of quality or acceptability in educational realm</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Assimilation</td>
<td>Only some aspects of culture or mores are purposefully assimilated (mostly cosmetic) to present an assimilated front</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Adaptation</td>
<td>Only partially adjusting selected aspects of schooling, instruction, subjects, and schedules to appease regulation standards</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Supplementation</td>
<td>Providing additional services by schools, like food, clothing, etc., to encourage enrolment and gain community support</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Abroad</td>
<td>Attending schooling abroad for a short period and returning back to the home country</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>Tolerating harassment by government and other groups to keep schools open or to continue accessing school and education</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: P = Pahlavi period; I = Islamic Republic period; J = Jewish community; C = Christian communities; B = Baha’i community

Theoretical and Methodological Contributions

In explaining educational strategy selection of religious minorities in Iran, I drew from three different fields of study: (a) conflict and critical theories of education, (b) social movement and contentious politics literature, and (c) international relations theories on internationalization, globalization and transnational movements. The
integration of these three is an uncommon enterprise, probably because the fields have very little interaction, and often their theoretical considerations remain isolated within each field of study. By integrating concepts the three bodies of literature in this study, I have more adequately addressed the questions posed in this dissertation by accounting for reasons for educational repression, group responses and strategies in meeting education needs, and how international networks and relations influences group and regime features and decisions.

In the field of comparative and international education, the contentious politics approach is an absent but indispensable tool of analysis in understanding causal factors for selection of specific education strategy. It provides the basis for understanding why and how regimes use education to meet personal agenda and control their populations. Likewise, the study of international relations can contribute further to our understanding of transnational networks and the impact of internationalization on educational movements in repressive societies, particularly how human rights norms and regimes are used in furthering educational rights of minority groups—as I have done in this dissertation. In future studies within political sociology and international relations, the empirical use of cases subjects and episodes related to education would help to analyze and better understand political processes involving the interactions between regimes and groups; I maintain that education is and will probably remain one of the single most important spaces of contention between authoritarian regimes and groups in the state.

I enhanced the explanatory aspects of the theories further by employing three propositions identifying proposed causal factors in educational strategy selection: group composition and characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations. While other
studies have focused on each of these in isolation, I looked at their dynamic combination in influencing educational strategy selection. My findings not only support these suppositions as important considerations in future studies on strategy selection by groups, but also indicate that adopted strategies affect group features. Within the construct of my educational opportunity dynamic model, I proposed a unique way of understanding the overarching processes and outcomes that shaped strategy selection: namely, the bi-cycle effect. This bi-cycle effect illustrates how group features affect strategies, but also how strategies in turn affect features. Taken together, they account for a more agent-centric approach to studying educational movements of minority groups.

While the literature on conflict theories helps explain the regime side of educational repression, most theories inadequately explains how groups cope and counter such strategies in constructive and meaningful ways. My inclusion of contentious politics literature helps enhance this neglected aspect of the contentious relationship between regimes and groups. It lays the foundation for theoretical considerations of what might be suitably referred to a topical sub-field of contentious politics of educational equity.

The importance of international relations theories helped establish the grounds for understanding the impact of international and transnational networks, as well as human rights norms in influencing both regime and group behaviour associated with educational agendas. I believe that by including the considerations of processes and mechanisms to explain how strategies materialized was another important contribution this dissertation made to the field.

The use of episodes and streams, as well as mechanisms and process was the foundation of this research enterprise. I included the consideration of my propositions
within the interplay of political opportunity structures, framing, and resources, and called this more sophisticated modeling of conditional and causal factors the educational opportunity dynamic. This more nuanced conceptual modeling was the vehicle by which episodes of educational contention and actuation were analyzed for explaining strategy selection. Future undertakings that set out to explain educational strategy selection of specific groups may consider the steps developed in this dissertation as a generalizable analytical framework through which other cases in various regimes may be studied (see Table 2).

Table 2
Steps in Researching Educational Strategy Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity Group</td>
<td>Select case subjects (groups) and objects (regimes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propositions</td>
<td>Analyze the group’s composition and characteristic, networks, and regime-group relations as analyzable units that bear on strategy selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episodes and Streams</td>
<td>Using historical analysis, identify episodes and streams of contention and actuation for a given time period, selecting various levels of observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Use the considerations of political opportunity structures, framing, and resource mobilization, and within this the propositional features of groups as the causal factors for mechanisms and processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanism and Processes</td>
<td>Use the steps in the mechanism processes approach, and explain causal factors within the EOD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflecting on the Past and Looking Forward

Significance of the Study

This dissertation should be of particular interest to those who study educational inequity. The literature is heavily weighted toward studying the effects of regime repression, as well as issues related to the disparities of accessibility and quality. This dissertation has broken from this emphasis, and, instead, provides a fresh perspective on how groups respond to such contentious interactions. Empirically, it has effectively
assessed a large and disparate body of primary and secondary sources, sifted them for quality, and examined comprehensively the features that go into strategy selection. It has also integrated relatively disconnected literature and recasts them into a modified theoretical and methodological framework that may be used by scholars in comparative education, political sociology, and international relations in looking at regime-group interactions and the formation and selection of educational strategies. Therefore, this work represents a substantial source for others who undertake a study of Jews, Christians, and Baha’is in Iran. More importantly, this dissertation is a foundation for future studies on educational strategy selection, educational inequity, and group education movements and resistance.

The study should also be of interest to those involved in educational policy—particularly those advocating for educational rights—because it highlights how processes are affected by regime-group relations as well as international and supranational networks. For example, it provides onlookers with actual strategies that are selected, how those strategies play out, and how future strategies may help facilitate increased educational opportunities while not being of detriment to the community. Finally, scholars in the field of comparative education would benefit from the incorporation of methods drawn from social movement and contentious politics studies to provide explanations for phenomena which remain unexamined.

**Contributions of the Study**

This dissertation, for the first time, provides a monographic multi-case study of religious minorities in Iran and their educational strategies. It is likely that previous attempts were not made because of the disparate body of literature available. I believe
that the integration and organization of modified theories and methods used and
developed in this dissertation allowed me to not only provide empirically sound analysis,
but also enabled me to produce a theoretical and methodologically contribution to the
fields of comparative and international education, political sociology, and international
relations. This comparative study charters an unexplored area in the field of comparative
and international education, namely, the casual factors for minority group educational
strategy selection in authoritarian settings. It categorizes groups according to an
innovative classification of features. The application of historical analysis using the
mechanism-process approach in tracing the effects of group composition and
characteristics, networks, and regime-group relations on strategy selection is a departure
from isolated and descriptive case studies. The concept of educational strategies itself is
understudied, and I am confident that this dissertation sheds light on dimensions of
strategy selection which have not previously been considered or studied, and provides the
fundamental theoretical and methodological tools to do so.

**Methodological Enhancements and Future Research**

In undertaking this study of three religious minority groups over two regimes and
85 years, it became evident that each one of these cases could have constituted a study on
its own. Nonetheless, it was precisely the comparative nature of this dissertation that
provided insights into the bearing of variations in group features on educational strategy
selection. However, some additional enhancements may have contributed to the study.
First, a proper network analysis may have provided more substantial grounding for
considering its effect on educational strategy selection. While beyond the scope of this
dissertation, future studies could take up an exclusively comparative analysis of the
effects of networks on educational strategies, primarily how resources and advocacy play a role in claiming educational rights and securing opportunities. Second, access to more sources in different languages would have provided greater empirical leverage in studying Armenian and Assyrian sources, as well as accessing archival sources in Hebrew and French. Most noticeable is the absence of the Zoroastrian religious minority in this study. While I have explained the technical reasons for their exclusion elsewhere, their inclusion in a future empirical analysis would be a worthy undertaking.

Future research could certainly build on the research design used in this study, by refining the methods of analysis. Smaller research projects could take up segments of this study for more in-depth examination, such as the different types framing processes in developing educational strategies, or the role of human rights regimes in determining state educational policies, and so forth. However, the robustness of the content and the range of elements prevented greater elaboration of certain concepts and particular issues. Future studies can focus on specific phenomena and interpretations put forward in this dissertation, such as the advantages and disadvantages of regime recognition and representation in selecting and deploying educational strategies. It would be interesting to focus on how institutionalization causes limitations in educational strategy selection, and conversely how non-institutionalization results sometimes in bolder initiatives. This study has opened the way for multiple research explorations, and supports efforts to research agent-centered topics in educational equity studies. In the final analysis, I believe this dissertation is a pioneering work for future studies on the contentious politics of education.
REFERENCES


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In Iran, Baha’i schoolchildren are now targets of persecution. (2007, January–March). *One Country, 18*(4). Retrieved from http://www.onecountry.org/e184/e18407as_Iran_Schoolchildren.htm


A minority less equal than most. (1980, June 14). The Economist, p. 46.


National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran. (1936). [Report prepared by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran]. In Baha’i Publishing Committee (Ed.), The Baha’i World (Vol. 6, pp. 94–108).


New laws for wiring foreign currency to students outside of Iran was announced. (1981, August 4). *Keyhan*, p. 4.


Take me, take my rug. (1979, February 17). *The Economist*, p. 75.


APPENDICES
# APPENDIX A:

## Tables—Chapter 3

### Table A 1

**Archival Source Sampling Categorization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARCHIVAL SOURCE</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>SUBCATEGORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES</td>
<td>Iranian government</td>
<td>Education (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regime-group relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Statistical information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other governmental bodies (i.e., international and national)</td>
<td>Education (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group characteristic and composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Statistical information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES</td>
<td>Religious minority organizations (national and int'l level)</td>
<td>Education (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil/human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group characteristics and composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group network (ties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regime-group relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supranational nongroup organizations</td>
<td>Education (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil/human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group characteristics and composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group network (ties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Statistical information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National nongroup organizations</td>
<td>Education (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil/human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group characteristics and composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group network (ties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Statistical information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES</td>
<td>Religious minority (group member or affiliate)</td>
<td>Education (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group characteristics and composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group network (ties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regime-group relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Education (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group characteristics and composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group networks (ties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regime-group relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA SOURCES</td>
<td>Religious minority group</td>
<td>Education (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group characteristics and composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group networks (ties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regime-group relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A 2

**Hierarchical Key Words Used for Internet and Electronic Text Search Engines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1:</th>
<th>Level 2: education</th>
<th>Level 2: human and civil rights (networks)</th>
<th>Level 2: characteristics</th>
<th>Level 2: regimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>subjects/objects</td>
<td>Jews/Jewish, Christian/Armenian/Assyrian, Baha’i/Baha’ism Islamic Republic of Iran, Pahlavi (+ Iran/Iranian)</td>
<td>Education, school, student, teacher, curriculum, class, university, textbook, college, principal, test/konkur/exam, educator, admission, enrolment, schoolchildren, expulsion, minority, etc.</td>
<td>Rights, human rights, persecution, minority, arrest, detained, execution, abuse, official, legal, government, employment, transgressed, excluded, protest, concern, support, tolerate, liberty, freedom, inhumane, violation, terror, raid, advocacy, etc.</td>
<td>Statistics, education system, economy, social, budget, population, policies, religious minorities, constitution, (regime leader name), (ministry name), etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A 3

**Governmental Sources (Documents, Statistics, and Websites)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iran (Pahlavi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran, Constitution (1906–1909)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution Referendum (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education, edicts (1928–1949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Census (1956–1976)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic Constitution (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education (1979–2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Science, Research, &amp; Technology (1979–2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*table continues*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Statistical Yearbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical Pocketbook (1985–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical Centre of Iran:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Governmental Bodies (States and Institutions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations, Educational, Scientific and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(<a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx">http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union, miscellaneous statements and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(<a href="http://europa.eu/documentation/archives/index_en.htm">http://europa.eu/documentation/archives/index_en.htm</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States, Department of State (1997–2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports on International Religious Freedom;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miscellaneous statements and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Commission on International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom Parliament, miscellaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statements and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Canada, miscellaneous statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** I accessed the sources I name here directly; however, in addition, I looked at governmental sources cited in other sources, such as organization reports, periodicals, and other secondary literature.
Table A 4

Organizational and Individual Sources (*Websites, Archives, and Resource Centers*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Access Type/Level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alliance Universelle Israelite</td>
<td><a href="http://aiu.org">http://aiu.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Foundation for the Advancement of Sephardic Studies and Culture</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sephardicstudies.org">http://www.sephardicstudies.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iranian American Jewish Federation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iajf.org">http://www.iajf.org</a></td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozar Hatorah</td>
<td><a href="http://www.shemayisrael.com/">http://www.shemayisrael.com/</a> ozerhatorah/ sommaire.htm</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran Jewish Committee, Iran</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iranianjew.com">http://www.iranianjew.com</a></td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>Access Type/Level</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td><a href="http://dioceseofiran.org">http://dioceseofiran.org</a></td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia</td>
<td><a href="http://www.armenianorthodoxchurch.org">http://www.armenianorthodoxchurch.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian Solidarity International</td>
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<td>Key word search</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elam Ministries</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Christian International</td>
<td><a href="http://farsinet.com/">http://farsinet.com/</a> ici</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Council of Churches</td>
<td><a href="http://www.mec-churches.org">http://www.mec-churches.org</a></td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Doors USA</td>
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<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Doors UK</td>
<td><a href="http://www.opendoorsuk.org">http://www.opendoorsuk.org</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Council of Churches</td>
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<td>Key word search</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
<td><a href="http://www.oikoumene.org">http://www.oikoumene.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Evangelical Alliance</td>
<td><a href="http://www.worldevangelicals.org">http://www.worldevangelicals.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*table continues*)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Baha'i</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td><strong>Access Type/Level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha'i Institute for Higher Education</td>
<td><a href="http://bihe.org">http://bihe.org</a></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha'i International Community</td>
<td><a href="http://bic.org">http://bic.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha'i's of Australia</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bahai.org.au">http://www.bahai.org.au</a></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha'i's of Canada</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ca.bahai.org/">http://www.ca.bahai.org/</a></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha'i's of the United Kingdom</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bahai.org.uk/">http://www.bahai.org.uk/</a></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha'i's of the United States</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bahai.us/">http://www.bahai.us/</a></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha'i World</td>
<td><a href="http://bahai.org">http://bahai.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Other Organizations (National and International)</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International (either targets many countries or is located in more than one country)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td><strong>Access Type/Level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
<td><a href="http://www.amnesty.org/">http://www.amnesty.org/</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td><a href="http://freedomhouse.org">http://freedomhouse.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hrw.org/">http://www.hrw.org/</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fidh.org/-english-">http://www.fidh.org/-english-</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>National (either targets one country or is operating in one country)</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iranhumanrights.org/">http://www.iranhumanrights.org/</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, Human Rights and Democracy for Iran</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iranhRights.org/">http://www.iranhRights.org/</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Human Rights</td>
<td><a href="http://iranhr.net/">http://iranhr.net/</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Human Rights Documentation Center</td>
<td><a href="http://iranhrdc.org">http://iranhrdc.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defenders of Human Rights Center</td>
<td><a href="http://www.humanrights-ir.org/english/">http://www.humanrights-ir.org/english/</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
Archival and Resource Centers (Physical and Electronic)  
(Letters, Memoirs, Pictures, Documented Interviews, Reports and Miscellaneous Material)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Access Type/Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center for Iranian Jewish Oral History: interview transcripts</td>
<td>University of California, Los Angeles</td>
<td>Boxes 9–12 (select personalities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Jewish Committee Archives: yearbooks</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ajcarchives.org/main.php">http://www.ajcarchives.org/main.php</a></td>
<td>Vols. 26–75 (scanned all)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Access Type/Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Canterbury Archives: memoirs, autobiographies, biographies, travel journals, pictures</td>
<td><a href="http://anglicanhistory.org/me/index.html">http://anglicanhistory.org/me/index.html</a></td>
<td>All related to Persia (Iran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Hierarchy: statistical information</td>
<td><a href="http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/ir.html">http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/ir.html</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation for Iranian Studies, Oral History: interview recordings, transcripts</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fis-iran.org/en/oralhistory">http://www.fis-iran.org/en/oralhistory</a></td>
<td>Key word search (select personalities)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baha’i</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Access Type/Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Baha’i Archives: letters, reports, pictures</td>
<td>Wilmette, Illinois</td>
<td>Oral Platt Papers, Box 1: Ahmad Sobr Papers, Box 4, 6, 11, 12, and 18; Hannan-Knobloch Family Papers, Box 1, 6, 7, 10, 15, 19, 20, 22, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i Library: letters, reports, statistics</td>
<td><a href="http://bahai-library.org">http://bahai-library.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i Reference Library: publications of authoritative texts (primary sources)</td>
<td><a href="http://reference.bahai.org">http://reference.bahai.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation for Iranian Studies, Oral History: interview recordings, transcripts</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fis-iran.org/en/oralhistory">http://www.fis-iran.org/en/oralhistory</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* I merge organizational and individual sources here, because source locations often overlapped.
### Table A 5

**Media Sources (Periodicals and Yearbooks)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Access Type/Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jewish</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. 26–75</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ajcarchives.org/main.php">http://www.ajcarchives.org/main.php</a></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1925–1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Journal</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jewishjournal.com/iranianamericanjews">http://www.jewishjournal.com/iranianamericanjews</a></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baha’i</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i World, Vols. 1–17 (1926–1979)</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i News, No. 1–714 (1921–1990)</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Star of the West Magazine (1910–1924)</td>
<td>Electronic, CD-ROM (Sifter)</td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Press Watch</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iranpresswatch.org">http://www.iranpresswatch.org</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payam-e-Doost Baha’i Radio</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bahairadio.org/">http://www.bahairadio.org/</a></td>
<td>Key word search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Media Sources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Print (3 print journals)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(key word scanning)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Sites (13 Iran-themed e-journals; key word search and general search)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexis-Nexis Academic (12 intl. e-journals; key word search)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic News Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Iranian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payvand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Farda (text)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice of America (text)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ettelaat 1979–1985 (all)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayhan 1979–1985 (all)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Times 1979–1985 (all)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (text)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gozaar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayandeh Roushan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Iran (text)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Zamaneh (text)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Islam (text)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Washington Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Press</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Globe and Mail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybercast News Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Newswire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Press International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Ettelaat, Kayhan, and Iran Times are commonly used in historical analysis of modern Iranian history. Issues between 1979 and 1985 include frequent interaction and statements on religious minorities. Lexis-Nexis Academic provides a search engine to query multiple media outlets drive by key word searches.
Table A 6  
*Response to Purposeful Sampling*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Requested</th>
<th>Accepted</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Ignored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A 7  
*Interviewee by Category (Including Purposeful and Snowball Sample Results)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Category</th>
<th>Religious Leaders</th>
<th>Organization Representatives</th>
<th>Topic Experts</th>
<th>Community Members (related to education)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A 8

**Semistructured Interview Guide**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Descriptive:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tell me about the [RELIGIOUS MINORITY] community’s:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational community (administrators, educators and students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions (boards, schools, classes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational initiatives (programs and sought educational reform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with government and non-government institutions in Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with government, supranational, and non-government institutions outside Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the Iranian state during Pahlavi period and the Islamic Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Explanatory (NOTE: These are questions for guiding the interview process):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Could you identify educational challenges under past and current situation (e.g. access and quality)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could you identify educational vision for future under current situation (e.g. access and quality)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What contributes to and/or impedes sustainability of education opportunities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What contributes to and/or impedes growth and development of education opportunities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What strategies did your organization adopt to meet educational needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the outcome of these strategies (successful, partially successful, and failures)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you think the [RELIGIOUS MINORITY] community’s composition and characteristics contributes to your strategy selection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you think the [RELIGIOUS MINORITY] community’s relations with the state contribute to strategy selection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you think the [RELIGIOUS MINORITY] community’s internal and transnational networks contribute to strategy selection?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Content-Specific Questions: interjected during 1 and 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This varies based on information acquired during the interview process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A 9

Steps in the Mechanism-Process Approach to Explanation of Contention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STEPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Specifying the sites, objects, and subjects of contention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Describe relevant conditions at those sites when the contention you are studying begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Identify and describe the streams of contention involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Specify the outcomes related to the contention being explained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Break the stream of contention into coherent episodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Search the episodes for mechanisms producing significant change and/or differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reconstruct the processes into which those mechanisms compound.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Using analogies or comparisons with similar processes elsewhere, combine conditions, mechanisms, and processes into explanations of specified outcomes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A 10  

*Processes and Mechanisms*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor Constitution: emergence of new or transformed political actors—a recognizable set of people who carry on collective action, making and/or receive contentious claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition formation: creation of new, visible, and direct coordination of claims between two or more previously distinct actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action: all coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition: pursuit of rewards or outcomes in mutually exclusive ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contention: making claims that bear on someone else’s interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated action: two or more actors’ mutual signaling and parallel making of claims on the same object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escalation: displacement of moderate goals and tactics by more extreme goals and tactics (usually applied to mutual interactions among political actors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing: adopting and broadcasting a shared definition of an issue or performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization: increase in the volume and speed of flows of capital, goods, information, ideas, people, and forces connecting actors across countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity shift: emergence of new collective answers to the questions “Who are you?” “Who are we?” and “Who are they?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalization: a combination of (1) increasing horizontal density of relations among states, government officials, and nonstate actors with (2) increasing vertical ties between these and international institutions or organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization/Demobilization: increase (decrease) in the resources available to a political actor for collective making of claims and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New coordination: coordination produced by the combination of brokerage and diffusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization: increasing ideological distance between political actors or coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale Shift: increase or decrease in the number of actors and/or geographic range of coordinated claim-making and efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-representation: an actor’s or coalition’s public display of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attribution of similarity: identification of another political actor as falling within the same category as your own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary activation/deactivation: increase (or decrease) in the salience of the us-them distinction separating two political actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary formation: creation of an us-them distinction between two political actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary shift: change in the persons or identities on one side or the other of an existing boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokerage: production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certification/Decertification: an external authority’s signal of its readiness to recognize and support the existence and claims of a political actor; or external authority’s signal that it is withdrawing recognition and support from a political actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defection: exit of a political actor from a previously effective coalition and/or coordinated action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion: spread of a performance, issue, or interpretative frame from one site to another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emulation: deliberate repetition within a given setting of a performance observed in another setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing: adopting and projecting a particular definition of an issue or performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Source: Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, pp. 214–217*
### Table B 1

**Percentage of Total Budget Allocated to Social Affairs (Education), 1928–1948**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1948</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget spent on education (%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table B 2

**Developments in Social Affairs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on education per pupil as percentage of per capita GNP</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparent net enrolment rate by gender (female/male)</td>
<td>86.3%/92.4%</td>
<td>92.7%/96.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of primary level classrooms built between 1990 and 1996</td>
<td>54,907</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy for ages 6 and above (per 1,000 population)</td>
<td>23,913 (in 1986)</td>
<td>41,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate</td>
<td>52.5/1,000</td>
<td>31.7/1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births</td>
<td>91 (in 1989)</td>
<td>37 (in 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of medical establishments (hospitals, maternity hospitals, nursing homes, excluding military hospitals)</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Sources for the first three items in the list: Sadri, 1999; for the fourth item, Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Centre of Iran, 1998; for the fifth and sixth items, Islamic Republic of Iran, Management and Planning Organization, 2004a; for the last item, Ministry of Health and Medical Education, 1994, 1999.
Table B 3

**Some Trends in Educational Development in Iran**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate at primary level (male/female)</td>
<td>95.9%/88.4%</td>
<td>99.0%/94.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment number of special needs children</td>
<td>31,158</td>
<td>63,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of special education organization teachers</td>
<td>4,713</td>
<td>7,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public current expenditure on education per pupil as percentage of GNP per capita</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop-out number per 1,000 primary school children ^ 40% of which were after first grade</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>60 ^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion rate (graduation) through primary school</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of constructed classrooms</td>
<td>7,516</td>
<td>3,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of literate population aged 15+</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education enrolment – secondary level</td>
<td>5,084,832</td>
<td>8,776,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education enrolment – tertiary level (not including private universities or teacher training)</td>
<td>312,076</td>
<td>625,380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Source for first eight items in list: Sadri, 1999; for last two items: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, various dates.

Table B 4

**Students Attending Higher Education Institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>All Degrees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>175,675 students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>250,709 students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>638,913 students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Figures do not include students at Islamic Azad University. Source: Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, Statistical Centre of Iran, 2006.
Table B 5

Selected Resolutions of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE DATE</th>
<th>SESSION</th>
<th>RESOLUTION DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/13/1999</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>Principles for establishing a center or evaluation and prediction of the status of science, technology, and development of the country under the supervision of the Academy of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/28/2001</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>Principle of research policies about women’s issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/14/2001</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>Policies, responsible, and procedures of activities of centers executing free education in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/9/2002</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>Continuation of benefiting from scientific skills of retired professors at universities, and higher education and research centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/27/2002</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>General conditions for evaluating the scientific qualification of experts who do not hold academic certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14/2003</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>Indices for evaluating science and technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/10/2003</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>Financial transaction by-law of nongovernmental and nonprofit higher education institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/17/2003</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>Policies and strategies for reducing the rate of elite emigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/29/2003</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>Articles of association of fund for supporting the researchers in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/30/2003</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>Policies promoting cultural activities at universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/24/2004</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>Objectives and policies on holding tours for pupils and students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/16/2004</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>Regulations regarding activities of academic publications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Source: adapted from Islamic Republic of Iran, Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (2006).
### APPENDIX C:

Tables—Chapter 5

#### Table C 1

*Iranian Jewish Population by Date and Source*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>American Jewish Yearbook (1950); Rahimiyan (2008a, 2008b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>90,000–100,000</td>
<td>Iranian Census Data, as cited in Hourcade (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>65,232</td>
<td>Iranian Census Data, as cited in Hourcade (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>American Jewish Committee Archives, <em>American Jewish Year Book</em> (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>60,683</td>
<td>Iranian Census Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>Shiloah &amp; Netzer (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>Higgins (1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Rahimiyan (2008b); Netzer &amp; Shiloah (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>60,000–70,000</td>
<td>Israel Ambassador Moshe Yegar (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>Aryeh Dulzin, as cited in Anderson (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>26,354</td>
<td>Iranian Census Data, as cited in Hourcade (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Shiloah &amp; Netzer (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>20,000–25,000</td>
<td>Israel Ambassador Moshe Yegar (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12,737</td>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Center of Iran, <em>Census</em> (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9,252</td>
<td>Statistical Center of Iran (Census, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, as cited in World Jewish Congress (2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C 2

Regime Performance: Pahlavi Actions Toward Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognized in the Constitution as official religious minority with rights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given one Parliamentary seat for representation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given judicial rights supported by the government for their community</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish-run schools recognized and registered by the Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated into public school system and encouraged to enter higher education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed social services and organizations (accessible to the public; e.g.,</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social services, hospitals, schools)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police or judicial protection extended to those whose rights were transgressed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored by government to study abroad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to integrate in residential and business districts outside Jewish quarters</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs made accessible to anyone without requiring statement of religious affiliation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (table continues)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labeling of civic forms with Jewish affiliation was accepted</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly in large public gatherings allowed, including establishment of more synagogues</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to publish material freely</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to purchase property for community use (e.g., cemeteries, historical sites, community centers)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to establish national and local administrative organizations without harassment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to develop ties with the West and other Jewish organizations</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to travel freely between Israel and Iran (as well as to other states)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to open nonreligious and religious schools</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed greater economic mobility (importing, business, professional advancement)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed publication of books and religious material</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to teach Hebrew</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of political, social, and cultural organizations allowed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No longer required to pay jeziyeh (tax on non-Muslims)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to take off from work/school on religious holy days</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
### REPRESION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closing of Jewish run schools</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional denial of redress by police or judicial courts when civil rights were transgressed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitic rhetoric in state-sponsored media and statements by high ranking officials (sporadic)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools required to compromise religious elements and names to meet government standards</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal and media calumny by state officials about Jewish-Israeli ties</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1,P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack down on (often closing of) politically oriented organizations (e.g., Zionist, communist)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Jewish schools taken over by government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1,P2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Official*: policies authorized through high ranking government authorities, agencies, and agents.  
*Level*: Geopolitical level at which actions were executed; “N” = national level; “P” = provincial level; “L” = local level.  
*Epoch*: When the action was applicable by epoch, “1 and 2 = the epoch*
Table C.3

Regime Performance: Pahlavi Actions Toward Christians

### FACILITATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognized in the Constitution as official religious minority with rights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given three Parliamentary seat for representation (2 for Armenians, 1 for Assyrians)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given judicial rights supported by the government for their community</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian and Armenian Christian-run schools recognized by the Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated into public school system and encouraged to enter higher education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services and organizations (accessible to public; e.g., social services, hospital, school) allowed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored by government to study abroad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courses taught on Armenian language and history in government run universities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted government and military jobs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TOLERANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labeling of civic forms with Christian affiliation was accepted</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to worship freely, congregate, and expand church establishments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to publish material freely in Persian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to teach ethnic languages (Armenian and Assyrian) freely</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to purchase property for community use (e.g., cemeteries, historical sites, community centers)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to maintain national and local administrative organizations without harassment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to develop ties with the West and other Christian organizations</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to travel freely between other countries and Iran</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
### TOLERANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to run libraries (Armenians) administered by the diocese</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to open nonreligious and religious schools</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed greater economic mobility (importing, business, professional advancement)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed publication of books and religious material</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of political, social, and cultural organizations allowed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No longer required to pay <em>jeziyeh</em> (tax on non-Muslims)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant and Roman Catholics allowed to practice and worship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to take off from work/school because of religious holy days</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### REPRESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian schools forced to teach classes in Persian, with Armenian as a supplementary subject only</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing of Armenian Christian and Presbyterian schools</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Christian rhetoric in state-sponsored media and statements by high ranking officials (sporadic)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools required to compromise religious elements and names to meet government standards</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All religious affiliates forbidden to attend missionary schools</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAVAK (secret intelligence of government) infiltrated and monitored activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Christian schools taken over/nationalized by government (Armenian, Presbyterian, and others)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure of Presbyterian social services throughout Iran (hospitals, clinics, etc.)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelistic activities prohibited by the government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian and Assyrian Christians denied government jobs and employment (selective)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Official:* policies authorized through high ranking government authorities, agencies, and agents.  
*Level:* Geopolitical level at which actions were executed; “N” = national level; “P” = provincial level; “L” = local level.  
*Epoch:* When the action was applicable by epoch, “1 and 2 = the epoch*
Table C 4

*Regime Performance: Pahlavi Actions Toward Baha’is*

**FACILITATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-level officials attended Baha’i public events</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i-run schools acknowledged and registered with the Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated into public school system and encouraged to enter higher education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to provide social services and organizations accessible to the public</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some police or judicial protection extended to Baha’is whose rights were transgressed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored by government to study abroad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted government and military jobs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOLERANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some civic forms did not require labeling according to religious affiliation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to assemble in large public gatherings (i.e., in venues other than homes)</td>
<td>No/Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to build structures and centers</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to purchase property for community use (e.g., cemeteries, historical sites, community centers)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to establish national and local administrative organizations without harassment</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to meet in private homes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1, P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to open schools</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed greater economic mobility (importing, business, professional advancement)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed publication of books and religious material</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to take off from work/school because of religious holy days</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
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<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denial of redress by police or judicial courts when civil rights transgressed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confiscation of Baha’i literature sent by mail (especially from abroad)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i-run schools shutdown (teachers and administrators harassed)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i marriage certificates unrecognized; denied civil service employment because of Baha’i identity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSA members and community members arbitrarily arrested and detained by police, threatened with being forced to recant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSA members and community members beaten or treated harshly in prisons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i leaders or active members asked to provide lists of other community members to police</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i meetings at centers broken up</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large public gatherings prohibited</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community members who volunteered homes for meeting places pressured to sign pledges promising not to hold future meetings</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure on Baha’i military personnel (particularly officers) to change religious status to one of the recognized religions, with threats of demotion and imprisonment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes not given government jobs if identified as Baha’i (selective government agencies)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes fired from government jobs if identified as Baha’i (selective government agencies)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expelled from school if outspoken about religious affiliation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers arrested or harassed by police if shops closed on Baha’i holy days</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i administrative elections disrupted by police</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denied counting in census (forced re-labeling)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading clergy conspired with government to destroy Baha’i centers and holy places, including direct participation of top ranking government and military officials (direct order of the Shah)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table C 5

Regime Performance: Islamic Republic of Iran Actions Toward Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACILITATION</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation in the reconstituted Parliament (one representative)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognized as an official religious minority with prescribed rights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish community-run schools allowed to remain open with reformed curriculum and system (Muslim administrators and teachers)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and organization recognized</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to provide social services and organizations (accessible to the public; e.g., hospital)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students allowed to integrate into public government-run schools and higher education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required military service (special department)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOLERANCE</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to maintain administrative and religious communal organizations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to maintain group-run schools (but with reformed curriculum, system, and structure)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to maintain religious centers, holy sites, cemeteries</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed publication of literature and periodicals</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed nursery schools, libraries, and learning centers related to religious group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to congregate in public places of worship</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to travel outside Iran</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to teach in post-secondary schools if vetted by government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to have gatherings with men and women together (for religious purposes)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to use alcohol for religious ceremonies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
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*(table continues)*
### TOLERANCE

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<tr>
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<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to have government jobs (i.e., religious affiliation not considered)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to make public statements on politics and social affairs (as long as not anti-regime)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to own private shops, property, etc.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed general equal rights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### REPRESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Execution of some leaders and prominent community members</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest of some leaders and prominent community members</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some dismissed from government and academic jobs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure of property and buildings of some prominent community members</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitic statements by government officials in state-run media</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accusations and charges of espionage, conspiracy, and Zionist or seditious behavior</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure of Zionist, Israel-supporting, and Communist-oriented organizations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools reorganized and restructured to fit regime agenda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish schools forced to remain open on Jewish Sabbath (i.e., Sabbath is now considered Friday)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment of large gatherings of Jews, including mass arbitrary arrests</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legally najes (ritually impure); status equivalent to filthy dogs, excrement, etc.; prohibited from engaging in businesses related to food and water (unless accessible only to other Jews and non-Muslims)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissal of university professors and administrators</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School curriculum distorted; Jews stigmatized and their identity and history undermined</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some group-run schools converted to government schools (including name changes)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish schools subjected to restrictions and limitations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
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**Note.** Official: policies authorized through high ranking government authorities, agencies, and agents. Level: Geopolitical level at which actions were executed; “N” = national ; “P” = provincial; “L” = local. Epoch: When the action was applicable by epoch, “1, 2, 3, and 4” = the epoch.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation in the reconstituted Parliament (total of three representatives for Armenians and Assyrians only)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognized as an official religious minority with prescribed rights (Armenians and Assyrians only)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-run schools allowed to remain open with reformed curriculum and system (Muslim administrators and teachers)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration and organization recognized</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated into public government-run schools and higher education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Required military service</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allowed general equal rights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
## REPRESSION

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<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
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<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missionary activity completely prohibited; only registered Christians allowed to attend churches and worship services</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign missionaries expelled; Anglican church disbanded</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure of property and buildings of several prominent community members</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities and services offered to the public were shut down and some confiscated</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some religious leaders of nonethnic groups arrested and tortured</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some religious leaders and converts executed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats against Protestant and Catholic Christians leaders to not engage in proselytizing</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian bookshops closed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accusations and charges of apostasy leveled against converts (ban on conversion from Islam)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not allowed to build new churches (selective)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legally <em>najes</em> (ritually impure); status equivalent to “filthy dogs,” excrement, etc.; prohibited from having business related to food and water (except if accessible only to other Christians and non-Muslims)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on publication of Christian material</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some group-run schools turned into government schools (including name changes)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians schools subject to restrictions and limitations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School curriculum stigmatized and distorted Christians identity and history</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table C 7

*Regime Performance: Islamic Republic of Iran Actions Toward Baha’is*

### FACILITATION

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<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary and secondary students integrated into government schools</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given access to higher education if students recant their faith</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given incentives if assimilate into regime ideological and social system</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required military service for all men (even when identified as Baha’is)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given access to government jobs if recant their faith</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
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</tbody>
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### TOLERANCE

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<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some civic forms do not require religious affiliation to be identified</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to access government-run hospitals and clinics</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to take out loans from banks</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to leave Iran with Iranian passport (no religious ID is necessary)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to have Baha’i cemeteries (selective)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to own private shops and work for private companies</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to own homes and private land</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted into universities (as long as not identified as Baha’is)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to vote in national elections</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### REPRESSION

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<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Execution of some organizational leaders and active members</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest of some leaders and active members</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels violent physical and psychological torture of detainees to recant faith</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological and mid-levels of violent physical torture of detainees</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>2,3,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
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<th>Level</th>
<th>Epoch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Destruction or seizure of holy sites, religious centers, and cemeteries</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction and looting of some individual homes and shops</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctioned mob violence against some individuals, religious sites and property</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and Local administration and organizations disbanded and completely outlawed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All group-run public services taken over by government (i.e., hospital, clubs, etc.)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and secondary school Baha’i children sporadically attacked by school personnel and clergy, some expelled from their schools if they identify themselves as Baha’is (1981–1991)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banned from higher education (as students, instructors, or administrators)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banned from entire education system as instructors and administrators</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fired from government jobs and positions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required to repay all pensions from government jobs (dating from initial time of employment)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraged private companies to fire employees once identified as Baha’i</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private religious gatherings and meetings in homes broken up (sporadic)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private homes raided for religious items and books, including scare tactics (sporadic)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested and harassed by police if close privately own shops on religious holy days (sporadic)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic forms rejected when not identified with one of the three recognized religions (affecting passports, marriage certificates, etc.)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-run private university (held in homes, shops, and some private buildings) raided</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer administrators and faculty arrested and interrogated</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematic demonization, vilification, slander and anti-group propaganda in government-run news papers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibited from publishing or possessing Baha’i literature</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Official: policies authorized through high ranking government authorities, agencies, and agents. Level: Geopolitical level at which actions were executed; “N” = national level; “P” = provincial level; “L” = local level. Epoch: When the action was applicable by epoch, “1, 2, 3, and 4” = the epoch.
Table C 8

*Iranian Religious Minority Actions in Relation to the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic Regimes*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Performance</th>
<th>Jewish community</th>
<th>Christian community</th>
<th>Baha’i community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accepted institutionalization (recognition in the Constitution)</td>
<td>Level Initiative Epoch</td>
<td>Level Initiative Epoch</td>
<td>Level Initiative Epoch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted institutionalization (recognition in the Constitution)</td>
<td>NPL L P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL L P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in Parliament through representative</td>
<td>N L P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>N L P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporated Ministry of Education regulations (applicable to all schools)</td>
<td>NPL LS P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LS P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LS P-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated by voting in political elections</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL L P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI P-2, I-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted government regulations concerning land, taxation, and social services</td>
<td>NPL LSI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LSI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LSI P-12, I-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporated regulations facilitating public religious activities</td>
<td>NPL LS P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LS P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LSI P-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCEPTANCE (continued)</td>
<td>Jewish community</td>
<td>Christian community</td>
<td>Baha’i community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted regulations regarding religious identification on civil forms</td>
<td>NPL LS P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LS P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in military (as officers or staff)</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in government agencies as employee or appointed official</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renounced affiliation with own organizations or groups because they were deemed unacceptable by the regime</td>
<td>NPL L a SI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL L a SI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>L I I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renounced affiliation to other organizations or groups which were deemed unacceptable by the regime</td>
<td>NPL LSI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LSI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>L I I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validated and supported the legitimacy of the regime to rule in public statements or motions</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI P-12, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut ties to transnational community states, leaders, organizations deemed unacceptable by the regime</td>
<td>IN L a I I-1234</td>
<td>IN L a I-12</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOLERANCE</td>
<td>Jewish community</td>
<td>Christian community</td>
<td>Baha'i community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerated Actions/Policies</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Epoch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposed restrictions on religious-run school central policies</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>LS</td>
<td>P-12, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on centers, holy sites, facilities</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>P-12, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on public dress</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>P-1, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement to indicate one of the three recognized religions on civil forms</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition from converting Muslims</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrary nonviolent harassment by low ranking government agents (i.e., teachers, police officers, administrators)</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>LI</td>
<td>P-12, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biased selection process for university admission</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biased selection process for government employment</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>LI</td>
<td>P-1, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOLERANCE (continued)</td>
<td>Jewish community</td>
<td>Christian community</td>
<td>Baha’i community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal laws concerning death penalty (<em>diyeh</em>)</td>
<td>NPL LI I-12</td>
<td>NPL LI I-12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biased judicial verdicts based on religious bigotry</td>
<td>NPL LI P-1, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI P-1, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL I P-1, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposed substantive changes to religious organization and practice</td>
<td>NPL LI I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on business ownership</td>
<td>NPL LI I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI I-1234</td>
<td>NPL I I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biased curriculum on religious education in public schools</td>
<td>NPL LI I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI I-1234</td>
<td>NPL I I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights violations against individual members in community</td>
<td>NPL LSI P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL L P-1, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL I P-12, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations on freedom of press and expression</td>
<td>NPL L P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL L P-12, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL L P-12, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilation for purpose of immediate safety</td>
<td>L I c P-2, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL I c I-1234</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESISTANCE</td>
<td>Jewish community</td>
<td>Christian community</td>
<td>Baha’i community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions/Performances</strong></td>
<td><strong>Level</strong></td>
<td><strong>Initiative</strong></td>
<td><strong>Epoch</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages(^d) sent to government to appeal policy or action</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>P-12, I-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately organized activities and mobilized resources to meet unrecognized and sometimes prohibited community agenda</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>LSI</td>
<td>P-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to sign pledges of recantation or dissimulation</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to denounce other governments or organizations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established underground worship/gatherings by congregating in houses</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Started parallel (i.e., not officially sanctioned) services, schools, keeping them private</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responded in national media outlets</td>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>P-1, I-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to leave blank on civil forms requiring identification of religious minority status</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RESISTANCE *(continued)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jewish community</th>
<th>Christian community</th>
<th>Baha’i community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Created ad-hoc organizing administration (not recognized by regime) to run community affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>PL L I 1-234</td>
<td>NPL L I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued to accept converts from other religions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NPL L^5 1-234</td>
<td>NPL LI I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed literature (within group) otherwise considered impermissible by regime officials</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NPL LI P-1, I-1234</td>
<td>NPL LI P-1, I-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REJECTION</td>
<td>Jewish community</td>
<td>Christian community</td>
<td>Baha’i community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions/Performances</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Epoch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages (d) solicited from transnational community on behalf of community for appeal of policy or action</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>P-12, I-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages (d) solicited from supranational organizations/agencies on behalf of community for appeal of policy or action</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals made by Parliamentary representative to reverse policy or action</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals made to other governments for assistance or intervention</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>LS</td>
<td>P-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals made to supranational organizations for assistance or intervention</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals made to public to raise awareness, advocate for human rights, with request to speak out on behalf of community, and expose situation more openly</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>P-12, I-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>P-1, I-134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note. Key:

**Level**: The geopolitical level at which the actions were executed; “N” = national; “P” = provincial; “L” = local; “I” = international (i.e., targeting objects outside Iran).

**Initiative**: “L” = leadership-driven initiatives (i.e., by religious leaders, organizational leaders, etc.); “S” = initiatives driven by sub-groups (i.e., collectives of members, socioeconomic status, sub-groups, etc.); “I” = uncoordinated individual initiatives.

**Epoch**: The period during which the action was applicable; “P” = Pahlavi era; “I” = Islamic Republic.

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a **Cut ties to transnational states**: Jewish representatives have successively denounced association with Israel, the United States, and any Zionist organization or movement; some interviews indicate that individual Iranian Jews also disassociate themselves from Israel or Zionism. Armenian representatives disclaim any association with Western governments.

b **Prohibition from converting Muslims**: Armenians and Assyrians oblige and do not convert from Islam; evangelical Christians slowed down conversion at one point, but did not stop proselytizing to other religious adherents (including Muslims).

c **Dissimulation**: the practice of hiding one’s identity by denying one’s religion or affiliation. Dissimulation by Christians is selective; some noted evangelical leaders and converts have refused to dissimulate and have been imprisoned, tortured, and even killed.

d **Messages**: refers to direct and official letters, petitions, and reports on behalf of community.

e **Leaders**: part of the evangelical denominations of Christians. The Armenian and Assyrian church generally kept a low profile and avoided attention outside the role of the representative, despite statements made on their behalf by transnational affiliates and superior organizations (such as the Catholicos of the Assyrian Church of the East and the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church).

f **Privately organized activities**: This refers primarily (if not exclusively) to nonrecognized Christian groups.

g **Refused to denounce**: Anglicans and Evangelicals did not renounce their missionary components or affiliation with the larger community.
APPENDIX D:

Tables and Figures—Chapter 6

Table D 1

*Examples of Some Early Responses to Alliance Schools After Their Establishment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Response Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Faced resistance from some of community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamadan</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Faced significant resistance from community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isfahan</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiraz</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Closed shortly after opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanandaj</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kermanshah</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijar</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazd</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nehavand</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Closed shortly after opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyserkan</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Closed shortly after opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashan</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Closed shortly after opening; reopened 10 years later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golpaygan</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Closed shortly after opening</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D 2  
*Some Prominent Locations of Christian-Run Schools in Iran During Pahlavi Era*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Iran</th>
<th>Presbyterian</th>
<th>Anglican</th>
<th>Lazarist</th>
<th>Armenian</th>
<th>Chaldean</th>
<th>Assyrian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tabriz</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uremia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazvin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanandaj</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Naqada</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rasht</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmas</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirmanshah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamadan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maragha</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Iran</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isfahan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Julfa</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shiraz</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazd</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khosrowabad</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kerman</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure D 1. Sequence of action & educational strategies of Iranian Jews, ca. 1900–1939.
Figure D 2. Rise and decline of Jewish-run schools in Iran during the Pahlavi era.\(^1\) Source: *American Jewish Year Book* (1932, 1933, 1950, 1973, 1977); Netzer, (1985); Nikbakht and Hojjat-Panah (1999); Netzer (1985); Nikbakht (2002); Ozar Hatorah (n.d.); “Ozar Hatorah,” (2007).

---

\(^1\) Only schools associated with dates of origin were included in this figure. In the case of the Ozar Hatorah schools, extant records for some have no date of origin, and thus are not included. Moreover, only independent schools are considered in this figure, not smaller programs part of other establishments. Furthermore, numbers cited here, seemingly at odds with the 41 count cited earlier, may be explained by the opening and closing of schools at different periods.
Figure D 3. Iranian Christian strategy development and school outcome, ca. 1928–1939.
Figure D 4. Iran, Ministry of Education orders to close Tarbiyat school (facsimile), ca. 1934. Source: Martin (1984).
17 Adhar 1312 [December 8, 1934]

To the Principal of the Tarbiyat School for Boys,

Following [my] notice no. 4738/3010, dated 15.2.1313, [you are] hereby informed:

According to the information received, you have again closed the school with no justification (dalil) on Thursday, the 15th of the present month [i.e., 15th of Adhar / December 6th]. Since this act violates the rules set in the School Bylaws, dated 1308 [1929] and is against point 82 of the Bylaws, dated 26/8/1313 [Nov. 17th 1934], your act is considered a violation of the rules, and the Ministry of Education, therefore, cancels your school concession issued on 26/03/1310 [June 16, 1931]. And from this date on you are not permitted to keep that school open.

Deputy Minister of Education,
Ali Asghar Hikmat

Figure D 5. Translation of Iran, Ministry of Education orders to close Tarbiyat school (above), ca. 1934. Translated by Moayyad (1991, p. 331).
**Figure D 6.** Baha’i action and strategy sequence after closure, ca. 1934-1939.

**Figure D 7.** Christian community response to government language and religious studies policies, ca. 1981–1983.
Figure D 8. Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Education: Muhammad Ali Rajai (Minister of Education) dismissing Baha’i teachers and staff from educational system, c. 1981. Source: Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre.
Figure D 9. Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Education recantation form (facsimile), ca. 1981. Source: Iranian Human Rights Documentation Centre.
The questions as listed on the form translate to:

1. Name [and other particulars]
2. Are your parents Baha’i?
3. Are you a follower of Baha’ism?
4. How many years have you been following this religion?
5. Do you discuss Baha’ism in your classes?
6. Which of your close relatives are followers of Baha’ism?
7. Are you ready to recant your religion?
8. Write any other necessary information?

*Figure D 10.* Translation of Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Education recantation form above, ca. 1981. Source: Iranian Human Rights Documentation Centre.
Figure D 11. Seyyed Muhammad Golpaygani memorandum on behalf of Islamic Republic of Iran, Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution regarding general government policy toward Baha’is in Iran, dated 25 February 1991. Source: Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre.)

(continued on next page)
بیانیه

شمخالی

جلال خان

پس از دریافت کته در اینجا به من نشان دادند که نهاده‌ای ماه‌ها قرار دارد.

سرورده

۲- خاتم مطالب مرجعی (تا اینجا) اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های و پیوسته‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

فلسفه و علم و انسان‌شناسی (تا اینجا) اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

در مورد سیاست (تا اینجا) اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

فلسفه و علم و انسان‌شناسی (تا اینجا) اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

بیانیه

جهت مطالعه و بررسی اینجا در هرگونه اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

بهمن خرداد

محمدرضا شمخالی

بیانیه

سید حسن خاتمی

پس از دریافت کته در اینجا به من نشان دادند که نهاده‌ای ماه‌ها قرار دارد.

سرورده

۲- خاتم مطالب مرجعی (تا اینجا) اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های و پیوسته‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

فلسفه و علم و انسان‌شناسی (تا اینجا) اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

در مورد سیاست (تا اینجا) اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

بیانیه

جهت مطالعه و بررسی اینجا در هرگونه اینجا با یافتن فرمان‌های لازم داده می‌شود.

بهمن خرداد

محمدرضا شمخالی
In the Name of God!

The Islamic Republic of Iran
The Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council

Number: 1327/....
Date: 6/12/69 [25 February 1991]
Enclosure: None

CONFIDENTIAL
Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani
Head of the Office of the Esteemed Leader [Khamenei]

Greetings!

After greetings, with reference to the letter #1/783 dated 10/10/69 [31 December 1990], concerning the instructions of the Esteemed Leader which had been conveyed to the Respected President regarding the Bahá’í question, we inform you that, since the respected President and the Head of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council had referred this question to this Council for consideration and study, it was placed on the Council’s agenda of session #128 on 16/11/69 [5 February 1991] and session #119 of 2/11/69 [22 January 1991]. In addition to the above, and further to the [results of the] discussions held in this regard in session #112 of 2/5/66 [24 July 1987] presided over by the Esteemed Leader (head and member of the Supreme Council), the recent views and directives given by the Esteemed Leader regarding the Bahá’í question were conveyed to the Supreme Council. In consideration of the contents of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the religious and civil laws and general policies of the country, these matters were carefully studied and decisions pronounced.

In arriving at the decisions and proposing reasonable ways to counter the above question, due consideration was given to the wishes of the Esteemed Leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Khamenei], namely, that “in this regard a specific policy should be devised in such a way that everyone will understand what should or should not be done.” Consequently, the following proposals and recommendations resulted from these discussions.

The respected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the Head of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council, while approving these recommendations, instructed us to convey them to the Esteemed Leader [Khamenei] so that appropriate action may be taken according to his guidance.

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

A. General status of the Bahá’ís within the country’s system
They will not be expelled from the country without reason. They will not be arrested, imprisoned, or penalized without reason. The government’s dealings with them must be in such a way that their progress and development are blocked.

B. Educational and cultural status
They can be enrolled in schools provided they have not identified themselves as Bahá’ís. Preferably, they should be enrolled in schools which have a strong and imposing religious ideology. They must be expelled from universities, either in the admission process or during the course of their studies, once it becomes known that they are Bahá’ís. Their political (espionage) activities must be dealt with according to appropriate government laws and policies, and their religious and propaganda activities should be answered by giving them religious and cultural responses, as well as propaganda. Propaganda institutions (such as the Islamic Propaganda Organization) must establish an independent section to counter the propaganda and religious activities of the Bahá’ís. A plan must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the country.

C. Legal and social status
Permit them a modest livelihood as is available to the general population. To the extent that it does not encourage them to be Bahá’ís, it is permissible to provide them the means for ordinary living in accordance with the general rights given to every Iranian citizen, such as ration booklets, passports, burial certificates, work permits, etc. Deny them employment if they identify themselves as Bahá’ís. Deny them any position of influence, such as in the educational sector, etc.

Wishing you divine confirmations,
Secretary of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council
Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani [Signature]

[Note in the handwriting of Mr. Khamenei]
In the Name of God!
The decision of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council seems sufficient.
I thank you gentlemen for your attention and efforts.
[signed:] Ali Khamenei

Figure D 12. Translation of Seyyed Muhammad Golpaygani memorandum in the figure above. Source: Baha’i International Community (27 August 2007).
Figure D 13. Enrollment in the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education before and after raids, ca. 1996–2010. Sources: Baha’i International Community (2005a); Baha’i Institute for Higher Education (2006); anonymous BIHE administrator in Iran (personal communication, 21 October 2009, 8 March 2010).
Figure D 14. Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology: Letter to 81 universities in Iran, banning of the education of Baha’is in universities, ca. 2006. Source: Baha’i International Community (27 August 2007).
In the Name of God

The esteemed management of the Security Office,

[The 81 universities addressed in this letter are listed below.]

Subject: Banning of the education of Bahá’ís in universities

Greetings,

Respectfully, we inform you that in accordance with decree number 1327/M/S, dated 6/12/69 [25 February 1991], issued by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and the notification of the responsible authorities of the Intelligence [Office], if Bahá’í individuals, at the time of enrolment at university or in the course of their studies, are identified as Bahá’ís, they must be expelled from university. Therefore, it is necessary to take measures to prevent the further studies of the aforementioned [individuals] and forward a follow-up report to this Office.

Asghar Zarei
Director General of the Central Security Office
[Signature]

[The list of 81 universities follow]

Figure D 15. Translation of Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology: Letter to 81 universities in Iran, banning of the education of Bahá’ís in universities, ca. 2006. Source: Baha’i International Community (27 August 2007).